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FOREWORD 
On 18 October 1966, the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) entered into force. After a rather slow start, the system of mixed 
dispute settlement established by the ICSID Convention has begun to develop at a 
remarkable pace and is today rightly seen as a corner-stone of international dispute 
settlement in the field of international economic law. In addition to its immense 
practical relevance, international investment arbitration has developed in such a way 
that it is – equally rightly – held to be one of the intellectually most fascinating and 
challenging areas of modern international law. Consequently, the Wilhelm Merton 
Center for European Integration and International Economic Order has always con-
sidered international investment law to be one of its major fields of scholarly inte-
rest. 
Therefore, its directors strongly welcomed the initiative taken by Dr. Christian J. 
Tams, Senior Research Assistant with the Walther Schücking Institute for Interna-
tional Law at the University of Kiel, to organise a symposium on current issues of 
ICSID law. This symposium took place on 26 – 28 April 2006 in Frankfurt am 
Main, and brought together a large number of investment experts from all over 
Europe. Opened with a keynote speech by Professor Dr. Christoph Schreuer, Uni-
versity of Vienna, who gave a general assessment of modern developments in in-
vestment law, the symposium was designed to allow six younger scholars and prac-
titioners to present papers on salient issues of ICSID law. The ensuing discussions 
were initiated by comments from more experienced participants, again from both 
academia and practice. The present volume brings together the keynote speech as 
well as these various papers and comments, and, it is hoped, will give readers a good 
insight into the major problems currently faced by international investment arbitra-
tion under the ICSID Convention. 
The directors of the Wilhelm Merton Center wish to use this opportunity to ex-
press their sincere gratitude to the Frankfurt am Main based sponsors of this sympo-
sium, namely Baker & McKenzie, Clifford Chance LLP, Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Lovells, and Shearman & Sterling LLP, for their financial support. They 
also wish to thank Dr. Christian J. Tams for his strong and continuous intellectual 
input throughout the project. Finally, the editors of this volume wish to thank Ms 
Christina Pfaff, LL.M., for her most valuable assistance before, during and after the 
symposium, and Mr Gennadi Rudak for his editorial skills. 
 
 
Frankfurt am Main, 25 January 2007 
 
 
Rainer Hofmann               Stefan Kadelbach               Rainer Klump
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Introduction: The International Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) – Taking Stock after 40 Years    
                    
Rainer Hofmann/Christian J. Tams∗  
Forty years ago, on 18 October 1966, the International Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) entered into force. It was quickly ratified by a rather 
large number of States and was received very favourably by most commentators, 
one of whom, Georg Schwarzenberger (not otherwise known for over-enthusiasm or 
idealism), considered it a "remarkable" and "astounding" "essay in multilateral law-
making".1 Notwithstanding this positive assessment, and the great expectations co-
ming with it, ICSID dispute settlement took a very slow start and for a long while 
looked destined to fail. Few cases were brought in the 1970s and 1980s, and those 
that were often dragged on for years before an eventual award was rendered (which 
then faced the risk of annulment by ad hoc committees).  
As is well-known, the pendulum has swung back again, and most commentators 
today would happily subscribe to Schwarzenberger's initial assessment. From the 
1990s, the system of mixed dispute settlement established by the ICSID Convention 
has begun to develop at a remarkable pace. The simplest, and yet most impressive, 
figure attesting to that development is the number of cases submitted to dispute 
settlement by ICSID arbitral tribunals. Whereas there tended to be an average of one 
case per year in the period between 1966-1996, the last decade has witnessed a sharp 
increase in the number of ICSID proceedings, with currently 108 cases pending 
before arbitral tribunals.2 There is no shortage of metaphors describing this dynamic, 
or frantic, development. Some have spoken of a “baby-boom” of investment arbitra-
tion,3 while others have likened ICSID to Sleeping Beauty, kissed awake by Prince 
Charming some time during the 1990s.4 But apart from inspiring writers to use 
 
∗  Rainer Hofmann is Professor of Public Law, European Law and International Law at the 
University of Frankfurt, Germany and Co-Director of the Wilhelm Merton Center for Euro-
pean Integration and International Economic Order. Christian J. Tams is Senior Research As-
sistant at the Walter-Schücking Institute for International Law at the University of Kiel, Ger-
many. 
1  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (1969), at p. 152. 
2  See the list of cases provided on the ICSID website: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ 
pending.htm (visited 19 January 2007).   
3  Alexandrov, 'The "Baby Boom" of Treaty-based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID 
Tribunals: Shareholders as "Investors" and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis', The Law and Prac-
tice of International Courts and Tribunals 4 (2005) , pp. 19. 
4  Obadia, “ICSID, Investment treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging Issues”, in ICSID 
News, Vol. 18/2 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-4.htm. 
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flowery language, investment law, with increasing numbers of ICSID proceedings 
and increasing amounts of damages sought, has gained an immense practical rele-
vance, while also raising ever more complex conceptual issues.  
While the pace of this development is astonishing, ICSID's increase in relevance 
has been facilitated by a number of factors. Two of them are regularly mentioned 
and remain valid. (i) The conclusion, by States, of ever more (bilateral and multila-
teral) investment treaties providing for dispute settlement by ICSID arbitral tribu-
nals, has been decisive, as has been (ii) the solid increase in foreign investment. But 
these 'structural' reasons alone cannot explain the flood of new cases submitted to 
ICSID arbitration. As anyone looking at the list of pending ICSID cases will quickly 
realise, one particular State's economic policy has been equally influential: Argen-
tina's response to the economic crisis of 2000-2002 is responsible for more than 1/3 
of the proceedings currently pending, and without it, the increase in the number of 
ICSID proceedings (while still impressive) would be less astounding. In addition, 
though this is not always fully appreciated, ICSID arbitral tribunals themselves have 
played an important part. When called upon to interpret and apply key concepts of 
investment protection, they have generally adopted rather expansive approaches. 
Recent ICSID jurisprudence has notably widened the notion of 'investment' and has 
adopted an broad analysis of core substantive standards of investment protection 
(e.g. expropriation or fair and equitable treatment). In addition, arbitral tribunals 
have relied on umbrella clauses found in many bilateral investment treaties to widen 
the circle of potential claimants, and have also embraced claims by minority share-
holders. This in turn has greatly expanded the scope of ICSID arbitration, both ra-
tione personae and ratione materiae – not always to the liking of States, and at times 
provoking harsh responses by governments suffering defeats before ICSID arbitral 
tribunals.  
At the same time, the developments sketched out in the preceding paragraphs 
have changed the character of investment arbitration: ICSID arbitration is no longer 
seen as the prerogative of a handful of specialists, but faces new challenges. Among 
them is what might be called the challenge of legitimacy, fuelling demands for a 
more transparent process of dispute settlement and a move away from traditional 
and confidential proceedings behind closed doors, especially in proceedings invol-
ving questions of environmental protection or labour standards. To exemplify the 
perception of investment arbitration as illegitimate, it may be helpful simply to cite 
Anthony DePalma's oft-quoted remark about the working of investment tribunals: 
"Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions 
they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a group of international tribunals 
handles disputes between investors and foreign governments can lead to national 
laws being revoked and environmental regulations changed. And it is all in the name 
of protecting foreign investors under NAFTA."5  
 
5  DePalma, 'NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too 
Far, Critics Say', in: New York Times, 11 March 2001, Section 3, p. 1. 
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But legitimacy is not the only challenge facing investment arbitration. Another 
challenge is that of (in)consistency: a mechanism relying on ad hoc tribunals runs a 
considerable risk of producing inconsistent awards. Even in the 1970s or 1980s, 
when few cases were submitted, that risk of course could never be completely 
avoided; however, with proceedings mushrooming, it seems more acute than ever 
and can no longer be neglected. In fact, ICSID tribunals have openly criticised pre-
vious awards, and some of the decisions involving similar or identical questions of 
law and fact seem to hard to square. This in turn endangers the reliability and pre-
dictability of ICSID dispute settlement, i.e. reasons for which the mechanism has 
been established in the first place.  
Finally, ICSID faces a challenge of coordination: paraphrasing a famous dictum 
about WTO law, one might say that investment law "cannot be read in clinical isola-
tion”,6 or that in any event, that its days of splendid isolationism are over. ICSID 
tribunals regularly apply the rules of State responsibility, cite decisions of other 
international courts and tribunals, and interpret treaties according to the general rules 
of treaty interpretation. Conversely, ICSID jurisprudence contributes (and is increas-
ingly recognised as a contributing element) to the development of international law 
generally. What is more, ICSID dispute settlement does not exist in isolation either. 
Given the continued debate about the role of investment within the WTO frame-
work, ICSID might turn out to be an attractive forum for the litigation of some viola-
tions of WTO law. At the same time, bearing in mind the close connection between 
investment protection and property rights, investors that fail to establish standing 
before ICSID tribunals might eventually be tempted to seek relief before human 
rights institutions. 
The papers put together in the present volume do not purport to analyse these de-
velopments exhaustively. Yet they address some of the more important controver-
sies facing the ICSID Convention's dispute settlement mechanism as it enters its 
fifth decade. They have grown out of a conference convened by the Wilhelm Merton 
Center at the University of Frankfurt, on 25-27 April 2006, which brought together 
academics and practitioners with an interest in investment arbitration.  
As the conference, the book opens with "The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID 
System" by Christoph Schreuer. This paper, which was the keynote speech of the 
conference, provides a general assessment of modern developments in investment 
law (fittingly, given the number of Argentine cases, following the moves of a tango). 
Situating the ICSID Convention in the broader historical context, Schreuer stresses 
the many advantages of investment arbitration, which provides for conditions con-
ducive to foreign investment, while also helping to defuse political tensions between 
developing and industrialised countries. However he also underlines that, faced with 
concerns by host States, ICSID must remind some of its clients of these benefits, and 
must avoid to be perceived as a one-sided mechanism favouring investors. 
 
6 Cf. the WTO Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R), p. 17. 
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Schreuer's introduction is followed by three papers exploring reasons of ICSID's 
recent popularity. Stephan Schill's paper (with comments by Kaj Hober and Jo De-
laney) provides a detailed analysis of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Al-
though found in a great number of bi- and multilateral investment treaties, that stan-
dard has been unduly neglected in the literature. Schill identifies its core elements 
and shows that it emerges as one of the key concepts in international investment 
law.  
Next in line is Richard Happ (with comments by Michael Kerling and Anthony 
Sinclair) who addresses two concepts that traditionally were considered to restrict 
the competence of ICSID tribunals, namely the 'foreign nationality' requirement and 
the 'exhaustion of local remedies' clause. Assessing recent ICSID jurisprudence, 
Happ notably shows that arbitral tribunals have yet to find a consistent and convin-
cing approach to claims by companies controlled by nationals of the host State (as in 
the case of Tokios Tokeles7), or to claims by companies that are mere shells.  
Alexander Szodruch then deals with a more specific problem, but one of immense 
practical and conceptual interest: that is the problem raised by the insolvency of a 
host State. In his paper (commented on by Peter Gnam and August Reinisch), he 
analyses the legal standards applicable to Argentina's pesification measures and, 
inter alia, clarifies how arbitral tribunals have rejected Argentina's defence based on 
the concept of 'necessity'. Beyond that, he shows how the present debate forces us to 
abandon cherished distinctions between the law of international investment and the 
international finance, and inquires how State insolvency could change (and could be 
changed by) investment law.  
The final three chapters then take up the different challenges to ICSID dispute 
settlement alluded to above. Carl Zöllner's paper (with comments by Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel and Noah Rubins), analyses what has been called the challenge of le-
gitimacy, and in so doing offers a first analysis of the recent ICSID institutional 
reform debate. Zöllner argues that transparency and broader public participation are 
vital in ensuring the acceptance and democratic legitimacy of investment arbitration 
and could also foster coherence in international investment law. This approach also 
leads him to welcome recent ICSID decisions admitting amicus curiae briefs8 and 
the results of the recent reform of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.  
Christian J. Tams (with comments by Richard H. Kreindler and Asif H. Qureshi) 
then inquires whether "There [Is] a Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure?", thus 
assessing whether faced with a challenge of (in)consistency, investment arbitration 
 
7  Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine (Case No. ARB/02/18), Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 
(Weil (presiding), Bernardini, Price).  
8  Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to 
a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005); Aguas Provin-
ciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 
Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (17 March 2006). 
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should move towards a two-level system of dispute settlement. He suggests that at 
present, there are no compelling reasons to move towards an investment appellate 
structure. Instead, the risk of inconsistency could be reduced by consolidating cases 
or ICJ proceedings, or (if a reform should prove unavoidable) through the introduc-
tion of a reference procedure along the lines of Art. 234 TEC.  
Finally, Christina Pfaff's paper (with comments by Rudolf Dolzer and Sabine 
Konrad) leaves the framework of ICSID arbitration proper. Taking up the challenge 
of coordination, it discusses the role (if any) that human rights institutions and also 
the WTO may play in the process of investment protection. While noting that there 
is a potential for overlap, Pfaff stresses the advantages of ICSID arbitration and 
argues that human rights institutions or the WTO are unable to safeguard foreign 
investment effectively.  
Taken together, the seven papers and twelve comments provide a broad spectre of 
views on the current state of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention.    
Readers expecting one single grand theory explaining the successes and failures of 
forty years of ICSID dispute settlement will look in vain. Yet the contributions to 
the present volume underline reasons for ICSID remarkable success and highlight 
future challenges. It is the editors' hope that in addition, at least implicitly, they will 
convince readers that investment arbitration is rightly regarded as one of the most 
fascinating areas of modern international law. 
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The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System    
                  
Christoph Schreuer∗ 
A. Investment and Development 
There is broad consensus, that private investment is the most important factor in 
economic development. This has led most developing countries to revise their previ-
ously reserved attitudes towards FDI and to adopt an open and welcoming attitude 
towards foreign investors.1 
Much of the investment climate in a country will consist of economic and politi-
cal factors such as market access, the availability and cost of production factors, 
taxation, the existence of infrastructures, the existence of a functioning public ad-
ministration, the level of corruption and political stability. 
In addition to economic and political factors, the legal framework for FDI is also 
important in determining its investment climate. A particularly important aspect of 
the legal protection of foreign investments is the settlement of disputes between host 
States and foreign investors. Impartial and effective dispute settlement is an essential 
element in the protection of investments. 
B. Protecting Foreign Investments - Procedural Alternatives 
In the absence of other arrangements, a dispute between a host State and a foreign 
investor will normally be settled by the domestic courts of the host State. From the 
investor’s perspective, this type of dispute settlement carries important disadvan-
tages. Rightly or wrongly, the courts of the host State are often not seen as suffi-
ciently impartial in this type of situation. In addition, domestic courts are bound to 
apply domestic law even if that law should fail to protect the investor’s rights under 
international law. In addition, the regular courts will often lack the technical exper-
tise required to resolve complex international investment disputes. 
Domestic courts of other States are usually not a realistic alternative. In most ca-
ses, they will lack territorial jurisdiction over investment operations taking place in 
another country. In addition, sovereign immunity and other judicial doctrines will 
usually make such proceedings impossible. 
 
∗  Christoph Schreuer is Professor of International Law at the University of Vienna, Austria.  
1  See World Investment Report 2003, FDI Policies for Development: National and International 
Perspectives, UNCTAD (2003). 
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Diplomatic protection was a frequently used method to settle investment disputes. 
It requires the espousal of the investor’s claim by his home State and the pursuit of 
this claim against the host State. This may be done through negotiations or through 
litigation between the two States before an international court or arbitral tribunal. 
But diplomatic protection has several disadvantages. The investor must have ex-
hausted all local remedies in the host country. Moreover, diplomatic protection is 
discretionary and the investor has no right to it. Also, diplomatic protection is un-
popular with States against which it is exercised and may lead to tensions in the 
relations of the States concerned.  
Today, direct arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor is the 
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes. International arbitration 
provides an attractive alternative to the settlement of investment disputes by national 
courts or through diplomatic protection. Arbitration is usually less costly and more 
efficient than litigation through regular courts. It offers the parties the opportunity to 
select arbitrators who enjoy their confidence and who have the necessary expertise 
in the field. Moreover, the private nature of arbitration, assuring the confidentiality 
of proceedings, is often valued by parties to major economic development projects. 
If arbitration is not supported by a particular arbitration institution, it is referred to 
as ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration requires an arbitration agreement that regu-
lates a number of issues. These include the selection of arbitrators, the applicable 
law and a large number of procedural questions. A number of institutions, like   
UNCITRAL, have developed standard rules that may be incorporated into the par-
ties’ agreement. But Ad hoc arbitration is subject to the rules of the arbitration law of 
the country in which the tribunal has its seat. The enforcement of awards rendered 
by such tribunals is subject to the same rules as awards by tribunals dealing with 
commercial cases. 
C. Tango: Two Steps Forward - One Step Back 
I. Step One: The ICSID Convention 
In this situation, the ICSID Convention2 was a major step forward. It is designed to 
close an important procedural gap. It was drafted in the 1960ies and entered into 
force in 1966. It currently has 143 Parties.  
 
2  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 575 UNTS 159 (1966); 4 ILM 532 (1965). 
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1. Purpose and Advantages 
The idea of the ICSID Convention is to stimulate investment and hence economic 
development3 by improving the standard of protection for foreign investments and 
the overall investment climate. 
Compared to ad hoc arbitration, the ICSID Convention offers considerable advan-
tages: it offers a system for dispute settlement that contains not only standard 
clauses for submission and rules of procedure but also institutional support for the 
conduct of proceedings. It assures the non-frustration of proceedings and provides 
for an award’s recognition and enforcement. 
2. Jurisdiction 
The ICSID Convention is specialized in the settlement of investment disputes. 
Therefore, the existence of a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment is a 
prerequisite for ICSID’s jurisdiction.4 The concept of an investment is not defined in 
the Convention but many BITs and multilateral treaties contain definitions of in-
vestment. 
In actual practice, the concept of “investment” has been given a wide meaning. A 
variety of activities in a large number of economic fields have been accepted as 
investments. In addition to traditional typical investment activities, these include 
pure financial instruments like the purchase of government bonds and the extension 
of loans.5 They also include civil engineering contracts like the construction of a 
highway6 and certain other services.7 Decisive criteria are a certain duration of the 
relevant activities, an element of profit, the presence of a certain economic risk, a 
substantial commitment as well as the relevance of the project for the host State’s 
development. 
Proceedings under the Convention are always mixed. One party (the host State) 
must be a State party to the Convention. The other party (the investor) must be a 
national of another Contracting State. Either party may initiate the proceedings but 
in actual practice it is nearly always the investor who is the claimant.  
 
 
3  ICSID Convention, Preamble, para. 1. 
4  ICSID Convention, Article 25(1). 
5  Fedax v. Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997, 5 ICSID Reports 186; Českoslo-
venská Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovakia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, 5 ICSID Re-
ports 335; CDC v. Seychelles, Award, 17 December 2003. 
6  Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 June 2001, 42 ILM 609 (2003); 
Bayindir v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005.  
7  SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406; SGS v. Phi-
lippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518. 
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An additional requirement is that the investor must not be a national of the host 
State. But if a foreign investor operates through a company that is registered in the 
host State, it is possible for the investor and the host State to agree that the company 
will be treated as a foreign investor because of foreign control.8 The nationality 
requirements under the ICSID Convention as well as under bilateral treaties have led 
to some creative nationality planning. For instance, an investor may create a com-
pany in a particular State for the primary purpose of gaining access to international 
arbitration. 
Access to investment arbitration, including ICSID arbitration, requires consent to 
jurisdiction by both parties. Participation in the ICSID Convention does not amount 
to consent to jurisdiction.9 This consent may be given in several ways. Consent may 
be contained in a direct agreement between the investor and the host State such as a 
concession contract. Alternatively, the basis for consent can be a standing offer by 
the host State which may be accepted by the investor in appropriate form. Such a 
standing offer may be contained in the host State’s legislation. A standing offer may 
also be contained in a treaty to which the host State and the investor’s State of na-
tionality are parties. Most BITs and some regional treaties dealing with investments 
contain such offers. The more recent cases that have come before ICSID show a 
trend away from consent through direct agreement between the parties towards con-
sent through a general offer by the host State which is later accepted by the investor 
often simply through instituting proceedings.  
3. Characteristics 
Proceedings under the ICSID Convention are self-contained. This means that they 
are independent of the intervention of any outside bodies. In particular, domestic 
courts have no power to stay, to compel or to otherwise influence ICSID procee-
dings.10 Domestic courts would have the power to order provisional measures only 
in the unlikely case that the parties agree thereto.11 An annulment or other form of 
review of an ICSID award by a domestic court is impermissible. 
The principle of non-frustration means that a case will proceed even if one party 
fails to cooperate. This circumstance alone will be a strong incentive to cooperate. 
ICSID proceedings are not threatened by the non-cooperation of a party. If one of 
the parties should fail to act, the proceedings will not be stalled. The Convention 
provides a watertight system against the frustration of proceedings by a recalcitrant 
party. E.g.: arbitrators not appointed by the parties will be appointed by the Centre12; 
 
8  Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention.  
9  ICSID Convention, Preamble, para. 7. 
10  Article 26 of the Convention. 
11  ICSID Arbitration Rules Article 39(6). 
12  Article 38 of the Convention. 
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the decision on whether there is jurisdiction in a particular case is with the tribunal13; 
non-submission of memorials or non-appearance at hearings by a party will not stall 
the proceedings14; non-cooperation by a party will not affect the award’s binding 
force and enforceability. 
The system of arbitration is highly effective. This effectiveness is the result of se-
veral factors: Submission to ICSID’s Jurisdiction is voluntary but once it has been 
given it may not be withdrawn unilaterally.15 
Awards are binding and final and not subject to review except under the narrow 
conditions provided by the Convention itself.16 Non-compliance with an award by a 
State would be a breach of the Convention and would lead to a revival of the right to 
diplomatic protection by the investor’s State of nationality.17 
The Convention provides an effective system of enforcement. Awards are recog-
nized as final in all States parties to the Convention. The pecuniary obligations  
arising from awards are to be enforced like final judgements of the local courts in all 
States parties to the Convention.18 Domestic courts have no power to review ICSID 
awards in the course of their enforcement. However, in the case of an award against 
a State the normal rules on immunity from execution will apply.19 In actual practice 
this will usually mean that execution is not possible against assets that serve the 
State’s public functions. 
The system of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention is likely to have an 
effect even without its actual use. The mere availability of an effective remedy will 
influence the behaviour of parties to potential disputes. It is likely to have a restrain-
ing influence on investors as well as on host States. Both sides will try to avoid 
actions that might involve them in arbitration that they are likely to lose. In addition, 
the prospect of litigation will strengthen the parties’ willingness to settle a dispute 
amicably. 
4. Caseload 
ICSID had a slow start. The Convention entered into force in 1966 but the fist case 
was not registered before 1972. The 1970ies and 1980ies saw steady but only inter-
mittent action. One or two cases per year were typical for that period.  
The last ten years have seen a dramatic increase in activity.  In 1995 there were 
four ICSID arbitrations pending. Today (26 April 2006) more than 100 are pend-
 
13  Article 41 of the Convention. 
14  Article 45 of the Convention. 
15  Article 25(1) of the Convention. 
16  Article 53(1) of the Convention. 
17  Article 27(1) of the Convention. 
18  Article 54(1) of the Convention. 
19  Article 55 of the Convention. 
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ing.20 During 2005 27 new cases were registered. Therefore, more than two new 
cases per month are registered on average.  
II. Step Two: The BIT Regime 
1. Consent to Jurisdiction 
A second big step forward in investment arbitration was the discovery and use of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as basis for jurisdiction in investment arbitration. 
BITs have existed for some time. But their number has increased enormously during 
the 1990ies. In addition, regional treaties such as NAFTA and ECT also offer juris-
diction. 
In the earlier cases of investor-State arbitration jurisdiction was always based on 
contracts between investors and host States. During the last 10 years most cases 
were brought on the basis of treaty provisions. 21 This has led to an enormous in-
crease in the number of cases. It has also changed the character of the cases.  
The vast majority of BITs contain clauses referring to investor-State arbitration. 
The States parties to the BIT offer consent to arbitration to investors who are nation-
nals of the other contracting party. 
The dispute settlement clauses in many BITs offer several possibilities. These 
may include the domestic courts of the host State, procedures agreed to by the par-
ties to the dispute, ICSID arbitration, ICC arbitration, and ad hoc arbitration often 
under the UNCITRAL rules. 
A provision on consent to arbitration in a BIT is merely an offer by the respective 
States that requires acceptance by the other party. The arbitration agreement is per-
fected through the acceptance of that offer by an eligible investor, i.e. a national of 
the other State party to the BIT. 
It is established practice that an investor may accept an offer of consent contained 
in a BIT by instituting ICSID proceedings. Therefore, where a BIT of this kind is in 
place, an investor no longer needs a formal arbitration agreement with the host State 
but can simply invoke the BIT. The Tribunal in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine said: 
“... it is firmly established that an investor can accept a State's offer of ICSID ar-
bitration contained in a bilateral investment treaty by instituting ICSID proceedings. 
There is nothing in the BIT to suggest that the investor must communicate its con-
sent in a different form directly to the State; ... It follows that the Claimant validly 
 
20  For detailed information on pending cases see: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending. 
htm. 
21  The first case in which consent was based on a BIT was AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 
1990, 4 ICSID Reports 250. 
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consented to ICSID arbitration by filing its Notice of Arbitration at the ICSID Cen-
tre.”22 
Treaty clauses providing for investor/State arbitration vary in scope. Some refer 
to all disputes concerning investments. Other treaties just refer to violations of the 
treaty itself. For instance, both the NAFTA23 and the ECT24 offer arbitration just for 
violations of the respective treaty itself. 
Some BITs offer consent to jurisdiction in narrow terms. For instance, most BITs 
of China only offer jurisdiction for disputes about the amount of compensation for 
expropriation owed to an investor. But in China's most recent BITs (notably with 
Germany) jurisdiction extends to any dispute with respect to investment.  
2. Umbrella Clauses 
The scope of consent offered in a BIT may also be affected by an umbrella clause 
contained in the treaty. An umbrella clause is a provision in a treaty under which the 
States parties undertake to observe any obligations they may have entered into with 
respect to investments. In other words, contractual obligations are put under the 
treaty’s protective umbrella. After some initial hesitation, most tribunals have now 
accepted that under the regime of an umbrella clause, violations of the contract be-
come treaty violations.25 Therefore, a provision in a BIT offering consent to arbitra-
tion for violations of the BIT extends to contract violations covered by the umbrella 
clause. 
3. MFN Clauses 
Most BITs and some other treaties for the protection of investment26 contain most 
favoured nation or MFN clauses. A MFN clause contained in a treaty will extend the 
better treatment granted to a third State or its nationals to a beneficiary of the treaty. 
This has led to the question of whether the effect of MFN clauses is restricted to 
substantive standards or extends to the provisions on dispute settlement in these 
treaties. Put differently, is it possible to avoid the limitations attached to consent to 
arbitration in a treaty by relying on an MFN clause in the treaty if the respondent 
 
22  Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, paras. 12.2, 12.3. 
23  Article 1116 NAFTA. 
24  Article 26(1) ECT. 
25  SGS  v. Philipines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518; Eureko v. 
Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005; Noble Ventures v. Romania, Award, 12 October 2005; 
MTD v. Chile, Award, 25 May 2004. But see: SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 
August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406; El Paso Energy Intl. Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Juris-
diction, 27 April 2006. 
26  See Article 1103 NAFTA. 
 22 
State has entered into a treaty with a third State that contains a consent clause with-
out the limitation? For instance, would a national of a country that has an old style 
BIT with China, providing for jurisdiction only for the amount of compensa-tion, be 
able to invoke an MFN clause to benefit from China's new BIT with Germany with 
its broad jurisdictional clause? Or even more radically, if the treaty con-taining the 
MFN clause does not offer consent to arbitration, is it possible to rely on consent to 
arbitration in a treaty of the respondent State with a third party?  
Tribunals have used MFN clauses in a number of cases to overcome procedural 
obstacles where consent to jurisdiction had been given in the basic treaty.27 But the 
issue whether an MFN clause can be used to establish jurisdiction which does not 
otherwise exist is an open question. I would tend to agree with Emmanuel Gail-
lard28: why not? 
4. Shareholder Protection 
Another area where big strides have been made is shareholder protection.29 Invest-
ments often take place through the acquisition of shares in a company that has a 
nationality different from that of the investor. 
The classical position was represented by Barcelona Traction30: only corporate 
rights would be protected and the corporation had to have the right nationality. Un-
der this doctrine, a company established under the law of the host State would be 
disqualified, in principle, because it did not have the status of a foreign investor. A 
company established under the law of another State would be disqualified if that 
State did not have a BIT or another suitable treaty with the host State or because the 
company's home State was not a party to the ICSID Convention. 
The issue is particularly acute where investments are made through companies in-
corporated in the host State. Many States require a locally incorporated company as 
a precondition for the investment. The local company would not as such qualify as a 
foreign investor and would hence be excluded from resorting to international arbitra-
 
27  Maffezini v. Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 396; Siemens 
v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 44 ILM 138 (2005); Gas Natural v. Ar-
gentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005. But see: Salini v. Jordan, Decision on Juris-
diction, 29 November 2004; Plama v. Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005. 
28  Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored Nation Clause, New York Law 
Journal, June 2, 2005 p. 3. 
29  See especially Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdic-
tion of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as “Investors” and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, 4 The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 19 (2005); Schreuer, Shareholder Pro-
tection in International Investment Law, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 2, Issue N°. 
03, June 2005. 
30  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgement, 5 Febru-
ary 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 4. 
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tion. This would have deprived a large proportion of foreign investment of interna-
tional protection.  
Contemporary treaty law offers a solution that gives independent standing to 
shareholders: most BITs include participation in a company in their definition of 
investment. In this way, the participation in the locally incorporated company be-
comes the investment. Even though the local company is unable to pursue the claim 
internationally, the foreign shareholder in the local company may pursue the claim 
in his own name. Put differently, the local company is not endowed with investor 
status but the participation therein, is seen as the investment. The shareholder may 
then pursue claims for adverse action by the host State against the local company 
that affects its value and profitability. Arbitral practice on this point is extensive and 
uniform.31 
This is not a roundabout way of introducing a control theory to the nationality of 
corporations. Minority shareholders too have been accepted as claimants and have 
been granted protection under the respective treaties.32 This practice has also been 
extended to indirect shareholding through an intermediate company.33 The same 
technique has been employed where the affected company was incorporated not in 
the host State but in a third State.34  
This shareholder protection extends not only to ownership in the shares but also 
to the assets of the company. Adverse action by the host State in violation of treaty 
 
31  See e.g.: Antoine Goetz et consorts c. République du Burundi, Decision of 2 September 1998, 6 
ICSID Reports 3; Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, 25 January 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 396; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Com-
pagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), Decision on Annulment, 3 
July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
8 December 2003, 43 ILM 259 (2004); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2004; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005; AMT v. Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), 
 5 ICSID Reports 11; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic 
of Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 241; CME Czech Republic B. V. (The Ne-
therlands) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001; Camuzzi v. Argentina, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005. 
32  See e.g.: AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Reports 246; LANCO v. Argen-
tina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, 5 ICSID Reports 367; Compañía de Aguas 
del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), 
Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340; CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, 42 ILM 788 (2003); Cham-
pion Trading Co. and Ameritrade International Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2003; GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, 15 November 2004; 
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2004. 
33  See e.g.: Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 44 
ILM  138  (2005); Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004. 
34  Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001, 9 ICSID Reports 66; 
Waste Management INC. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004, 43 ILM 967 
(2004). 
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guarantees affecting the company's economic position gives rise to rights by the 
shareholders.35 
This generous extension of procedural rights to shareholders is likely to lead to 
some interesting situations. Practical problems may arise where claims are pursued 
in parallel, especially by different shareholders. In addition, the affected company 
itself may pursue certain remedies while a group of its shareholders may pursue 
different ones. The situation becomes even more complex where indirect sharehol-
ding through intermediaries is combined with minority shareholding. In such a case 
shareholders and companies at different levels may pursue conflicting or competing 
litigation strategies that may be difficult to reconcile and coordinate.  
III. Step Three: Backing Off? 
Developments have not all been in favour of investors. The enthusiasm for investor 
protection has been dampened by the sometimes painful experience of States in 
losing cases. The pain is particularly acute if the damages awarded are high or if 
there are multiple cases against the State in question. For some countries the mere 
fact of being sued is already a cause of alarm and a reason to think about ways to 
limit the access of investors to international arbitration.  
Signs of retreat from investment arbitration have manifested themselves in a 
number of ways. Here are a few examples. 
1. The Revival of Domestic Remedies 
One is the revival of domestic remedies.36 International investment arbitration dis-
penses with the traditional requirement to exhaust local remedies, at least in prin-
ciple. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention specifically does away with this tradi-
tional requirement “unless otherwise stated”. Arbitral practice confirms that the 
exhaustion of local remedies is not required in contemporary investment arbitra-
tion.37 
But States have attempted to counteract international arbitration by inserting fo-
rum selection clauses in investment contracts. Under these clauses disputes arising 
in the context of the contract are to be taken to national courts or tribunals. When the 
investors instituted international arbitration on the basis of a BIT, the host States 
 
35  GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, 15 November 2004. 
36  Generally see Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren : The Return of Local Remedies in Investment 
Arbitration, 4 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 1-17 (2005). 
37  Lanco v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, para. 39, 40 ILM 457, 469/70 
(2001); Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, paras. 13.1–13.6; Yaung 
Chi Oo v. Myanmar, Award, 31 March 2003, para. 40, 42 ILM 540, 547/48 (2003); Loewen v. 
United States, Award, 26 June 2003, paras. 142 et seq., 42 ILM 811 (2003). 
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would object contending that the contractual forum selection clause, pointing to 
domestic litigation, constituted a waiver of international arbitration. 
Tribunals have reacted by adopting the distinction between treaty claims and con-
tract claims. They have held consistently that the contractual clauses pointing to 
domestic courts did not deprive them of their jurisdiction to hear claims for viola-
tions of international law, especially BIT claims.38  
The distinction between contract claims and treaty claims has become a standard 
feature of recent investment arbitrations. The Respondent's objection, that the case 
only involves contract claims and the Claimant's insistence that treaty rights are 
involved, are routine features of many recent cases. As it turned out, the distinction 
between treaty claims and contract claims is not always easy. A particular course of 
action by the host State may well constitute a breach of contract and a violation of 
international law. The two categories are not mutually exclusive. Rather, two dif-
ferent standards have to be applied to determine whether one or the other or both 
have been violated. The ad hoc Committee in Vivendi39said: 
“... whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a 
breach of contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined 
by reference to its own proper or applicable law – in the case of the BIT, by interna-
tional law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract 
...”
40
 
The situation is made even more complex by the fact that some treaties offer ju-
risdiction for any investment dispute, which probably includes contract claims. Also 
umbrella clauses will convert contract breaches into treaty breaches.41  
The problem with the separate treatment of contract claims and treaty claims is 
less a theoretical than a practical one. It leads to situations where the claimant is 
 
38  See e.g. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argen-
tine Republic, Award, 21 November 2000, 16 ICSID Review – FILJ 643 (2001); 5 ICSID Re-
ports 296; 40 ILM 426 (2001); Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S. A. & Vivendi Universal 
(formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, 3 
July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports  340, 41 ILM 1135 (2002); Salini Costruttori SpA et Italstrade 
SpA c/ Royaume du Maroc, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, Journal de Droit Interna-
tional 196 (2002), 6 ICSID Reports 400, 42 ILM 609 (2003); CMS v. Argentina, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, 42 ILM 788 (2003); SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 
August 2003, 42 ILM 1289 (2003); Azurix v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 
2003; Enron v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004; SGS v. Philippines, De-
cision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518; Siemens v. Argentina, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004. For a broader discussion see Schreuer, Investment Treaty Ar-
bitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims - the Vivendi I Case Considered, in Weiler, ed., 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilat-
eral Treaties and Customary International Law 281-323 (2005). 
39  Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S. A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale 
des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340, 
41 ILM 1135 (2002). 
40  At para. 96. 
41  See above at Fn 25. 
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compelled to pursue part of its claim through national and another part through in-
ternational procedures. This has undesirable results. The need to dissect cases into 
contract claims and treaty claims to be dealt with by separate fora requires claim 
splitting and has the potential of leading to parallel proceedings. This is unecono-
mical and contrary to the goal of reaching final and comprehensive resolutions of 
disputes.  
Even worse, the separation of types of claims arising from the same set of facts 
can lead to a situation where a host State, threatened by a treaty claim before an 
international tribunal, will start domestic proceedings before a local court or domes-
tic tribunal which it can control in order to counteract and frustrate the international 
proceedings. In this way, the host State can exert pressure on the investor to settle or 
withdraw the treaty claim. Alternatively, the host State can use the domestic pro-
ceedings to recoup the money awarded in the international award through an action 
for breach of contract against the investor. Put differently, allowing the host State to 
pursue contract claims from the same dispute in its own domestic forum can under-
mine the procedural protection granted to the foreign investor in the BIT. 
In some cases tribunals have reintroduced domestic remedies in a different way. 
They have at times indicated that a violation of a treaty standard occurs only once 
some redress has been sought and denied through proceedings in domestic courts. 
For instance, a tribunal found that a de facto expropriation could not be assumed in 
the absence of a reasonable effort to obtain correction in the domestic courts.42  
Similarly, another tribunal found that the availability of local remedies was rele-
vant to whether the host State had violated the treaty standard of fair and equitable 
treatment.43 It is not difficult to see that the rationale in these cases can be developed 
into something that reintroduces the local remedies rule through the back door.  
2. Restricting Substantive Standards 
In another attempt to stem the tide of investment claims States have attempted to 
limit the meaning of the substantive standards granted to investors.  
One such attempt concerns the standard of fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
which is contained in most treaties. This standard has created a considerable amount 
of case law and is nowadays invoked in almost every case. Its somewhat open ended 
and flexible nature, has led to attempts to restrict its meaning.  
Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA providing for FET has been the subject of an offi-
cial interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), a body composed 
of representatives of the three States Parties with the power to adopt binding inter-
 
42  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, para. 20.30. See also Lauder 
v. Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001, para. 204, 9 ICSID Reports 66. 
43  Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004, para. 116. 
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pretations.44 The FTC interpretation of July 2001 states that Article 1105(1) reflects 
the customary international law minimum standard and does not require treatment 
beyond what is required by customary international law.45 NAFTA tribunals have 
accepted the FTC interpretation.46 
The recent BITs of the US and Canada incorporate this approach by stating that 
FET does not require treatment beyond what is required by customary IL.47  
Tribunals not operating under such restrictive interpretations have not adopted a 
dogmatic position on whether the fair and equitable treatment standard contained in 
BITs is an autonomous standard or merely reflects customary international law.48 
Rather, they have interpreted the relevant provisions in BITs autonomously as a 
matter of treaty interpretation.49  
Professor Dolzer has pointed out that the attempt to contain the meaning of FET 
by equating it with customary IL may have exactly the opposite effect. The specific 
meaning that tribunals have given to fair and equitable treatment may be projected 
into customary international law. The consequence is that investors may in the fu-
ture invoke the detailed case law on fair and equitable treatment as part of customary 
international law even in situations that are not subject to a treaty provision contain-
ing that standard. 
Another area where there have been recent attempts to dampen the enthusiasm of 
investors to bring claims against host States has been expropriation. There is a lively 
debate surrounding the State's right to regulate in the public interest. Of course it is 
not per se unreasonable for States to insist on their right to regulate. On the other 
hand, investors predictably insist on the protection of their assets even if the State 
purports to act in the public interest. 
 
44  Article 1131 (2) NAFTA. 
45  FTC Note of Interpretation of 31 July 2001. 
46  See e.g.: Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, 11 October 2002, 6 
ICSID Reports 192, paras. 100 et seq.; United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, 
Award, 22 November 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 288, para. 97; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States 
of America, Award, 9 January 2003, 6 ICSID Reports 470, paras. 175–178; Loewen Group, 
Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Award, 26 June 2003, 7 ICSID Re-
ports 442, paras. 124–128; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 
April 2004, paras. 90–91. See also United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., Judgment, Su-
preme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001, 5 ICSID Reports 236, paras. 61–65. 
47  US Model BIT 2004, Article 5(1)(2). 
48  See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005 at paras. 282-284 
where the Tribunal found that the question whether the standard of fair and equitable treatment 
was identical with customary international law was not relevant in the case before it since “the 
required stability and predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn legal and 
contractual commitments, is not different from the international law minimum standard and its 
evolution under customary law.” At para. 284. 
49  See e.g. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 
May 2003, 43 ILM 133 (2004), paras. 155 and 156; MTD v. Republic of Chile, Award, 25 May 
2004, paras. 110–112; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Award, 1 July 
2004, paras 188–190. 
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Under classical IL and most treaty provisions dealing with expropriation, the    
existence of a public purpose is a requirement for the legality of an expropriation 
together with non-discrimination and appropriate compensation. It would seem to 
follow that a legitimate public purpose cannot be the basis of an argument that no 
expropriation has occurred. Rather, the existence of a public purpose is a require-
ment for the expropriation's legality in addition to compensation. 
Recent treaties, especially of the United States state that except in rare circum-
stances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and ap-
plied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.50 
Judge Schwebel has referred to these Developments as a "Regressive Develop-
ment of International Law"51.  Indeed there is a danger that immunizing interfe-
rences with investments on account of their public purpose may seriously undermine 
the protection against indirect expropriations as we know it. 
These ideas have already borne fruit in arbitral practice. In Methanex v US52 the 
Tribunal said quite bluntly that a measure that is taken for a public purpose, is non-
discriminatory and is accomplished with due process is not an expropriation but a 
lawful regulation and hence does not require compensation.53 This position was 
subsequently repeated and expanded in Saluka v. Czech Republic.54 
There are two kinds of problems with that approach. One is a question of logic. 
The other is a matter of policy. As a matter of logic, if a lawful expropriation re-
quires a public purpose and full compensation it seems difficult to say that a legiti-
mate public purpose means there is no expropriation but just regulation and there-
fore no compensation  needs to be paid. 
The policy issue is perhaps more serious. Once it is accepted that regulatory ac-
tion for a public purpose by definition is not an expropriation, one is on a very slip-
pery slope. It will not be difficult to find a legitimate public purpose for most meas-
ures affecting foreign investors. It would then be for the investor to bear the eco-
nomic consequences of such measures even if they radically affect the investment. 
Taken to its logical conclusion this could well spell the end of protection of foreign-
owned property as we know it.  
 
50  US Model BIT 2004, Annex B, Para. 4 (b).  
51  Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the 
Regressive Development of International Law, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 3, N° 
2, April 2006. 
52  Methanex v. United States, Award, 3 August 2005. 
53  At Part IV, Chapter D, paras. 7, 14.  
54  Saluka v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 at paras. 254, 255, 262, 276. 
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3. Tango Argentino: Some Radical Proposals 
Among the States that are unhappy about investment arbitration, Argentina is surely 
the unhappiest. It has several dozen cases pending against it and there are a number 
of adverse decisions already although most of these concern jurisdictional ques-tions 
and are hence preliminary. The aggregate amount in dispute under these cases is 
staggering and goes into the billions.  
Argentina, is considering drastic action. There are a number of proposed bills that 
foresee:  
• denouncing all BITs that foresee international investment arbitration,  
• establishing that claims against Argentina may only be brought to Argentinean 
courts, 
• declaring that international arbitral awards are unenforceable unless they have 
been reviewed by local courts. 
These proposals are obviously contrary to Argentina's treaty obligations under the 
ICSID Convention and under the applicable BITs. From a legal perspective such 
threats may not carry much weight and are easily dismissed. Nevertheless signs of 
States becoming weary with the system of investment arbitration should not be taken 
lightly. Other countries might follow suit and take joint action once they realize that 
they continue to be on the losing side of investment arbitrations. After all, it is the 
States that ultimately control the system. 
So is investor-State arbitration in danger? The answer is probably: not yet but we 
should not necessarily take it for granted. There may well be further curtailments or 
even calls to replace the current system by a State v. State system.  
D. Finale: It Takes Two to Tango          
The Complementary Interests of Investors and Host States 
It is appropriate to keep in mind and to remind States that investment arbitration is 
not a one-sided system that works all in favour of investors. Investment protection is 
also in the longer term interest of host States. It is no coincidence that the ICSID 
Convention was conceived in the framework of the World Bank and that the first 
sentence of its Preamble refers to the need for international cooperation for eco-
nomic development and the role of private international investment therein.  
Investment arbitration carries more than one advantage to host States. The more 
obvious advantage is a country's improved investment climate through the possibi-
lity of international arbitration. The possibility of going to arbitration is an important 
element of the legal security required for an investment decision. In other words, by 
offering arbitration the host State creates an important incentive to foreign invest-
ment. 
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The Tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia55 pointed out that: 
“...to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and of 
developing countries.”56 
In addition, by consenting to ICSID arbitration the host State protects itself        
against other forms of foreign or international litigation. In particular, a major ad-
vantage of ICSID arbitration is that the host State effectively shields itself against 
diplomatic protection by the State of the investor’s nationality. 
Before investors received the right to pursue claims on their own behalf on the in-
ternational level, the standard practice was for their home States to act on their be-
half. This method carried political disadvantages for both States. It often created 
friction between the States concerned and cast a shadow over their relations. Not 
surprisingly, developing countries do not like being leaned upon by powerful indus-
trialised States.  In an investment dispute the limited inconvenience of having to 
defend a case before an international tribunal may be vastly preferable to the alterna-
tive of feeling the pressure of the United States, of Germany or of the European 
Commission. 
Like most successful human endeavours investment arbitration serves the inte-
rests of all concerned. It is important to make sure that the system keeps its proper 
balance but also that everyone concerned is aware of this mutual interest. 
 
 
55  Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389. 
56  At para. 23. See also Award, 20 November 1984, 1 ICSID Reports 413, at para. 249. 
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“Fair and Equitable Treatment” as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law
                         
Stephan Schill∗ 
A. Introduction 
After forty years of ICSID arbitration it is not only time to take stock of past deve-
lopments in international investment arbitration.  Given above all the widespread 
criticism investor-state dispute settlement is facing in regard of its restrictive effect 
on host state law- and policy-making, it is also time to develop more conceptual 
frameworks with respect to the substantive law contained in international investment 
treaties.  Among other factors, the criticism seems to stem to a large extent from the 
considerable vagueness of many standard guarantees in international investment 
treaties1 and the perception that their interpretation by investment tribunals is unpre-
dictable and comprises the risk of inconsistent or even contradictory interpretation.2  
 
∗  Stephan Schill, LL.M. Scholar of the European Recovery Program/Studienstiftung des 
deutschen Volkes (2006/2007); Hauser Global Scholar (New York University School of Law, 
2005/2006); First and Second Legal State Exam (Bavaria, 2001, 2003); LL.M. in European 
and International Economic Law (Universität Augsburg, 2002); LL.M. International Legal 
Studies (New York University, 2006). I hereby gratefully acknowledge financial support for 
the preparation of this article by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes/European Recovery 
Program.  This article takes into account the jurisprudence of investment tribunals until the be-
ginning of July 2006.  
1  See Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J. Int'l 
Arb. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that the “lack of clarity in Chapter 11 prevents the establishment of a 
secure and stable framework for investments”);  Ferguson, California’s MTBE Contaminated 
Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental Interpretative Note on Article 1110 of 
NAFTA, 11 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 499, 503 (2000) (noting that the “vague language” 
of NAFTA allows for an “abuse” of investor-state dispute resolution);  Beauvais, Regulatory 
Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. Envt’l 
L. J. 245, 257 et seq. (2001-2002);  Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate 
Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 Environmental Law 851, 902 et seq. (2003);  
Been/Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Mis-
guided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 125 
et seq. (2003) (all noting the vagueness of the expropriation standard under international law);  
Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 79 
(2006) (arguing that fair and equitable treatment due to its vagueness cannot constitute a le-
gitimate norm of international law); Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment 
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 
301, 350 (2004) (referring to “the vague and unbounded notions of fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security”).  
2  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1558 et seq. (2005).  
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In this context, commentators frequently allude to a “legitimacy crisis” in invest-
ment arbitration.3   
While initially the protection of foreign investors against indirect expropriations 
has been the focus of much political and academic debate,4 more recently another 
key guarantee of international investment treaties is coming to the fore in the on-
going struggle over the appropriate scope of international investment protection: the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.  Being attested to have “the potential to 
reach further into the traditional ‘domaine réservé’ of the host state than any one of 
the other rules of [investment] treaties”,5 fair and equitable treatment is emerging as 
one of the core concepts governing the relationship between foreign investors and 
host states in international investment law.  The standard appears prominently in 
almost all of the approximately 2400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as 
regional and multilateral investment treaties, such as Art. 1105(1) of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Art. 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), prior to that figured in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
Treaties the United States concluded with various countries and played a role in all 
multilateral projects relating to the protection of foreign investment.6   
Despite its textual presence in various international legal instruments over a pe-
riod of over 60 years, fair and equitable treatment has for a long time received sur-
prisingly little attention in academic literature and in the practice of international 
courts and tribunals.  Over the past five years, however, fair and equitable treatment 
has emerged as a central element on the grounds of which host states are increasing-
ly often ordered to pay damages to foreign investors in disputes before international 
 
3  Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, Nat’l L. J., Oct. 7, 2002; Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of 
International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Cri-
sis, 17 Geo. Int'l Envt’l L. Rev. 51 (2004); Franck (supra note 2), 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 
(2005).  
4  Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Envt’l L. J. 64 (2002-2003);  
Been/Beauvais (supra note 1), 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003);  Brunetti, Indirect Expropriation 
in International Law, 5 Int’l L. FORUM du droit int. 150 (2003);  Dolzer/Bloch, Indirect Ex-
propriation: Conceptual Realignments?, 5 Int’l L. FORUM du droit int. 155 (2003);  For-
tier/Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I know It When I 
See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID Rev. — Foreign Inv. L. J. 293 (2004);  Yannaca-Small, 
“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD  
 Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/4, available at http://www 
.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf (all websites visited last on July 11, 2006);  Kunoy, 
Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration, 6 J. 
World Inv. & Trade 467 (2005);  Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation, 20 
ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. L. J. 1 (2005).  
5  Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 953, 964 (2005).   
6  See on the history of the fair and equitable treatment standard Vasciannie, The Fair and Equi-
table Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70 Brit. Yb. Int’l Law 
99 (1999);  Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/3, p. 3 et seq., avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.   
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arbitral tribunals.  Yet, the frequency with which it is invoked by foreign investors 
and applied as a basis for state responsibility by arbitral tribunals contrasts with an 
astonishingly fundamental lack of conceptual understanding about the principle’s 
normative content.  Given that fair and equitable treatment undoubtedly constitutes a 
legal standard, not an empowerment of arbitral tribunals to render decisions ex 
aequo et bono,7 the tribunals are faced with the task to enrich this admittedly vague 
standard with concrete normative content in order to apply it to the factual circum-
stances submitted to them.   
Although the language of the various investment treaties is not uniform, varying 
above all between a plain prescription of fair and equitable treatment and a combina-
tion of the standard with an explicit reference to international law or the customary 
international minimum standard,8 it is questionable whether substantial differences 
result from the different framing of the standard with a view to the actual practice of 
investment tribunals.  This has become apparent in particular in the NAFTA context 
where Art. 1105(1) has to be interpreted – pursuant to a binding interpretation by 
NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission under Art. 1131(2) – in accordance with custom-
ary international law.9  Two factors, in particular, level possible differences between 
treaty law and custom in this context.  First, some tribunals held that the inclusion of 
fair and equitable treatment in the vast web of international investment agreements 
has transformed the standard itself into customary international law.10  Secondly, 
even absent such an explicit transformation, other tribunals interpret the interna-
tional minimum standard as an evolutionary concept that has evolved since the days 
of traditional international law concerning the treatment of aliens.11  This evolution-
 
7  See Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 40;  Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral 
Practice, 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 365 (2005);  see also Case Concerning Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) – Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 
Dec. 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 803 et seq., Separate Opinion by Judge Higgins, par. 39.  
8  See Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 Int’l 
Law. 87, 90 (2005) (explaining that the plain approach prevails in the treaty practice of Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, whereas the BITs of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States generally make reference to international law).  See also 
UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 10 et seq. (1999), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf.   
9  NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 
July 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.   
10  See for example Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award in Respect of Da-
mages of May 31, 2002, par. 62;  similarly Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of Oct. 11, 2002, par. 125 (all investment 
awards are, unless explicitly stated otherwise, available via http://www.investmenclaims.com); 
see also Hindelang, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate – 
The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited, 5 J. World 
Inv. & Trade 789 (2004).   
11  See Pope & Talbot (supra note 10), par. 58 et seq.;  Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), 
par. 125;  ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Final Award of 
Jan. 9, 2003, par. 179;  see also Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? – Defining Fair and  
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297 (2005).  
 34 
ary interpretation also levels differences between treaty law and custom concerning 
the fair and equitable treatment standard.   
This paper attempts to contribute to the on-going debate on rule- and decision-
making of investment tribunals with a specific view to the tribunals’ construction 
and application of fair and equitable treatment.  The task in the context of this paper 
does, however, not consist in exhaustively describing the facts of each case and the 
conclusions drawn by arbitral tribunals; the arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equit-
able treatment has been accurately and extensively discussed in a number of scho-
larly contributions.12  Instead, the paper focuses on outlining the elements arbitral 
tribunals attribute to fair and equitable treatment in a more conceptual way and at-
tempts to provide a general framework of analysis for the standard’s application and 
interpretation.   
In Part II, the paper takes a critical look at the way arbitral tribunals interpret and 
apply fair and equitable treatment and points to some shortcomings in the arbitral 
jurisprudence resulting mainly from the standard’s considerable vagueness.  Part III 
subsequently aims at clarifying the normative content of fair and equitable treatment 
and outlines a methodology for the application of fair and equitable treatment to the 
circumstances of a case submitted to arbitration.  This should promote predictability 
in and uniformity of the standard’s interpretation and thus its acceptance by states 
and investors.   
The paper shows how international tribunals have developed certain sub-elements 
of fair and equitable treatment that appear in recurrent fashion in arbitral jurispru-
dence and argues that these elements can be understood as and united under the 
concept of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat in the German, état de droit in the French 
tradition).  The underlying assumption of such an approach is that the fair and equi-
table treatment standard has an independent and genuine normative content that is 
different from other rights granted in international investment treaties.  Understan-
ding fair and equitable treatment in such a fashion attributes to the standard a quasi-
constitutional function that serves as a yardstick for the exercise of the host states’ 
administrative, judicial or legislative activity vis-à-vis foreign investors.  In this 
perspective, the arbitral jurisprudence does not appear as a fragmented and disor-
dered aggregate of awards but as an expression of the continuous emergence of a 
global regime that governs foreign investment and the conduct of host states relating 
to it.  Conceptualizing fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of 
law mainly relies on a comparative public law approach that takes a cross-view of 
the restrictions of governmental activity in domestic legal systems that embrace the 
concept of the rule of law.   
Conversely, the appropriate methodology for concretizing fair and equitable 
treatment the paper suggests, consists in a comparative method that attempts to ex-
 
12  See for recent attempts to sum up the jurisprudence Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 13 et 
seq.; Choudhury (supra note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297 (2005); Schreuer (supra note 7), 
6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357 (2005); Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87 (2005).   
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tract general principles from domestic legal systems and other international legal 
regimes that embrace an institutional design prescribing rule of law standards for the 
exercise of governmental power in administrative and judicial proceedings and le-
gislation.  At the same time, a comparative approach to fair and equitable treatment 
illustrates the tension between the rule of law as a legal value and competing public 
interests that require a proportionate balance.  It underscores that fair and equitable 
treatment cannot be understood as an absolute guarantee but rather as a principle that 
allows for a balance between investment protection and the host state’s public inter-
est.   
This understanding of fair and equitable treatment can, however, not only be used 
as a conceptual explanation of the bulk of the arbitral jurisprudence, but can be 
grounded in the normative framework contained in international investment treaties, 
above all the treaties’ object and purpose.  Part IV therefore provides an analysis of 
the economics of international investment treaties and shows the positive effects the 
adoption of the concept of the rule of law has on the behavior of foreign investors, 
thus promoting foreign investment and economic growth in host countries.   
B. Shortcomings in Arbitral Practice Relating to Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Arbitral tribunals seem generally ill-equipped in tackling the interpretative conun-
drum posed by the vagueness of the fair and equitable treatment standard.  Tribunals 
do not only regularly criticize that the standard is not further defined and clarified in 
investment agreements,13 they have also not achieved to develop a uniform metho-
dology in order to determine whether specific host state conduct violates fair and 
equitable treatment.14  The main reason for this is that traditional interpretative ap-
proaches applying Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties,15 either directly or as an expression of the customary international law of treaty 
 
13  See Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A. S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, 
ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award of June 25, 2001, par. 367: “the exact content of this stan-
dard is not clear”;  Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 
Sentence Arbitrale of Dec. 22, 2003, par. 51: “Il n’existe pas de définition précise du traite-
ment just et équitable dans le droit des traités”;  Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UN-
CITRAL, Final Award of Sept. 2, 2001, par. 292: “[T]here is no further definition of the notion 
of fair and equitable treatment in the Treaty.”;  CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of May 12, 2005, par. 273: “The Treaty, 
like most bilateral investment treaties, does not define the standard of fair and equitable treat-
ment.”  
14  Criticizing the lack of a uniform methodology, for example, Kantor, Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment: Echoes of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan in the International Law Approach Towards Regu-
latory Expropriation, 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 231 
(2006).  
15  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.   
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interpretation,16 are hardly able to clarify the meaning of fair and equitable treat-
ment.  The vagueness of the standard goes beyond the commonplace assertions in 
legal theory that law is inherently vague and indeterminate when it comes to the 
application of abstract standards to concrete cases.  Vagueness and indeterminacy of 
fair and equitable treatment are not a matter of the penumbra of a rule in the Hartian 
sense or the edges of the rule’s frame in the Kelsenian sense, but concern the very 
core of the provision.  It does not have a consolidated and conventional core     
meaning that can easily be applied.  Apart from consensus on the fact that fair and 
equit-able treatment constitutes a standard that is independent from the domestic 
legal order and does not require actions in bad faith by host states,17 it is hardly 
substantiated by state practice or elucidated by travaux preparatoires and difficult to 
narrow down by traditional means of interpretation.   
An interpretation of the ordinary meaning may replace the terms “fair and equit-
able” with similarly vague and empty phrases such as “just”, “even-handed”, “un-
biased” or “legitimate”,18 but does not succeed in clarifying its normative content.19  
In particular, the semantics of fair and equitable treatment do not clarify as against 
which standard “fairness and equitableness” has to be measured.  It could equally 
refer to notions of equality or substantive justice, or to less grand notions of proce-
dural due process.   
Likewise, a plain teleological interpretation hardly provides more specific    
meaning even if the purpose of international investment treaties points to the protec-
tion and promotion of foreign investment and the deepening of the mutual economic 
relations between the contracting states.20  Although this narrows down the possible 
understandings of fair and equitable treatment to an economic framework, a pur-
posive interpretation does not enable tribunals to directly translate the broad lan-
guage into specific guarantees for foreign investors in the sense of hard and fast 
rules.  In particular, it is difficult to foresee and estimate whether a specific interpre-
tation of an international investment treaty will actually encourage investment flows 
or whether, on the contrary, an interpretation that may be too onerous for host states 
 
16  See only Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judg-
ment of Feb. 13, 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, 21, par. 41;  Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of Dec. 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
803, par. 23;  Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 
Dec. 13, 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045 par. 18.  
17  Concerning the independence of fair and equitable treatment from domestic law Dolzer (supra 
note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005);  on the independence from bad faith Schreuer (supra note 
7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 384 et seq. (2005).  
18  Cf. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award of May 25, 2004, par. 113.  
19  It rather confirms that a terminological approach does not succeed in substantiating and clari-
fying what fair and equitable refers to.  In this sense Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Re-
public, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of Mar. 17, 2006, par. 297;  differently Dolzer (supra note 
8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005).  
20  See on the object and purpose of investment treaties and the statements contained in their 
preambles Dolzer/Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 11 et seq., 20 et seq. (1995).  
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will have the effect of chilling the investment climate due to host states admitting 
less foreign investment.21   
The traditional methods of treaty interpretation therefore prove to be relatively in-
effective in clarifying the meaning of fair and equitable treatment.  Understandably, 
investment tribunals do not follow a uniform methodology.22  Some tribunals follow 
an approach that extensively describes the facts of a case and simply characterizes 
them as a violation of fair and equitable treatment.23  The problem with this ap-
proach is that it does not elucidate the normative content of fair and equitable treat-
ment and leaves the legal reasoning underlying the decision in the obscure.  Other 
tribunals simply posit an abstract standard as part of fair and equitable treatment and 
subsequently subsume the facts of the case under this standard.24  While this is 
closer to the traditional legal syllogism, the tribunals nevertheless fail to properly 
justify how they ground these abstract standards in fair and equitable treatment.  
Finally, various tribunals apply fair and equitable treatment with a strong reference 
to prior arbitral jurisprudence.25  This approach is critical in two respects.  First, 
treating arbitral decisions as precedent in international law is problematic;26 se-
condly, the awards face the criticism that earlier decisions have themselves applied a 
problematic methodology in terms of failing to grasp the normative content of fair 
and equitable treatment.  
By failing to establish a clear normative, i. e. prescriptive, content of fair and    
equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals run the risk of facing the reproach that they 
handle the standard as a malleable tool of ex post facto control of host states’ meas-
 
21  Accordingly, the Tribunal in Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 
Award of Oct. 12, 2005, par. 52 warned that a teleological interpretation should not simply 
lead to an interpretation of bilateral investment treaties in dubio pro investore: “While it is not 
permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of 
investors, here such an interpretation is justified.” (emphasis added).    
22  See Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 93 et seq. (2005) (discerning the three lines of 
reasoning subsequently addressed).  
23  See, for example, Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), par. 118, stressing that “[a] judg-
ment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it must depend on the facts 
of the particular case”.   
24  See, for example, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial 
Award of Nov. 13, 2000, par. 134.   
25  See for example Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award of 30 April 2004, par. 89 et seq.  
26  Under general international law no doctrine of stare decisis exists, see Articles. 38(1)(d) and 
59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;  see also Verdross/Simma, Universelles 
Völkerrecht, p. 397 et seq. (3rd ed. 1984).  This general observation also holds true in the in-
vestment arbitration context.  Explicitly in this sense Art. 1136(1) NAFTA: “An award made 
by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect 
of the particular case.”  See also Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 53 
par. 15 (2001) (noting that in the preparatory works for the ICSID Convention nothing implies 
the applicability of a stare decisis rule).  Art. 53(1) ICSID-Convention that provides that “[t]he 
award shall be binding on the parties […]” can therefore be read as “binding only on the par-
ties”.   
 38 
ures based on the arbitrators’ personal conviction and understanding about what is 
fair and equitable.  The assumption that personal convictions, instead of prescriptive 
legal standards, play a major role in applying fair and equitable treatment is nou-
rished by the frequent reference to treatment that “shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of juridical propriety”27 as a yardstick for the standard’s application.28   
Similarly, legal scholarship has not provided much conceptual guidance.29  Like 
arbitral tribunals, commentators have not developed a definition or a methodological 
tool for concretizing fair and equitable treatment.  Above all, they have not at-
tempted to unite the vast jurisprudence under a comprehensive concept in order to 
give a fuller normative explanation of the standard’s content.  Mostly, they concede 
that no agreement on the exact meaning of the principle exists30 and largely confine 
themselves to describing the existing case law in order to extract contextual ele-
ments of fair and equitable treatment31 or attribute to it the function of a gap-filling 
device for judging host state conduct that cannot be subsumed under other, possibly 
more precise, investment treaty guarantees.32  Some commentators therefore suggest 
that fair and equitable treatment constitutes “an intentionally vague term, designed 
to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules ne-
 
27  See for example Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v. The United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of May 29, 2003, par. 154 (quoting the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. 
Italy), Judgment of July 20, 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15, par. 128).  See for a criticism of the 
ICJ’s test for arbitrariness in the ELSI case Hamrock, The ELSI Case: Toward an International 
Definition of “Arbitrary” Conduct, 27 Tex. Int’l L. J. 837, 849 et seq. (1992) (highlighting the 
prevalence of subjective elements in the Court’s test).  
28  See UNCTAD (supra note 8), p. 10 (noting the “inherently subjective” trait of the concepts of 
fairness and equitableness);  see also Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 2 et seq. (mentioning 
the concern of “a number of governments […] that, the less guidance is provided for arbitra-
tors, the more discretion is involved and the closer the process resembles decisions ex aequo et 
bono, i.e [sic] based on the arbitrators’ notions of ‘fairness’and ‘equity’.”).  
29  See also Thomas, Reflections on Art. 1105 NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence 
of Commentators, 17 ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. L. J. 21, 51 et seq. (2002). (warning to attach 
too much weight to the opinions of commentators).  
30  Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005) (noting that “a review of some attempts at 
defining the standard may invite such thinking inasmuch as the approach is so general in na-
ture that the clause may appear to amount to a catch-all provision which may embrace a very 
broad number of governmental acts”);  Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 
364 (2005);  Choudhury (supra note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297, 298 (2005).  
31  Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 364 et seq. (2005) (stressing the specific 
fact situations considered as a violation of fair and equitable treatment);  Choudhury (supra 
note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297, 316 et seq. (2005) (providing a working definition of 
fair and equitable treatment that relies on the acceptance of several sub-elements of the stan-
dard in arbitral jurisprudence);  see also Thomas (supra note 29), 17 ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. 
L. J. 21, 59 et seq. (2002);  Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, p. 332 et 
seq. (2nd ed. 2004).  
32  Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 90 (2005).  Similarly Mann, British Treaties for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 241, 243 et seq. (1981) (under-
standing fair and equitable as an “overriding duty”).  
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cessary to achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular disputes”.33  Simi-
larly, other commentators support the view that the interpretative problems posed by 
the principle’s vagueness should be solved by simply letting tribunals do the work in 
developing more precise elements of fair and equitable treatment.34   
It is, however, questionable whether states intended such a broad delegation of 
powers to international tribunals.35  In addition, shifting the responsibility of concre-
tizing the meaning of fair and equitable treatment to arbitral tribunals is problematic.  
It does not only fail to meet the need for further guidance regularly uttered by some 
tribunals themselves.  More importantly, it is unsatisfactory from the perspective of 
host states that need to evaluate the way they exercise public authority without ha-
ving to pay damages for the violation of investment treaties.36  Likewise, it is unsa-
tisfactory from the perspective of foreign investors who desire a stable and predict-
able investment climate and need to know beforehand against which political risks 
and government interferences they are protected by the respective investment treaty.  
Unpredictable, or worse arbitrary, outcomes of arbitration proceedings will not only 
dissatisfy the parties involved, but may overall chill the efficiency of investment 
arbitration and the promotion of foreign investment.   
A missing conceptual understanding of fair and equitable treatment may also lead 
to inconsistent decisions in the field of investment protection, possibly lessening the 
stability and predictability necessary for foreign investment and fostering the frag-
mentation of international investment law.  A theoretic approach to the normative 
content of fair and equitable treatment may, therefore, not only clarify the concep-
tual foundations of the standard but is also crucial in order to generate a sustainable 
understanding of the rights and obligations of investors and host states that are criti-
cal to the very basis of international investment protection.  With respect to fair and 
equitable treatment a clearer delineation between investors’ rights and state sove-
reignty is thus needed.   
 
33  Brower, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Columb. J. 
Transnat’l L. 43, 56 (2003).  Similarly Franck (supra note 2), 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1589 
(2005);  Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice, p. 76 (1992).  See 
also Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 89 (2005) (suggesting that states deliberately in-
cluded this general standard as a gap-filling clause).   
34  See for example Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 365 (2005) (explaning 
that fair and equitable treatment “is susceptible of specification through judicial practice”.);  
Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 105 (2005) (concluding that the task with respect to 
fair and equitable treatment consists in “developing a body of jurisprudence tailored to the spe-
cific structures of foreign investment and acceptable to investors, the host state and the home 
state”.). 
35  Porterfield (supra note 1), 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 79, 103 et seq. (2006).  For the contrary 
view see supra note 33.   
36  Alternatively, host states may even abstain from regulation due to this insecurity.  International 
investment treaties would then result in a “regulatory chill”, possibly even in areas where regu-
lation is not only necessary but even in the interest of foreign investors.  In this sense see 
Franck, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v Republic of Ecuador, 99 A.J.I.L. 675, 678 
(2005).  
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C. Fair and Equitable Treatment as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law 
In this chapter the paper presents an attempt to provide a normative framework of 
analysis for the interpretation and application of fair and equitable treatment.  The 
argument forwarded is that fair and equitable treatment should properly be under-
stood as an embodiment of the concept of the rule of law (or Rechtsstaat in the 
German, état de droit in the French tradition).  The rule of law is a wide-spread 
concept of positive law that can be found with similar characteristics in most legal 
systems that adhere to liberal constitutionalism.37  Relying on a common tradition,38 
the main thrust of the rule of law is the aspiration to subject public power to legal 
control39 and can be paraphrased with the words of F. A. Hayek: “stripped of all 
technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair cer-
tainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to 
plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”.40   
The rule of law primarily refers to the formal quality of law as providing guid-
ance for human affairs and comprises the institutional aspiration that government 
has to use law as a means of exercising power.41  First, the rule of law translates into 
procedural requirements for the deployment of legal processes42 and mandates that 
“individuals whose interests are affected by the decisions of […] officials have cer-
tain rights”, such as “the right to a hearing before a decision is made, the right to 
have the decision made in an unbiased and impartial fashion, the right to know the 
basis of the decision so that it can be contested, the right to reasons for the official’s 
decision, and the right to a decision that is reasonably justified by all relevant legal 
and factual considerations.”43  Hence, the rule of law requires that the affected indi-
vidual is recognized as a subject with certain rights which have to be taken into 
account in the decision making process of public authorities.  In addition to the re-
cognition of procedural rights, the rule of law is often also at the origin of the idea of 
 
37  See Schulze-Fielitz, in: Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz – Kommentar, Art. 20 par. 5 et seq. (vol. II 
1998).  
38  See on the development of the rule of law against its politico-philosophical background Ta-
manaha, On the Rule of Law – History, Politics, Theory (2004).  
39  Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 127, 130 (2005);  similarly Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Con-
cept (in Florida)?, 21 Law & Philosophy 137, 158 (2002);  Hesse, Der Rechtsstaat im Verfas-
sungssystem des Grundgesetzes, in: Forsthoff (ed.), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, 
p. 557, 560 et seq. (1968).  As such, it should also be distinguished from other concepts of 
good and desirable government, such as human rights, democracy or justice;  see Raz, The 
Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Quart. Rev. 195 et seq. (1977). 
40  Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 54 (1944).  
41  See Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Columb. L. Rev. 
1, 14 et seq. (1997) on the formalist ideal in the rule of law.  
42  See Fallon (supra note 41), 97 Columb. L. Rev. 1, 18 et seq. (1997) on the legal process ideal 
understanding of the rule of law.  
43  Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 129 (2005).  
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proportionality, referring to the proper balance that has to be struck between the 
interests of the individual and competing public interests.44  Secondly, the rule of 
law has implications for the institutional design of government.  It mandates a basic 
separation of powers and the possibility to seek review of public acts by an inde-
pendent judiciary.45  Essentially it is this primarily formal understanding of the rule 
of law that prevails in many domestic legal traditions.46  
In this sense, fair and equitable treatment can be understood as a rule of law stan-
dard that the legal systems of host states have to embrace as a standard for the treat-
ment of foreign investors.  While this may not seem much of a concretization given 
different historic developments and thrusts of the rule of law in different national 
legal systems and in light of the fact that the exact content and the requirements of 
the rule of law are often debated,47 it nevertheless seems to constitute a viable ap-
proach to explain the normative content of fair and equitable treatment.  A compara-
tive analysis of municipal law reveals certain common ideas and standards that can 
be transferred to the international level and help to identify the paradigm features a 
state has to conform to in order to comply with the notion of “fairness and equit-
ableness” in international investment law.  Arguably, a comparative approach also 
constitutes a suitable methodological approach for the standard’s interpretation and 
renders the outcome of investment disputes more predictable.   
I. Principles Derived from Fair and Equitable Treatment 
In view of the existing arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equitable treatment, seven 
specific normative principles can be discerned that occur in recurring fashion in the 
reasoning of arbitral tribunals and are presented as elements of fair and equitable 
treatment.  These principles are (1) the requirement of stability, predictability and 
consistency of the legal framework, (2) the principle of legality, (3) the protection of 
investor confidence or legitimate expectations, (4) procedural due process and denial 
of justice, (5) substantive due process or protection against discrimination and arbi-
trariness, (6) the requirement of transparency and (7) the requirement of reasonable-
 
44  See on this thrust that has been developed particularly in the German tradition and has been 
taken up in the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice infra note 110.  
45  Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 130 et seq. (2005). 
46  See on the primarily formal tradition in Germany for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), 
Art. 20 par. 13 et seq.  Similarly, the due-process clause of the U.S. Constitution has mainly 
found a procedural interpretation;  see Shell, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie in den USA, 
in: Tohidipur (ed.), Der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat, p. 377 et seq. (1978).  See also Kantor (supra 
note 14) on the decline of the substantive understanding of due process in the U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and its emphasis on procedure.  
47  See only Waldron (supra note 39), 21 Law & Philosophy 137 (2002).  
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ness and proportionality.  These principles also figure prominently as sub-elements 
or expressions of the broader concept of the rule of law in domestic legal systems.  
1. Stability, Predictability, Consistency 
International investment treaties in general seek to enhance the stability of the in-
vestment climate and reduce political risk.48  Accordingly, one aspect that is recur-
rently invoked by investment tribunals as part of fair and equitable treatment is the 
concept of stability, predictability and consistency of the host state’s legal frame-
work.  Based on the preamble in the United States-Argentina BIT that provides “that 
fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable 
framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic re-
sources”, the Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina, for example, found that “there can be no 
doubt […] that a stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair 
and equitable treatment”.49  On this basis, the Tribunal found that the Argentine 
emergency legislation in 2001/2002 which entirely and permanently transformed the 
legal framework of the privatized gas sector violated fair and equitable treatment.50  
Likewise, the Tribunal in OEPC v. Ecuador held that “[t]he stability of the legal and 
business framework is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”.51   
Similarly, the predictability of the legal framework governing the activity of fo-
reign investors is frequently considered as an element of fair and equitable treat-
ment.  The Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, based its finding of a vio-
lation of Art. 1105(1) NAFTA inter alia on the argument that Mexico “failed to 
ensure a […] predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and invest-
ment”.52  The predictability of the legal framework was also evoked by the Tribunal 
in Tecmed v. Mexico when stressing that the foreign investor needs to “know be-
forehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as 
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices and directives, to be 
able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations”.53  Accordingly, a lack 
 
48  Rubins/Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution, p. 1 et seq. 
(2005).  See also CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of June 17, 2003, par. 28 
(regarding bilateral investment treaties as one of the “expressions of the search for stability and 
legal certainty” in international economic relations).   
49  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 274.   
50  See for a fuller analysis of the case Schill, From Calvo to CMS: Burying an International Law 
Legacy – Argentina’s Currency Reform in the Face of Investment Protection: The ICSID Case 
CMS v. Argentina, 3 SchiedsVZ/German Arb. J. 285 (2005).  
51  See Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award of July 1, 2004, par. 183.   
52  See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award of Aug. 30, 2000, par. 99.  
53  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.   
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of clarity of the legal framework or excessively vague rules can violate fair and 
equitable treatment.54 
Finally, the concept of consistency plays an important role in the arbitral jurispru-
dence on fair and equitable treatment.  The Tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
for example, stressed this connection when it underscored that fair and equitable 
treatment could be violated if domestic agencies acted inconsistently in applying 
domestic legislation.55  Similarly, in MTD v. Chile the Tribunal found a violation of 
fair and equitable treatment due to “the inconsistency of action between two arms of 
the same Government vis-à-vis the same investor”.56  Likewise, the Tribunal in 
Tecmed v. Mexico emphasized the need of consistency in the decision-making of a 
national agency in order to conform to fair and equitable treatment.57   
These lines of argument run parallel to one of the central elements the concept of 
the rule of law is associated with in domestic legal systems: legal certainty and legal 
security (Rechtssicherheit).58  This element of the rule of law refers to the core as-
pect of normativity of law that allows individuals to adapt their behavior to the re-
quirements of the legal order and form stable social relationships.  Especially in the 
commercial context stability is a critical component for long-term investment.  Legal 
security requires a certain stability of the legal order, legal certainty calls for pre-
dictable and understandable rules and their consistent application.  This interpreta-
tion notably conforms with the object and purpose of international investment trea-
ties, as stability, predictability and consistency are necessary for investors in order to 
plan and calculate their investment and adjust to the legal framework in the host 
country.  
Yet, one has to be aware that stability and predictability of domestic law can only 
relate to the normal deployment of governmental law- and policy-making and, paral-
lel to the function of the rule of law in domestic constitutional law, should not be 
 
54  See for example OEPC v. Ecuador (supra note 51), par. 184 (criticizing the vagueness of a 
change in the domestic tax law that did not “provid[e] any clarity about its meaning and ex-
tent”).  
55  Lauder v. Czech Republic (supra note 13), par. 292 et seq.  In the case at hand, a regulatory 
agency had commenced an administrative proceeding against a television broadcasting com-
pany for non-compliance with the domestic Media Law due to allegedly unauthorized broad-
casting without the necessary license.  The Tribunal declined to find a violation of fair and     
equitable treatment by arguing that there were understandable grounds why the agency had ini-
tiated administrative proceedings.  It also pointed out that inconsistent conduct of domestic 
agencies could not be assumed if the conduct consisted in enforcing domestic law, unless there 
was a specific undertaking to refrain from doing so.   
56  MTD v. Chile (supra note 18), par. 163.  
57  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154, 162 et seq.  See also OEPC v. Ecuador (supra note 
51), par. 184.  
58  As such it is recognized, mostly as a constitutional standard, in many domestic legal systems.  
See for its implementation in the German Constitution Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 
par. 117 et seq.;  see Fallon (supra note 41), 97 Columb. L. Rev. 1, 14 et seq. (1997) with ref-
erences to U.S. constitutional practice;  more generally, see also Raz (supra note 39), 93 L. 
Quart. Rev. 195, 198 (1977).  
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understood as an absolute requirement that would allow foreign investors to be ef-
fectively excluded from regulatory changes in the host state.59  Accordingly, stability 
and predictability should not be misunderstood as a guarantee that the legal frame-
work will never change or even serve as a business guarantee to investment pro-
jects.60  Likewise, the stability of the legal order will vary with the circumstances 
host states might have to react to: a serious crisis or even an emergency situation 
may call for different reactions than the deployment of public power in the normal 
course of things.61  Concerning consistency, one should be aware that domestic 
regulatory frameworks are never completely free of inconsistencies.62  A violation of 
this sub-element should therefore be handled in a prudent manner.  
2. Legality 
Fair and equitable treatment has also been interpreted by arbitral tribunals as inclu-
ding the principle of legality.  In various cases tribunals based their assessment of 
fair and equitable treatment on an appreciation of whether domestic actors obeyed 
national legal provisions governing the conduct in question.  Although tribunals 
diverge on the question to which extent the correct application of domestic law is 
subject to scrutiny by arbitral tribunals, their jurisprudence is consistent in holding 
that a violation of domestic law can constitute a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment.63  This obligation applies to the domestic judiciary as well as to adminis-
 
59  In this sense also Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 105 (2005). 
60  See only Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Award of Nov. 13, 2000, par. 64 (“emphasiz[ing] that Bilateral Investment Treaties are not in-
surance policies against bad business judgments”);  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. The United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of Dec. 16, 2002, par. 112 (noting 
“that not every business problem experienced by a foreign investor is an indirect or creeping 
expropriation under Article 1110, or a denial of due process or fair and equitable treatment un-
der Article 1110(1)(c)”).  
61  See, for example, the ELSI Case (supra note 27), par. 74: “Clearly the right [to control and 
manage a company] cannot be interpreted as a sort of warranty that the normal exercise of con-
trol and management shall never be disturbed.  Every system of law must provide, for exam-
ple, for interferences with the normal exercise of rights during public emergencies and the 
like.”  
62  Franck (supra note 36), 99 A.J.I.L. 675, 678 (2005).  
63  Although some tribunals held that a violation of domestic law in itself is not a violation of fair 
and equitable treatment, such as ADF v. United States (supra note 11) (stressing explicitly that 
“something more than simple illegality or lack of authority under the domestic law of a State is 
necessary to render an act or measure inconsistent with the customary international law re-
quirements of Article 1105(1)”), I rather do not interpret this as requiring an additional or 
qualified violation of domestic law but instead see this as a question of the standard of review 
of international tribunals that may depend on the procedural posture of the case, the applicable 
law, the question whether local remedies were exhausted etc.   
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trative agencies, and has even been alluded to concerning the question whether the 
activity of the domestic legislator was in conformity with the national constitution.64   
In Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, one factor for the Tribunal’s finding of a 
violation of fair and equitable treatment was the apparent misapplication of a con-
struction law by a local municipality.65  Similarly, in Pope & Talbot v. Canada the 
Tribunal relied on the lack in competence of a domestic agency for initiating admi-
nistrative proceedings against a foreign investor.  Instead of relying “on naked asser-
tions of authority and on threats that the Investment’s allocation could be cancelled, 
reduced or suspended for failure to accept verification”, the Tribunal emphasized 
that “before seeking to bludgeon the Investment into compliance, the SLD [i. e. the 
administrative agency] should have resolved any doubts on the issue and should 
have advised the Investment of the legal basis for its actions”.66  Here, the failure to 
produce a legal basis for the administrative proceedings under domestic law was 
therefore taken into account as one aspect for the violation of fair and equitable 
treatment.   
Fair and equitable treatment was also interpreted to include an obligation to apply 
domestic law.  In GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico the Tribunal deduced from fair 
and equitable treatment an obligation to not only abide by but also to enforce exis-
ting provisions of national law.67  Similarly, in Tecmed v. Mexico the Tribunal un-
derscored that host states have to make use of “the legal instruments that govern the 
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments”.68   
The connection between fair and equitable treatment and the principle of legality 
does, however, not only become apparent when domestic decision-makers violate 
municipal laws.  On the contrary, the observance of domestic legal rules is often 
relied upon by tribunals in order to deny a violation of fair and equitable treatment.  
In Noble Ventures v. Romania, for example, the Tribunal observed that certain bank-
ruptcy proceedings “were initiated and conducted according to the law and not 
against it”69 and accordingly denied a violation of fair and equitable treatment.  
Similarly, in Lauder v. Czech Republic the Tribunal emphasized that a violation of 
fair and equitable treatment was usually excluded in case of a “regulatory body 
taking the necessary actions to enforce the law”.70  
 
64  See CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 119 et seq.  
65  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 93.  
66  Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Mer-
its of Phase 2 of April 10, 2001, par. 174 et seq.  
67  GAMI Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, UN-
CITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of Nov. 15, 2004, par. 91: “It is in this sense that a govern-
ment’s failure to implement or abide by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign 
investor may but will not necessarily lead to a violation of Article 1105.”   
68  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.   
69  Noble Ventures v. Romania (supra note 21), par. 178.  
70  Lauder v. Czech Republic (supra note 13), par. 297.  
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The decisions therefore clearly consider the principle of legality as an element of 
fair and equitable treatment.  The principle of legality also finds its counterpart in 
rule of law concepts that encompass the requirement that public power derives its 
authority from a legal basis and is exercised along the lines of pre-established pro-
cedural and substantive rules.71  The principle of legality should, however, not dis-
tract from the fact that fair and equitable treatment does not simply buttress the ap-
plication of domestic law and provide a claim of the foreign investor against the host 
state to apply its domestic law correctly.  Rather, fair and equitable treatment re-
mains an independent standard of international law against which the domestic legal 
order is measured.   
3. Protection of Confidence and Legitimate Expectations 
While the principle of legality is closely related to the idea that the executive and the 
judicial branch of government have to obey the law enacted by the legislator, legal 
rules are only able to have a stabilizing function for social relationships and create 
the basis of an environment conducive to long-term investment when they are ap-
plied according to how a reasonable investor would expect them to be applied.  The 
ordering function of law therefore requires taking into account the perceptions of the 
law’s subject and their expectations vis-à-vis government activity.   
Accordingly, the concept of legitimate expectations is emerging as another 
prominent sub-element of fair and equitable treatment in arbitral practice.  The Tri-
bunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic referred to the concept of legitimate expectations 
even as “the dominant element of that standard”.72  Its existence can also be traced 
as an element of the rule of law in domestic legal systems73 and as a concept of ge-
neral international law.74  Its main thrust in this context is the protection of confi-
dence against administrative and legislative conduct.  In this sense, the Tribunal in 
 
71  In the German constitutional tradition this element of the rule of law is designated as “Gesetz-
mäßgkeit der Verwaltung” and “Vorrang des Gesetzes”.  See Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), 
Art. 20 par. 83 et seq.  
72  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), 301.  
73  See Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 133 et seq. (2005) with refe-
rence to case law in Australia and the UK;  Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 134 et 
seq. concerning German Constitutional Law; Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Adminis-
trative Law (2000) on English, French and EC/EU law;  Dyer, Legitimate Expectations in Pro-
cedural Fairness after Lam, in: Groves (ed.), Law and Government in Australia, p. 184 et seq. 
(2005) on Australian law; see also Woehrling, Le Principe de Confiance Légitime dans la Ju-
risprudence des Tribunaux, in: Bridge (ed.), Comparative Law Facing the 21st Century, p. 815 
et seq. (1998) summarizing a comparative study by the XVth International Congress of Com-
parative Law, Bristol/UK in 1998.  
74  See Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (1971).  See more specifically in the context of 
the law of expropriation of aliens Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of 
Alien Property, 75 A.J.I.L. 553, 579 et seq. (1981).   
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Tecmed v. Mexico held that fair and equitable treatment requires “provid[ing] to 
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that 
were taken into account by the foreign investors to make the investment”.75  Simi-
larly, the Tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico 
explained that “the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ relates […] to a situation 
where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations 
on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that 
a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor 
(or investment) to suffer damages”.76  
Legitimate expectations can result from a number of actions that are attributable 
to the host state.77 In the first place, a breach of legitimate expectations will come 
into play if there is conduct “in breach of representations made by the host State 
which were reasonably relied on by the [investor]”.78  They can result, for example, 
from opinions and statements released by administrative agencies about the applica-
tion of domestic law.79   
It is, however, not necessary that expectations were induced by administrative ac-
tion that was individually directed towards a foreign investor.  Legitimate expecta-
tions can also originate from the provisions of the general regulatory framework 
which a host state has set into place80 as long as the confidence the framework ge-
 
75  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.  The Tribunal’s approach was also taken up in a 
number of other cases.  See ADF v. United States (supra note 11), par. 189;  MTD v. Chile (su-
pra note 18), par. 114 et seq.;  OEPC  v. Ecuador (supra note 51), par. 185;  CMS v. Argentina 
(supra note 13), par. 279;  Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award of Aug. 19, 2005, 
par. 235, 241.  
76  International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UN-
CITRAL/NAFTA, Arbitral Award of Jan. 26, 2006, par. 147 (internal citation omitted).  
77  See on the connection between the expectations and government conduct ADF v. United States 
(supra note 11), par. 189, where the Tribunal declined to find a violation of Art. 1105(1) 
NAFTA in a case where the claimant argued that existing case law suggested that an agency 
would have to grant a waiver from a statutory local content requirement, noting that “any ex-
pectations that the Investor had with respect to the relevancy or applicability of the case law it 
cited were not created by any misleading representations made by authorized officials of the 
U.S. Federal Government but rather, it appears probable, by legal advice received by the Inves-
tor from private U.S. counsel.”  
78  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98.  Similarly CME Czech Republic B.V. v. 
The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of Sept. 13, 2001, par. 611 (arguing that the 
Respondent “breached its obligation of fair and equitable treatment by eviscerations of the ar-
rangements in reliance upon which the foreign investor was induced to invest”).  
79  In International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76) the investor wanted to set up a 
gaming business in Mexico and sought a statement of the competent agency as to whether its 
gaming machines were in conformity with Mexican law that prohibited gambling and luck-
related games.   The Tribunal did, however, not consider the opinion given by the administra-
tive agency as sufficiently specific so as to form the basis of legitimate expectations.  See also 
Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 85 et seq. (concerning the violation of fair and equi-
table treatment pursuant to the (incorrect) statement of a government agency that the permits 
necessary to start building a waste landfill had been obtained).  
80  See GAMI v. Mexico (supra note 67), par. 100.  
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nerated is sufficiently specific.  In this context, the concept of legitimate expecta-
tions as an element of the rule of law may even restrict the domestic legislator in its 
decision-making concerning changes of the regulatory framework.  This was the 
case in the dispute in CMS v. Argentina, where the regulatory framework the foreign 
investor relied upon when making his investment was permanently and fundamen-
tally altered at a later stage.81   
The concept entails, however, the danger that domestic legal orders and the ac-
tions of host states are exclusively measured against the expectations of foreign 
investors.  Although the legitimacy of expectations already limits the scope of the 
concept,82 it should not be handled as an inflexible and absolute yard-stick.  Instead, 
tribunals should allow for a certain flexibility for host states to react, for example 
but not exclusively, to emergency situations.  Accordingly, the Tribunal in Eureko v. 
Poland suggested that the breach of basic expectations was not a violation of fair 
and equitable treatment if good reasons existed why the expectations of the investor 
could not be met.83  Similarly, the Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic specifically 
warned of the danger of taking the idea of the investor’s expectation too literally 
since this would “impose upon host States’ [sic] obligations which would be inap-
propriate and unrealistic”.84  Instead, the Tribunal set out to balance the investor’s 
legitimate expectations and the host state’s interests within a broader proportionality 
test.  It reasoned:  
“No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the investment is made remain totally unchanged.  In order to determine whether 
frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the 
host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest must be taken into consideration as well. […]  
The determination of a breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore re-
quires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the 
one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.   
A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in any case properly expect that 
the Czech Republic implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it 
affects the investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that 
such conduct does not manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, transpa-
rency, even-handedness and non-discrimination.  In particular, any differential 
treatment of a foreign investor must not be based on unreasonable distinctions and 
demands, and must be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to 
 
81  See specifically on the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of this case Co-
stamagna, Investors' Rights and State Regulatory Autonomy: the Role of the Legitimate Ex-
pectation Principle in the CMS v. Argentina Case, 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 6 et seq. 
(available via http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com).  
82  See Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304.  
83  See Eureko v. Poland (supra note 75), par. 232 et seq.  
84  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304.  
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rational policies not motivated by a preference for other investments over the fo-
reign-owned investment.”85 
Overall, the concept of legitimate expectations therefore offers sufficient flexibil-
ity to reconcile the interests of foreign investors and host states.  The aim of achiev-
ing a balance between the protection of confidence and legitimate expectations and 
the public interest can also be mirrored in the concept of protection of confidence 
under domestic legal systems.86  
4. Administrative Due Process and Denial of Justice 
Several cases interpreted fair and equitable treatment so as to include the concept of 
due process.  Due process, in this context, mainly comes in two forms: administra-
tive and judicial due process.87  It is thus closely connected to the proper administra-
tion of civil and criminal justice.88  Recently, both an explicit reference to due pro-
cess and the concept of denial of justice as part of fair and equitable treatment have 
been included in the treaty practice of the United States.  Art. 10.5(2)(a) of the The 
Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement, for 
instance, stipulates that  
“fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the prin-
ciple of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world”.89 
Even absent this explicit reference, investment tribunals have interpreted fair and 
equitable treatment in this way.  The Tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico, for 
instance, defined a violation of fair and equitable treatment as “involv[ing] a lack of 
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety – as might be the 
case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete 
lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process.”90  Similarly, for the 
 
85  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 305 et seq.   
86  See, for example, on the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court Schulze-Fielitz 
(supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 139 et seq. 
87  The national legislator, so far, has not been subjected to any due process notions in investment 
arbitration.  This could, however, be conceivable in the context of legislative expropriations 
since most BITs explicitly require host states to grant affected investors due process.  See Dol-
zer/Stevens (supra note 20), p. 106 et seq. (1995).  
88  See comprehensibly on the closely related concept of denial of justice in international law 
Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005).   
89  The Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 
Aug. 5, 2004, available at  http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Section 
_Index.html.  Similar provi sions can be found in a number of other recently concluded and 
currently negotiated free trade agreement of the United States, see Kantor (supra note 14).  
90  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98.  
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Tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada fair and equitable treatment, among other ele-
ments, included “the international law requirements of due process”.91   
The main thrust of the due process requirement in investment treaty arbitration is 
to establish procedural rights for investors in administrative proceedings.  This was 
emphasized by the Tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico that 
held that the proceedings of a government agency “should be tested against the stan-
dards of due process and procedural fairness applicable to administrative officials”.92  
Fair and equitable treatment is, however, equally relevant for the discharge of judi-
cial proceedings.93  In this context the standard can be violated “if Claimants were 
denied access to the courts […] or if the Claimants were treated unfairly in those 
courts (denial of procedural justice) or if the judgment of those courts were substan-
tively unfair (denial of substantive justice)”.94   
5. Protection against Arbitrariness and Discrimination 
The protection of foreign investors against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment 
also plays a major role in the operation of fair and equitable treatment.  While some-
times international investment treaties contain a specific provision prohibiting such 
treatment, arbitral tribunals also ground this aspect in the concept of fair and equit-
able treatment.  The connection between arbitrariness and the concept of the rule of 
law has been explicitly drawn by the decision of the International Court of Justice in 
the ELSI Case.  Considering whether the requisition by the Mayor of Palermo of a 
foreign-owned factory in order to prevent its closure and the layoff of around 1000 
workers, the Court observed that 
“[a]rbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something 
opposed to the rule of law.  This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum 
case, when it spoke of ‘arbitrary action’ being ‘substituted for the rule of law’.  It is 
wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of juridical propriety.”95 
Although the case arose under the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty 
between the United States and Italy, the decision has been widely accepted as being 
relevant for the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment in international invest-
 
91  S.D. Myers v. Canada (supra note 24), par. 134.   
92  International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76), par. 200.   
93  See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux  v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of Nov. 21, 2000, par. 80;  The Loewen Group, 
Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award of June 26, 2003, par. 132;  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 132.  
94  Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina (supra note 93), par. 80.  
95  ELSI Case (supra note 27), par. 128 (internal citations omitted).   
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ment treaties.96 The reason for this may be that arbitrary conduct can essentially be 
regarded as a qualified violation of the requirement to act in accordance with domes-
tic law.  Arbitrary conduct therefore can be seen as a sufficient but not as a neces-
sary requirement for the violation of fair and equitable treatment.  It can also be 
linked to the requirement under fair and equitable treatment to act in good faith.97   
The nexus between fair and equitable treatment and the prohibition of discrimina-
tory treatment has been emphasized in Loewen v. United States.  Here, the Tribunal 
stated that fair and equitable treatment is violated by “[a] decision which is in breach 
of municipal law and is discriminatory against the foreign litigant”.98  Similarly, the 
Tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico elaborated that “fair and equitable treat-
ment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if 
the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and 
exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice”.99   
Other tribunals suggest drawing a clearer distinction between fair and equitable 
treatment and the prohibition of discriminatory conduct.  They emphasize that 
“[c]ustomary international law does not […] require that a state treat all aliens (and 
alien property) equally, or that it treats aliens as favourable as nationals”.100  They 
only consider a violation of fair and equitable treatment if the investor was “specifi-
cally targeted” or if the differential treatment amounted to bad faith.101   
 
96  See for example Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 371;  Waste Management v. Mexi-
co (supra note 25), par. 98;  Noble Ventures v. Romania (supra note 21), par. 176.   
97  See Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 138: “A basic obligation of the State 
under Article 1105(1) is to act in good faith and form, and not deliberately to set out to destroy 
or frustrate the investment by improper means”;  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 
367: “Acts that would violate [fair and equitable treatment] would include acts showing a wil-
ful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even 
subjective bad faith.”  See also Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.  
98  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 135.  
99  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98;  similarly Eureko v. Poland (supra note 
75), par. 233 (finding that the state “acted not for cause but for purely arbitrary reasons linked 
to the interplay of Polish politics and nationalistic reasons of a discriminatory character” and 
therefore breached fair and equitable treatment).  S.D. Myers v. Canada (supra note 24), par. 
266, also draws a parallel between national treatment and the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard when stating: “Although […] the Tribunal does not rule out the possibility that there 
could be circumstances in which a denial of the national treatment provisions of the NAFTA 
would not necessarily offend the minimum standard provisions, a majority of the Tribunal de-
termines that on the facts of this particular case the breach of Article 1102 essentially estab-
lishes a breach of Article 1105 as well.” 
100  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 368;  similarly Methanex Corporation v. United 
States of America, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of Aug. 3, 2005, Part IV - Chapter C 
par. 25.  
101  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 369 and 371.  
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6. Transparency 
A few cases have based a violation of fair and equitable treatment on a lack of trans-
parency.  The Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, found that the respon-
dent breached Art. 1105 NAFTA because “Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment”.102  In a 
similar manner, the Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico connected the element of legiti-
mate expectations to the requirement of transparency by stating:  
“The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free 
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so 
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices 
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. “103 
Especially, the decision in Metalclad v. Mexico has received major critique for in-
terpreting fair and equitable treatment as including a transparency requirement and 
has been set aside by the Supreme Court of Columbia exercising jurisdiction under 
the British Columbia International Arbitration Act for this reason.104  Yet, the Court 
seems to have over-interpreted the scope of the transparency requirement the Tribu-
nal deduced from fair and equitable treatment.105  Indeed, if transparency is consi-
dered to mean “that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, 
completing and successfully operating investments […] should be capable of being 
readily known to all affected investors” and requires the host state “to ensure that the 
correct position is promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors can pro-
ceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in 
accordance with all relevant laws”,106 such an onerous standard risks to “overstretch 
the position and function of administrative agencies by developing them into consul-
tative units and insurers for the implementation of foreign investment projects”.107   
Yet, a more restrictive reading of the transparency requirement seems equally 
possible and more closely related to the concept of the rule of law.  In the Tecmed-
 
102  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 99 (emphasis added).  
103  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154;  similarly Maffezini v. Spain (supra note 60), par. 
83.  
104  See Supreme Court of British Columbia, The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 
2001 BCSC 644, available via http://www.investmentclaims.com.  
105  In addition, it is questionable whether the domestic courts acted in conformity with the provi-
sions of NAFTA when entertaining a claim to set aside a NAFTA award.  See on this Brower, 
Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 
43  (2001).  
106  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 76 (for both citations).  
107  Schill, Revisiting a Landmark: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable Treatment in the 
ICSID Case Tecmed, 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 15 (available via http://www. transna-
tional-dispute-management.com);  for the original German version of this article see Schill, 
Völkerrechtlicher Investitions- und Eigentumsschutz in der ICSID-Entscheidung TECMED, 
in: 51 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 330 (2005).   
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case, for example, transparency mainly referred to procedural aspects of administra-
tive law, such as the requirement to give sufficient reasons108 and the obligation to 
act in a comprehensible and predictable way.109  Essentially, these statements only 
reiterate more general requirement of the rule of law that relate to the procedural 
position of foreign investors in administrative proceedings.  Transparency does 
therefore not necessarily have to be viewed as an additional substantive requirement, 
but rather as an instrument of procedurally resolving uncertainty in the domestic law 
and closely interacts with the burden of proof.  As a matter of procedural fairness 
complete uncertainties of domestic law should not be imposed to the detriment of 
the foreign investor who is less accustomed to the general legal and political culture 
of the host state.   In that sense it is fully compatible with a procedural understand-
ding of the rule of law and does not impose obligations upon host states to counsel 
foreign investors or provide them with comprehensive legal advice.  
7. Reasonableness and Proportionality 
Finally, arbitral tribunals often link fair and equitable treatment to the concept of 
reasonableness and proportionality.  Such criteria also play an important role as part 
of the rule of law in many domestic legal systems, the law of the European Union 
 
108  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 123: “administrative decisions must be duly 
grounded in order to have, among other things, the transparency required so that persons that 
disagree with such decisions may challenge them through all the available legal remedies.”  
Similarly, Tecmed v. Mexico, par. 164.  
109  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 160: “The incidental statements as to the Landfill’s 
relocation in the correspondence exchanged between INE and Cytrar or Tecmed […] cannot be 
considered to be a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of the Mexican authorities to 
change their position as to the extension of the Permit so long as Cytrar’s business was not re-
located, nor can it be considered an explicit, transparent and clear warning addressed to Cytrar 
from the Mexican authorities that rejected conditioning the revocation of the Permit to the re-
location of Cytrar’s operations at the Landfill to another place”.  
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and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.110  Its function, how-
ever, mainly consists in controlling the extent to which interferences of host states 
with foreign investments are permitted.  In this light, the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot 
v. Canada repeatedly referred to the reasonableness of the conduct of an administra-
tive agency in order to decline a violation of fair and equitable treatment.111  The 
mitigating role of the principle of proportionality has also been applied in the deci-
sion in Saluka v. Czech Republic as a way to balance the host state’s interest in up-
holding the stability of its banking sector with the expectations of the foreign inves-
tor.112   
Another award that used proportionality as a concept restricting generally permis-
sible interferences with foreign investments is the decision in Tecmed v. Mexico.  
Here, the Tribunal incorporated a proportionality test as a method to distinguish 
between a compensable indirect expropriation and a non-compensable regulation.113  
In the Tribunal’s reasoning an indirect expropriation occurs whenever a restriction 
of the right to property is disproportionate:   
“[T]he Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be 
characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to 
the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally 
granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a 
key role upon deciding the proportionality. […] There must be a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor 
and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”114  
Although integrating proportionality into the principle of fair and equitable treat-
ment allows to a certain extent for a substantive control of host state conduct, the 
 
110  See for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 167 et seq. on German constitu-
tional law where the proportionality principle arguably finds its origins in modern positive 
constitutional law.  See also Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(1999);  on proportionality as a principle in EU/EC law Emiliou, The Principle of Proportion-
ality in European Law, p. 23 et seq. (1996);  Nolte, General Principles of German and Euro-
pean Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historic Perspective, 191 Mod. L. Rev. 191 
(1994);  see also Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 Emory Int'l 
L. Rev. 465 (2005).  Proportionality is also a guiding principle in the interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, see van Dijk/van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, p. 80 et seq. (1998). Critical however concerning the 
scope of the proportionality requirement in U.S. constitutional law in particular concerning 
criminal law in the context of the Eighth Amendment see Ristroph, Proportionality as a Princi-
ple of Limited Government, 55 Duke L. J. 263 (2005) with further references;  see also on the 
hesitance in U.S. constitutional law to accept proportiona-lity as a general principle Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on 
“Proportionality”, Rights And Federalism, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 583 (1999).  
111  See Pope & Talbot v. Canada (supra note 66), par. 123, 125, 128, 155;  see also MTD v. Chile 
(supra note 18), par. 109 with a reference to an expert opinion by Schwebel.  
112  See above all Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304 et seq.   
113  Schill (supra note 107), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 9 et seq.  
114  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 122.  
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proportionality requirement also clarifies that fair and equitable treatment is not an 
inflexible standard, but allows for the balancing of the interests of host states and 
foreign investors.  As long as sufficient leeway is given for the implementation of 
domestic policies and as long as tribunals refrain from using it in order to establish 
an intrusive standard of review, proportionality constitutes a concept that helps to 
counter fears about the dominance of investors’ rights over the interests of host 
states.  Although the concept of proportionality as part of fair and equitable treat-
ment is still in its infancy, it helps to reconcile the interests of foreign investors with 
the necessary implementation of regulatory policies by host states.   
II. Contextualization of Fair and Equitable Treatment in the Separation        
of Powers Framework 
Although the elements arbitral tribunals have developed in order to concretize the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment are of a fairly general nature, they can be 
further concretized in regard of the discharge of public power by the domestic ad-
ministration, in domestic legal proceedings and national legislation.  Fair and equit-
able treatment, thus, develops into increasingly specific requirements that national 
legal systems have to incorporate in order to comply with international investment 
treaties.  Fair and equitable treatment therefore assumes a function that is compare-
able to domestic constitutional law, however with two modifications: it only consti-
tutes a special regime for foreign investors and, only entitling to damages in case the 
host state violates its treaty obligations, does not assume normative supremacy.   
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Administrative Law 
National administrative law is particularly prone to the influence of fair and equita-
ble treatment as foreign investors are affected by administrative proceedings at vari-
ous stages of an investment project, reaching from the application for and issuance 
of operating licenses to the general regulatory control and supervision of their under-
taking.  In this context, several sub-elements of the standard establish rule of law 
components that serve as a yardstick for domestic administrative law.  In this con-
text, fair and equitable treatment becomes a leitmotif for structuring the relationship 
between investors and national administrations.115  The rule of law elements that 
mainly influence domestic administrative law are the principle of legality, the pro-
tection of confidence and the requirement of due process.  These elements influence, 
for example, the structure and process of administrative decision-making, account 
 
115  Schill (supra note 107), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 13 et seq.   
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for procedural rights of foreign investors and may limit the exercise of administra-
tive discretion.   
a) Administrative Procedure 
With respect to administrative procedure, in particular concerning the granting, 
renunciation or renewal of operating licenses, fair and equitable treatment requires 
domestic administrations to grant foreign investors a fair hearing, conduct procee-
dings in a comprehensible way and give reasons for their decisions.  The right to a 
fair hearing and the right to participation in administrative proceedings played a role 
in the NAFTA case Metalclad v. Mexico where the Tribunal found a breach of fair 
and equitable treatment because the investor was not properly involved.  According 
to the Tribunal the investor should have been given the chance to participate in a 
meeting of a local town council that discussed whether a construction permit was to 
be given for the investor’s waste landfill.116  Similarly, the Tribunal in Tecmed v. 
Mexico emphasized the right to a fair hearing as part of fair and equitable treatment 
in the context of an administrative proceeding that concerned the non-prolongation 
of an operating license for a waste landfill.  It also stated that the standard required 
the national administration to take decisions about the requests of a foreign inves-
tor.117   
Fair and equitable treatment further obliges the domestic administration to give 
reasons for their decisions and base them on sufficient factual evidence.  The pur-
pose of this requirement is to rationalize the decision-making process and to secure 
that decisions are taken in accordance with the legal requirements contained in do-
mestic law.  Against this backdrop, the Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico determined 
that Mexico had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard because the 
Town Council’s decision to deny the construction permit was not grounded in con-
siderations concerning “construction aspects or flaws of the physical facility”118 but 
was mainly motivated by the opposition of the local population against the landfill.  
In the Tribunal’s view, the decision was therefore not supported by evidence per-
taining to legitimate criteria under the municipal construction law.  The requirement 
to supply sufficient evidence also results in a duty to conduct fact-finding and to 
verify evidence before a final decision is taken.  Furthermore, the requirement to 
give reasons aims at facilitating the legal review of an administrative decision.119  
 
116  The Tribunal particularly pointed out that “the permit was denied at a meeting of the Municipal 
Town Council of which Metalclad received no notice, to which it received no invitation, and at 
which it was given no opportunity to appear”, Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 91.  
117  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 161 et seq.  More specifically on the elements of a 
fair hearing required under fair and equitable treatment Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the 
Principles of International Economic Law, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 35, 79 et seq. (2003).   
118  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 93.  
119  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 123. 
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Overall, fair and equitable treatment therefore requires that domestic administrative 
proceedings conform to standards that are derived from a process-oriented under-
standing of the rule of law.120   
b) Exercise of Administrative Discretion 
Fair and equitable treatment can also restrict or channel the exercise of the admini-
stration’s discretionary power.  The standard requires administrative agencies to 
sufficiently take into account the effect of their decisions on foreign investors.  In 
addition, the element of consistency and the concept of legitimate expectations play 
an important role regarding the exercise of administrative discretion.   
The case in Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A. v. Egypt121 in-
volved the seizure and auctioning of the Claimant’s vessel in order to recover debts 
the investor had incurred in relation to a state entity.  Interestingly, the issue focused 
on the question whether the procedural implementation of the auction was valid, in 
particular whether sufficient notice of the seizure was given.122  Arguably in con-
formity with Egyptian law, the notice was given by attaching a copy of a distraint 
report to the vessel, because the Claimant could not be found onboard the ship.  The 
Tribunal, however, considered that the authority had wrongly exercised its discretion 
by using this in absentia notification instead of notifying the Claimant directly at his 
local address.  Relying on the principle of fair and equitable treatment in interpreting 
the due process requirement in the expropriation provision of the Greek-Egyptian 
BIT, the Tribunal reasoned that  
“a matter as important as the seizure and auctioning of a ship of the Claimant 
should have been notified by a direct communication […] irrespective of whether 
there was a legal duty or practice to do so by registered mail with return receipt”.123 
The exercise of administrative discretion can also be limited by the principle of 
consistency and the concept of legitimate expectations.  Consistency requires that 
administrative agencies exercise their discretion according to uniform standards and 
do not deviate from standard procedures or the usual assessment of comparable 
circumstances.  Consistency may not only influence administrative decision-making 
 
120  See for parallel developments of transnational administrative law in the context of administra-
tive proceedings in the EU/EC and similar developments under WTO law della Cananea, Be-
yond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 
Eur. Publ. L. 563 (2003).  
121  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/99/6, Award of April 12, 2002.  
122  The issue turned around the question whether the seizure yielded the requirement of due pro-
cess in the provision prohibiting direct and indirect expropriations without compensation in the 
Egyptian-Greek BIT and the principle of fair and equitable treatment.  
123  Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt (supra note 121), par. 143.  
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with respect to the granting of licenses,124 but can also restrict the intervention by 
administrative agencies in order to enforce domestic law.  If, for example, the do-
mestic administration has consistently tolerated a specific unlawful conduct, fair and 
equitable treatment may prevent them from intervening against a foreign investor 
who engaged in the same conduct.  Similarly, legitimate expectations of the investor 
can reduce the administration’s discretionary power.  Acting contrary to representa-
tions made by government officials, for instance, constitutes a breach of fair and 
equitable treatment.125   
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Judicial Proceedings 
The rule of law elements derived from fair and equitable treatment also influence the 
institutional structure of the host state’s judiciary and the procedural law they apply.  
Fair and equitable treatment requires that host states provide a fair and efficient 
system of justice,126 including effective judicial dispute settlement procedures for the 
review of administrative acts127 and dispute settlement between private parties.128  In 
Mondev v. United States the Tribunal, for example, entertained the possibility that 
“the conferral of a general immunity from suit for conduct of a public authority 
affecting a NAFTA investment could amount to a breach of Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA”.129  In Azinian v. Mexico the Tribunal pointed out that “a denial of justice 
could be pleaded if the relevant courts refused to entertain a suit, if they subject it to 
undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way”.130  Accor-
dingly, fair and equitable treatment grants a right to access to domestic courts for 
foreign investors.   
Similarly, the procedural law applied by domestic courts has to conform to the 
rule of law requirements stemming from fair and equitable treatment.  This requires 
 
124  See MTD v. Chile (supra note 18), par. 107 et seq.  
125  See International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76), par. 137 et seq.;  Metalclad 
v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 85 et seq.  
126  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 153 with further references.   
127  Cf, also Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 116: “the availability of local 
remedies to an investor faced with contractual braches is nonetheless relevant to the question 
whether a standard such as article 1105(1) have [sic] been complied with by the State.” 
128  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 129: “customary law is concerned with the denial 
of justice in litigation between private parties”; ibid., par. 123: “it [is] the responsibility of the 
State under international law and, consequently, of the courts of a State, to provide a fair trial 
of a case to which a foreign investor is a party.  It is the responsibility of the courts of a State 
to ensure that litigation is free from discrimination against a foreign litigant and that the for-
eign litigant should not become the victim of sectional or local prejudice.”  
129  See Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), par. 151 (concluding, however, that the immunity 
granted to a municipal authority in the case at hand was not a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment).   
130  Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award of Nov. 1, 1999, par. 102.   
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courts to entertain suits in a timely fashion, to give a fair hearing to the foreign in-
vestor on all essential questions, not to base a decision on unexpected legal grounds 
and give reasons for the decisions reached.131  In essence, concerning the judicial 
proceedings the obligations stemming from fair and equitable treatment will be 
similar to the obligations arising under human rights instruments, such as Art. 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.132   
3. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Legislation 
Finally, fair and equitable treatment also affects the way national legislation deals 
with foreign investors.133  Although domestic legislation is only rarely subject to the 
assessment of investment tribunals, mainly due to the fact that it often requires spe-
cific implementation by administrative or judicial decisions and does not affect 
foreign investors directly,134 fair and equitable treatment can result in significant 
restrictions of the domestic legislator, mainly based on the rule of law element of 
legitimate expectations or protection of confidence.   
So far the apparently only case that concerned the impact of fair and equitable 
treatment on the domestic legislator is the dispute in CMS v. Argentina.  Although 
the Tribunal emphasized that it “does not have jurisdiction over measures of general 
economic policy […] and cannot pass judgment on whether they are right or wrong 
[…] it has jurisdiction to examine whether specific measures affecting the       
Claimant’s investment or measures of general economic policy having a direct  
 
131  See Azinian v. Mexico (supra footnote 130), par. 102.  To a lesser extent fair and equitable 
treatment may also require the outcome of a legal decision to conform to substantive rule of 
law standards or, as expressed by the Tribunal in Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina (supra note 
93), par. 80: “substantive justice”. 
132  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
protocols, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  For this analogy see Mondev v. United States (su-
pra note 10), par. 144.  Compare also Art. 19(4) of the German Basic Law that provides for a 
guarantee to have judicial recourse against acts of public authority.  
133  Under general international law it is established that the internal law of a state cannot be in-
voked as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty, see Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.  As a consequence, the breach of an international obligation by the 
domestic legislator entails state responsibility since acts of the legislator can constitute interna-
tionally wrongful acts.  Art. 4(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.  See for fur-
ther authority International Law Commission, Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, Art. 4 par. 4 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments 
/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
134  Cf. on the question of the self-executing nature of expropriatory legislation Jahangir Mohtadi, 
et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 573-271-3 (2 Dec. 
1996), 32 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 124, 140 et seq.;  Reza Said Malek and The Government of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 534-193-3 (11 Aug. 1992), 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 246, 
266 et seq.  
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bearing on such investment have been adopted in violation of legally binding com-
mitments made to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts.”135   
On the merits, the Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina specified that transparency, con-
sistency in the governmental decision making process, orderly process and predict-
ability constituted the core elements of fair and equitable treatment also with respect 
to national legislation.136  Measures that entirely converted the existing legal frame-
work, such as the fundamental change in the U.S. dollar-based tariff calculation that 
the investor relied upon when making its initial investment decision, were found to 
breach fair and equitable treatment.  Arguably, the key factor in this context was the 
permanent abrogation of the existing tariff system that completely waived the cen-
tral promises made vis-à-vis the investor and breached his expectations.137   
Yet, the protection of confidence should not be interpreted as an absolute guaran-
tee.  Rather, as the Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic rightly pointed out, “[n]o 
investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged”.138  Although the stability of the legal 
framework is an essential factor for the investment decision of foreign investors, one 
cannot presume that host states denounced their right to legislate and change domes-
tic legal rules by entering into international investment treaties.  Concerning the 
concept of legitimate expectations, it therefore seems appropriate to draw a distinc-
tion between situations where a host state has incited specific confidence in the 
stability of certain regulations and situations where a foreign investor merely relied 
on the regulatory framework of the host state in a more general way.   
In the first case, the concept of legitimate expectations will find its genuine appli-
cation.  Not only are expectations in this context directly attributable to a host state, 
but moreover did the host state know about the specific weight the foreign investor 
placed on the regulatory infrastructure in making its investment decision.  Yet, ab-
sent specific commitments, legitimate expectations will not operate so as to prevent 
any changes in the regulatory framework.  Based on the principle of proportionality, 
in particular emergency situations may justify even severe interferences.139   
In the second case, where a foreign investor merely relies on the general legal 
framework without any specific commitments or intention on behalf of the host state 
to attract foreign investors, the concept of legitimate expectations may only have a 
more marginal scope of application.  It will mostly come into play with respect to 
legislation with a retroactive affect.140  Apart from that, it is difficult to imagine 
 
135  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 48), Decision on Jurisdiction, par. 33.  
136  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 276 et seq. with further references.  
137  See also Costamagna (supra note 81), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006), p. 6 et seq.  
138  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 305.  
139  Compare Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 38 Brit. 
Yb. Int’l L. 307, 331 (1962) (noting that in the context of expropriation the purpose of a host 
state’s conduct may justify “even severe, although by no means complete, restrictions on the 
use of property”).  
140  See for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 139 et seq.  
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cases of legislative regulatory change that violate fair and equitable treatment but do 
not at the same constitute measures with an expropriatory effect.   
III. Methodological Implications of the Rule of Law Approach  
Understanding fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of law does 
not only clarify its normative content, it also suggests a specific methodology in-
vestment tribunals should follow in concretizing the standard and in solving con-
flicts between the sometimes competing interests of host states and foreign inves-
tors.  Instead of primarily relying on prior arbitral decisions, an approach that is little 
helpful in particular when disputes concern novel circumstances, or positing the 
content of fair and equitable treatment in an abstract way without sufficient justifica-
tion, tribunals should use a comparative method that draws on domestic and interna-
tional law regarding the concept of the rule of law.  These bodies of law can eluci-
date the meaning and specific implications of rule of law requirements.   
1. Comparative Analysis of Domestic Legal Systems 
The first approach relies on a comparative approach to rule of law standards con-
tained in the major domestic legal systems that adhere to a liberal tradition.  This 
approach essentially relies on the attempt to extract general principles of law in 
order to concretize fair and equitable treatment.  This approach has also been pro-
posed in order to concretize the concept of indirect expropriation under international 
law and its distinction from non-compensable regulation.141  With respect to the 
concept of the rule of law, such an approach can be made equally fruitful for the 
application of fair and equitable treatment.  Arbitral tribunals should therefore en-
gage in a comparative analysis of the major domestic legal systems in order to grasp 
common features those legal systems establish for the exercise of public power.   
Such a comparative analysis may influence the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment mainly in two respects.  First, it may enable investment tribunals to posi-
tively deduce institutional and procedural requirements from the domestic rule of 
law standards for a context-specific interpretation of fair and equitable treatment.  A 
comparative analysis of domestic legal systems and their understanding of the rule 
of law may, for example, be used to justify the standards administrative proceedings 
 
141  Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht, p. 213 et seq. 
(1985);  Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Inv. L. J. 41 
(1986).  Similarly Salacuse/Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int'l L. J. 67, 115 (2005).   
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affecting foreign investors have to live up to.142  Secondly, a comparative analysis of 
the implications of the rule of law under domestic law may be used to justify the 
conduct of a state vis-à-vis a foreign investor under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.  If similar conduct, for instance the repudiation of an investor-state con-
tract in an emergency situation, is generally accepted by domestic legal systems as 
being in conformity with their understanding of the (national) rule of law, invest-
ment tribunals can transpose such findings to the level of international investment 
treaties as an expression of a general principle of law.   
2. Comparative Analysis of International Legal Regimes 
The second methodological approach relies on a cross-regime comparison with other 
international law regimes that incorporate rule of law standards.  A particularly 
promising field for such an approach is the comparative evaluation of the jurispru-
dence developed by international courts in the human rights context that address 
specific elements of the rule of law.  The primary example in this context is the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Art. 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  This provision can be viewed 
as an expression of a more general standard of an institutional and procedural under-
standing of the rule of law.143  The rich jurisprudence of the ECtHR could thus be 
used to further concretize fair and equitable treatment, for example with respect to 
the timely administration of justice or the right to a fair trial.144  Similarly, compara-
tive recourse could be had to the emerging principles of European administrative 
law145 or the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body in order to further develop 
the rule of law requirements with respect to the exercise of public power.146  The 
comparative analysis of rule of law understandings under both domestic legal sys-
 
142  See also della Cananea (supra note 120), 9 Eur. Publ. L. 563, 575 (2003) (explaining that the 
WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimps Case has “subsumed from national legal orders some 
general or ‘global’ principles of administrative law” in order to impose procedural rule of law 
elements on the exercise of public power by WTO Member States).  
143  This approach has occasionally already played a role in investment arbitration. See Mondev v. 
United States (supra note 10), where parallels were considered between Art. 7 ECHR (freedom 
from non-retrospective effect of penal legislation) and Art. 1105 NAFTA (par. 138) and be-
tween the assessment of granting immunity to a state agency under Art. 1105 NAFTA and Art. 
6 ECHR (par. 141 et seq.).  Another example of an investment tribunal that drew a parallel be-
tween the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the context of indirect expropriation is Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), 
par. 166, 122.   
144  For an account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Art. 6 
ECHR, see van Dijk/van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, p. 391 et seq. (1998).  
145  See, for example, Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (2nd ed. 2005).  
146  See della Cananea (supra note 120), 9 Eur. Publ. L. 563, 575 (2003).  
 63 
tems and other international law regimes should be able to give examples for the 
effect of the rule of law and the scope of restrictions it imposes on states and thus 
help to inform the content of fair and equitable treatment in international investment 
law.  Yet, it will, always be necessary to keep in mind the specific context of inter-
national investment treaties which aim at protecting and promoting foreign invest-
ment between the contracting state parties.   
D. A Normative Justification of the Rule of Law Approach 
Explaining the various context-specific implementations and sub-elements derived 
from fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of law can also be 
normatively grounded in international investment treaties by linking this understan-
ding to the intentions of the contracting state parties as expressed in the object and 
purpose of international investment treaties.  This teleology can be instrumentalized 
in order to equate fair and equitable treatment with the concept of the rule of law as 
a guiding and restricting principle for the exercise of public power by host states.  In 
particular, institutional economics suggest that the concept of the rule of law con-
tributes to the promotion of foreign investment and, more generally, economic 
growth and development.  
I. The Teleology of International Investment Treaties  
As expressed in their preambles, international investment treaties aim not only at 
protecting but also at promoting foreign investment.147  Investment flows will, how-
ever, depend on the decision of foreign investors to invest in a certain country.  One 
critical factor for this investment decision is the political risk of the host country.148  
Consequently, international investment treaties intend to establish a legal regime 
 
147  See Dolzer/Stevens (supra note 20), p. 11 et seq., 20 et seq. (1995).  See in general on the 
effects of bilateral investment treaties on actual flows of foreign investment Neumayer/Spess, 
Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Coun-
tries?, 33 World Development 1567 (2005);  Salacuse/Sullivan (supra note 141), 46 Harv. Int'l 
L. J. 67 (2005); Tobin/Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environ-
ment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Yale Law School 
Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 293. (all suggesting, albeit 
to differing degrees the existence of an empirical link between the existence of BITs, the do-
mestic policy framework and actual investment flows). 
148  On the connection between international investment treaties and the reduction of political risk 
see Rubins/Kinsella (supra note 48), p. 1 et seq. (2005). 
 64 
that reduces the political risk associated with foreign investment in order to increase 
investment flows between the contracting parties149.   
The mechanisms for the protection and promotion of foreign investment are, 
however, not an end in themselves.  They are rather closely related to the goals of 
economic growth and development, in particular in developing countries.  This was 
explicitly mentioned as an objective of the ICSID Convention that recognized “the 
need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment therein”.150  The link between the inflow of foreign invest-
ment and economic development is further reinforced by the character of the World 
Bank as a development institution.151  The implementation of an investor-state dis-
pute settlement mechanism under the ICSID Convention aimed at reducing the po-
litical risk connected with investing in a developing country with weaker domestic 
institutions and a less stable legal and political infrastructure in the interest of 
growth and development.152  Accordingly, from a macroeconomic perspective fo-
reign investment is perceived as “a supplement to a necessarily limited volume of 
public development finance”.153   
II. Institutional Economics and the Role of the Rule of Law 
Institutional economics help to explain the function of the rule of law with respect to 
both objectives of international investment treaties, i. e. the promotion of foreign 
investment and economic growth and development.  Institutional economics analyze 
the relationship between institutions, markets and growth.  Institutions, in this con-
text, are “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.”154  Institutions are characterized by con-
 
149  See Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 469, 478 
et seq. (2000) (concluding at 490 that the “principal contribution [of bilateral investment trea-
ties] to increasing investment is to reduce risk for investors and thereby provide some induce-
ments for those investments that the host state desires”).  
150  See the preamble of the ICSID Convention.   
151  Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Natio-
nals of Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 342 et seq. (1972-II);  Schöbener/Markert, 
Das International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 105 ZVglRWiss 65, 
67 (2006).  
152  See for an overview on the contentious question to what extent foreign investment actually 
contributes to economic growth Cosbey, International Investment Agreements and Sustainable 
Development: Achieving the Millenium Development Goals, p. 11 et seq. (2005), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_iias.pdf.  
153  Broches (supra note 151), 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 343 (1972-II). 
154  North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p. 3 (1990).  See also 
North, Structure and Change in Economic History, p. 201 et seq. (1981) (defining institutions 
as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of 
principals”).  
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straints with a certain permanence and durability which are imposed on actors.155  
They comprise legal rules that impose restrictions on the behavior of individuals as 
well as legal requirements that concern the exercise of public power.  Institutions 
thus have a double thrust in avoiding private disorder, on the one hand, as well as 
public dictatorship on the other.156  They are also essential for the functioning of 
markets as they “structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, 
or economic”.157  In this sense, the rule of law as a concept of restricting public 
power can be properly understood as an institution that constitutes one of the bases 
of market economies.   
With respect to the immediate objective of international investment treaties, the 
concept of the rule of law is important in the context of attracting investment into fo-
reign, particularly developing countries.  This becomes clear from an empirical 
perspective.  According to a survey by the World Bank, investors primarily make 
their decision to invest dependent upon the credibility of states to ensure a predict-
able and stable legal framework, or – in other words – to effectively implement the 
rule of law.158  Conversely, government activity and domestic legal procedures that 
do not adhere to the concept of the rule of law constitute a critical deterrent for an 
investment decision in a specific country.  Government according to the rule of law 
is therefore a prerequisite for risk-adverse investment decisions in a specific country.  
This fact should influence the interpretation of international investment treaties, in 
particular concerning the principle of fair and equitable treatment.   
Yet, the rule of law does not only influence the foreign investor’s microeconomic 
perspective.  Instead, institutional economics also suggest a link between the rule of 
law and the broader objective of international investment treaties, i. e. economic 
growth and development, because “[e]conomic institutions matter for economic 
growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in par-
ticular, they influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, 
and the organization of production.”159 
The importance of the rule of law in the decision making process of economic ac-
tors has been highlighted in economic literature since its earliest days.  Max Weber 
was among the first scholars to argue for the interdependence of the emergence of 
modern forms of growth-creating market-economies in Western civilizations and a 
 
155  See Glaeser/La Porta/Shleifer, Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. Econ. Growth 271, 275 
(2004).  
156  See for this double thrust in evaluating the rule of law as an economic institution 
Djankov/Glaeser/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. 
Comp. Econ. 595 (2003).  
157  North (supra note 154), p. 3 (1990).   
158  World Bank, World Development Report – The State in a Changing World 5, p. 34 et seq. 
(1997).  
159  Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Economic Growth, 
Working Paper 10481, NBER Working Paper Series, p. 2, available at http://www.nber.org/pa 
pers/w10481.  
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modern legal system based on rational and predictable rules.160  For him, the core 
explanation for economic growth in Europe was the rationality of the legal institu-
tions, including the existence and enforcement of contracts and property rights, 
which had emerged in the socio-legal discourse in the 18th and 19th century and 
subsequently paved the way for the development of modern market economies.161  
Weber thus showed that modern law “helps structure the free market system”.162   
Although Weber primarily focused on the function of legal institutions to create 
horizontal order between private individuals by enabling them to use private law 
institutions for purposes of private ordering, institutions are also critical in the rela-
tionship between the state and society.  In this context, the rule of law is the primary 
and, at the same time, most general expression for the predictable exercise of public 
power vis-à-vis the individual.  This aspect complements the function of the rule of 
law as an institution that aims at not only avoiding private disorder but also public 
dictatorship.163  It is also the aspect that grasps the public law understanding of the 
concept and its function of limiting the exercise of public power.   
This aspect has been described as an important factor for the functioning of mar-
ket economies and economic growth.  Already Adam Smith noted that  
“[c]ommerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel them-
selves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not 
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regu-
larly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.  
Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which 
there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”164   
Similarly, F. A. Hayek underscored the importance of the rule of law’s restraining 
function with respect to public authority for modern market economies and eco-
nomic growth.  For him, “[n]othing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free 
country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in 
the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law.”165  In his reasoning, 
 
160  Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (4th ed. J. 
Winckelmann, 1956).  
161  For a short and informative summary of Weber’s account of the relationship between law and 
economic growth see Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay in the Study of Law 
and Development, 82 Yale L. J. 1, 11 et seq. (1972).  
162  Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 15 (1972).   
163  See Djankov/Glaeser/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer (supra note 156), 31 J. Comp. Econ. 
595 (2003).  
164  Adam Smith, cited in: Rodrik/Subramanian/Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institu-
tions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. Econ. Growth 131 
(2004).  See also North/Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institu-
tions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 803 (1989);  
De Long/Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolu-
tion, 36 J. Law Econ. 671 (1993).  
165  Hayek, The Road To Serfdom, p. 72 (1944).  
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market economies are based on the initiatives and decision-making of individuals 
who, in order to be able to plan their economic efforts, require governmental actions 
to be restricted according to rules “made in advance, in the shape of formal rules 
which do not aim at the wants and needs of particular people [, but] are intended to 
be merely instrumental in the pursuit of people’s various individual ends.”166   
While the function of legal institutions was initially mainly of interest in explain-
ing the economic development of industrialized nations and was debated in the ideo-
logical conflict between liberalism and socialism, lawyers and social scientists took 
interest in institutional economics after decolonization gained momentum after 
World War II in order to explain and remedy the economic weaknesses of many 
developing countries.  In this context, the “law and development” movement focus-
sed on the function of law in the Third World and its possible impact on sustainable 
economic growth.167  In its core conception, the movement viewed “modern law 
[…] as a functional prerequisite of an industrial economy”, because it promoted the 
development of markets or, in a more state-centered view, enabled the state to use 
law as a tool to guide economic activity.168  Notably, the concept of the rule of law 
figured prominently in the movement’s theoretic framework.169   
More recently, the linkage between institutions, growth and development is ana-
lyzed by new institutional economics.  Scholars in this field particularly emphasize 
the significance of a well-functioning legal system that embodies the rule of law for 
economic growth and development.  Posner, for instance, points to the “empirical 
evidence showing that the rule of law does contribute to a nation’s wealth and its 
 
166  Hayek (supra note 165), p. 73.  
167  See for an overview of the law and development movement with further references see Trubek 
(supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1 (1972).  
168  Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 6 et seq. (1972).   
169  See Trubek/Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wisc. L. Rev. 1062, 1071 (1974);  see 
also Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 6 et seq. (1972) with further references.  Al-
though the scholarly endeavors of the law and development movement ended quickly in the 
United States because the perspective it assumed was criticized as centered on Western thought 
and little receptive to the needs and traditions of third world countries, its legacy continued in 
other countries and was also influential with respect to the development efforts of international 
organisations within the United Nations system.  For an overview of the history of the law and 
development movement see Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 
A.J.I.L. 470, 472 et seq. (1995). 
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rate of economic growth.”170  This evidence is also buttressed by various theoretic 
economic analyses.171   
The findings of new institutional economics have also been at the core of the de-
velopment strategy of the World Bank.  The linkage between the rule of law and 
economic development has, in particular, materialized in the Bank’s legal reform 
program.172  It has also been reiterated in the World Bank’s good governance 
agenda, which comprises, as one of the core concepts that help to establish good 
government in developing countries, the rule of law.  In its 1992 report on Gover-
nance and Development the Bank stated, although not in respect of foreign invest-
ment, that  
“[the] connection of the rule of law with efficient use of resources and productive 
investment, which must be understood and dealt with in highly specific and differen-
tiated cultural and political settings, is the aspect most important to economic deve-
lopment, and hence to World Bank assistance.”173  
While the economic literature consistently points to parallels and interdependen-
cies between economic development and the emergence of stable and reliable insti-
tutions, the nature of the relationship between institutions and economic growth is 
debated, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, a causal relationship be-
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tween institutions and growth exists.174  From this perspective it is unclear whether 
the development of legal institutions, including the rule of law, will result in eco-
nomic growth or whether, in turn, legal institutions are a result of prior economic 
development and the pressure exercised by the respective interests of economic 
actors.  Yet, even if institutions do not trump all other factors in the quest for eco-
nomic growth,175 they nevertheless constitute one important factor for growth and 
development.  In addition, the debate about a causal relationship between institu-
tions and growth seems to be mitigated in the context of foreign investment by the 
fact that a certain institutional infrastructure that reduces the investment risk is ne-
cessary to attract foreign investment.  Therefore the critique concerning the causality 
between institutions and growth seems to be less convincing than in a setting where 
growth is to be based solely on internal and self-induced economic activity.   
Although the rule of law is surely not the only variable that influences economic 
growth,176 institutional economics show the importance of the concept for growth 
and development.  Consequently, it seems appropriate to draw a connection between 
the economic analysis of institutional economics, in particular its emphasis on the 
impact of the rule of law both on the microeconomics of foreign investors and its 
macroeconomic implications, and the normative framework of international invest-
ment treaties.177  This gives a normative foundation for interpreting fair and equit-
able treatment as an embodiment of the concept of the rule of law since states pre-
sumably intended to establish institutions that effectively contribute to the object 
and purpose of international investment treaties and thus to growth and develop-
ment.   
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geography as the decisive factor for economic growth in developing countries).  Arguing in-
stead for a positive causal relationship see, for example, Rodrik/Subramanian/Trebbi (supra 
note 164), 9 J. Econ. Growth 131 (2004),  Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson, (supra note 170), 91 
Am. Econ. Rev. 1369, 1395 (2001).   
175  In this sense Rodrik/Subramanian/Trebbi (supra note 164), 9 J. Econ. Growth 131 (2004).  
176  See North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 359, 366 (1994): “[…] 
transferring the formal political and economic rules of successful Western economies to third-
world and Eastern European economies is not a sufficient condition for good economic per-
formance.”   
177  See also Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the Rule of Law, 8 Constellations 521 et seq. 
(2001) (arguing that “[t]he investment rules regime is intended to protect established invest-
ments abroad far into the future by locking countries into predictable regulatory frameworks.  
The objective is to bind states to a version of economic liberalism, to impose the discipline of 
the ‘rule of law’ on state regulation of the market; domestic rules are thereby rendered predict-
able and certain.”).  
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E. Conclusion 
Fair and equitable treatment has become one of the standard guarantees of protection 
in international investment treaties and is regularly applied by investment tribunals 
as a basis for ordering host states to pay damages to foreign investors.  The scope 
given to it in recent investment arbitration is increasingly wide, covering restrictions 
of domestic courts, domestic administrative bodies and even the national legislator.  
This transforms fair and equitable treatment into a quasi-constitutional concept that 
overarches the activity of states vis-à-vis foreign investors.  At the same time, arbi-
tral tribunals and scholars in the field of investment protection and public interna-
tional law frequently note the amorphous structure, the lack of a definition and, in 
more general terms, the lack of a conceptual understanding of the normative content 
of this wide-spread treaty standard.   
The vagueness of the fair and equitable treatment standard constitutes structural 
problems for the principle’s interpretation and construction by arbitral tribunals.  
While the arbitral jurisprudence continuously develops a more precise meaning of 
fair and equitable treatment, it nevertheless meanders around without any clear con-
ceptual vision of the principle’s function.  The reasoning in arbitral awards is there-
fore often weak or even unconvincing in its legal analysis.  It regularly restricts itself 
to invoking equally weakly reasoned precedent or refers in an inconclusive manner 
to the object and purpose of BITs without any deeper justification of how the spe-
cific construction contributes to the treaties’ objective.  Ultimately, these shortcom-
ings endanger the suitability of fair and equitable treatment as a concept against 
which the conduct of host states can be measured.  The main concern in this context 
is that the jurisprudence does not produce predictable results that are accepted by 
states but endorse an approach that allows for a broad ex post facto control of host 
state conduct.  Predictability in its application is, however, essential for host states 
and foreign investors alike who need to know beforehand what kind of measures 
entail the international responsibility of the state and, accordingly, against which 
kind of political risk fair and equitable treatment protects.   
In order to grasp the normative content of fair and equitable treatment, this article 
submitted that the standard can be understood as an embodiment of the rule of law.  
The survey of investment decision shows that the concept underlying fair and equit-
able treatment is functionally equivalent to the understanding of the requirements 
deduced from the rule of law under domestic legal systems and other international 
law regimes.  Investment tribunals have thus interpreted fair and equitable treatment 
so as to encompass sub-elements the rule of law is associated with in various domes-
tic legal systems.  In this respect, the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals concerning 
fair and equitable treatment can be analyzed as including (1) the requirement of 
stability and predictability of the legal framework and consistency in the host state’s 
decision-making, (2) the principle of legality, (3) the protection of investor confi-
dence or legitimate expectations, (4) procedural due process and denial of justice, 
(5) protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, (6) the requirement of trans-
parency and (7) the concept of reasonableness and proportionality.   
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In its core, the rule of law understanding underlying the jurisprudence of invest-
ment tribunals can be described as primarily procedural and institutional in nature.  
Accordingly, the control exercised by investment tribunals over the conduct of host 
states is mainly concerned with the institutional structure and the procedural imple-
mentation of law and policy which affect foreign investors.  Fair and equitable 
treatment, for example, requires the existence of a minimal separation of powers in 
host states, the possibility of recourse to courts for the adjudication of private rights 
and the review of acts of public authorities, legal security, protection of legitimate 
expectations and the observance of procedural rights in administrative and judicial 
proceedings. 
At the same time, such a procedural and institutional understanding of the rule of 
law allows states sufficient leeway in implementing their own substantive policy 
choices and in reacting to newly emerging circumstances, including state emergen-
cies.  Fair and equitable treatment does, however, not only influence the way host 
states change their regulatory frameworks after an investment was made,178 but in a 
more comprehensive way requires them to adapt their domestic legal orders to stan-
dards that are internationally accepted as conforming to the concept of the rule of 
law.  While, the paper only aimed at outlining the general features of a rule of law 
understanding of fair and equitable treatment and tried to explain the concept and 
function of this widely used treaty standard, the exact contours of the various sub-
element still require further elaboration and context-specific analyses.   
Arguably, such an understanding of fair and equitable treatment can be supported 
by an economic analysis of international investment treaties.  This is particularly 
true considering the object and purpose of investment treaties that aim at protecting 
and promoting foreign investment flows and ultimately economic growth and devel-
opment.  This purposive link between the protection standards contained in the trea-
ties and the promotion of investment justifies drawing a parallel to the economic 
literature that expands on the relationship between the rule of law and economic 
growth.  The positive economic impacts that are linked to the rule of law and the 
incentive structure necessary for foreign investors to invest in a specific country 
suggest such an understanding of fair and equitable treatment as appropriate in the 
context of investment treaties.  This can be buttressed by the assumption that states 
intended to have the most efficient structures implemented in order to promote in-
vestment flows.  Finally, the paper suggests that tribunals should draw – in a com-
parative approach – on the jurisprudence of domestic and international courts on rule 
of law standards in order to further concretize fair and equitable treatment.  This 
would help to convincingly justify and apply fair and equitable treatment in various 
context-specific fields of economic activity and state regulation.  At the same time, 
the reference to rule of law concepts under domestic legal orders also illustrates that 
the rule of law is not an absolute guarantee but rather allows for a balance between 
the interests of host states and foreign investors.  In this context, one should keep in 
 
178  In this sense Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 100 et seq. (2005).  
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mind the words of Joseph Raz who concluded his seminal article on the The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue by recalling:  
“After all the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social good, and 
should not be lightly used to show that it should not do so.  Sacrificing too many 
social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty.”179  
 
179  Raz (supra note 39), 93 L. Quart. Rev. 195, 211 (1977).  
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“Expropriation” and “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Standards in Recent 
ICSID Jurisprudence        
            
Comment by Jo Delaney∗ 
Thank you to Professor Hofmann and the organisers for their kind invitation and 
giving me, a younger practitioner, an opportunity to present. 
Mr Schill’s comprehensive analysis of the standards of expropriation and fair and 
equitable treatment raises many thought provoking questions.  
I want to focus on the interrelationship between the two standards in the 10 mi-
nutes I have. As Mr Schill has referred to in his analysis, the trend in recent invest-
ment cases, ICSID and non-ICSID, raises questions about the role of the legitimate 
expectations of the investor and how such expectations connect these two standards. 
First, I want to briefly address the increasing emphasis on legitimate expectations as 
an essential element of fair and equitable treatment. Then, I will look at the role of 
the investor's expectations in determining whether there has been an expropriation, 
particularly a "regulatory taking", which is itself a growing concept.  
A. Legitimate Expectations - Fair and Equitable Treatment 
The focus on the legitimate expectations of the investor has widened the standard of 
"fair and equitable" treatment beyond the minimum standard for aliens in customary 
international law. Recent cases have emphasised that fair and equitable treatment not 
only requires the State not to act in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or to ensure 
good faith or due process, but it also now requires that the State consider and act 
consistently with the legitimate expectations of the investor.  
The respect for the investor's "legitimate expectations" was explained in detail in 
paragraph 154 of the Tribunal's Award in the Tecmed case. I won't read out the 
paragraph as it is very long but the Tribunal referred to the need for the State to act 
consistently, "free from ambiguity and totally transparently", not only in relation to 
regulations but the goals of regulations so the investor can plan its investment and 
comply with the necessary regulations. The Tribunal emphasised that consistency 
requires the State not to arbitrarily revoke any pre-existing decisions or permits 
which the investor has relied upon and to act in conformity with any regulations.  
This approach has been adopted in subsequent cases which have also been ana-
lyzed by Mr Schill: 
 
∗  Jo Delaney, Attorney Clifford Chance LLP, London. 
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• MTD v Chile (ICSID) where the Tribunal found that it was unfair that the State 
(acting through one body) approved an investment and entered into a foreign in-
vestment contract when the investment was against the policy of the State itself 
in that the State would not change a zoning permit in order to grant the neces-
sary permits for the investment. 
• Occidental Petroleum v Ecuador (UNCITRAL) - where the Tribunal found that 
the State had acted without clarity and inconsistently in relation to the tax 
change and its practice and regulations in relation to VAT refunds. The investor 
had entered into participation contracts for the exploration and production of oil 
and had been able to claim VAT refunds but in 2001 there was a change in tax 
policy by the SRI (tax authority) and subsequent VAT refunds were denied. 
• CMS v Argentina  (ICSID) - where the Tribunal found that the State had not 
provided a stable legal and business environment as required as an essential 
element of fair and equitable treatment, these guarantees being crucial for the 
investor's investment decision]  
 
Most recently, it was considered by the NAFTA Tribunal in Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v Mexico (UNCITRAL), the ad hoc Tribunal in Eureko v Poland and 
the UNCITRAL Tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (otherwise 
referred to as Nomura case).   
While Saluka was not an ICSID case but under the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribu-
nal's comments are still instructive to future ICSID Tribunals. The Tribunal in that 
case emphasised that "legitimate expectations" was the "dominant element" of the 
fair and equitable standard. The investor's expectations included the State's observa-
tion of "good faith, due process and non-discrimination" (para 303). The Tribunal 
stressed that such expectations must be legitimate and reasonable "in light of the 
circumstances" (para 304).  
The Tribunal held that the Czech Republic undertook an obligation not to frus-
trate the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the investor (para 302) and found 
that the Czech Republic had breached the investor's legitimate expectations such that 
it had treated the investor unfairly and inequitably. It is how the Tribunal found this 
breach, while also holding that its conduct did not amount to expropriation because 
of the State's right to regulate that I want to focus on but first I will address the role 
of legitimate expectations in expropriation.  
Similarly in Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico, the NAFTA Tribunal 
held that if the State's conduct creates legitimate expectations and the investor acts 
in reliance on that conduct, the State must honour those expectations if a failure to 
do so would cause damage to the investor (para 147).  
Professor Thomas Walde expanded upon this concept in his Separate Opinion, 
emphasising that the expectation must be "legitimate" through some official conduct 
and that the investor must have relied upon that conduct to its detriment (para 1, 21, 
119).There must be reasonable detrimental reliance if the investor is to be entitled to 
compensation. 
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B. Legitimate Expectations - Expropriation  
The investor's legitimate expectation is often the starting point for a tribunal's analy-
sis of whether there has been an expropriation of the investment.  
For example, in Metalclad, the Tribunal looked to whether the investor had been 
deprived "in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be expected 
economic benefit of the property" (para 103). 
In Tecmed, the Tribunal looked at the investor's expectations of its return on the 
investment, particularly since it was a long term investment that required time to 
establish the business and recover the investment and obtain an expected return. In 
determining whether there had been an expropriation of the investment, the Tribunal 
analysed (1) the reasonable expectations of the investor for a return; (2) whether the 
State had failed to protect the investor's rights when the State was confronted with 
social opposition; and (3) whether the measures taken were proportionate to the 
investor's expectations or excessive in light of the social protests.  
In both of these cases, the Tribunals found that the State had deprived the investor 
of its legitimate expectations to a return or economic benefit and thus had expropri-
ated the investment.  They also found a breach of fair and equitable treatment. 
However, in some cases, even though the Tribunal found that the State acted in-
consistently with the investor's legitimate expectations and found a breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, it did not found that the State's conduct amounted 
to an expropriation of the investment. There is not necessarily any inconsistency 
between these two findings but there may be where the alleged expropriation is 
found to be a legitimate regulation. 
For example, in CMS, the Tribunal found that the State failed to provide a stable 
legal and business environment due to the uncertainty of the period from 2000 to 
2002 and the final determinations under the Emergency Law, thereby in breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard. However, it did not find an expropriation 
as (1) CMS retained full ownership and remained in control of the investment; and 
(2) the Government had not managed the day-to-day operations of the company. In 
this case, the Tribunal focused on the investor's continuing ownership, management 
and control rather than whether Argentina's regulatory measures were legitimate.  
But what if the investor does lose its investment, as in the Saluka case? Can a 
regulation that is said to be legitimate also be consistent with the legitimate expecta-
tions of the investor? What if the carrying out of that regulation by the State is in-
consistent with investor's expectations? How is the State's legitimate regulation to be 
balanced against the investor's legitimate expectations? 
The Saluka case raises questions about the interrelationship between an investor's 
legitimate expectations in the context of fair and equitable treatment on the one 
hand, and expropriation, on the other. The alleged expropriation in this case was a 
"regulatory taking". The Tribunal found that the State's regulatory actions were 
justified: i.e. that the Czech National Bank was justified in imposing the forced 
administration on the bank and appointing an administrator, particularly since the 
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decision had been confirmed by the CNB Appellate Board and upheld by the Prague 
City Court twice.  
Yet the Tribunal also found that the State had acted unfairly and inequitably, con-
trary to Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations:  
 
• (1) The State had failed to provide financial assistance to IPB for the bad debt 
problem when it had provided that assistance to three of the Big Four banks. 
The Tribunal recognised that this failure was discriminatory and created an en-
vironment which made it impossible for the IPB to survive. Saluka was justified 
in expecting to be treated in an even-handed and reasonable manner. 
• (2)  The State had also failed to take seriously Saluka's proposals to solve the 
problem and deal with it in an objective, transparent, unbiased and even-handed 
way. The State had failed to address Saluka's proposal and had unreasonably re-
fused to communicate with IPB and Saluka/Nomura in an adequate manner. 
 
What is difficult to digest with this case is that it was the CR's conduct in relation 
to its failure to provide financial assistance and its failure to consider Nomura's 
proposals, these both being contrary to Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations, 
which led to the factual circumstances that resulted in the Czech National Bank 
having to take the decision to place IPB in forced administration leading to the al-
leged expropriation. If Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations had been fulfilled, 
then the forced administration may not have been necessary. Yet the Tribunal found 
that the forced administration was a justifiable regulatory step that did not amount to 
expropriation. 
Other tribunals analysing alleged regulatory takings have taken a different ap-
proach, e. g. in the Feldman case, where the Tribunal acknowledged that not all 
regulatory measures amount to an expropriation.   
In Tecmed, which Mr Schill also referred to, the Tribunal emphasised that     
measures, whether or not they were regulatory, amounted to an indirect expropria-
tion if they were "irreversible and permanent" and the "economic value of the use, 
enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative action 
or decision have been neutralized or destroyed" (para 116). The Tribunal empha-
sised that it was the effect of the measures, not the intent that was important. The 
Tribunal also looked to whether the measures were proportionate to the public inte-
rest they intended to protect and found that in that case they were disproportionate.  
Beyond looking at the proportionality of the measures, the Tribunal did not offer 
any assistance in determining when a legitimate regulatory measure crosses the line 
and amounts to a regulatory taking or expropriation. However, would the propor-
tionality test have assisted the Tribunal in Saluka? 
The UNICTRAL Tribunal in Saluka acknowledged that the threshold for regula-
tory takings has not yet been defined, but did not offer any suggestions as to what 
would be appropriate criteria in determining that threshold, other than referring to 
the Harvard Draft Convention of the 1960s which recognised that bona-fide non-
discriminatory regulation was not expropriation and set out 4 exceptions, which I 
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will not go into due to time. In the context of analysing the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard, the Tribunal focused on the expectations of the investor and the need 
to balance those expectations with the State's legitimate regulatory interests (para 
305-6). But it did not do so in the context of the expropriation claim. If it did, per-
haps it would have reached a different conclusion. Or if the Tribunal had analysed 
whether the decision of forced administration was proportionate to Saluka's legiti-
mate expectations, it may have reached a different conclusion.  
C. Conclusion 
Accordingly, it appears that we must be content with the vague indications given by 
investment tribunals to date on the role of legitimate expectations in the analysis of 
these two standards:   
• Legitimate expectations of the investor is an essential element of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard;  
• It may be the starting point for an analysis of an expropriation claim; 
• The investor's legitimate expectations may need to be balanced against the le-
gitimate regulatory interests of the State if regulatory measures have allegedly 
led to an expropriation; 
• However, how are these expectations and regulatory interests to be balanced?  
• Is it sufficient to consider whether the regulatory measures are proportionate to 
the investor's expectations?  
 
Hopefully, we will all have an opportunity to encourage future Tribunals to pro-
vide some guidance to these questions, preferably within the next 4-5 years rather 
than the next 40 years.  
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“Fair and Equitable Treatment” – Determining Compensation  
           
Comment by Kaj Hobér∗ 
A. Introduction 
Fair and equitable treatment is one of the standards of treatment of foreigners under 
international law. One of the early sources for a discussion of the treatment of fo-
reigners is the Neer Case.1 The concept of fair and equitable treatment did not exist 
at that time, but the case does address in general terms treatment of foreigners by a 
host State. 
In the post Second World War attempts to regulate the international economy – 
resulting in the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund – the negotiating states also tried to create a world trade organization, later 
referred to as the International Trade Organization. In the 1948 Havana Charter for 
the International Trade Organisation it was stated in Article 11(2)2 that the Interna-
tional Trade Organisation could make recommendations and promote bilateral or 
multilateral agreements on measures designed “to assure just and equitable treat-
ment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one Mem-
ber country to another”. In the same year the Ninth International Conference of 
American States adopted the Economic Agreement of Bogotá under which foreign 
capital were to receive “equitable treatment” 3 (Article 22). However, neither the 
Havana Charter, nor the Agreement of Bogotá came into force. In the 1950’s refer-
 
∗  Kaj Hobér, Partner Mannheimer Swartling, Stockholm; Professor of East European Commer-
cial Law, Uppsala University. 
1   Neer v. Mexico, Opinion, United States – Mexico General Claims Commission, 15 October 
1926 21 American Journal of International Law (1927) 555.  
2  Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter reads as follows: “The Organization may, in such collabo-
ration with other inter-governmental organizations as may be appropriate: 
 (a) make recommendations for and promote bilateral or multilateral agreements on measures 
designed. 
 (i) to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology 
brought from one Member country to another;  
 (ii) to avoid international double taxation in order to stimulate foreign private investments; 
 (iii) to enlarge to the greatest possible extent the benefits to Members from the fulfilment of 
the obligations under this Article; 
 (b) make recommendations and promote agreements designed to facilitate an equitable distri-
bution of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment, with due regard to the needs of all 
Members;  
 (c) formulate and promote the adoption of a general and treatment of foreign investment.” 
3  “Los capitales extranjeros recibirán tratamiento equitativo”. 
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ences to fair and equitable treatment started to appear in the US Treaties on Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation.4 
As noted by Stephan Schill in his article “’Fair and Equitable Treatment’ as an 
Embodiment of the Rule of Law”, arbitral tribunals have struggled, and continue to 
struggle, with a definition of the rather vague concept of fair and equitable treat-
ment, and have, so far, been unable to develop a uniform methodology for deter-
mining when a violation of fair and equitable treatment has occurred.5  
These difficulties do not come as a surprise. The standard of fair and equitable 
treatment is relatively imprecise and is very much dependent on the specific circum-
stances of the individual case. The principle can thus not be applied in the abstract. 
The standard of fair and equitable treatment is a broad principle of international law 
which must, like other such principles, be specified, refined and supplemented by 
decisions of international tribunals. In fact this is the only realistic approach, since it 
would be virtually impossible to anticipate and specify in detail host State conduct 
that should be covered by this principle. 
The aforementioned lack of precision notwithstanding, Stephan Schill has identi-
fied seven normative elements forming part of the reasoning of arbitral tribunals 
when analysing the principle of fair and equitable treatment, viz., (i) the requirement 
of stability, predictability and consistency of the legal framework, (ii) the principle 
of legality, (iii) the protection of investor confidence or legitimate expectations, (iv) 
procedural due process and denial of justice, (v) substantive due process or protec-
tion against discrimination and arbitrariness, (vi) the requirement of transparency 
and (vii) the requirement of reasonableness and proportionality.6  
The purpose of this contribution is to address another aspect of fair and equitable 
treatment, viz., to analyze arbitral practice with the aim of identifying principles, if 
any, for the determination of the compensation for violation, once established, of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard. 
B. Compensation for Violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
I. Introduction 
Almost all recent Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties (BIT:s) require that inves-
tors covered by the treaty in question receive fair and equitable treatment. This prin-
ciple is also enshrined in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)7 as 
 
4  See further Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment No. 2004/3, p. 3-4. 
5  See Schill, p. 35-36. 
6  Schill, p. 41-42. 
7  Article 1105(1) of NAFTA reads as follows: “Each Party shall accord to investments of inves-
tors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equita-
ble treatment and full protection and security”. 
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well as in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)8. In none of these treaties, however, is 
there any provision, nor language, addressing the issue of compensation in case of 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. The situation is of course dif-
ferent with respect to expropriation. Most investment protection treaties, bilateral as 
well as multilateral, have provisions addressing compensation in case of expropria-
tion. 
II. The Legal Basis for Compensation 
The determination of compensation for violations of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is, however, not made in a legal vacuum. The legal basis is found in cus-
tomary international law. Article 31 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 
Articles on State Responsibility reads as follows: 
 
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full repara-
tion for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
 
2.  Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by 
the internationally wrongful act of State. 
 
The principles expressed in this Article are generally held to represent generally 
accepted customary international law. These principles were formulated already by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case.  
 
The Court said: 
 
“It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement in-
volves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation 
therefore is the indispensable complement to a failure to apply a convention 
and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. Dif-
ferences relating to reparations, which may be due by reason of failure to 
apply a convention, are consequently differences relating to its applica-
tion”.9 
 
 
8  Article 10(1) of the ECT reads as follows “Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of 
other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment […]”. 
9  Factory at Chorzów, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 2. 
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Under the Chorzów Factory case, the State violating international law is liable to 
provide full compensation, i.e. to re-establish the situation, which would have exis-
ted had that violation not occurred: 
 
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in par-
ticular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, so far 
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a 
sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be cov-
ered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles 
which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act 
contrary to international law.”10 
 
 
Article 34 of the ILC Articles then goes on to describe the different forms of repa-
ration. They include restitution, compensation and satisfaction. 
Even though the primary form of reparation under the ILC Articles is restitution, 
from an investment dispute point of view, the practically relevant form is compensa-
tion, which is regulated in Article 36. It reads:  
 
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under 
an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, inso-
far as such damage is not made good by restitution. 
 
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage 
including loss of profit insofar as it is established. 
 
In the context of compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard, 
suffice it to make two comments at this stage.  
 
First, Article 31 refers to “full reparation”. This means, in the words of the Chorzow 
Factory case “to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been com-
mitted”.11 This principle has been extensively discussed with respect to calculation 
of compensation for expropriation. Difficult as it may be to apply this principle to 
expropriation, it is at least arguable that this is easier than to apply the principle to 
compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard. The typical situation 
 
10  Factory at Chorzów, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47. 
11  See note 10, supra 
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with respect to an expropriation is that it puts an end to the investment in question. 
Violations of the fair and equitable standard do not necessarily lead to this result, but 
the investment, e.g. a business activity, may well continue. The difficulty then is to 
determine what “full reparation” means in this context. 
The foregoing leads to the second observation. It is clear from the language used in 
Articles 31, 34 and 36 that there must be a causal link between the injury and the 
internationally wrongful act. The provisions all refer to the “injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act”. In the context of fair and equitable treatment, it is not 
difficult to envisage situations where it must be very complicated to determine the 
extent to which an injury has been caused by a violation of this standard and not by 
any other event.  
C. Decisions by Arbitral Tribunals 
I. Introduction 
There are few recent decisions by arbitral tribunals in investment disputes, which 
deal with compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard as a discrete 
and separate matter. This is perhaps not very surprising since many, if not most, 
investment disputes primarily focus on expropriation. Questions of fair and equit-
able treatment then tend to play a secondary role, and are not given separate treat-
ment. There are three recent ICSID cases which address the issue of compensation 
for violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard as a separate matter. The 
only two cases decided so far on the merits under the ECT also deal with these is-
sues, as do at least three NAFTA cases. These cases will be discussed in the fol-
lowing. 
II. ICSID cases 
1. MTD v. Chile 
In MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile12, MTD (Malay-
sia) had invested in Chile by participating in a joint venture which planned to buy 
land for the purpose of constructing a mixed use upscale community. The invest-
ment was made through a local company, MTD Chile, which in turn invested in and 
owned 51 percent of the joint venture company, El Principal, which was to own the 
land and develop the project. The investment was approved by the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission (FIC) and a foreign investment contract was signed. An addi-
 
12  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 25 May 2004. 
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tional capital contribution by MTD was subsequently approved by the FIC. Thereaf-
ter the project ran into difficulties resulting from the absence of a change of zoning 
legislation for the use of land. In the end the project was not approved by the au-
thorities. 
The applicable Malaysia-Chile BIT contained an MFN-clause, which in the view 
of the Tribunal made substantive protection standards of other Chilean BITs appli-
cable as argued by the Claimants. 
 
In the arbitration the Claimants alleged that the Respondent had breached: 
 
(i) Articles 2(2) and 3(1) of the BIT and Article 4(1) of the Croatia BIT by     
treating their investment unfairly and inequitably; 
(ii) Article 3(1) of the Denmark BIT by breaching the Respondent’s obligations 
under the Foreign Investment Contracts; 
(iii) Article 3(2) and (4) of the Croatia BIT by impairing through unreasonable 
and discriminatory measures the use and enjoyment of the Claimants’ investment 
and by failing to grant the necessary permits to carry out an investment already au-
thorized; and 
(iv) Article 4 of the BIT by expropriating their investment. 
 
In essence the issues under dispute were the following: what was the significance 
to be attached to the approvals of the FIC and the execution of the Foreign Invest-
ment Contracts (i.e. creating legitimate expectations that the project would be 
granted necessary approvals or a mere decision on the legality of inflow of foreign 
capital), whether MTD had been warned of the risks relating to the zoning change, 
whether MTD otherwise had exercised due diligence in making its investment. 
Article 2(2) of the applicable BIT required that “Investments of investors of either 
Contracting Party shall at all time be accorded fair and equitable treatment”. The 
Croatia BIT provided further that the right to fair and equitable treatment shall “not 
be hindered in practice” (Article 4(1)). 
The Tribunal noted that being a Tribunal established under the BIT, it was 
obliged to apply the provisions of the BIT and interpret them in accordance with the 
norms of interpretation established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties, which is binding on the State parties to the BIT. Article 31(1) of the     
Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 
The Tribunal found that in their ordinary meaning, the terms “fair” and “equit-
able” used in Article 3(1) of the BIT mean “just”, “even-handed”, “unbiased”, “le-
gitimate”. As regards the object and purpose of the BIT, the Tribunal referred to its 
Preamble where the parties state their desire “to create favourable conditions for 
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party”, and the recognition of “the need to protect investments by investors 
of both Contracting Parties and to stimulate the flow of investments and individual 
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business initiative with a view to the economic prosperity of both Contracting Par-
ties”. Hence, in terms of the BIT, fair and equitable treatment should be understood 
to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the pro-
motion of foreign investment. Its terms are framed as a pro-active statement –“to 
promote”, “to create”, “to stimulate”- rather than prescriptions for a passive beha-
viour of the State or avoidance of prejudicial conduct to the investors. 
The Tribunal also adopted as its standard the standard suggested by the Tribunal 
in the TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States case: 
 
“to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its rela-
tions with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all 
rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of 
the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to 
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State ac-
tions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, di-
rectives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but 
also to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also ex-
pects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any 
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the state that were relied upon by 
the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the state to 
use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the in-
vestment in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instru-
ments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required 
compensation”.13 
 
Taking account of, inter alia, the ministerial membership of the FIC, the duty of 
Chilean state organs to act coherently and to apply its policies consistently, and of 
the fact that the State under international law is to be considered as a unit, the Tribu-
nal was satisfied, based on the evidence presented to it, that approval of an invest-
ment by the FIC for a project that was against the urban policy of the Government, 
amounted to a breach of the obligation to treat an investor fairly and equitably.  
As regards compensation the Tribunal noted that the BIT provided for “prompt, 
adequate and effective” compensation for expropriation. However, the BIT did not 
provide for any standard for compensation for breaches of the BIT on other grounds, 
including fair and equitable treatment. As a starting point, the Tribunal used the 
standard pronounced by the Permanent Court of Justice in the Chorzów Factory 
 
13  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)00/2, award dated May 29, 2003, para. 154. 
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case, viz., that the compensation should “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
had not been committed”.14    
Based on this principle the Tribunal concluded that the expenditures relating to 
Claimant’s investment in Chile, which were eligible for purposes of the calculation 
of damages amounted to approximately US$ 21.5 million. Such expenditures could 
have been avoided, had there been no breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. 
The Tribunal also underlined, however, that Chile was not responsible for the 
consequences of unwise business decisions or for the lack of diligence of the inves-
tor. Its responsibility was limited to the consequences of its own actions to the extent 
they breached the obligation to treat the Claimants fairly and equitably. In this re-
spect the Tribunal observed, inter alia, that no specialist on urban development had 
been contacted by the Claimants until the deal was closed, that the Claimants ap-
parently did not appreciate the fact that their JV-partner may have had a conflict of 
interest with the Claimants, that they seemed to have accepted his judgment, that 
MTD was in a hurry to start the Project, that BITs are not an insurance against busi-
ness risks, and that the Claimants, as experienced businessmen, must bear the con-
sequences of their own actions. Their choice of partner, the acceptance of a land 
valuation based on future assumptions without protecting themselves contractually 
in case the assumptions would not materialize, including the issuance of the required 
development permits, were risks that the Claimants took irrespective of Chile’s 
actions. Therefore, the Tribunal awarded only 50 per cent of eligible expenditures 
resulting from the fact that the zoning legislation was not changed. 
The starting point for the Tribunal was thus the concept of “full reparation” as 
laid down in the Chorzow Factory case and in the ILC Articles On State Responsi-
bility. The more interesting aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning is the fact that it re-
duced the amount eligible for compensation by 50 per cent. The percentage as such 
would seem to be the result of the Tribunal exercising its discretion in determining 
the amount of compensation. The justification for the reduction could be explained 
in either of the following ways. First, it is possible that the Tribunal took the view 
that the Claimants had not established a causal link between the violation of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard going beyond 50 per cent of the expenditures. Put 
differently: part of the injury was the result of Claimants’ own doing. In the view of 
the Tribunal, the Claimants had not in all respects acted as a prudent investor. The 
consequences of such conduct had to be borne by the Claimants themselves.   
Second, an alternative explanation – but to a large extent, the other side of the 
same coin – would be to view Claimants’ conduct as a case of contributory negli-
gence. In other words, the Claimants themselves had contributed to their own mis-
fortune. To the extent that this was the case, the host state could not be held respon-
sible.  
 
14  See note 10, supra. 
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2. CMS v. Argentine 
The second ICSID case is CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Re-
public15  In this case the Argentinean company TGN had been granted a license for 
the transportation of gas. Investors had been invited to invest in the shares of TGN. 
The American company CMS acquired 29.42 per cent of the shares. 
Under the arrangements made for the privatization of this sector of the Argen-
tinean economy, tariffs were to be calculated in US dollars and expressed in pesos at 
the exchange rate at the time of billing. They were also to be adjusted semi-annually 
in accordance with the United States Producer Price Index (the “US PPI”). Fol-
lowing the major economic and financial crisis in the country, the Republic of Ar-
gentina enacted, starting late 1999, various measures which had, in the Claimant’s 
view, an adverse impact on its business and breached the guarantees (i.e. the legal 
regime created by the gas legislation and regulations as well as the terms of the 
license) which were intended to protect its investment in TGN. These measures later 
led to the devaluation of the peso and the adoption of additional financial and ad-
ministrative measures also alleged to have had an adverse impact on the investor. 
The Claimant was of the view that the measures adopted by the Argentine Go-
vernment were in violation of the commitments that the Government made to for-
eign investors in the offering memoranda, relevant laws and regulations and the 
license itself. Such commitments, it was asserted, included the calculation of tariffs 
in US dollars, the semi-annual adjustment in accordance with the US PPI and a 
general adjustment of tariffs every five years, all with the purpose of maintaining the 
real dollar value of the tariffs. The Claimant argued that Argentina further agreed 
expressly not to freeze the tariff structure or subject it to further regulation or price 
controls; and that in the event that price controls were introduced, TGN would be 
compensated for the difference between the tariff it was entitled to and the tariff 
actually charged. Moreover, the basic rules governing the license could not be al-
tered without TGN’s consent. The Claimant was of the view that these guarantees 
constituted essential conditions for CMS’s investment and that it had an acquired 
right to the application of the agreed tariff regime.  
The Claimant argued, inter alia, that Argentina had breached the fair and equit-
able standard insofar as it had profoundly altered the stability and predictability of 
the investment environment, an assurance that was key to CMS’s decision to invest. 
Quoting the preamble of the Argentina – US BIT – that fair and equitable treat-
ment is desirable “to maintain a stable framework for investments and maximum 
effective use of economic resources” – the Tribunal found that a stable legal and 
business environment was an essential element of fair and equitable treatment. The 
Tribunal found that the measures complained of did in fact entirely transform and 
alter the legal and business environment under which the investment was decided 
and made. The Tribunal further noted that a significant number of treaties show that 
 
15  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 12 May 2005. 
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fair and equitable treatment was inseparable from stability and predictability and 
that the law of foreign investment and its protection had been developed to avoid 
adverse legal effects when specific commitments had been made. The Tribunal also 
observed that this was an objective requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent 
had had any deliberate intention or bad faith in adopting the measures in question. 
Turning to compensation, the Tribunal initially noted that under international law 
that are three main forms of reparation for injury: restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction.16 It ruled out “satisfaction” since the case was not of reparation due to 
an injured State. As regards “restitution” the Tribunal noted, by reference to the 
Chorzów Factory case, that this is the standard used to re-establish the situation 
which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided that this is not mate-
rially impossible and does not result in a burden out of proportion as compared to 
compensation.17  
As regards “compensation” the Tribunal stated that it is designed to cover any fi-
nancial assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established, and 
that it is only called for when the damage is not made good by restitution.18 Quoting 
the decision in the Lusitania case19, the Tribunal held that the remedy should be 
commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made whole.20 The 
Tribunal was thus inclined to award full compensation for a violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. 
However, when discussing the methods to determine and calculate compensation 
the Tribunal stated that “[d]epending on the circumstances, various methods have 
been used by tribunals to determine the compensation which should be paid but the 
general concept upon which commercial valuation of assets is based is that of ‘fair 
market value.’”21  
 
The Tribunal continued to say that: 
 
“Four ways have generally been relied upon to arrive at such value. (1) the 
‘asset value’ or the ‘replacement cost’ approach which evaluates the assets 
on the basis of their ‘break-up’ or their replacement cost; (2) the ‘compar-
able transaction’ approach which reviews comparable transactions in simi-
lar circumstances; (3) the ‘option’ approach which studies the alternative 
uses which could be made of the assets in question, and their costs and 
benefits; (4) the ‘discounted cash flow’ (‘DCF’) approach under which the 
valuation of the assets is arrived at by determining the present value of fu-
 
16  The Award, para. 399.  
17  The Award, para. 400. 
18  The Award, para. 401. 
19  Lusitania, RIAA, Vol. VII, 1923, p. 32.  
20  The Award, para. 401. 
21  The Award, para. 402. 
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ture predicted cash flows, discounted at a rate which reflects various cate-
gories of risk and uncertainty.”22  
 
Having concluded that reparation by way of restitution was not an alternative for 
the Tribunal in the present situation, because such restitution would require a settle-
ment between the parties, the Tribunal went on to analyze the issue of compensa-
tion.23 It appears that the path eventually chosen by the Tribunal was the method 
commonly used when determining compensation for expropriation.  
 
“[T]he cumulative nature of the breaches discussed here is best dealt with 
by resorting to the standard of fair market value. While this standard figures 
prominently in respect of expropriation, it is not excluded that it might also 
be appropriate for breaches different from expropriation if their effect re-
sults in important long-term losses.”24    
 
The Tribunal had no problem in finding that the standard of compensation to be 
used was that of the fair market value. Likewise, it did not hesitate to use the dis-
counted cash flow (DCF) method as the most appropriate method to calculate the 
compensation. The decisive factor in this respect seems to have been that TGN was a 
going concern. TGN:s license was valid until 2027. With a view to determining the 
actual loss of the Claimant resulting from the violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, the Tribunal had to compare two scenarios. The first scenario 
involved the evaluation of revenue, cash and profits until 2027 on the assumption 
that there had been no change in the regulatory environment. The second scenario 
involved the same evaluation based on the new regulatory framework.25 The Tribu-
nal’s reasoning makes it clear that, in this particular case, it concluded that the fair 
market value and the DCF methodology was the most appropriate way to determine 
the actual loss of the Claimant. It may also be noted that all experts consulted in the 
case agreed with this approach.26 
3. Azurix Corp v. Argentine 
In Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic27, decided on 14 July 2006, the Azurix-
Group of the US (at the time of the investment owned by Enron) participted in the 
privatization of water services in the Province of Buenos Aires (the Province). The 
investment was carried out through a local Argentinian company, Azurix Buenos 
 
22  The Award, para. 403. 
23  Cf. Articles 35-36 of ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. 
24  The Award, para. 410. 
25  See Award, paras. 419, 422. 
26  The Award, para. 421. 
27  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006. 
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Aires S.A. (ABA), which was incorporated to act as the concessionaire after the 
Azurix-Group won the bid for the water service concession (the Concession). After 
ABA had made a so-called Canon Payment of 438,555,554 Argentine Pesos on 30 
June 1999, ABA and the Province executed a 30-year concession agreement. The 
concession was overseen and regulated by a regulatory authority established for the 
purpose - Organismo Regulador de Aguas Bonaerense (“ORAB”). 
In the arbitration, the Claimant argued, inter alia, that the Respondent had vio-
lated its obligation, under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, of fair and equitable treatment. 
The Claimant stated that such measures consisted of actions and omissions of the 
Province or its instrumentalities that resulted in the non-application of the tariff 
regime of the Concession Agreement for political reasons; that the Province did not 
complete certain works that were to remedy historical problems and were to be 
transferred to the concessionaire upon completion; that the lack of support for the 
concession regime prevented ABA from obtaining financing for its operations; that 
in 2001, the Province denied that the Canon Payment was recoverable through ta-
riffs; and that “political concerns were always privileged over the financial integrity 
of the Concession”.28 As a result ABA had been forced to give notice of termination 
of the Concession and file for bankruptcy, since it was faced with no hope of recov-
ering its investments in the “politicized regulatory scheme”.29 
The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the dispute was a contractual dis-
pute, and that the difficulties encountered by ABA in the Province were of its own 
making. In particular, Argentina argued that the case presented by the Claimant was 
intimately linked to Enron’s business practices and its bankruptcy; that the price 
paid for the Concession was excessive and opportunistic and related to the forthco-
ming IPO of Azurix at the time Azurix bid for the Concession and that ABA did not 
comply with the Concession Agreement. 
Article II(2)(a) of the applicable BIT provided that “[i]nvestment shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment,…and shall in no case be accorded treat-
ment less than required by international law”. 
The Tribunal noted that the BIT is an international treaty that should be inter-
preted in accordance with the norms of interpretation established by the Vienna 
Convention, which is binding on the state parties to the BIT.30 Article 31(1) of the 
Convention requires that a treaty be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. 
The Tribunal found that it follows from the ordinary meaning of the terms fair 
and equitable and the purpose and object of the BIT that fair and equitable should be 
understood to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to foste-
ring the promotion of foreign investment. The text of the BIT reflects a positive 
 
28  The Award, para. 43. 
29  The Award, para. 43. 
30  The Award, para.. 307. 
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attitude towards investment with words such as “promote” and “stimulate”. Fur-
thermore, the parties to the BIT recognize the role that fair and equitable treatment 
plays in maintaining “a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use 
of economic resources”.31  
The Tribunal also found that except for Genin v. Estonia,32 there is a common 
thread in the recent awards under NAFTA and in Tecmed v. Mexico,33 to the effect 
that bad faith or malicious intention of the recipient State is not a necessary element 
in the failure to treat investments fairly and equitably. The Tribunal concurred with 
the Tribunal in CMS, which stated that fair and equitable treatment is an objective 
standard “unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or 
bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such intention and bad 
faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the standard.”34 
 
As to the question whether the standard of fair and equitable treatment had been 
breached, the Tribunal said that it was: 
 
“struck by the conduct of the Province after the the Claimant gave notice of 
termination of the Concession Agreement. ABA had requested to terminate 
the agreement in agreement with the Province. The Province refused what 
was a reasonable request in light of the previous behavior of the Province 
and its agencies. The refusal by the Province to accept that notice of termi-
nation and its insistence on terminating it by itself on account of abandon-
ment of the Concession is a clear case of a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. It is evident from the facts before this Tribunal that the 
Concession was not abandoned.”35 
 
The Tribunal countinued to say that: 
 
“Although the Tribunal has rejected to a certain extent the interpretations of 
the Concession Agreement and the Law alleged by the Claimant regarding 
the RPI and the Canon, it is also clear that the tariff regime was politicized 
because of concerns with forthcoming elections or because the Concession 
was awarded by the previous government. The issues of the zoning coeffi-
cients and the construction variations are cases in point. It is significant 
that, once the service was transferred, the new service provider was allowed 
to raise tariffs reflecting the construction variations. 
 
31  The Award, para. 307. 
32  Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, 25 June 2001. 
33  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)00/2, Award, 29 May 2003. 
34  The Award, para. 372. 
35  The Award, para. 374. 
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Finally, the repeated calls of the Provincial governor and other officials for 
non-payment of bills by customers verges on bad faith in the case of the 
Bahía Blanca incident when the Province itself had not completed the 
works that would have helped to avoid the problem in the first place. 
 
Considered together, these actions reflect a pervasive conduct of the Prov-
ince in breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment.”36 
 
As regards the question whether Argentina in addition to the above had also taken 
measures that could be considered to be arbitrary and to have impaired “the ma-
nagement, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or dis-
posal”37 of the investment of Azurix in Argentina, the Tribunal found that the actions 
of the provincial authorities calling for non-payment of bills even before the regula-
tory authority had made a decision, threatening the members of the ORAB because 
it had allowed ABA to resume billing, requiring ABA not to apply the new tariff 
resulting from the review of the construction variations and affirming that zone 
coefficients apply in contradiction with the information provided to the bidders at 
the time of bidding for the Concession, restraining ABA from collecting payment 
from its customers for services rendered before March 15, 2002, and denying to 
ABA access to the documentation on the basis of which ABA was sanctioned were 
arbitrary actions without any support in the Law or the Concession Agreement and 
impaired the operation of Azurix’s investment.38 
Turning to compensation, the Tribunal concluded that the BIT did not provide 
any measure of compensation apart from cases of expropriation. The Tribunal re-
ferred to the CMS v. Argentina case (Section 3.2.2 above), in which the tribunal 
found that the standard of fair market value, which frequently figures in respect of 
expropriation, may be appropriate also for other breaches if their “effect results in 
important long-term losses”.39 Turning to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal 
found that “compensation based on the fair market value of the Concession would 
be appropriate, particularly since the Province has taken it over”.40 In measuring the 
fair market value, the Tribunal stated that the function of the Tribunal is “to try and 
determine what an independent and well-informed third party would have been 
willing to pay for the Concession in March 2002, in a context where the Province 
would have honoured its obligations”.41 
 
36  The Award, para. 375-377. 
37  Article II.2(b) of the US-Argentina BIT provides: “Neither Party shall in any way impair by 
arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments”. 
38  The Award, para. 390-393. 
39  The Award, para. 420. 
40  The Award, para. 424. 
41  The Award, para. 427. 
 93 
The Claimant had submitted two methodologies for determining the fair market 
value: the actual investment and the book value. The Tribunal agreed with the 
Claimant that “the actual investment method is a valid one in this instance”.42 The 
Tribunal found that the Claimant’s investment in this respect was the price paid for 
the Concession and the additional investments made to finance ABA. 
The Tribunal emphasised, however, that a significant adjustment was required to 
arrive at the real value of the Canon paid by the Claimant for the Concession. Ac-
cording to the Tribunal, no well-informed investor would at the time of the violation 
have paid for the Concession the price (and more particularly, the Canon) paid by 
Azurix in mid-1999, irrespective of the actions taken by the Province and of the 
economic situation of Argentina at that time.43 The primary reason for this conclu-
sion of the Tribunal appears to have been the Tribunal’s findings with regard to the 
tariffs and tariff adjustment review provided by the Concession Agreement. The 
Claimant argued that under the Concession Agreement the Canon Payment should 
be included in the asset base that the concessionaire had the right to recover through 
the tariffs to be applied to the concessionaire’s services under the Concession 
Agreement. However, in the view of the Tribunal, the Canon Payment could not be 
included as a recoverable asset base for the purpose of tariff increases.44 
In light of the above factors, the Tribunal concluded that no more than a fraction 
of the Canon Payment could realistically have been recuperated under the existing 
Concession Agreement. The Tribunal therefore found that the value of the Canon at 
the time of the violation should be established at 60,000,000 US dollars. The Tribu-
nal did not explain, however, how it arrived at this amount. The full Canon Payment 
made by the Claimant amounted to 438,555,551 US dollars.45 
It should also be noted that the Tribunal did not award any compensation for un-
paid bills owed by customers to ABA, which the Province had directed the custom-
ers not to pay, since the Tribunal found that this amount was owed by the Province 
to ABA and, therefore, should not be part of the compensation awarded to Azurix.46 
Nor did the Tribunal award compensation for certain expenditures incurred by the 
Claimant in connection with negotiations with the Province and the termination of 
the Concession, since the Tribunal found that it had not received sufficient evidence 
in support of such costs and that, in any case, these were costs related to the business 
risk that Azurix took when it decided to make the investment. Therefore, although 
agreeing in principle that compensation should wipe out the consequences of an 
illegal act, in the circumstances of this particular case, the Tribunal did not find the 
amount claimed to be justified.47 
 
42  The Award, para. 425. 
43  The Award, para. 426. 
44  The Award, para. 427. 
45  The Award, para. 429. 
46  The Award, para. 431. 
47  The Award, para. 432. 
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III. Cases Decided by Other Tribunals 
1. Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia48 
Nykomb v. the Republic of Latvia was the first award on the merits rendered under 
the ECT. It was rendered on 16 December 2003 and concerned a dispute regarding 
the purchase of power by the state-owned Latvian company, Latvenergo, and the 
Latvian company Windau, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swedish company 
Nykomb. Latvenergo and Windau entered into several agreements, according to 
which Windau would build a co-generation electric plant and Latvenergo would 
purchase the surplus electricity produced subsequently. Windau and Latvenergo had 
a dispute over Windau’s tariff. Nykomb argued that Windau was entitled to a double 
tariff in accordance with the Entrepreneurial Law in force at the time when the con-
tract in question was concluded, whereas Latvenergo claimed that Windau only was 
entitled to a lower tariff in accordance with subsequent legislation that had amended 
the Entrepreneurial Law. 
As to the merits of Nykomb’s claim, the Tribunal found that Latvia had breached 
its obligation under Article 10 of the ECT49 not to discriminate against foreign in-
vestors by offering the so-called “double tariff” to certain other companies but not to 
Nykomb’s Latvian subsidiary, Windau, and by failing to present any evidence why 
those companies were different. 
As to the standard of compensation applicable in case of such discrimination, the 
Tribunal noted that the principles of compensation provided for in Article 13(1) of 
the ECT, in case of expropriation, were not applicable to the assessment of damages 
or losses caused by violations of Article 10. The Tribunal found that “the question of 
remedies to compensate for losses or damages caused by the Respondent’s violation 
of its obligations under Article 10 of the Treaty must primarily find its solution in 
accordance with established principles of customary international law. Such princi-
 
48  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 53. See further T. Wälde and K. Hobér, 
The First Energy Charter Award, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2005), 
pp. 83–103. 
49  Article 10 (1) of the ECT reads as follows: “Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of 
other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the 
most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by un-
reasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use enjoyment or dis-
posal. In no such case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that 
required by international law, including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall ob-
serve any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of 
any other Contracting Party.” 
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ples have authoritatively been restated in The International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility adopted in November 2001”.50 
The Tribunal further noted that according to Articles 3451 and 3552 of the ILC Ar-
ticles, restitution was the primary remedy. However, with respect to the case before 
it, the Tribunal found that restitution was a suitable remedy primarily where the state 
had instituted actions directly against the investor. Where the actions were directed 
against its subsidiary, the Tribunal instead found the appropriate remedy to be com-
pensation for the losses or damage inflicted on the investor’s investment.53 
Nykomb claimed damages corresponding to the difference between the “double 
tariff” and the tariff that had actually been paid to Windau. However, the Tribunal 
decided not to give Nykomb the full difference between the two sets of tariffs be-
cause the higher payments would not have gone directly to Nykomb but to Windau. 
The Tribunal stated that “the money would have been subject to Latvian taxes etc., 
would have been used to cover Windau’s costs and down payments on Windau’s 
loans etc., and disbursements to the shareholder would be subject to restrictions in 
Latvian company law on payment of dividends”.54 
Taking into account the requirements under applicable customary international 
law of causation, foreseeability and the reasonableness of the result, the Tribunal 
nevertheless found that the reduced earnings of Windau constituted the best avail-
able basis for the assessment also of Nykomb’s losses. It came to the conclusion that 
a discretionary award of one third of the estimated loss in purchase prices of elec-
tricity up to the time of the award would serve as a reasonable basis for the quantifi-
cation of Nykomb’s assumed losses up to the time of the award.55 
As regards Nykomb’s alleged losses on delivery of electric power to Latvenergo 
for the remainder of the eight year contract period, the Tribunal found this potential 
loss too uncertain and speculative to form the basis of an award of monetary com-
pensation. The Tribunal, however, considered it to be a continuing obligation of 
Latvia to ensure payment at the double tariff for electric power delivered under the 
contract for the rest of the eight year contract period. It therefore ordered Latvia to 
 
50  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 104-105. 
51  “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with 
the provisions of the chapter.” 
52  “A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitu-
tion, that is, to establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, 
provided and to the extent that restitution:  
 (a) Is not materially impossible;  
 (b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefits deriving from restitution 
instead of compensation”. 
53  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 105-108. 
54  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 105. 
55  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 107. 
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fulfil its obligation to pay the double tariff for future deliveries during the remainder 
of the contract period.56 
2. Petrobart Limited v. Kyrgyzstan57 
The second arbitral award on the merits rendered under the ECT was between 
Petrobart Ltd of Gibraltar and the Kyrgyz Republic. It concerned a sales contract 
between Petrobart and the Kyrgyz state owned company KGM for the purchase by 
the latter of 200,000 tonnes of gas condensate. The award was rendered on 29 March 
2005.58 
Petrobart delivered five shipments of gas but was only paid for the first two. At 
the same time as Petrobart turned to domestic courts for recourse, Kyrgyz authori-
ties – as part of a reform of the system for supply of oil and gas in the Kyrgyz Re-
public –took certain measures that made it impossible for Petrobart to enforce its 
rights under the contract. The measures included a decision by the Kyrgyz authori-
ties to privatize KGM, and to transfer its assets, but not its liabilities (including mon-
ies owed to Petrobart), to a new company as well as a request by the Vice Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic who – referring to KGM’s critical financial stan-
ding – asked the chairman of the Kyrgyz court that previously had rendered a judg-
ment in favour of Petrobart, to assist in granting a stay of the enforcement of the 
judgment against KGM. Enforcement was stayed by the court referring to the letter 
of the Vice Prime Minister, and before the period of stay of execution ended, KGM 
was declared bankrupt, which meant that enforcement of the judgment was no 
longer possible. 
The Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Government was liable for certain breaches 
of the ECT, specifically by virtue of its failure to provide fair and equitable treat-
ment by transferring assets from KGM to the above mentioned new company to the 
detriment of KGM’s creditors, including Petrobart (Article 10(1)); and by interve-
ning in court proceedings regarding the stay of execution of a final judgment to the 
detriment of Petrobart (Article 10(12)).59 
The Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Republic had violated its obligations under 
Articles 10(1) and 10(12) of the ECT. With reference to the Chorzów Factory case 
and to ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, the Tribunal found that Petrobart had 
 
56  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 108. 
57  The full text of the award is available e.g. at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions 
 /Petrobart-kyrgyz-rep-Award.pdf. 
58  The award was challenged at the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm, but the challenge was 
rejected. 
59  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 76. Article 10(12) of the ECT reads as follows: 
“Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its domestic law provides effective means for the as-
sertion of claims and the enforcement of rights with respect to Investments, investment agree-
ments, and investment authorizations”. 
 97 
suffered damage as a result of the Kyrgyz Republic’s breaches of the ECT and that 
Petrobart had to, as far as possible be placed financially in the position in which it 
would have found itself, had the breaches not occurred.60 
Petrobart essentially claimed compensation for (i) the unpaid invoices for gas 
condensate actually delivered by Petrobart to KGM; and (ii) loss of profit with re-
gard to the remaining deliveries under the contract. 
The Tribunal found that due to the troublesome financial situation of KGM, KGM 
would probably not have survived irrespective of the breaches of the ECT commit-
ted by the Kyrgyz Republic.61 
The Tribunal nevertheless found that the transfer by the Kyrgyz Republic of sub-
stantial assets belonging to KGM to other state entities caused substantial damage to 
KGM’s creditors, including Petrobart. Due to the inadequacy of the information 
submitted by the parties, the Tribunal found that the damage suffered by Petrobart 
could not be established with precision. The Tribunal therefore found it necessary to 
make a general assessment based on its appreciation of the situation as a whole. In 
making such assessment, the Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Republic “as responsi-
ble for the transfer and lease of KGM’s assets, shall compensate Petrobart for da-
mage which the Arbitral Tribunal estimates at 75% of its justified claims against 
KGM”.62 
With regard to Petrobart’s claim for lost profit, the Tribunal found that there re-
mained a great deal of uncertainty as to the consequences of the breakdown of the 
business relations between Petrobart and KGM. The Tribunal therefore concluded 
that Petrobart had not established that it was entitled to compensation for loss of 
future profits.63 
Since most of the respective Tribunals’ findings regarding damages in Nykomb 
and Petrobart are rather fact specific, only limited conclusions can be drawn from 
such cases. It should be noted, however, that in the absence of express provisions on 
the standard of compensation, the Tribunals in both cases relied on general provi-
sions of customary international law on state responsibility. 
It could also be noted that in Nykomb, where the investment – the local subsidiary 
Windau – was still in operation and the contract for delivery of electric power still in 
force between Windau and Latvenergo, the Tribunal made a clear distinction be-
tween the damage suffered by Nykomb – the foreign investor – and the damage suf-
fered by Windau. The Tribunal only awarded damages that would compensate 
Nykomb for the damage, that it had actually suffered, and not for losses suffered by 
Windau. Nykomb’s damage was quantified as a proportion of the earnings that 
would have been generated by Windau, had there not been any breach of the treaty, 
i.e. the Tribunal estimated the dividends that would have been received by Nykomb 
 
60  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 77-78. 
61  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 81. 
62  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 83-84. 
63  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 86-87. 
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from its subsidiary, rather than establishing a reduction of the value (if any) of 
Nykomb’s shares in Windau.  
3. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada 
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada64, S.D. Myers, Inc (SDMI) (USA) claimed that Canada 
had failed to comply, inter alia, with its obligation under Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA65 to treat investors of another party to the NAFTA in accordance with inter-
national law, including fair and equitable treatment. SDMI, an Ohio corporation that 
processed and disposed of PCB waste, alleged that Canada’s ban on the export of 
PCB wastes from Canada to the United States in late 1995 had resulted in SDMI 
suffering economic harm to its investment through interference with its operations, 
lost contracts and opportunities in Canada.  
In its first Partial Award of 13 November 2000 the Tribunal held that Canada had 
breached the fair and equitable treatment obligation of Article 1105 of the NAFTA. 
As regards the principles for compensation the Tribunal stated that in non-
expropriation cases the drafters of the NAFTA had left “it open to Tribunals to de-
termine a measure of compensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the 
case, taking into account the principles of both international law and the provisions 
of the NAFTA”.66 The Tribunal further concluded that in some non-expropriation 
cases a Tribunal might find it appropriate to adopt the fair market approach and in 
some not. In this case the Tribunal found that the fair market value standard was not 
a logical, appropriate or practicable measure of the compensation to be awarded. 
Instead the Tribunal cited the Chorzów Factory case and stated that “whatever pre-
cise approach is taken, it should reflect the general principle of international law that 
compensation should undo the material harm inflicted by a breach of an interna-
tional obligation”.67 Further, the Tribunal made clear that it was for SDMI to prove 
the quantum of the losses. The Tribunal also stated that compensation is payable 
only in respect of harm that is proved to have a sufficient casual link with the spe-
cific NAFTA provision that has been breached, and that double recovery must be 
avoided in situations e.g. when several NAFTA provisions have been breached.68  
In the second Partial Award of 21 October 2002 the Tribunal held that “the ap-
propriate loss to be considered in this particular case is the loss of net income 
stream”.69 The Tribunal noted that this approach formed part of the submissions of 
 
64  8 ICSID Reports (2005) 18. 
65  Article 1105(1) of NAFTA reads as follows: “Each Party shall accord to investments of inves-
tors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equita-
ble treatment and full protection and security”. 
66  First Partial Award para. 309. 
67  First Partial Award para. 315. 
68  First Partial Award para. 317. 
69  Second Partial Award, para. 100. 
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both parties and, further, that expert accountants retained by both sides agreed that 
SDMI’s lost income stream was capable of rational assessment. 
In order to asses the compensation due to SDMI as a result of Canada’s export 
ban on PCB the Tribunal used a 12-step methodology aimed at determining the net 
income stream lost by SDMI plus compensation for abridged opportunity and de-
lay.70 The Tribunal finally determined the total compensation (excluding interest) by 
using this methodology to CAN$6,050,000. 
4. Marvin Feldman v. Mexico 
Marvin Feldman v. Mexico71, concerned a dispute regarding the application of cer-
tain Mexican tax laws to the export of tobacco products by CEMSA, a company 
organized under the laws of Mexico and owned and controlled by the Claimant, Mr. 
Feldman. The Claimant alleged that Mexico’s continuing refusal to recognize 
CEMSA’s right to a refund of certain Mexican taxes in connection with cigarette 
exports constituted a breach of Mexico’s obligations under Chapter Eleven of 
NAFTA. 
In most instances, when cigarettes were purchased in Mexico at a price that in-
cluded tax, and subsequently exported, the tax amounts initially paid could be re-
funded. However, in 1991 the law was changed so that only producers – not resellers 
such as Claimant – became eligible for the refund. Subsequently, resellers again 
became eligible for the refund, but the Claimant did not manage to meet statutory 
invoice requirements, as the invoices from the volume retailers, from which the 
Clamiant purchased, did not itemize the tax on the invoice. This eventually forced 
Claimant to shut down its business. 
Claimant argued, inter alia, that Mexico discriminated against CEMSA, since 
Mexican authorities permitted at least three Mexican owned resellers of cigarettes to 
export cigarettes and to receive refunds, notwithstanding the fact that like the 
Claimant, they purchased their goods from retailers, and, thus, could not have in-
voices stating the tax amounts separately. 
The majority of the Tribunal found that the evidence available supported that the 
Claimant was denied the refunds at a time when at least three Mexican companies in 
like circumstances, i.e. resellers and exporters, were granted them. The majority 
therefore found that Mexico had violated the Claimant’s right to non-discrimination 
under Article 1102 of NAFTA.72 
Concerning the quantum of damages to be awarded to the Claimant, the Tribunal 
observed that NAFTA provides no guidance as to the proper measure of damages or 
compensation for situations that do not fall under Article 1110 (expropriation). The 
 
70  Second Partial Award, para. 229. 
71  ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award 16 December 2002. 
72  The Award, para. 173 et seq. 
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Tribunal found that “in case of discrimination that constitutes a breach of Article 
1102, what is owed by the responding Party is the amount of loss or damage that is 
adequately connected to the breach. In the absence of discrimination that also consti-
tutes indirect expropriation or is tantamount to expropriation, a claimant would not 
be entitled to the full market value of the investment which is granted by NAFTA 
Article 1110”.73 The Tribunal, thus, dismissed the Claimant’s claim for compensa-
tion equivalent to CEMSA’s “going concern value”, because compensation for the 
full market value of CEMSA would require a finding of expropriation.74 Since, most 
parts of the Claimant’s claim for loss of profits were time barred under NAFTA 
Article 1117(2), the only thing that remained of Claimant’s claim was three months 
tax refunds relating to the period after the cut-off date. Compensation for such claim 
was awarded by the Tribunal with 9,464,627.50 Mexican pesos (about 946,462 U.S. 
dollars) after certain adjustments for miscalculations and reductions for amounts 
relating to cigarettes exported to tax havens, since the latter amounts would not have 
been eligible for refunds under Mexican law.75 
5. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada 
In Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada76, Pope & Talbot claimed that Canada’s implemen-
tation of the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) between Canada and the US, 
which among other things regulated the export of softwood lumber from Canada to 
the US, inter alia, violated Article 1105 of the NAFTA, according to which parties 
have an obligation to treat investors of another party to the NAFTA in accordance 
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. Under the SLA export 
fees were levied on exports of softwood lumber out of Canada to the U.S., unless the 
exports came within a certain annual quota for all such softwood lumber exports. 
There was also a certain export quota on which a lower fee was levied. Pope & 
Talbot alleged that a number of measures taken by Canada with regard to the alloca-
tion of the above export quotas violated Article 1105. 
The tribunal found that whereas Canada’s quota allocations were handled in a 
reasonable manner, the handling of a certain “verification review procedure” regard-
ing information underlying Pope & Talbot’s quota applications initiated by Can-
ada’s Softwood Lumber Division (SLD), constituted a denial of the investor’s fair 
treatment required by NAFTA Article 1005. In the view of the Tribunal, the actions 
undertaken by SLD meant that Pope & Talbot was subjected to threats, denied its 
reasonable requests for pertinent information, required to incur unnecessary expense 
 
73  The Award, para. 194. 
74  The Award, para. 198. 
75  The Award, para. 202 et seq. 
76  UNCITRAL Award, 10 April 2001, www.investmentclaims.com. 
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and disruption in meeting SLD:s requests for information, forced to expend legal 
fees and probably suffer a loss of reputation in government circles.77 
In its award on damages78, the Tribunal did not expressly discuss the standard of 
compensation to be applied in case of violations of fair and equitable treatment un-
der NAFTA Article 1105. In light of the Tribunal’s conclusions with regard to liabil-
ity, the Tribunal simply awarded the investor compensation for costs and expenses 
incurred due to SLD:s “verification review procedure”, which primarily included 
accountants’ and legal fees as well as expenses incurred in lobbying efforts.79 The 
Claimant’s claim for compensation for the value of management time devoted to the 
“verification review procedure” was denied, since the Tribunal found management 
costs to be a fixed cost that the Claimant would have had irrespective of the “verifi-
cation review procedure”.80 
D. Concluding Remarks  
As mentioned above there are few arbitral awards dealing with the issue of compen-
sation for violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard. This means that 
caution is required when trying to draw general conclusions from such awards. It is 
submitted that it is in fact too early to draw any general conclusions at all. The cases 
discussed in this contribution show that there is, for the time being, no general ap-
proach to this issue. Only time will tell if there will ever be such a general approach. 
This notwithstanding, some preliminary observations come to mind. 
First, given the absence of treaty provisions in this area, tribunals rely – as they 
must – on customary international law. Guidance is usually sought from the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility which in turn build on the principles laid down in 
the Chorzow Factory case. This is, however, only the first step in that it establishes 
the standard of compensation. As stated in Article 31 of the ILC Articles the stan-
dard is “full reparation” 
Second, when it comes to the method of establishing and calculating “full repara-
tion”, customary international law does not provide much guidance. The cases dis-
cussed above illustrate that the method chosen depends on, and varies with, the 
circumstances of each individual case, including, inter alia, the nature of the viola-
tion of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the kind and nature of the in-
vestment in question. Sometimes the starting point might be the amount actually 
invested, in other cases it might be more appropriate to focus on lost future profits as 
established by using the DCF method. 
 
77 The Award, para. 181. 
78 UNCITRAL Award, 31 May 2002, www.investmentclaims.com. 
79 The Award, para. 85. 
80 The Award, para. 82. 
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Third, it would seem that the issue of causality has the potential of creating more 
problems in this context than in relation to compensation for expropriation. One 
possible explanation is that violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
does not automatically result in the elimination of the investment, as is mostly the 
case with expropriation, but rather results in a decline in the business in question, or 
in other negative impact on it. The difficulty is to determine the extent to which this 
is caused by the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and the “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies” in Recent ICSID Jurisprudence     
                    
Richard Happ∗ 
I have been asked to analyse recent jurisprudence1 of arbitral tribunals constituted 
under the auspices of the “International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes” (hereinafter “ICSID tribunals” or “tribunals”) relating to the “foreign 
nationa-lity – requirement” and the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The scope 
of this report is restricted to awards and decisions rendered between 2001 and 2006. 
A. Introductory Remarks 
I. ICSID Convention and Diplomatic Protection 
The “foreign nationality”-requirement can be located in Article 25 (1) ICSID Con-
vention2 which sets out the general requirements for the jurisdiction of an ICSID 
tribunal. The exhaustion of local remedies is not something which the ICSID Con-
vention requires. To the contrary, Article 26 ICSID Convention sets out that a Con-
tracting State “may require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its 
consent to arbitration under this Convention.”  
Both issues are not privy to the ICSID Convention, but have developed as part of 
the right of states to grant diplomatic protection to their nationals. States are only 
entitled to bring a claim on behalf of their nationals once that national has exhausted 
the local remedies. In the ELSI-case, the International Court of Justice qualified this 
rule as “an important principle of customary international law.”3 
 
∗  Richard Happ, Senior Associate, Practice Group Dispute Resolution, Luther Rechtsanwaltsge-
sellschaft, Hamburg. The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author. 
1  If not explicitly stated, the awards and decisions cited in this paper can be found on the website 
of ICSID at www.worldbank.org/icsid/ or at the following private websites: www.Investmentc 
laims.com or http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_list.htm.  
2  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States, Washington, 18. März 1965, I.L.M. 4 (1965), 524; in force since 14.10.1966 (hereinaf-
ter the „ICSID-Convention“). 
3  1989 I.C.J. Reports 42, para. 50.  
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In the area of investment disputes, diplomatic protection has been factually re-
placed by treaty-based investment arbitration as a means of dispute settlement4. The 
current caseload of ICSID consists nearly exclusively of disputes relating to the 
alleged breach of a bi- or multilateral investment treaty (hereinafter “BITs”).  
Notwithstanding this, one must be aware that within the framework of the ICSID 
Convention, the foreign nationality requirement and the exhaustion of local reme-
dies have a different function than they have within the framework of diplomatic 
protection. The jurisdiction of ICSID extends to all kinds of investment disputes, 
whether they are based on contract, national law or treaty, as long as the require-
ments of Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention are fulfilled. In contrast, diplomatic pro-
tection is restricted to alleged breaches of international law. Regard must be had to 
this different function when interpreting the ICSID Convention. 
II. ICSID Convention and Investment Protection Treaties 
The basis for the jurisdiction of an arbitration Tribunal is a respective agreement of 
the parties. Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention incorporates this by requiring the ‘con-
sent’ of the parties to submit their dispute to Centre. 
Where a dispute is based on a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), the consent of 
the state is contained in the dispute settlement clause of the BIT. In terms of an 
agreement, the dispute settlement clause constitutes the offer of the state made to 
nationals of the other state. The investor consents to arbitration – and accepts the 
offer of the state - by filing its request of arbitration. Thus, provisions in the dispute 
settlement clause dealing with nationality and exhaustion of local remedies become 
part of the arbitration agreement.5 
An arbitration agreement must conform to the requirement of Article 25 ICSID 
Convention in order for an ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction. It follows that from 
the perspective of the ICSID Convention, the provisions in a BIT dealing with na-
tionality and exhaustion of local remedies are conceptually subordinated to the  
ICSID Convention.  
 
4  For an analysis of that change (and some of its implications) cf. Happ, Schiedsverfahren 
zwischen Staaten und Investoren nach Artikel 26 Energiechartavertrag. Eine Studie zum Wan-
del der Streitbeilegung im Investitionsschutzrecht unter den Bedingungen einer globalen 
Weltwirtschaft (2000). 
5  Schreuer, The ICSID-Convention: A Commentary, Article 25 mn. 481.1. 
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B. The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement 
I. The General Rule 
Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention sets out that the 
“jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of 
a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre”. 
To fall under the jurisdiction of the Centre, a dispute must thus arise between a 
Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State. The nationality re-
quirement is considered not to have the same importance as in the field of diplo-
matic protection. In the framework of the Convention, the ‘foreign nationality’-
requirement is only the means to bring an investor within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre6.  
In Article 25 (2) (a-b), the Convention clarifies that a “national of another Con-
tracting State” can be an individual or a juridical person. The Convention does not 
define the concept of nationality. Whether an individual or a juridical person is a 
national of a Contracting State is, in the first instance, a matter of the law of that 
Contracting State7. The possession of the nationality of a certain state can be proven 
by passports and/or certificates of nationality, although tribunals are not bound by 
these documents. In Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates8, the Clai-
mant had submitted certificates of nationality issued by the Italian authorities to the 
tribunal. While it agreed with Prof. Schreuer that certificates of nationality should be 
given appropriate weight, it noted that such documents did not preclude a contrary 
decision by the tribunal9. Analyzing the submitted documents in detail, the tribunal 
found no evidence that the Italian officials who issued the certificates were aware 
that the Claimant had lost his Italian nationality. In cross-examination, the Claimant 
also admitted that he had not informed any Italian official of his loss of nationality, 
since he himself did not believe that he had lost it.  Consequently, the tribunal held 
that the Claimant could not rely on any of these certificates or on the letter of the 
Italian foreign ministry10. The tribunal was therefore compelled to determine for 
itself whether the Claimant reacquired Italian nationality after 1991. Italian law 
provided for that possibility, requiring only the taking up of residence in Italy for a 
 
6  Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration (yet 
unpublished paper), p. 3-4 (citing Broches and Amerasinghe). 
7  Schreuer, The ICSID-Convention: A Commentary, Article 25 mn. 429, 460. 
8  Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, Case No. ARB/02/7, Award of 7 July 
2004 (Fortier (presiding), Schwebel, El Kholy). The case arose on the basis of the BIT between 
Italy and the United Arab Emirates.  
9  Id., para. 63. 
10  Id., para. 66-68. 
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period of not less than a year. Reviewing the evidence submitted, it found that the 
Claimant could not prove that he had fulfilled this requirement, and thus concluded 
that he was not an Italian national11. As a result, the tribunal decided that the dispute 
was outside its jurisdiction. The Claimant could not rely on the BIT between Italy 
and the United Arab Emirates.12 
II. Nationality of Individuals  
Article 25 (2) (a) ICSID Convention clarifies that the investor must not have the 
nationality of the Contracting State which is a party to the dispute. The ICSID Con-
vention does not prohibit double nationality as long as the investor has the national-
ity of at least one Contracting State13. It is only where the investor has both the na-
tionality of the host state and of another Contracting State that he will not be able to 
resort to ICSID jurisdiction. This proved fatal for some of the claimants in Cham-
pion Trading et. al v. Arab Republic of Egypt14. The individual claimants had both 
U.S. and Egypt nationality and relied on their Egyptian nationality when making the 
investment in Egypt. The tribunal thus held that their claims were outside its juris-
diction.   
The principle of effective nationality, which the International Court of Justice had 
pronounced in the Nottebohm15 case, seems also have to been accepted with regard 
to investment disputes16. Within the period under review, however, no ICSID tribu-
nal seems to have issued a holding dealing with this principle. It was an issue raised 
by the individual claimants in Champion Trading, but considered not decisive since 
those claimants had US nationality. 
Article 25 (2) (a) imposes two temporal limitations: the investor must have the 
nationality of another Contracting State at the time when both parties consented to 
ICSID jurisdiction and at the time when the request for arbitration17 was registered. 
The continuous nationality - rule proclaimed by the tribunal in Loewen v. United 
 
11  Id., para. 81. 
12  The claimant could not accept the offer made by the United Arab Emirates to nationals of Italy 
to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration, since he was no Italian national. The possible prece-
dential value of the decision is thus not restricted to ICSID cases.  
13  Schreuer, Article 25 mn. 438. 
14  Champion Trading et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/02/09, Decision on Juris-
diction of 21 October 2003 (Briner (presiding), Yves Fortier, Aynès). 
15  ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgement of 6 April 1955, 
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4 et seq. 
16  Schreuer, mn. 439; cf. Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Interim decision 
on preliminary jurisdictional issues of 6 December 2000 (Bravo, Gantz, Kerameus), para. 32. 
Cf. also Wisner/Gallus, JWIT 2004, 927, 930-933. 
17  ICSID Arbitration is initiated by a request for arbitration, Article 36 (1) ICSID Convention. 
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States18 might apply to treaty-based investment disputes. But since the ICSID sys-
tem is also open for mere contractual disputes, the ICSID Convention does not re-
quire continuous nationality. The investor may change its nationality as long as 
he/she fulfils the requirements of Article 25 (2) (a) ICSID Convention19. Of course, 
this is without prejudice to a possible rule of continuous nationality under applicable 
bi- or multilateral investment treaties or customary international law20 in a treaty-
based investment dispute.  
III. Nationality of Juridical Persons 
1. General Rule 
Article 25 (2) (b) ICSID Convention provides that a “national” is also  
“any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the 
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationa-
lity of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of 
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.” 
The Convention does not define the concept of “juridical person”. It seems, how-
ever, to be generally accepted that legal personality is a necessary prerequisite for 
being a “juridical person”, and that mere associations of individuals are not suffi-
cient21. In Impregilo v. Pakistan, the Tribunal thus held that the Claimant could not 
bring a claim on behalf of an unincorporated Swiss joint venture, which it consi-
dered to be not a juridical person22. It is to be noted that several BIT’s, inter alia the 
new German-Chinese BIT, provide that “investors” can also be entities without legal 
 
18  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill). For a critical review, see Rubins, 
Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-Statee Arbitration Claim, Arbitration In-
ternational 21 (2005), 1 set seq. 
19  Schreuer, Article 25 mn. 452, 453. 
20  Cf. Dugard, Addendum to the first report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. 
A/Cn.4/506/Add.1. Dugard concludes (on p.10): “12. The dubious status of the requirement of 
continuity of nationality as a customary rule is emphasized by the uncertainties surrounding 
the content of the alleged rule. There is no clarity on the meaning of the date of injury, nation-
ality, continuity and the dies ad quem (the date until which continuity of the claim is re-
quired).“ 
21  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 457-459. 
22  Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005 (Guillaume (presiding), Cremades, Landau), para. 132. Cf. also 
Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. – Dipenta v. Algeria, Award on 10 January 2005 (Tercier (pre-
siding), Faurès, Gaillard), par. 34/37. 
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personality23. Those investors thus will not qualify as”juridical persons” pursuant to 
Article 25 (2) (b) ICSID Convention24.  
The nationality of juridical persons is primarily determined by the national law of 
the state whose nationality is claimed. Usually, corporate nationality is determined 
by the place of incorporation and/or the head office of the juridical person. These 
criteria have been adopted consistently by ICSID Tribunals25. Control of the corpo-
ration by nationals of that state is not considered a necessary criterion26, since Ar-
ticle 25 (2) (b) presupposes that a juridical person has the nationality of the host 
state, but is controlled by nationals of another Contracting state. Provisions on na-
tionality in national investment laws and investment treaties which provide for  
ICSID jurisdiction form part of the legal framework of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute and/or of the arbitration agreement.  
2. Agreement to Treat a Juridical Person as a Foreign National 
Pursuant to Article 25 (2) (b), the parties to the dispute may agree to treat a juridical 
person which has the nationality of the host state, but is controlled by nationals of 
another Contracting State, as a national of another Contracting State. Such an 
agreement should normally be explicit to avoid any doubts27. However, ICSID tri-
bunals have been generous in assuming an implicit agreement at least in cases where 
the state had agreed to ICSID jurisdiction with a locally incorporated company28. 
BIT’s may also contain a respective explicit offer of the State, which upon accep-
tance by the investor becomes part of the arbitration agreement. Absent such an 
explicit offer, no tacit agreement can be deduced from the conclusion of a BIT. 
While parties may agree explicitly or implicitly on treating a juridical person as a 
foreign national, it is an objective requirement that the juridical person must be con-
 
23  Cf. Art. 1(2) (a) of German-Chinese BIT, pursuant to which an investor (as regards the Federal 
Republic of Germany) is: “any juridical person as well as any commercial or other company or 
association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory of the Federal Re-
public of Germany”. An English-language version of the BIT can be found at http://www. 
iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_germany_china_bit_2003.pdf.  
24  It is to be noted that the German-Chinese BIT provides only for ICSID jurisdiction, unless the 
parties agree otherwise. Since it seems extremely unlikely that China would agree to the juris-
diction of a different forum to enable an investor to bring a claim, the consequence seems to be 
that only the individuals behind those entities can file a claim. 
25  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 460. In the period under review, no tribunal seems to have deviated from 
this general rule. 
26  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 463. 
27  ICSID has published several model arbitration clauses. The respective clause no. 7 (to be 
found at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/model-clauses-en/9.htm#c) reads as follows: “It is 
hereby agreed that, although the Investor is a national of the Host State, it is controlled by na-
tionals of name(s) of other Contracting State(s) and shall be treated as a national of 
[that]/[those] State[s] for the purposes of the Convention.” 
28  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 519. 
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trolled by nationals of another Contracting State. Control is primarily exercised via 
majority shareholding29. Often, the foreign national is a juridical person and only the 
first link in a chain of juridical persons of different nationality. In such cases, the 
questions arises whether a Tribunal has to stop at the first level of control, or can 
‘look through the corporate veil’ of the controlling foreign national to determine 
whether there are further controlling companies of different nationality, and deter-
mine which one of them exercises ‘effective’ control. Past tribunals seem to have 
decided differently: in Amco30, the tribunal stayed with the first-tier foreign share-
holder, while in SOABI31 the tribunal searched for real control and went one step 
further to second-tier control.32  
In Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Venezuela (“Aucoven”), Aucoven was 
controlled by the US corporation Icatech, which in turn was 100%-owned by the 
Mexican company ICA Holding. As Venezuela submitted, ICA Holding exercised 
direct control over its subsidiaries, including Aucoven. Venezuela thus argued that 
the ‘effective’ control thus lay with a Mexican company (not a Contracting State). 
The tribunal did not accept that Art. 25 (2) (b) required ‘effective control’, observing 
that the ICSID convention does not know such a requirement, and that it would be 
difficult and impractical to apply.33 The tribunal then considered that the parties in 
their agreement had placed emphasis on the majority shareholding in Aucoven, and 
considered the majority shareholding to be a reasonable test for control34 and within 
the limits imposed by the ICSID Convention. 
The issue of “direct” or “effective control”, albeit with regard to a respective BIT-
clause, was also one of the main contentious issues in Aguas del Tunari S.A. 
 
29  See infra the discussion of the cases Autopista v. Venezuela and Aguas de Tunari v. Boliva. 
This is irrespective of the fact that very often less than majority shareholding can be sufficient 
to control a corporation. Cf., inter alia, International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. 
Mexico, Award of 26 January 2006 (van den Berg (presiding), Ariosa, Waelde), para. 105-110. 
30  Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 396. The 
Tribunal held, however, that in exceptional circumstances it might search for the true controller 
of a company (id., para. 14): “… in fact, it could be so where for political or economical rea-
sons, it matters for the Contracting State to know the nationality of the controller or the con-
trollers, and where it is proven that would the Contracting State have known this nationality, it 
would not have agreed to the arbitration clause; such a situation might possibly be met in ex-
ceptional instances”.  
31  SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction of 1. August 1984, 2 ICSID Reports 182/3. 
32  Cf. Wisner/Gallus, JWIT 2004, 927, 936 analyze these two decisions and argue that :”These 
facts suggest that investor-State tribunals will look through holding companies to determine 
control but will not look through companies pursuing activities in the jurisdiction in which 
they are incorporated.” 
33  Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No. 
ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2001 (Böckstiegel, Cremades, Kauf-
mann-Kohler (presiding)), para. 112-113. 
34  Id., para 117-121. Article 64 of the contract between the parties provided that if the majority of 
the shares should be sold to a national of a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention, then 
disputes should be settled at ICSID. 
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v.Republic of Boliva35. Aguas del Tunari S.A. (“AdT”) is a Bolivian company the 
shares of which were owned – after some changes – by a chain of Dutch holding 
companies, the last one of which was held in equal parts by another subsidiary of the 
US company Bechtel Enterprise Holding, Inc (“Bechtel”)and by the Italian company 
Edison S.p.A (“Edison”) directly. 
When a dispute arose, AdT brought a claim on the basis of the Netherlands-
Bolivian BIT, Article 1 (b) (iii) of which provides that “nationals” of a Contracting 
Party (to the BIT) are also “legal persons controlled directly or indirectly, by nation-
als of that Contracting Party, but constituted in accordance with the laws of the other 
Contracting Party”. AdT thus claimed that it should be considered as a Dutch na-
tional, since it was controlled by Dutch companies. Bolivia objected to the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal, arguing that AdT was not controlled by Dutch companies, but 
by Bechtel.  
The Tribunal thus had to determine whether the indirect ownership of AdT’s 
shares was sufficient, or whether the Dutch companies did not exercise control, as 
they in turn were owned by Bechtel and Edison. It noted that majority ownership of 
shares was generally considered to be sufficient for control and that it was nearly 
impossible to draw the line between formal control and ‘actual control’ required by 
Bolivia36. After a lengthy analysis of the holding structure and the provisions of the 
BIT, the Tribunal considered that majority ownership of shares was sufficient for 
‘control’37 and that AdT was controlled by Dutch nationals. 
3. Foreign Juridical Persons Controlled by Nationals of the Host State 
No clear and uniform opinion, however, exists with regard to cases where the fo-
reign juridical person, be it direct investor or only shareholder of the investor, is not 
owned and controlled by third-state nationals, but by nationals of the host state. To 
imagine such a situation might cause a certain kind of uneasiness, since the ‘foreign’ 
investor in fact would not be foreign at all. In his 2000 commentary on the ICSID 
Convention, Prof. Schreuer described this uneasiness as follows: “[I]f the immediate 
controller is a national of a Contracting State which is, in turn, controlled by natio-
nals of non-Contracting States or even by nationals of the host state? Realism would 
militate against jurisdiction in such a case.”38 
The landmark decision in this respect seems to be the decision on jurisdiction in 
Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine39. The dispute arose on the basis of the bilateral invest-
 
35  Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB /02/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005 (Caron (presiding), Alberro-Semerena, Alvarez).  
36  Aguas de Tunari, para. 246. 
37  Aguas de Tunari, para. 264. 
38  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 562. 
39  Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 
(Weill (presiding), Bernardini, Price).  
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ment treaty between Lithuania and Ukraine (the “BIT”). The Claimant, Tokios Toke-
les, is a business enterprise established under the laws of Lithuania. It is owned and 
controlled by Ukrainian nationals, which hold ninety-nine percent of the company’s 
outstanding shares. In 1994, Tokios Tokeles created Taki spravy, a wholly owned 
subsidiary established under the laws of Ukraine. Tokios Tokeles alleged that, be-
ginning in February 2002, governmental authorities in Ukraine engaged in a series 
of actions with respect to Taky spravy that breached Ukraine’s obligations under the 
BIT.  
Ukraine argued that Tokios Tokeles should not be considered a ‘genuine national’ 
of Lithuania, since it was predominantly owned and controlled by Ukrainian natio-
nals and also had no substantial business activities in Lithuania. To find jurisdiction, 
Ukraine argued, would be tantamount to allowing claims of nationals against their 
own governments and incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICSID con-
vention.40 
The Tribunal considered that under the BIT, the claimant’s incorporation in 
Lithuania was sufficient to qualify it as an ‘investor’ of Lithuania. The Tribunal 
refused to apply a further ‘control’ or ‘substantial business activity’ test. It consid-
ered the lack of ‘denial of benefits’ provision to be a deliberate choice of Ukraine 
and Lithuania. Accordingly, Tokios Tokeles was held to be an ‘investor’ under the 
terms of the BIT.41 The Tribunal then turned to Article 25 of the ICSID Conven-
tion.42 Ukraine had asked the Tribunal to apply Article 25(2)(b) to create an excep-
tion to the state-of-incorporation rule of nationality. The Tribunal found no support 
in the text of the Convention for such an approach. It considered the object and pur-
pose of Article 25(2)(b) to be expansion of jurisdiction, rather than limiting it.43 The 
Tribunal also refused to apply the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”. While it 
acknowledged that the doctrine formed part of customary international law, and that 
Barcelona Traction44 was the seminal case affirming that proposition, it noted that 
Ukraine had not demonstrated that the requirements for veil-piercing had been 
met.45 The Tribunal then found that its conclusions were consistent with earlier 
ICSID awards and the views of ICSID scholars.46 
The chairman, Prof. Prosper Weill, dissented. He noted that “the approach taken 
by the Tribunal on the issue of principle raised in this case for the first time in   
ICSID’s history is in my view at odds with the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention and might jeopardize the future of the institution.”47 Professor Weill 
criticized the majority’s assumption that the origin of invested capital was not deci-
 
40  Id., para. 22.  
41  Id., para. 38. 
42  Id., paras. 42-52. 
43  Id., para. 46-49. 
44  Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd. (note 9). 
45  Tokios Tokeles Award (note 61), para. 53-56. 
46  Id., para 58-70. 
47  Dissenting Opinion of Professor Prosper Weil, para. 1. 
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sive, denouncing this approach as “flying in the face of the object and purpose of the 
ICSID Convention and system”. Relying inter alia on the preamble of the Conven-
tion and the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention, he noted that the  
“ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for investments made in a State by 
its own citizens with domestic capital through the channel of a foreign entity, 
whether pre-existent or created for that purpose.”48 
Quite the contrary decision seems to have been reached in the Loewen49 case (an 
ICSID Additional Facility dispute). It is noteworthy that the Tribunal decided to 
pierce the corporate veil (although apparently denying that). After the Claimant had 
filed for bankruptcy in the US, all of its business operations were reorganized under 
the mantle of  a United States corporation. The Canadian Loewen Group, imme-
diately prior to its going out of business, assigned all of its right, title and interest to 
the NAFTA claim to a newly created corporation called Nafcanco. The tribunal 
considered that not Nafcanco, but the new US corporation should be considered as 
‘real’ claimant 
“By the terms of the assignment, the only item being assigned was this NAFTA 
claim. All of the assets and business of TLGI have been reorganized under the mant-
le of an American corporation. All of the benefits of any award would clearly inure 
to the American corporation. Such a naked entity as Nafcanco, even with its catchy 
name, cannot qualify as a continuing national for the purposes of this proceeding.”50  
4. Mail Box-Companies and Shells  
Since ‘control’ is no requirement under the ICSID convention for the nationality of 
juridical persons (with the exception of Article 25 (2) (b)), it is in principle both 
possible and permissible51 for an investor from a non-Contracting State to channel 
investments into a host country via the subsidiary in a third state which is a Con-
tracting State. This may lead to disputes where the ‘formal investor’ is a mere mail-
box company or ‘shell’ created for the purpose of achieving ICSID-jurisdiction52.  
 
48  Id., para. 19. 
49  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill). 
50  Id., para. 237. 
51  Aguas de Tunari, para 330: “[…] it is not uncommon in practice, and - absent a particular 
limitation - not illegal to locate one’s operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a benefi-
cial regulatory and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law 
of the jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.” 
52  Although that seems unlikely. The primary driving factor for the structuring of a foreign in-
vestment is the existence of double taxation agreements. To prevent ‘treaty shopping’ in the 
field of double taxation agreements, many states, including Germany (§ 50d III EStG), have 
enacted ‘denial of benefits’-provisions in their internal law which deny the advantages of a 
DTA to such mailbox companies. The scope of these provisions is similar to a denial of bene-
fits-provision under a BIT.  
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The ICSID Convention does not contain explicit substantive requirements to pre-
vent such a ‘treaty shopping’-approach, but leaves it to the agreement of the parties 
to determine who is deemed to be a ‘foreign national’. If the consent of the state is 
contained in a national law or a BIT, it is up to the contracting parties to include a 
respective “denial of benefits” provision. Several BIT’s contain “denial of benefits”- 
provisions, pursuant to which the provisions of the Treaty are not applicable to com-
panies controlled by third-state nationals (e.g. of states not party to that treaty), if 
those companies have no substantial business activity of their own. Respective ar-
guments have been advanced, inter alia, by the state parties in Generation Ukraine 
v. Ukraine and in Nova Plama A.D. v. Bulgaria, but to no avail. In both cases, the 
tribunals considered that the requirements of the denial of benetifs-provision were 
not fulfilled.  
Absent such a denial of benefits-provision, it seems that control by third-state na-
tionals would not affect ICSID jurisdiction as long as the third state is a Contracting 
State to the ICSID convention.  
It needs to be noted, however, that in several disputes the Contracting State par-
ties have raised the objection that the Claimant was a mere shell which was created 
for the sole purpose of gaining access to ICSID jurisdiction. In each of these cases, 
the tribunals did not dismiss that objection per se, but were careful to show that the 
objection was unfounded on the facts.  
In Autopista v. Venezuela, Venezuela had asserted that Icatech would be a corpo-
ration of convenience. The Tribunal analysed the context in which Icatech acquired 
shares in the claimant and considered that the assertion to be unfounded53. In Tokios 
Tokeles v. Ukraine, the tribunal did not in principle refuse to apply the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil, but merely considered that the requirements for doing so 
had not been fulfilled. In Aguas de Tunari v. Bolivia, Bolivia had asserted that the 
two Dutch companies were mere shells set up to obtain ICSID jurisdiction. The 
tribunal did not refuse that argument as being irrelevant per se, but concluded that 
both companies were not shells54. In its concluding observations, the tribunal also 
noted that it “does not find a sufficient basis in the present record to support an alle-
gation of abuse of corporate form or fraud”55. It did not reject the respective allega-
tion of Bolivia as irrelevant.  
The reasoning of these cases does not indicate whether they considered the “shell-
issue” to be part of the ICSID Convention or rather part of the respective bilateral 
investment treaty. Two recent non-ICSID awards, however, indicate that the shell-
issue might  be considered a part of the respective offer of the state party in a BIT to 
submit the dispute to arbitration.  
 
53  Autopista v. Venezuela, paras. 123-126. 
54  Aguas de Tunari, para. 320-323. 
55  Id., note 331. 
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In X v. Kazakhstan56, an SCC case on the basis, inter alia, of the US-Kazakhstan 
bilateral investment treaty, the Tribunal was faced with Respondent’s objection that 
the US corporate claimant was a mere shell controlled by non-U.S. nationals, possi-
bly even Kazakh citizens. The Claimant had failed to produce documentation con-
cerning its shareholders. The Tribunal noted that several provisions of the BIT re-
lated to ownership and control. It concluded that the Claimant was thus obliged to 
provide  
“the necessary information and evidence concerning the circumstances of ownership 
and control, directly or indirectly, over [Claimant-investor] at all relevant times”.57 
Since the Claimant had not provided any evidence that U.S. citizens or companies 
had any degree of control over the Claimant, the Tribunal concluded that it had not 
been established that it had jurisdiction on the basis of the Treaty. 
In Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic58, the Tribunal came to a different 
conclusion. It was faced with the objection that the Claimant was a mere shell con-
trolled by its UK parent company. The Tribunal observed that it had  
“ some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no real connection 
with a State party to a BIT, and which is in reality a mere shell company controlled 
by another company which is not constituted under the laws of that State, should not 
be entitled to invoke the provisions of that treaty.” 
However, it refused to find an implied “control”-requirement in the provisions of 
the Czech-Netherlands BIT.  
“The Tribunal cannot in effect impose upon the parties a definition of “investor” 
other than that which they themselves agreed. That agreed definition required only 
that the claimant-investor should be constituted under the laws of (in the present 
case) The Netherlands, and it is not open to the Tribunal to add other requirements 
which the parties could themselves have added but which they omitted to add”.59 
While several tribunals seem to have accepted the argument that mail-box com-
panies and shells set up for the mere purpose of obtaining access to arbitration 
should be denied that access, the jurisprudence is not yet uniform. However, none of 
the Tribunals seem to have interpreted an implied “control”-requirement into the 
ICSID-Convention. Also, both ICSID- and non-ICSID tribunals have pronounced on 
the shell-issue. That suggests that if an implied control-requirement exists, it must be 
found in the state’s offer to arbitrate contained in the respective BIT.  
 
56  Jurisdictional Award rendered in 2003 in SCC Case 122/2001, Stockholm International Arbi-
tration Review 2005:1, 123. 
57  Id., 151-152. 
58  Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006 (Sir Arthur Watts 
(presiding), Fortier, Behrens).  
59  Id., paras. 240-241. 
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C. Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
I. Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule is a rule of customary international law. In the 
Interhandel Case, the International Court of Justice stated that: 
“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings 
may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law; the rule 
has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its 
national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in viola-
tion of international law. Before resort may be had to an international court in such a 
situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation oc-
curred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the frame-
work of its own domestic system.”60 
In the ELSI-case, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that the local 
remedies rule may be derogated from, qualified or varied by any binding treaty. 
However, the Court pointed out that the  
“[…] Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary 
international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence 
of any words making clear an objection to do so.” 
In this report, it shall be assumed that this rule has a procedural nature only. There 
has been a long standing debate whether the rule forms a part of procedural law or 
whether it is a substantive requirement for a breach of international law to exist. It is 
neither appropriate nor possible to give even a summary of this debate, or to com-
ment on it. Instead, reference shall be made to the summary given by John Dugard, 
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, in his second report on 
diplomatic protection61.  
However, both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the rule of exhaus-
tion of local remedies have been discussed in recent cases. Consequently, both shall 
be reviewed.  
II. Exhaustion of Local Remedies as a Procedural Requirement 
Art. 26 ICSID Convention reads as follows:  
“Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise 
stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. 
A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.” 
 
60  1959 ICJ Reports 27. 
61  Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, ILC 53rd session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, pp. 
15-32. 
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Absent an explicit requirement to the contrary – in bilateral investment treaties, 
national legislation or investment agreements – access to ICSID thus will not require 
the exhaustion of local remedies. This serves to further the Centre’s purpose as a 
neutral venue for the settlement of investment disputes62, and also the exclusive 
character already provided for in the first sentence. 
In Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the Respondent thus fruitlessly argued that the 
Claimant first had to exhaust local remedies before resorting to ICSID Arbitration. 
The dispute arose on the basis of the US-Ukrainian bilateral investment treaty (the 
“BIT”), which did not contain a respective requirement of exhaustion of local reme-
dies. Since Ukraine had given its consent to ICSID arbitration already in the BIT, 
which was matched by the investor’s consent (given by filing the notice of arbitra-
tion), the Tribunal considered the reliance on Article 26 ICSID convention to be 
unfounded63. 
The duty to exhaust local remedies refers only to legal remedies. It is considered 
that this includes judicial remedies before ordinary and extraordinary courts as well 
as available remedies before administrative bodies. However, the individual is not 
obliged to exhaust “extra-legal remedies or remedies as of grace” or remedies which 
are of a discretionary nature64. 
It is considered that local remedies need not be exhausted where they provide no 
reasonable possibility of an effective remedy65. In The Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America66, the Tribunal put it as follows 
(para. 168 et seq.):  
“It is an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective and adequate and are 
reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances in which he is situated. 
169. Availability is not a standard to be determined or applied in the abstract. It 
means reasonably available to the complainant in the light of its situation, including 
its financial and economic circumstances as a foreign investor, as they are affected 
by any conditions relating to the exercise of any local remedy.  
170. If a State attaches conditions to a right of appeal which render exercise of the 
right impractical, the exercise of the right is neither available nor effective nor ade-
quate. Likewise, if a State burdens the exercise of the right directly or indirectly so 
as to expose the complainant to severe financial consequences, it may well be that 
the State has by its own actions disabled the complainant from affording the State 
the opportunity of redressing the matter of complaint. The scope of the need to ex-
haust local remedies must be considered in the light of these considerations.”  
 
62  Cf. Schreuer, Preamble Mn. 16-21. 
63  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003 
(Salpius, Voss, Paulsson (presiding)), paras. 13.1 – 13.6. 
64  Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 8; Brownlie, Princi-
ples of Public International Law, 5th ed., p. 499. 
65  Dugard, Third report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/523, p. 17 
66  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill), para. 169. 
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It must be mentioned, however, that the decision then rendered by the Loewen 
Tribunal is not free from criticism67. The Tribunal considered that the claimants had 
not exhausted all available remedies (but settled instead), although an appeal vas 
virtually impossible and chances for further remedies (such as a Supreme Court 
review), were considered by experts as exceedingly remote. 
Several BIT’s contain requirements that the investor must first turn to the local 
courts and can only after a certain time of pending proceedings initiate arbitration. 
The purpose of such a rule seems to be similar to the purpose of the rule of exhaus-
tion of local remedies: to give the Respondent state the possibility to redress the 
wrong done by its own legal system68. However, such a rule is, technically speaking, 
not a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. Thus, in Maffezini v. Spain, in 
Siemens v. Argentina and in Gas Natural v. Argentina, the tribunals considered such 
a rule not to require the exhaustion of local remedies69.  
III. Exhaustion of Local Remedies as a Substantive Requirement for a Breach  
As discussed above, the substantive aspect of the exhaustion of local remedies rule 
is not a procedural requirement, but pertains to the question whether there has been a 
breach of international law at all. Reviewing recent awards, three different aspects 
can be differentiated.  
1. Denial of Justice 
It is generally accepted that a denial of justice requires that the individual has ex-
hausted all reasonable local remedies70. The landmark case in this regard is Loewen 
v. United States. The claimants had lost a jury trial in Mississippi and were faced 
with a judgement over US-$ 500 million. While the tribunal concluded that the court 
failed to “afford Loewen the process that was due”, it also considered “that a court 
 
67  Cf. Paulsson, Denial of Justice p. 122-125; Rubins, Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an 
Investor-State Arbitration Claim, Arbitration International 21 (2005), p. 1 et seq. 
68  Cf. Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 2. 
69  Emilio Agustín Meffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tri-
bunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Orrego Vicuna (presiding), Burgenthal, Wolf), para. 28; 
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 
August 2004 (Rigo Sureda (presiding), Brower, Bello Janeiro), para. 104; Gas Natural SDG, 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/03/10; Decision of the Tribunal of 17 June 
2005 on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (Lowenfeld (presiding), Lavarez, Nikken), para. 
30. 
70  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 108. 
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decision which can be challenged through the judicial process does not amount to a 
denial of justice at the international level”71. It noted that the  
“purpose of the requirement that a decision of a lower court be challenged 
through the judicial process before the State is responsible for a breach of interna-
tional law constituted by judicial decision is to afford the State the opportunity of 
redressing through its legal system the inchoate breach of international law occa-
sioned by the lower court decision. The requirement has application to breaches of 
Articles 1102 and 1110 as well as Article 1105.”  
It is noteworthy that this purpose is the same which is thought to be the purpose 
of the procedural rule of exhaustion of local remedies72.  
2. No Breach of International Law by a Decision of a Lower Court? 
The Loewen-award suggests that the acts of a court of first instance do not normally 
give rise to the level of an international wrong73. For the Loewen-Tribunal consi-
dered that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies against the decision of the 
lower court applied not only in cases of denial of justice, but also to alleged breaches 
of Article 1105 NAFTA (fair and equitable treatment) and Article 1110 NAFTA 
(expropriation). 
It needs to be recalled that each and every court, and not the court system in itself, 
is an ‘organ’ of the state, the acts of which can be attributed to the state74. A state is 
responsible for actions of its courts which are in breach of international law75. Se-
cond, irrespective of the attribution of an act to the state, state responsibility further 
requires that the act is in breach of international law. Whether a judgement of a 
lower court, against which an appeal is possible, constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation, can only be determined with respect to that particular obligation. 
With regard to a denial of justice, the conduct of a court of first instance does not 
constitute a breach since, as Paulsson describes it, “[t]he obligation is to establish 
and maintain a system which does not deny justice; the system is the whole pyra-
mid.”76  
 
71  Loewen, para. 153. 
72  Cf. Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 2 (citing Bor-
chard and Jiménez de Aréchaga). 
73  Rubins, Arbitration International 21 (2005), p. 16. 
74  Cf. draft Article 4 (1) of the ILC draft Articles on State Responsibility (underlining by author): 
“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether that organ exercises legislative, executive judicial or any other functions, what-
ever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of 
the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.” 
75  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 84-87. 
76  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 109. 
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The Loewen-holding seems to extend the reach of the ‘substantive exhaustion of 
local remedies’ from denial of justice to expropriation and fair and equitable treat-
ment. Whether that holding accurately reflects the state of the law under NAFTA, or 
general customary international law, deserves further analysis. 
3. No Breach of International Law if Local Remedies are Available? 
Several awards indicate that certain forms of state conduct might not constitute a 
breach of an obligation under a BIT as long as local remedies are available to the 
investor.  
In Feldman v. Mexico77, the arbitral tribunal found that although “the Claimant, 
through the Respondent’s actions, is no longer able to engage in his business” as a 
result of the elimination of a tax rebate on export resales of cigarettes”78, and al-
though “it is undeniable that the Claimant has experienced great difficulties in deal-
ing with [Ministry] officials, and in some respects has been treated in a less than 
reasonable manner”,79 the Mexican Government’s regulatory actions were, on ba-
lance, not equivalent to an expropriation. In declining to find that the claimant’s 
allegations of unlawful administrative actions constituted expropriation, the tribunal 
took account of the availability of court review of those administrative actions80. 
In Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine81, the claimant alleged that through a series of 
actions and omissions, the Ukrainian authorities had expropriated his investment in 
an office building. The tribunal found that due to the lack of seeking local remedies, 
no expropriation took place: 
“20.30 The fact that an investment has become worthless obviously does not mean 
that there was an act of expropriation; investment always entails risk. Nor is it suffi-
cient for the disappointed investor to point to some governmental initiative, or inac-
tion, which might have contributed to his ill fortune. Yet again, it is not enough for 
an investor to seize upon an act of maladministration, no matter how low the level of 
the relevant governmental authority; to abandon his investment without any effort at 
overturning the administrative fault; and thus to claim an international delict on the 
theory that there had been an uncompensated virtual expropriation. In such in-
stances, an international tribunal may deem that the failure to seek redress from 
national authorities disqualifies the international claim, not because there is a re-
quirement of exhaustion of local remedies but because the very reality of conduct 
 
77  Marvin Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16 December 2002 
(Kerameus (presiding), Bravo, Gantz).  
78  Id., para. 109. 
79  Id., para. 113. 
80  Id., para. 140. 
81  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003 
(Salpius, Voss, Paulsson (presiding)). 
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tantamount to expropriation is doubtful in the absence of a reasonable - not neces-
sarily exhaustive - effort by the investor to obtain correction.” 
In Waste Management v. Mexico (II)82, the tribunal concluded that the alleged 
breach of a contractual obligation by a state did not constitute a breach NAFTA 
Article 1105 (fair and equitable treatment)  
“116. […] It is true that in a general sense the exhaustion of local remedies is a pro-
cedural prerequisite for the bringing of an international claim, one which is dis-
pensed with by NAFTA Chapter 11. But the availability of local remedies to an 
investor faced with contractual breaches is nonetheless relevant to the question 
whether a standard such as Article 1105(1) have been complied with by the State. 
Were it not so, Chapter 11 would become a mechanism of equal resort for debt col-
lection and analogous purposes in respect of all public (including municipal) con-
tracts, which does not seem to be its purpose.”  
or Article 1110 (expropriation): 
“175. The Tribunal concludes that it is one thing to expropriate a right under a con-
tract and another to fail to comply with the contract. Non-compliance by a govern-
ment with contractual obligations is not the same thing as, or equivalent or tanta-
mount to, an expropriation. In the present case the Claimant did not lose its contrac-
tual rights, which it was free to pursue before the contractually chosen forum. The 
law of breach of contract is not secreted in the interstices of Article 1110 of 
NAFTA. Rather it is necessary to show an effective repudiation of the right, unre-
dressed by any remedies available to the Claimant, which has the effect of preven-
ting its exercise entirely or to a substantial extent.”  
Other tribunals have reached similar conclusions with regard to contract 
breaches83. 
The latest decision in this regard is the (non-ICSID) award in EnCana v. Ecuador, 
in which the refusal of a governmental agency to grant tax refunds was at issue. The 
claimant alleged that the state had expropriated its right to the refunds. The tribunal, 
relying on the Waste Management – award, held that  
“In terms of the BIT the executive is entitled to take a position in relation to claims 
put forward by individuals, even if that position may turn out to be wrong in law, 
provided it does so in good faith and stands ready to defend its position before the 
courts. Like private parties, governments do not repudiate obligations merely by 
contesting their existence. An executive agency does not expropriate the value rep-
resented by a statutory obligation to make a payment or refund by mere refusal to 
pay, provided at least that (a) the refusal is not merely wilful, (b) the courts are open 
 
82  Waste Management, Inc v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Award of 30 
April 2004 (Crawford, Civiletti, Gómez), paras. 161-174. 
83  SGS v. Philippines, Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 (El-
Kosheri, Crawford, Crivellaro), para. 163; Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, Case No. 
ARB/00/6, Award of 22 December 2003 (Briner, Cremades, Fadlallah), Abs. 65: “Pour qu’il y 
ait droit à compensation if faut que la personne de l’exproprié prouve qu’il a été l’objet de me-
sures prises par l’Etat agissant non comme cocontractant mais comme autorité publique“.   
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to the aggrieved private party, (c) the courts’ decisions are not themselves overrid-
den or repudiated by the State.”84  
D. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Parties are free to include into their arbitration agreements provisions on nationality. 
In treaty-based investment arbitration, the agreement of the parties is constituted by 
the dispute settlement offer of the BIT, which is accepted by the investor. State par-
ties have the possibility to include denial of benefits-clauses into the BIT and, by 
this, to exclude certain groups of investors from the scope of their offer to arbitrate.  
The reviewed cases suggests that in determining the nationality of corporations, 
ICSID Tribunals give deference to any existing agreements of the parties. As long as 
a tribunal considers an agreement not be incompatible with explicit provisions or 
with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention, it will uphold that agreement.  
In those cases where nationality was disputed (e.g. Tokios Tokeles), the problems 
arose from the lack of such provisions. Since the ICSID Convention sets only the 
outer limits for such agreements, it should not be burdened with issues which the 
parties could and should have regulated for themselves (such as excluding investors 
which are controlled by host-state nationals). Irrespective of that, several awards 
indicate that tribunals will not accept mere shells as Claimants. While their reaso-
ning is not entirely consistent, it seems that tribunals interpret into the dispute set-
 
84 EnCana Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award of 3 Feb-
ruary 2006 (Crawford (presiding), Grigera Naon, Thomas), para. 194. The award was rendered 
by a majority only. Arbitrator Horacio Grigera-Naon dissented sharply: “To require such 
“substantive” exhaustion of local remedies, consisting of a prior and final determination by the 
local courts of the host State under its own national law of disputes concerning the entitlement 
of rights (or denial of such rights) of a foreign investor covered by the Treaty, suggests the   
existence of a public international law had-and-fast rule, binding on international arbitral tribu-
nals, according to which such rights are localized in the host State, exclusively governed by its 
own laws and, for that reason, that disputes involving such rights must be previously adjudi-
cated by the courts of the host state under its own laws, before related claims under interna-
tional law are ripe for decision on the merits at the international level.” 
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tlement offer of a bilateral investment treaty a respective implied prohibition of shell 
companies as claimants.  
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies has little practical relevance as a proce-
dural rule in treaty-based investment arbitration. However, Tribunals have declined 
to find a breach of BIT-provisions where the investor alleged the non-fulfilment of 
rights existing under the law of the host state, but failed to seek recourse with (not 
necessarily exhaust) available local remedies. Investors wishing to submit such a 
dispute to treaty-based arbitration should thus carefully review whether the respec-
tive dispute settlement clause allows for such disputes, or is limited to disputes rela-
ting to a breach of the BIT.  
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and the “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies” in Recent ICSID Jurisprudence     
                               
Comment by Michael Kerling∗ 
A. Introduction 
I have been asked to comment on the report “The foreign nationality requirement 
and the exhaustion of local remedies in recent ICSID Jurisprudence” by Dr. Richard 
Happ. As an in-house counsel of a major German construction contractor my com-
ments will be focused on the rather practical aspects of ICSID and I will mainly 
concentrate on the experiences of our company within the last four years.  
As far as I am informed, our company is still the only German construction com-
pany that has ever been involved in ICSID proceedings even though it seems to have 
been established by recent ICSID Jurisprudence that as a matter of principle a con-
struction project in a foreign state might be considered an investment in the sense of 
bi- or multilateral investment treaties. 
Even though we have considered international arbitration on the basis of bilateral 
investment treaties in the context of quite a few projects, only two cases have “really 
made it to Washington” so far. One of these cases is the quite well known case “Im-
pregilo vs. Pakistan” – our company has been one of the partners of the respective 
joint venture. The other case “Ed. Züblin AG vs. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” is for 
sure less known, mainly because it has been finished through amicable settlement in 
a very early stage. 
B. The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and “Treaty Shopping” in Practice:     
Impregilo vs. Pakistan 
The case “Impregilo vs. Pakistan” seems at least in parts to be suitable for some 
further thoughts about the “foreign nationality requirement” already discussed in 
more detail by my colleague Dr. Happ.  
As I mentioned earlier, our company has been one of the members of an unincor-
porated joint venture under Swiss law lead by the Italian contractor Impregilo, con-
sisting of Impregilo, German Ed. Züblin AG and two Pakistani contractors. The 
dispute arose out of two contracts relating to the construction of hydro-electric 
power facilities located on the Indus river immediately downstream of the Tarbela 
 
∗  Michael Kerling, Corporate Counsel Ed. Züblin AG, Stuttgart. 
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Dam in Northern Pakistan, that when completed, would increase power generation 
in Pakistan by 15%.  
The joint venture had suffered immense damages through continuous frustration 
of the contractual dispute resolution instruments (Dispute Adjudication Boards in 
the sense of the FIDIC Red Book). The frustration went far beyond what might have 
to be expected in such environment. The Employer, the Pakistan Water and Power 
Development Authority, not only continuously refused any cooperation with regard 
to obviously outstanding claims but also acted to the detriment of the joint venture 
by nominating obviously biased adjudicators and by continuously questioning the 
credibility of the adjudicators nominated by the joint venture. Thus, a fruitful and 
reasonable handling of the claims became impossible. On the top of that the situa-
tion for a foreign contractor became increasingly difficult due to the consequences 
of the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001.  
All this lead us to the decision to search for a solution on the international level. 
Unfortunately, we had to notice that there was no BIT providing for an ICSID clause 
between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany (the 
old BIT between Germany and Pakistan, which was signed in 1959, does not contain 
such a clause and has never been amended accordingly). However, a BIT with an 
ICSID clause was signed between Italy and Pakistan on 19th July 1997. The joint 
venture decided to start proceedings on this basis. Of course the joint venture was 
aware of the jurisdictional problems that this might cause but due to the lack of 
alternative there was no choice but trying it.  
As expected, the jurisdiction “ratione personae” was one of the main points chal-
lenged by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (“the Respondent”). The Respondent 
argued that the Italian Contractor could not pursue claims on behalf of the joint 
venture because the joint venture lacked legal personality and therefore could not be 
considered as an entity of foreign nationality in the sense of the ICSID Convention. 
All partners to the joint venture would rather have to appear on their own behalves. 
The main counter arguments of the joint venture was the following: 
The Italian contractor had to have a possibility to assert the claims on behalf of 
the joint venture as leader and majority stakeholder in the joint venture for the fol-
lowing reasons: Under the joint venture agreement, the Italian contractor was obli-
gated to distribute any monetary judgement awarded to it in an arbitral proceeding to 
its joint venture partners according to the respective stakes of the partners in the 
joint venture. Thus, the only way for the Italian Contractor to obtain its full share in 
the joint venture would have been for the Tribunal to permit the Italian Contractor to 
proceed on behalf of the joint venture. Otherwise, the aim of the BIT, which always 
must be the full protection of the foreign investor, could not be reached. 
Unfortunately in its decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal did not follow this view 
and considered that the Italian Contractor was not able to pursue claims on behalf of 
the joint venture. It mainly referred to Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, which 
defines as we have heard before, that the investor, who may be either an individual 
or a juridical person, must not have the nationality of the Contracting State which is 
a party to the dispute. Referring to the drafting history of the Convention the Tribu-
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nal then concludes that an association of individuals or juridical persons does not 
qualify as a foreign juridical person for the purposes of the Convention. This lead to 
the conclusion of the Tribunal that the joint venture as a whole was not covered by 
the BIT.  
In the Tribunals view, the Italian Contractor was not able to claim compensation 
amounting to 100% of the damages suffered by the joint venture: In its view, of the 
three other joint venture partners 1.) none was a protected investor in the terms of 
the BIT, (2.) two were not nationals “of another Contracting State” for the purposes 
of Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. It pointed out that in concluding the BIT 
with Italy, the Respondent had conferred certain rights exclusively to Italian natio-
nals but not to any other nationals; not to mention Pakistani investors themselves. 
The fact that the Italian investor was forced by the joint venture agreement to dis-
tribute any awarded sums to the other partners to the joint venture was considered a 
mere internal contractual problem of the Italian Contractor. It has to be mentioned 
that the Tribunal declined this argument in only a few words, which we considered 
as neither convincing let alone satisfying. However, the view of the Tribunal seems 
to be in line with former ICSID jurisprudence. 
Nevertheless, the case, containing some further interesting questions, could be 
settled shortly after the decision on jurisdiction had been released. At least a part of 
the damages suffered was compensated, which would most probably not have been 
the case if the joint venture had not decided to bring the case to international arbitra-
tion. 
From the point of view of “Treaty Shopping”, which was also raised by my col-
league Dr. Happ, our company drew the conclusion that it might be wise not only to 
clarify whether a BIT containing an ICSID clause exists before negotiating contracts 
with public entities abroad but also to choose foreign partners against the back-
ground of a possibly existing BIT. Even though it has been established in the above 
mentioned decision that in a joint venture only partners being nationals of one of the 
contracting states can claim jurisdiction, it still is a means of pressure to have at least 
one partner in a joint venture who is able to refer the dispute to ICSID arbitration if 
any other instrument of reasonable dispute resolution has failed. 
C. The “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”: Ed. Züblin AG vs. Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia 
As I mentioned earlier, this case has been settled in such an early stage that probably 
none of you has even heard of it. I am not sure if I really fully hit the mark of the 
topic but when drafting our request for arbitration we came at least across some very 
interesting questions concerning local remedies. 
The dispute arose out of the long delay in the rendering of a judgement by the 
courts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as the persistent failure by the Go-
vernment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to honour a final and binding judgment in 
favour of our company.  
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A few words concerning the project and the dispute: On 8th April 1978, King 
Saud University (“the University”) and our company entered into a contract to con-
struct a new academic campus for the University. This contract was substantially 
completed in May 1986. Continuous failures to comply with its obligations under 
the contract by the University caused the Contractor to suffer significant damages. 
Any claims always submitted in accordance with the contract were rejected by the 
University. The Contractor therefore was compelled to submit these claims to the 
“Board of Grievances”, which was according to the contract to resolve any disputes 
between the parties. The lawsuit was initiated in 1984. On 12th March 2001, a judg-
ment awarding the contractor more or less what was claimed 17 years before. Our 
lawyers in Saudi Arabia considered this judgment “most probably final”. What had 
happened during this period of 17 years? In the following a short overview from the 
time of submitting the points of claim until the issuance of a “final judgment”: 
• 24th March 1986: first hearing 
• no communication and no explanation in the following 6 years 
• 3rd March 1992: re-opening of the case due to appointment of new judges 
• “final hearings” on 2nd May and 19th October 1992 
• no action in the following three years 
• re-opening of the case on 14th February 1995 
• 19th December 1995: first judgment 
• appeal of the University, relegation to Board of Grievances 
• 29th September 1997: appointment of a Technical Expert 
• 25th January 1999: submission of the report, confirming first judgment 
• accusation of the Technical Expert of bribery and forgery by the University 
• 5th July 2000: rejection of the accusations by the Investigation Bureau 
• 8th October 2000: new judgment ordering the University to pay the claimed 
amount 
• appeal by the University 
• 12th March 2001: confirmation of judgment of 8th October. 
 
After the last confirmation of the judgment nobody could really assure us that it 
was really final. Our company made multiple attempts to obtain the sums awarded 
but all such attempts failed: All governmental bodies involved had been informed, 
the request was sent from one authority to the other, but none of the officials in-
volved wanted to make any statement. Our company even referred the dispute to the 
Royal Court (but this obviously is not a further instance in Saudi judicial system) 
and to the Saudi General Investment Authority, which was founded in the year 2000 
in connection with the new Foreign Investment Law in order to improve the “in-
vestment climate” in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the German Em-
bassy officially but unsuccessfully raised the issue several times with the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia. Yet, because none of these attempts led to any success and 
due to the lack of enforcement rules against public entities in the Saudi legal system, 
we started thinking about ICSID and decided to initiate respective proceedings 
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against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the basis of the BIT signed between Ger-
many and Saudi Arabia on 29th October 1996. 
In the light of such history, the term of “exhaustion of local remedies” became 
quite of essence for us. It is difficult to establish such exhaustion if it is completely 
unclear how the local remedies work. For that reason, we had to do some in-depth 
research on the Saudi judicial system when drafting our request for arbitration and 
we learnt that the Saudi legal system belonged to the legal systems where it might 
even be impossible to establish the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies.  
There are only very few publications on the Saudi legal system so that we had to 
rely mostly on information of our local counsels. The Board of Grievances, before 
which our case was handled, is a very traditional institution dating from the early 
years of Islam. It was revived by the Saudis in the fifties and today has amongst 
others exclusive jurisdiction over “cases regarding disputes relative to contracts to 
which the Government or public juridical person is a party”. Judgments usually are 
not published and the stages of appeal are extremely complicated and thus confu-
sing. Especially in the procedure for disputes between private companies and public 
entities, there are different stages of “automatic appeal” and endless relegations, 
which are quite difficult to follow. By all means, in the end, we just had to assume 
that the local remedies had been exhausted in this case and submitted our request for 
arbitration on this basis. 
Fortunately for us but unfortunately for those dedicated to ICISD jurisprudence a 
very profitable settlement offer came shortly after the Tribunal had been constituted. 
This way, many interesting questions have never been dealt with. Another question 
in this case would also have been the one of the foreign joint venture partner be-
cause our company had been the leader of a joint venture with two Swiss partners.  
D. Conclusion 
Both of our cases show that ICSID arbitration has proven as a successful instrument 
of pressure for companies involved in multinational projects, when conventional 
mechanisms of dispute resolution or enforcement of judgements fail. Therefore, 
from the point of view of an international contractor, it definitely makes sense to 
verify whether a Bilateral Investment Treaty containing an ICSID clause exists be-
fore entering into a contract with a foreign public entity.  
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirements in ICSID Arbitration 
                              
Comment by Anthony C. Sinclair* 
This commentary to Dr Happ’s paper1 focuses on the first of his two topics and 
deals with three essential themes.  First, this commentary acknowledges the rela-
tionship between the element of consent called for pursuant to Article 25 of the 1965 
„Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States” (the “Convention”2) and the nationality requirements of any appli-
cable investment protection treaty.  Secondly, it emphasises the mandatory require-
ments of the Convention as to nationality for the „International Centre for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes” (“ICSID” or “the Centre”) to have jurisdiction and 
highlights their interplay with requirements to qualify for investment treaty protec-
tion.  And finally, the commentary conducts a brief and admittedly selective survey 
of the diversity of approaches to nationality and qualification for protection found in 
investment treaties, and how these approaches can interact with the objective outer 
limits of ICSID jurisdiction. 
Possession of the nationality of a Contracting State to the Convention is a door 
through which an investor must pass in order to be able to bring a claim within  
ICSID’s jurisdiction.  Article 25(1) of the Convention provides that the jurisdiction 
of the Centre: 
“shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.  When the 
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally” 
(emphasis added). 
 
*  Anthony C. Sinclair, Associate International Arbitration Group, Allen & Overy LLP, London. 
This paper is a revised version of a presentation given by the author at the inaugural confe-
rence on ICSID arbitration to be held in Germany: The International Convention for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes: Taking Stock after 40 Years co-hosted by Frankfurt am Main 
University and the Wilhelm Merton Center, held in Frankfurt, 26 to 28 April 2006.  The views 
expressed herein are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Allen & Overy or its     
clients. 
1 Happ, “The Foreign Nationality Requirement and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Recent 
ICSID Jurisprudence”, The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes: Taking Stock after 40 Years, Frankfurt, 26 to 28 April 2006. 
2  World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Natio-
nals of Other States, Washington D.C. 1965 signed 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966, 
575 U.N.T.S. 159 reprinted in (1965) 4 I.L.M. 532 and available online at 
www.worldbank.org/icsid. 
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Dr Happ rightly acknowledges that in practice it is the scope of “consent” that is 
the key for claimants’ standing.  For in the vast majority of ICSID cases today, arbi-
tration proceedings stem from a standing generic offer on the part of the host State 
to arbitrate disputes with qualified foreign investors set out in an investment promo-
tion and protection treaty.  Having the nationality of an investor to whom such an 
offer is made is therefore an essential element in order for the parties’ consent to 
arbitrate disputes to crystallise.  Matters of ICSID case law necessarily merge here 
with questions of qualification arising under investment protection treaties, notwith-
standing that strictly speaking it is only the former that is the topic of this confe-
rence.  It is for this reason, however, that reference may be made to questions of 
nationality arising both under investment treaties as well as under the Convention.  
Indeed, many of the most interesting nationality cases of recent years concern na-
tionality for the purpose of ascertaining consent under the applicable BIT, not sim-
ply nationality for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention. 
These instruments – the Convention and any applicable investment treaty – pre-
sent dual requirements for the Centre to have jurisdiction to decide a dispute.  A 
claimant must establish both that it meets the nationality conditions in any treaty, as 
well as the objective requirements of the Convention.  The relationship between 
these is governed by Article 25, which sets the “outer limits” of ICSID’s jurisdic-
tion.3  The majority in Tokios Tokel÷s v. Ukraine therefore may well have incor-
rectly marginalised the requirements of the Convention - express or implied - when 
it essentially deemed its jurisdiction to be established merely by satisfaction of the 
criteria for standing under the applicable Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.4 There is principle 
behind the majority’s approach which many will favour: generally, “an agreement to 
submit to ICSID’s jurisdiction should be upheld unless it would lead to a use of the 
Convention for purposes for which it was clearly not intended”.5  It is precisely that 
cautionary proviso, however, that motivated the chairman of the Tribunal to disagree 
with the majority.  Weil’s frequently cited dissent – perhaps even more so than the 
majority decision itself – takes the view that satisfaction of the nationality conditions 
for jurisdiction to exist under the Convention must be “the first leg of the reaso-
ning”.6  Weil opined that although the Contracting Parties to an investment treaty 
“are free to confer to the ICSID tribunal a jurisdiction narrower than that provided 
for by the Convention, it is not for them to extend the jurisdiction of the ICSID tri-
bunal beyond its determination in the Convention”.7 
The divergence between the arbitrators in Tokios turned on the recurring – and yet 
to be convincingly resolved – question whether ICSID jurisdiction can extend to a 
 
3 Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of other States, (1972-II) 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 361 (hereafter “Broches”). 
4  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 29 April 2004. 
5 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), Article 25, para. 464 (hereafter 
“Schreuer”). 
6  Dissenting Opinion dated 29 April 2004, para. 15. 
7 Tokios, Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, para. 13. 
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juridical entity incorporated in another Contracting State to the Convention that is 
owned or controlled by nationals of the host State.  As Dr Happ has described, the 
majority in Tokios saw no impediment to their jurisdiction in these circumstances 
once the criteria in the investment treaty were found to be satisfied.  Notably, during 
the drafting of the Convention, a proposal was raised to define standing by reference 
to the foreign origin of the investment, consistent with the Convention’s goal to 
encourage the international flow of capital.  The idea was not pursued8 and, indeed, 
in many ICSID cases the fact that funds have been sourced locally has not proved an 
impediment to ICSID jurisdiction.9  Although the national origin of capital per se 
may therefore not be relevant to ICSID jurisdiction, the national origin of the con-
trollers of the investment may well be. Weil would have declined jurisdiction in the 
light of the general principle in international law that a national is not permitted to 
sue its own State in an international forum10 and the fact that the Convention is con-
cerned with “the need for international cooperation for economic development and 
the role of private investment therein”, not the resolution of essentially domestic 
disputes.11  Foreshadowing this issue in his Commentary, Schreuer admitted to fin-
ding the possibility that a national of a host State may seize ICSID of jurisdiction via 
a corporate vehicle incorporated in another Contracting State “troubling”.12  He 
believed that “realism” ought to “militate against jurisdiction” where the claimant 
company is controlled by nationals of the host State: 
“[o]n balance, the better approach would appear to be a realistic look at the true 
controllers thereby blocking access to the Centre for juridical persons that are con-
trolled directly or indirectly by nationals of non-Contracting States or nationals of 
the host State”.13 
The majority decision in Tokios turned on the presumed intention of the Contrac-
ting Parties to the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.  The majority’s reasoning is relatively 
less concerned with the objective requirements for jurisdiction to exist under the 
ICSID Convention.  Like Tokios, it is also conspicuous that the jurisdictional deci-
sion in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia contains no explicit discussion 
as to whether the objective requirements of the ICSID Convention were met in that 
case, although there is again extensive reference to the requirements of the applica-
ble investment treaty.14  The Tribunal’s decision contains a lengthy treatment of the 
requirements for an entity to qualify for protection under the Bolivia-Netherlands 
BIT but no reference to ICSID Article 25(2)(b) even though the claimant was Bo-
 
8 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 427. 
9 E.g., Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Award dated 29 April 1999, para. 109. 
10 Ibid., paras. 5, 10; also Schreuer, Article 25, para. 496:  “The Convention is designed to facili-
tate the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States.  It is not 
meant for disputes between States and their own nationals.  The latter type of dispute is to be 
settled by domestic procedures, notably before domestic courts”. 
11 Convention, Preamble, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
12 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 562. 
13 Ibid., para. 563. 
14  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2005. 
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livian.15  Charitably perhaps, the Tribunal was content to infer the exi-stence of an 
agreement between the parties to treat the Bolivian company, Aguas del Tunari, as a 
national of a foreign Contracting State because of foreign control once it had estab-
lished that it fell within the definition of a Dutch “investor” as set out in the BIT.  
Admittedly, the Convention requires no special form for such an agreement.16  
Schreuer observes, in fact, that “[t]he practice of ICSID tribunals shows an in-
creasing readiness to accept an implicit agreement to treat a juridical person as a 
foreign national because of foreign control”.17  From that practice, Schreuer deduces 
that “[i]f the investor takes up the offer contained in the … treaty, the provisions on 
access of locally established but foreign controlled companies become part of the 
agreement between the parties”.18  This approach is consistent with the universally-
accepted construction of an agreement to arbitrate arising from the offer on the part 
of host States found in modern investment treaties, and the acceptance of that offer 
by investors at the time they submit a request for arbitration.19  It also appears to be 
the approach adopted by the Tribunal in Aguas del Tunari.  The case is a relatively 
rare modern example of a question of ICSID jurisdiction potentially turning on the 
application of Article 25(2)(b).  As investment protection treaties are repeatedly 
confirmed to confer upon the foreign shareholders in local companies both substan-
tive protection and a direct right to submit claims to arbitration for harm suffered to 
their subsidiaries,20 recourse to ICSID’s jurisdiction for a locally-incorporated entity 
ceases to depend on the existence of an agreement to treat it as a foreign national.21  
It is therefore unfortunate, for those seeking further clarification of ICSID law, at 
 
15  With respect to legal persons, a national of a Contracting State is defined in Article 25(2) as: 
       “(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to con-
ciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this 
Convention”. 
16 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 504. 
17 Ibid., para. 510. 
18 In this manner, an express agreement is formed:  ibid., para. 505, also 536 but cf. para. 519 
where Schreuer doubts whether an implied agreement on nationality can arise where consent to 
jurisdiction is based on the host State’s legislation or on a treaty:  “If the investor simply ac-
cepts a standing offer by the host State to submit to jurisdiction, no agreement to treat that par-
ticular investor as a foreign national can be imputed to the host State”. 
19 E.g., El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion dated 27 April 2006, para. 35:  “It is now established beyond doubt that a general refe-
rence to ICSID arbitration in a BIT can be considered as being the written consent of the State, 
required by Article 25 to give jurisdiction to the Centre, and that the filing of a request by the 
investor is considered to be the latter’s consent” (emphasis added). 
20 E.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 3 August 2004, 
para. 142:  “As regards ICSID law dealing with the issue of the rights of shareholders to bring 
a claim before an arbitral tribunal, the decisions of arbitral tribunals have been consistent in fa-
vor of such right of shareholders”. 
21 This development is foreshadowed by Schreuer, Article 25, para. 520. 
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least,22 that the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal did not engage in any explicit analysis of 
the locally-incorporated claimant’s de facto foreign status for the purposes of Article 
25(2)(b).23 
Aside from the exception in Article 25(2)(b), the Convention provides relatively 
little elucidation itself on many of the contemporary problems arising from nationa-
lity requirements raised in Dr Happ’s report.  One further exceptional instance of a 
clear rule in the Convention concerns the standing of a dual national having both the 
nationality of another Contracting State, as well as the nationality of the host State.  
In Champion Trading et. al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,24 nationals of the United 
States who were also found to be Egyptian nationals were denied the right to submit 
their claims to ICSID on account of the “clear and specific rule” found in Article 
25(2)(a).25  This provision, which had been adopted unanimously by the Conven-
tion’s drafters, ex-cludes absolutely from ICSID’s jurisdiction claims by physical 
persons who are dual nationals having both the nationality of the host State and 
nationality of another Contracting State.  Schreuer explains that “persons who pos-
sess the nationality of another Contracting State are excluded if they possess the host 
State’s nationality concurrently”.26  The rule cannot be bypassed even with the par-
ties’ consent and applies irrespective of arguments as to which nationality is the 
more effective.27  The Convention is clear in this respect. 
The larger question whether the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality, as 
elucidated by the International Court Nottebohm28 and, for example, applied by the 
 
22 Ibid., para. 537. 
23 The pre-2000 jurisprudence, based largely on contractual submissions to ICSID’s jurisdiction, 
is discussed in Schreuer, ibid., paras. 496-607. 
24  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2003.  See also Shihata/Parra, “The Experience of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes” (1999) 14 ICSID Rev.-
F.I.L.J. 299, 308. 
25  With respect to physical persons, Article 25(2) defines “National of another Contracting State” 
to mean:  
       “(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party 
to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation 
or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph 
(3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either 
date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute” (emphasis added).  
On the drafting history to this provision, see Schreuer, Article 25, para. 442. 
       Interestingly, the plain wording of Article 25(2)(a) would suggest that physical persons who 
are stateless will not have standing before the Centre: Nathan, ICSID Convention: The Law of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (2000) 84; also Schreuer, 
Article 25, para. 437. 
26 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 440. 
27 Ibid., para. 444. 
28 Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgment dated 6 April 1955 
(1955) ICJ Rep. 4, 22. On the principle of effective nationality see also Salem Claim (1932) II 
R.I.A.A. 1184, 1188; Mergé Claim (1955) 22 I.L.R. 443, 456; Flegenheimer Claim (1958-I) 25 
I.L.R. 91, 149; and Stankovic Claim (1963) 40 I.L.R. 153, 155. 
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Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Case No. A/18,29 is generally applicable to ICSID’s 
requirements remains at large, notwithstanding Dr Happ’s view that it “seems … to 
have been accepted with regard to investment disputes”.  The question whether the 
principle of effective nationality has any place in investment treaty arbitration was 
extensively argued in Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, but not 
decided.30  It is also adverted to in the Champion Trading decision, but again not 
decided.31  The drafting history to the Convention suggests that possession of the 
nationality of a non-Contracting State in addition to that of a Contracting State is not 
in itself a bar to ICSID jurisdiction over dual nationals.32  Broches himself suggested 
in his 1972 Hague lectures that the drafters were not concerned to legislate against 
such jurisdiction.33  The question is therefore still undecided, and will no doubt be 
raised again in future cases,34 but with the International Law Commission moving 
away from the Nottebohm position,35 it is by no means clear that the doctrine of 
dominant and effective nationality will be adopted into ICSID law.  
To conclude on the standing of physical reasons to submit claims to ICSID,   
writing on the scope of investment treaty arbitration in 1962, Elihu Lauterpacht (as 
he then was) considered that “where natural persons are concerned, few difficulties 
are likely to arise”.36  Claims have been submitted to ICSID by natural persons in at 
least a dozen cases37 and, for the most part, Lauterpacht’s forecast has been fair.  
 
29 Decision No. Dec 32-A18-FT dated 6 April 1984, reprinted in (1984) 5 Iran-US C.T.R. 251, 
263. 
30 Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, Award dated 7 July 2004, para. 42.  
Noting the Award, see Sinclair, Nationality of Individual Investors in ICSID Arbitration 
(2004) 7 Intl. Arb. L. Rev. 191 (hereafter “Sinclair (2004)”).  Allen & Overy LLP represented 
the United Arab Emirates in this dispute and continues to do so in an annulment proceeding, 
which is still pending at the time of writing. 
31  Champion Trading et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 
2003, at p. 16. 
32 ICSID, Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Vol. I (Washington 
D.C.: ICSID, 1968) 122 (hereafter “History of the ICSID Convention”); ibid., Vol. II, 170, 
447. 
33 Broches, op cit. 
34 There is also passing reference to the concept in Feldman Karpa (Marvin Roy) v. United 
Mexican States, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 6 December 2000, para. 32; and Olguín (Eu-
doro A.) v. Republic of Paraguay, Award dated 26 July 2001, para. 18. 
35 International Law Commission (Dugard, Rapporteur), First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (2000) 35; International Law Commission, Draft Convention on Diplo-
matic Protection (2002), Article 5(1) reprinted in International Law Commission, Report to the 
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/57/10 (2002) 166, 182; and also Orrego Vicuña, Interim Re-
port to the International Law Association on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, in 
International Law Associate Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, 
First Report (2000) at 32-33, 35 (available online at www.ila-hq.org). 
36 Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investment (1962), ICLQ Suppl. 
No. 3, 18. 
37 See the references cited in Sinclair (2004), op cit. 
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However, exceptional cases such as Soufraki and Champion Trading demonstrate 
that the nationality issues that can arise are not always straightforward. 
Just as, given the current state of the law, it cannot be said that the Convention 
imposes a legal test of “dominant and effective” nationality for physical persons, 
likewise the Convention contains no express requirement that a juridical person 
should have any particular connection with the Contracting State in which it is in-
corporated beyond the fact of incorporation.  There is no general doctrine in ICSID 
law or investment treaty arbitration generally mitigating against jurisdiction where 
the claimant is a mere “shell”, absent a specific limitation to that effect in the appli-
cable treaty.  Although it is a UNCITRAL case, remarks in Saluka Investments B.V. 
v. Czech Republic38 are highly relevant and, on this point, had Saluka been an ICSID 
case it is very likely that the Tribunal’s conclusions would have been no different.  
The Czech Republic had argued that Saluka was not a “real Dutch investor” but a 
mere conduit for an investment by Nomura, a UK entity.  Although Article 1 of the 
Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT clearly extended to Saluka, since it was an entity 
organised in accordance with the laws of the Netherlands, the Czech Republic ar-
gued strongly against that being the end of the story and requested that the Tribunal 
look at the reality of the situation.  The Tribunal denied the objection: 
“The Tribunal has some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no 
real connection with a State party to a BIT, and which is in reality a mere shell com-
pany controlled by another company which is not constituted under the laws of that 
State, should not be entitled to invoke the provisions of that treaty.  Such a possibil-
ity lends itself to abuses of the arbitral procedure and to practices of ‘treaty shop-
ping’, which can share many of the disadvantages of the widely criticised practice of 
‘forum shopping’. 
However that may be, the predominant factor which must guide the Tribunal’s 
exercise of its functions is the terms in which the parties to the Treaty now in ques-
tion have agreed to establish the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  ...The parties had complete 
freedom of choice in the matter, and they chose to limit entitled ‘investors’ to those 
satisfying the definition set out in Article 1 of the Treaty”.39 
Equally, the Convention’s drafters chose deliberately not to import any rule that 
would deny jurisdiction to a juridical person that is a so-called shell, not having any 
substantial business activities in the territory of the Contracting State in which it is 
incorporated.  To the extent that States may wish to exclude protection for such 
entities, such jurisdictional choices are, again, matters of consent that may or may 
not be addressed in any applicable relevant investment treaty. 
Accordingly, reviewing the range of approaches in investment treaties to deter-
mine whether an investor has the nationality of a Contracting Party one can find a 
great deal of variation, and rightly so, since different States legitimately may take 
different approaches to qualification for treaty protection.  There is no single appro-
 
38  Partial Award dated 17 March 2006. 
39  Ibid., paras. 240-241. 
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priate link between an entity asserting a right to protection under an investment 
treaty, and the State under whose treaty the investor is seeking to benefit.40  Many 
States bestow their treaty protection liberally, believing, one may surmise, that the 
reciprocal promotion of investment flows is best achieved by a very flexible and 
open definition of nationality based on mere formalities alone.  On the other hand, a 
significant minority of States appear to take the view that the economic and deve-
lopmental goals underpinning their investment treaties are best satisfied by confer-
ring protection only upon entities with a tangible economic link to their country, 
such as “substantial economic activities”, or their “effective management” or “main 
headquarters”.41  Whichever approach is the more appropriate for a particular State 
is a question best to be debated by economists and politicians. 
Insofar as treaties contain a reference to ICSID jurisdiction, the Convention itself 
notoriously does not specify any particular test for nationality.  The Convention thus 
accommodates the freedom of States to legislate who may be their nationals and to 
agree upon these criteria, subject to the objective outer limits of the Convention.   
In time, other criteria for standing to submit claims to international fora may be 
developed, especially as the role of individuals as subjects of international law be-
comes more widely accepted.42  For the time being, the necessary qualification to 
access ICSID is to have the nationality of a Contracting State although it is said that 
nationality for these purposes is not identical to the concept of nationality in the 
traditional sense of the link conferring upon a State the right in international law to 
espouse a claim by way of diplomatic protection.43  Nationality, for the purposes of 
ICSID, merely “serves as a means of bringing the private party within the jurisdic-
tional pale of the Centre”.44 
At one time, international investment protection had been fortuitous, but given 
the breadth of the network of investment protection available today, international 
law firms routinely advise investors on the strategic structuring of their investments.  
In doing so, close adherence to the diversity of treaty language is required in order to 
ensure that an investment benefits from the protection of an effective investment 
 
40 For a detailed study of the tests of corporate nationality, see Acconci, Determining the Interna-
tionally Relevant Link between State and Corporate Investor (2004) 5 Journal of World In-
vestment & Trade 139. 
41  For a survey of the approaches, see Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration (2005) 20 ICSID Rev.-F.I.L.J. 357 (hereafter “Sinclair (2005)”). 
42 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 431. 
43 Broches, Chairman’s Report on the Preliminary Draft of the Convention, 9 July 1964, Doc 
Z11, History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, 557, 579 and Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (1979) 19 Indian J. Intl. L. 
166, 198, 203 (hereafter “Amerasinghe”). 
44 Amerasinghe, 198. 
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treaty and access to ICSID should a dispute arise.45  Absent any special treaty limita-
tion, it is not uncommon and apparently not contrary to ICSID jurisdiction to locate 
a new operation in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and 
legal environment, including the availability of an investment treaty.46  Frequently, 
such structuring takes place in the months, or even weeks, before the crystallisation 
of a cause of action.  This does not mean, however, that an investor of a State that is 
not an ICSID Contracting State may assign a ripe treaty claim to an entity having 
the nationality of a Contracting State in order to attract ICSID jurisdiction.47  The 
Tribunal in Mihaly International Corp. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka stated that a treaty claim “under the ICSID Convention with its carefully 
structured system is not a readily assignable chose in action as shares in the stock-
exchange market or other types of negotiable instruments, such as promissory notes 
or letters of credit”.48  To allow such an assignment to operate in favour of ICSID 
jurisdiction would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the 
sanctity of the privity of international agreements not intended to create rights and 
obligations for non-Convention States or their nationals.49 
 
45 For example, the notion of “juridical person” in the definition of “national of a Contracting 
State” is not defined in the Convention but has been held to exclude unincorporated groupings:  
Schreuer, Article 25, para. 458 and see Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction dated 22 April 2005, paras. 131-139; Consorzio Groupement LESI-
DIPENTA v. Republic of Algeria, Award dated 10 January 2005, para. 40. 
46 Aguas del Tunari, para. 330. 
47  The ICSID Convention requires claimants to establish that they had the nationality of a Con-
tracting State on the date at which the parties consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction (and, in the 
case of natural persons only, also on the date the Request for Arbitration is registered) but does 
not itself require continuity of nationality, for instance, through to the date of an award:  
Schreuer, Article 25, paras. 452 (natural persons) and 493 (juridical persons).  One can there-
fore agree with Dr Happ that, to the extent that a continuous nationality rule may apply at all, it 
is to be derived not from the ICSID Convention but from any applicable investment protection 
treaty; e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Award 
dated 26 June 2003, para. 220 determining that under NAFTA Chapter 11, the claimant must 
demonstrate its continuous nationality through to the date of any award.  Amongst the com-
mentary on this controversial finding, see e.g., Paulsson, Note – Loewen v. United States,   
ICSID Additional Facility Case No. ARB/AF/98/3 - Continuous Nationality in Loewen (2004) 
20 Arb. Intl. 213; Duchesne, The Continuous-Nationality-of-Claims Principle: Its Historical 
Development and Current Relevance to Investor-State Investment Disputes (2004) 36 Geo. 
Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 783; Mendelsohn, Runaway Train: The Continuous Nationality Rule from 
the Panavezys-Saldutiskis Railway case to Loewen in Weiler (ed.) International Investment 
Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Customary International Law (2005) chapter 4; Rubins, The Burial of an Investor-State 
Arbitration Claim (2005) 21 Arb. Intl. 1. 
48  Award dated 15 March 2002. 
49  Where an investor changes his nationality after already enjoying the protection of a BIT on the 
basis of its former nationality, “it is doubtful that he would continue to be deemed a national of 
his former country for the purposes of the BIT”:  Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (1995) 34. 
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However, just as investors may structure their activities to benefit from invest-
ment treaty protection, so too may different States take steps to limit or avoid claims 
from entities to which they did not intend to extend the protection of a particular 
treaty.  In addition to defining criteria to qualify for treaty protection, some States 
insert a so-called “denial of benefits” clause in their treaties that appears to be in-
tended to confer upon host States an absolute right to exclude claims brought by 
shell or “mailbox” companies.  The rationale for the provision may be that such 
companies are understood not to contribute economically or socially to the fabric of 
the State in which they are incorporated.  Again, whether that actually is the case is a 
matter for analysis going beyond the scope of this paper. 
Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria50 is one of the few published cases 
to date to have addressed the application of such clauses.  Plama was a company 
incorporated in Cyprus, which is a Contracting Party to the 1994 Energy Charter 
Treaty (the “ECT”).  Plama indirectly owned a formerly state-owned oil refinery in 
Bulgaria through a locally-incorporated company, Nova Plama.  When a dispute 
arose, Plama submitted claims against the Republic of Bulgaria to ICSID, alleging 
violations of both the ECT and the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT.  Bulgaria sent a letter to 
ICSID purporting to invoke the denial of benefits provision in Article 17(1) of the 
ECT and deny to the claimant the substantive protection of the ECT on the basis 
that:  (1) Plama was owned or controlled by nationals of a State that was not a Con-
tracting Party to the ECT; and (2) Plama conducted no substantial business activities 
in Cyprus.  The Tribunal assumed, for the purposes of its analysis, that both re-
quirements of Article 17(1) were met and turned to the question of how Article 
17(1) was intended to operate in the context of the ECT as a whole and, specifically, 
in relation to the generic offer to submit investment disputes to international arbitra-
tion set out in Article 26.51  The Tribunal stated that by operation of Article 26(3)(a) 
of the ECT and Article 25 of the Convention, the parties had given their uncondi-
tional written consent to the arbitration of the dispute.  Such consent, once given, 
may not be unilaterally withdrawn.52  As such, Article 17(1) of the ECT was con-
genitally incapable of constituting a bar to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the 
claims brought under the ECT.  As the Tribunal stated, Article 17(1) is not a condi-
tion precedent to the offer to submit disputes to investor-state arbitration; it created 
only a right to deny the protection of the ECT. 
 
50  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 8 February 2005. A denial of benefits clause was also consid-
ered in Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Award dated 16 September 2003. 
51 For more extensive discussion, see Sinclair, Investment Protection for Mailbox Companies 
under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty 5(2) TDM (November, 2005); Sinclair (2005) op cit.; 
and Jagusch/Sinclair, The Limits of Protection for Investments and Investors under the Energy 
Charter Treaty in Ribeiro (ed.) Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty (2006) 
73, 93-103. 
52 Article 25(1) of the Convention provides:  “When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally”. 
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The Tribunal went on to consider the question whether Article 17(1) could sup-
port an objection to the admissibility of Plama’s claims on the merits.53  In the Tri-
bunal’s opinion, while Article 17(1) conferred on Bulgaria a right to deny the ECT’s 
protection to mailbox company investors, for that denial to be effective the right had 
to be exercised:  “the existence of a right is distinct from the exercise of that right”.54  
More importantly, the Tribunal held that once exercised, any denial of benefits could 
only apply prospectively.  It concluded that it would run contrary to the legitimate 
expectations of existing investors and undermine any certainty for those planning 
new investments if, once invoked, the right to deny benefits provision could exclude 
treaty protection for existing investments.55 
The Plama Tribunal’s interpretation of the denial of benefits clause presents a 
number of practical and philosophical difficulties, which have already been de-
scribed elsewhere, leading some to question its correctness.56  If correct, however, 
the effect the Plama Tribunal gives to the denial of benefits clause has a number of 
practical consequences.  First, it appears to have left very little scope for host States 
to invoke denial of benefits clauses, since by the time it becomes aware that a dis-
pute has arisen with a mailbox company investor, it would already be too late.  The 
denial of benefits provision can offer a good defence to claims brought by mailbox 
companies but a State must exercise its right prior to or at the time of the invest-
ment.  Conversely, for investors deciding whether to commence arbitration procee-
dings or for those advising investors on structuring new investments, it is possible to 
take comfort that if the denial of benefits provision has not already been invoked, it 
may not be raised subsequently. 
By way of a final remark, it is hoped that in conjunction with Dr Happ’s report, 
the foregoing analysis of nationality requirements in ICSID – and investment treaty 
arbitration – encourages one to share the more uncontroversial view of the Plama 
Tribunal, when it said that: 
 
53 On the distinction between jurisdiction and the admissibility of claims, see Paulsson, Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility in Aksen, Böckstiegel, Mustill, Patocchi and Whitesell (eds.) Global Re-
flections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum in Hon-
our of Robert Briner (2005). 
54 Plama, para. 155. 
55 Ibid., para. 163. 
56 See the references cited at footnote 51, above. 
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“issues as to citizenship, nationality, ownership, control and the scope and loca-
tion of business activities can raise wide-ranging, complex and highly controversial 
disputes”.57  
 
57  Plama, para. 149. 
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State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties         
                    
Alexander Szodruch∗ 
A. Introduction  
With more than 40 pending investor claims challenging Argentina’s 2001/2002 
pesification measures, it cannot be denied that the topic of this study, though cur-
rently being en vogue, is somewhat displaced in a “stocktaking” exercise. It is no 
doubt true that ICSID could very well exist in the absence of proceedings stemming 
from state insolvency. But it is worth pondering the opposite question: Will ICSID 
survive in the presence of such investor claims? Or, putting it less drastically, does 
the phenomenon of state insolvency have the potential to change the nature of In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID itself? Argentina’s fierce opposition to 
current proceedings and to (possible) enforcement attempts illustrates that Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration could in fact reach an important turning point when faced 
with claims resulting from situations of state insolvency.1  
It is interesting to see that although much has been written about the legal impli-
cations of the Argentina crisis, there has been a separation between traditional Fo-
reign Direct Investment (FDI) by multinational corporations on the one hand and 
issues arising from portfolio investment in Argentine public debt (i.e. sovereign 
bonds issued by Argentina in the 1990s) on the other.2 The former debate on FDI 
has largely focussed on questions of ICSID jurisdiction, the interpretation of treat-
ment obligations under BITs and Argentina’s plea of State of Necessity, while the 
discussion on Argentina’s record-breaking debt default has centred on how to cope 
with collective action problems traditionally surfacing in the corporate insolvency 
setting, the most ambitious plan being the IMF’s suggestion for an institutionalized 
 
∗  Alexander Szodruch, LL.M. (Indiana) is Ph.D Candidate at the Walther-Schücking Institute, 
University of Kiel. 
1  In particular, states could attempt to terminate Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) if they 
perceive that ICSID Arbitration prevents them from adopting emergency measures designed to 
escape an economic crisis. 
2  For exceptions see Tietje, Die Argentinien-Krise aus Rechtlicher Sicht: Staatsanleihen und 
Staateninsolvenz, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 37, Feb. 2005, 13-16; 
Wälde, The Serbian Loans Case: A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection of Foreign 
Debt, in Weiler (ed.), Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Custo-
mary International Law, 2005, 383, 401-423. 
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Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).3 This separation reflects the 
general distinction between the Law of International Investment and the Law of 
International Finance, the Law of International Trade being the third leg in the trian-
gle called International Economic Law.4 However, given that Italian holders of de-
faulted Argentine bonds recently announced to initiate an ICSID claim to recover 
their losses from the Argentine default,5 the implications of Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration for sovereign debt restructuring, one of the traditional disciplines of Interna-
tional Financial Law, must no longer be neglected. In fact, as the IMF’s SDRM 
proposal is shelved for the time being due to U.S. opposition,6 it is legitimate to ask 
whether Investment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID can serve as an adequate inter-
national forum to solve disputes between distressed sovereign borrowers and their 
private lenders.7 If ICSID Tribunals turn out to be willing and legally able to hear 
and decide cases brought by a distressed sovereign’s creditors, the nature of Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration could significantly depart from the original ICSID/BIT 
drafters’ intentions. 
As a starting point, I will briefly sketch the recent discussion on state insolvency 
and highlight the important (and partly unresolved) legal issues outside of Invest-
ment Treaty law (II.). Part III., the core of the study, will analyze the substantive 
ICSID/BIT implications and obligations with respect to the phenomenon of state 
insolvency. Part IV. will address, from an ICSID perspective, two important proce-
dural issues that have frequently arisen in domestic sovereign debt litigation, i.e. the 
possibility of a temporary stay of proceedings and the prospects of enforcing credi-
tor claims. The concluding Part V. analyzes how Investment Treaty Arbitration can 
alter the common sovereign debt restructuring process and, turning that very ques-
tion upside down, how state insolvency claims can change the nature of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration. The conclusion also contains an assessment whether or not the 
current BIT/ICSID framework could perform functions of an SDRM and whether 
 
3  Anne Kruger (then IMF First Deputy Managing Director), A Financial Architecture for 2002: 
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address given at the National Economists’ 
Club Annual Members’ Dinner, 26 Nov. 2001, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
2001/112601.htm. The initiative was further elaborated on in the following years, see IMF, 
Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, 12 Feb. 2003, http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf. 
4  Dolzer, Generalklauseln in Investitionsschutzverträgen, in Frowein et al. (eds.), Negotiating 
for Peace: Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, 2003, 291 (293). 
5  Assoziazione per la Tutela Degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini, Tfa, pronto ricorso a Icsid, 2 
March 2006, http://www.tfargentina.it/download/ComunicatoStampaTFA-02_03_2006.pdf. 
Holders of defaulted Russian debt initiated ICSID proceedings in 1998. The case was report-
edly settled, see Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, The Argentine Crisis – Foreign Investors’ 
Rights, Jan. 2002, 3; Wälde, supra note 2, 402 (Fn. 44). 
6  Snow (then Secretary of the Treasury), Statement at the Meeting of the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee, 12 April 2003, http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/ 
stte/eng /usa.htm. (“it is neither necessary nor feasible to continue working on SDRM”). 
7  Debt restructurings with official lenders (states and multilateral institutions) are not covered by 
ICSID/BITs.  
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Investment Treaty Arbitration could be reconciled with the overriding principles of 
state insolvency identified by the IMF. 
This study does not contain a current affairs discussion on the Argentina procee-
dings, tempting as that may be. Still, the Argentina case will quite inevitably be used 
to illustrate what the legal issues of state insolvency are and how currently pending 
ICSID proceedings could set important precedents8 for future cases. 
B. Legal Issues of State Insolvency in the Post Brady Age 
Much has been written about the legal problems relating to state insolvency in the 
last years, which is why I will only provide a very brief overview of the core points 
of the subject matter. The notion of state insolvency hereinafter will refer to the case 
where a state does not meet (or threatens not to meet) its contractual payment obli-
gations towards foreign nationals located abroad, regardless of whether the state is 
unable or only unwilling to pay.9 In the vast majority of cases, these payment diffi-
culties arise regarding payment obligations denominated in a foreign currency (a 
currency other than the state’s own), as the debtor state always has the option to 
inflate itself out of a domestic currency payment crisis.10 State insolvency covers all 
kinds of contractual payment obligations such as debt owed to suppliers and service 
providers. However, most prominent in the state insolvency context is the debt that 
states accumulate when tapping international financial markets to finance their ex-
penditures. This is due to the fact that states are more likely to default on classic 
debt instruments, since the immediate welfare losses are much less significant com-
pared to defaulting on trade credit.11 Although the ensuing analysis will take heed of 
this factual practice, it should be kept in mind that state insolvency affects more 
claims than just those stemming from long term debt securities. 
 
8  Arbitration under ICSID does not follow a stare decisis rule, and hence the term “precedent” 
could be misleading. It will nonetheless be used in an informal sense because ICSID Tribunals 
are frequently invoking prior ICSID awards as authority for their own decisions.  
9  Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, Vol. I. 1951, 115. Admittedly, this is 
economically inaccurate as the term insolvency only covers the situation where the debtor does 
not have sufficient funds to pay. However, already drawing a distinction between inability and 
unwillingness to pay at this definitional stage would confuse the definitional question with the 
question of whether or not the state actually has the right to refuse payments, see Ohler, Der 
Staatsbankrott, JZ 2005, 590, 593. 
10  The Russian default on ruble denominated Russian Law debt obligations (GKOs) in 1998 
illustrates that local currency debt is not immune from default either, see Gelpern/Setser, Do-
mestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 795, 
801 (2004). 
11  Samberg, Debt Restructuring: Trade Finance Falls from Favour, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. Sept. 2002, 
21, who notes that the traditional pattern of sparing trade creditors from restructuring is chan-
ging. 
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I. Sovereign Debt in Global Financial Markets 
The most important feature that renders the problem of state insolvency so complex 
is the fact that sovereign debt is now mainly issued in the form of bonds that are 
freely traded on securities exchanges. This constitutes a remarkable departure from 
sovereign financing through syndicated bank loans in the 1970s/80s and can be 
traced back to the 1989 Brady-plan (named after then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Nicholas Brady) that swapped bank debt for tradable debt securities.12 Moreover, 
throughout the 1990s, many emerging market countries issued new debt securities to 
a variety of receptive investors, including retail investors. This development dra-
matically changed the sovereigns’ foreign creditor base from a limited number of 
large western commercial banks to millions of investors ranging from U.S. Hedge 
Funds to Italian retirees and German dentists.13 
What is important from a legal point of view is that sovereign bonds are (undis-
putedly) private law instruments that contain express (and valid) choice of law 
clauses,14 mostly declaring the law of the place of issuance applicable, i.e. the law of 
New York or the U.K., with Japanese and German law having a much smaller 
share.15 On the other hand, we are only recently witnessing states issuing debt in-
struments under their own laws that are open for foreigners to buy. Another signifi-
cant feature of foreign law debt instruments are waiver of immunity clauses whereby 
the debtor state unequivocally submits to the jurisdiction of foreign courts and ex 
ante waives any immunity defences.16 These contractual provisions already high-
light a fundamental difference to traditional FDI where the investment contracts are 
often governed by the law of the host state and contain choice of forum clauses in 
favour of the local courts of the host state. Presumably, this reflects both a difference 
in bargaining power on the part of the foreign investors as well as the more territo-
rial nature of the FDI contracts. Debt securities are not as easily associated with a 
domestic legal order as, say, the construction of a factory on foreign soil.  
 
12  Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 
1993, 21 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1802, 1804-1818 (1998). 
13  Fisch/Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 Emory L. J. 1053, 1070 ff. (2004). 
14  Siebel, Rechtsfragen Internationaler Anleihen, 1997, 191. 
15  In September 2005, 63% of the outstanding emerging market debt (USD 264 bn.) was go-
verned by New York law, 29% (USD 120 bn.) by English law, 5% (USD 20 bn.) by German 
law and 3% (USD 12 bn.) by Japanese law, IMF, Progress Report on Crisis Resolution, 21 
Sept. 2005, 15. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/092105.pdf. 
16  This is in line with most legal systems that adhere to the restricted theory of state immunity 
and consider debt instruments acts iure gestionis, Reinisch, Anm. zu LG Frankfurt Judgment of 
14 March 2003, JZ 2003, 1013, 1014 with further references. 
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II. The Current Restructuring Process  
Despite a long history of ideas to form an institutionalized sovereign debt mecha-
nism, such a mechanism is still lacking. Debtors and creditors have so far looked for 
alternative avenues to find acceptable solutions for state insolvencies. It is interes-
ting for our later analysis to observe that debtor states have employed different re-
structuring techniques depending on whether the debt instruments were governed by 
foreign law or by the law of the debtor state.  
In cases of foreign law debt, restructuring has largely meant that – in some cases 
after negotiating with a creditor committee – the debtor makes an offer to its credi-
tors to swap its old debt claims for new ones that contain more favourable terms for 
the debtor (such as extended maturity, reduced interest or in some cases also debt 
relief in the form of decreased principal payments). Some of these restructurings 
have been pre-emptive, i.e. before a cessation of payments (an event of default) 
occurred, while others such as Ecuador (2000) and Argentina (2005) have been post-
default restructurings.17 Much ink has been spent on whether collective action prob-
lems could be mitigated by allowing a majority of creditors (say 75%) to bind a 
minority that is unwilling to accept a swap offer (the holdout creditors) and how 
corresponding contractual clauses could be drafted. At the time of writing this paper, 
drafting practice in New York embraces such a contractual approach and incorpo-
rates Collective Action Clauses (CACs), already a common feature in English and 
Japanese law bonds, into sovereign bonds.18 Although recent experience with the 
Uruguayan restructuring 2003 is positive,19 it remains to be seen whether or not 
CACs will actually be an effective tool for more orderly debt restructurings. Regard-
less of recent developments in drafting practice, there is still a large stock of foreign 
law debt outstanding that does not allow for majority restructuring, meaning that 
only those bondholders who accept a debt swap offer will be bound by the restruc-
turing terms.20 
Contrary to the debt swap methods employed to restructure foreign law debt, 
states have occasionally made use of their law making powers to restructure domes-
tic law debt. They adopted laws amending the terms of the debt or the modes of debt 
servicing, irrespective of whether these debt instruments were held by domestic or 
 
17  See Fisch/Gentile, supra note 13, 1069 f. 
18  For a coherent analysis of recent market practice see Drage/Hovaguimian, Collective Action 
Clauses: An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, Financial Sta-
bility Review by the Bank of England, Nov. 2004, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/public 
tions/fsr/2004/fsr17art9.pdf. German law bonds still do not contain CACs as counsel to the is-
suers and underwriting banks fear that such clauses could be struck down on consumer protec-
tion grounds, see Schneider, Die Änderung der Anleihebedingungen durch Beschluss der 
Gläubiger, in Baums/Cahn (eds.), Die Reform des Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, 69, 87.  
19  Steneri, Uruguay Debt Reprofiling: Lessons from Experience, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 731, 748 (Fn. 
31) (2004). 
20  In June 2005, 47% of outstanding emerging market foreign law debt did not include CACs, 
IMF, supra note 15, 3. 
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foreign creditors. Russia in 1998 serviced the GKOs held by foreigners into blocked 
accounts, the proceeds being convertible into dollars only on a very restricted basis. 
Argentina took a more drastic step in 2002 when it unilaterally converted domestic 
law dollar bonds into peso debt.21 It strikes the eye that these coercive restructurings 
could give rise to Investment Treaty claims. 
III. Sovereign Debt Litigation  
As the creditor group in the post-Brady age is much more heterogeneous than in the 
1980s, the recent debates highlighted the (perceived) threat that creditors would no 
longer behave as a group acting in the common interest but would rush to the courts 
and recover as much from their debt holdings as possible, thereby obstructing an 
orderly debt restructuring process. The case of Argentina where creditors took to the 
courts in multiple jurisdictions such as Italy, Germany and the U.S. (where a court 
certified the first class action suit against a sovereign state)22 could serve as proof 
that the “rush to the courthouse”-threat is real. However, other debt restructurings, 
even highly controversial ones such as Ecuador in 2000,23 have not seen creditor 
litigation, let alone an asset-grabbing race. 
The success of holdout creditor litigation in domestic courts has largely depended 
on where they brought suit. New York courts (the most prominent forum given the 
choice of forum clauses in most debt instruments) have generally ruled in favour of 
the creditors, rejecting sovereign defences such as the Act of State Doctrine or the 
famous Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement.24 In Germany, there is still a case 
pending before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on 
whether Argentina can invoke a public international law State of Necessity de-
fence,25 and in April 2005 the Italian Corte di Cassazione held that Italian courts 
lacked jurisdiction to hear bondholder claims against Argentina on the principle of 
 
21  See Gelpern/Setser, supra note 10, 802-803, 806. 
22  Debevoise/Orta, The Class Action Threat to Sovereign Workouts, Int’l Fin. L. Rev July 2003, 
41-44. 
23  Ecuador made use of a coercive restructuring technique borrowed from U.S. corporate restruc-
turing known as exit consents, see Buchheit/Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Ex-
changes, 48 UCLA L. Rev., 59-84 (2000). The technique was only recently validated, Grey-
lock v. Mendoza, No. 04 Civ. 7643 (HB), 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1742 (S.D.N.Y. 7 Feb. 2005), 
aff’d Greylock v. Mendoza, No. 05-1414-CV, 2006 U.S. App. 1501 (2nd Cir. 18 Jan. 2006). 
24  Allied Bank International et. al. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520-522 
(2nd Cir. 1985). For an Argentina case see Lightwater Corp. et. al. v. Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 
3804, 3808, 5932 (TPG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6156 (S.D.N.Y. 14 April 2003), 11. Libra 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F.2d 870, 900 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
25  See inter alia the request for a preliminary ruling (Vorlagebeschluss) by OLG Frankfurt/M. 
NJW 2003, 2688. 
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par in parem non habet jurisdictionem, holding that the Argentine default was an act 
iure imperii that Italian courts could not sit in judgment over.26 
Even where creditors obtained a judgment in their favour, they have largely been 
unable to actually collect on it.27 This is due to the traditional international law con-
cept of immunity from enforcement which prevents creditors from attaching assets 
used for iure imperii purposes.28 As states are eager not to park commercial assets 
abroad,29 payment awards are little useful at the end of the day. In 2000, the noto-
rious decision of the Brussels Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Peru30 suggested that 
holdout creditors had ultimately overcome the classic enforcement dilemma as it 
enabled them to stop the debt swaps with those creditors willing to tender their old 
bonds. However, recent U.S. court judgments31 and a subsequent ruling of that very 
Brussels Court32 indicate that the Elliott-jurisprudence was very short lived and that 
the old obstacles to enforcement remain. Enforcing debt claims in the debtor state 
itself seems unlikely at best. Local enforcement authorities are not obliged to en-
force foreign court judgments in the absence of a Treaty obligation. Even where a 
Treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgments exists, it is subject to a 
public policy review by local authorities.33  
Where foreign investors have sued on their domestic law bonds in the debtor 
state’s courts, they have largely been unsuccessful as the courts applied the domestic 
emergency laws over the principle of pacta sunt servanda.34 
 
26  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezioni Uniti Civili, 21 April 2005, Docket No. 11225/05 (on 
file with author). For an English brief see Cleary Gottlieb Steen Hamilton, Argentina in Italian 
Supreme Court Win in Bond Payment Suspension Suit, News Bulletin 27 May 2005, 
http://www.cgsh.com/english/news/NewsDetail.aspx?id=2523. 
27  Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. April 2005, 19, 21. 
28  Whether or not the far reaching immunity waiver clauses also waive immunity from attaching 
iure imperii assets is a question in the pending German BVerfG proceedings, see Pfeif-
fer/Kopp, Der Imunitätsverzicht in Staatsanleihen und seine Reichweite, 102 ZVglRWiss 563-
573 (2003).  
29  One of the popular cases was Argentina’s president Kirchner cancelling a visit to Germany, 
fearing attachment of his presidential aircraft, see Handelsblatt, Tango-König verzichtet auf 
Tango, 13 Oct. 2003 (No. 196), 21. 
30  Het Hoef van Beroep de Brussel (8ste Kamer), 26 Sept. 2000, Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (on file 
with author). 
31  EM Ltd. et al. v. Argentina, No. 05-1525-cv, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8599 (2nd Cir. 13 May 
2005). 
32  See Latin Finance, Nicaragua Beats the Vultures, June 2004, 38. 
33  As to the possibility of enforcing German judgments in Argentina see Baars/Böckel, Argenti-
nische Auslandsanleihen vor Deutschen und Ausländischen Gerichten, ZBB 2004, 445, 463. 
34  For litigation as a result of the 1998 Russian default see Nadmitov, Russian Debt Restructuring 
– International Finance Seminar, 27, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/Alexande 
r_nadmitov.pdf. As to the proceedings in Argentine courts on the pesification of domestic law 
debt see Baars/Böckel, supra note 33, 462. 
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C. Bilateral Investment Treaty Obligations and ICSID 
The above analysis of recent state insolvency cases shows that in the restructuring 
process, the debtor state is in a much stronger position than the creditors, especially 
since the prospects for enforcement remain slim. This difference in bargaining 
power necessarily affects the outcome of restructuring negotiations, as the creditors 
do not have much leverage against the debtor, the times of gun-boat diplomacy to 
enforce private party claims (luckily) being long gone. We will now assess whether 
Investment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID has the potential to shift power to the 
creditors and provide them with more leverage in debt restructurings.  
I. Applicability of BITs to Sovereign Debt 
It is noteworthy that debt instruments traditionally lack arbitration clauses and in-
stead refer disputes between the parties exclusively to domestic courts.35 Hence, the 
only way for ICSID to come into play lies in the respective BIT clauses. This raises 
the question whether the specific treatment obligations are applicable to sovereign 
debt in the first place. 
1. Ratione Materiae 
There is reliable authority for the assumption that the traditionally broad investment 
definition of Art. 25 ICSID encompasses loans and bonds, whether issued by private 
or public entities.36 Interestingly, no state has thus far made use of Art. 25 (4) ICSID 
to exempt sovereign debt disputes from ICSID Arbitration. 
The more precarious question is whether the debt instruments are investments in 
the meaning of BITs. So far, we have not seen a coherent practice on this question. 
Some investment protection instruments such as the E.U.-ACP Investment Princi-
ples37 or the Italy–Argentina BIT38 expressly include public debt held by nationals of 
 
35  Ebenroth/Dillon, Arbitration Clauses in International Financial Agreements, 10 J. Int’l Arb. 5, 
22 (1993). Recent commentators have promoted the inclusion of ICSID arbitration clauses in 
sovereign bonds, Griffin/Farren, How ICSID Can Protect Sovereign Bondholders, Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. Sept. 2005, 21-24. 
36  Fedax v. Venezuela (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 
1384 (1998), para. 29. Delaume, ICSID and the Transnational Financial Community, 1 ICSID 
Rev. – F.I.L.J., 237 (1986), 242, referring to the drafting history of the Convention. 
37  Council of the European Communities: „Community Position on Investment Protection Princi-
ples in the ACP-States”, ACP-CEE 2172/, 3 Nov 1992, 5. 
38  http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_argentina_it.pdf, Art. 1 lit. c. 
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the other state party. Also, the recent U.S.-Uruguay BIT39 indicates that the U.S. 
government regards public debt as a covered investment. On the other hand, the 
Canadian Model BIT40 expressly excludes public debt instruments. Other treaty 
clauses are rather ambiguous and open to interpretation. The Tribunal in Fedax in 
1997 decided that promissory notes issued by a state were covered by the notion of 
“Titles to Money” in the Netherlands-Venezuela-BIT.41 The Tribunal drew an ex-
press analogy to the issuance of long term debt instruments such as bonds and loans 
which it implicitly assumed would no doubt qualify as “Titles to Money” as they 
would serve to finance the country’s needs.42 Taking Fedax as precedent and com-
bining this with a number of BITs that expressly cover public debt, we cannot but 
conclude that sovereign debt will qualify ratione materiae as investments for the 
sake of BIT Arbitration unless there is an express opposite treaty provision. 
2. Ratione Loci 
One possible objection to the application of BITs could be that financial instruments 
such as bonds or syndicated loans are not made “in the territory” of the debtor state 
as required by most BITs.43 The difficulty with applying this “territoriality criterion” 
to sovereign debt is that financial instruments, as opposed to traditional FDI, are 
intangible and that therefore the situs of the investment is difficult to determine. 
Indeed, it would not seem too far off to argue that a sovereign bond, traded on the 
NYSE, payable on a U.S. bank account, governed by New York law and purchased 
from a U.S. broker/dealer is not an investment “in the territory” of the debtor state. 
However, both recent BIT- and (even more so) ICSID jurisprudence are abundantly 
clear that such objections will not be sustained. The 2004 BIT between the U.S. and 
Uruguay, which maintains the territoriality criterion, implicitly acknowledges that 
debt instruments governed by New York law do fall within the ambit of the BIT.44 
And the Fedax Tribunal expressly states that the situs of a debt instrument (wherever 
it is) is irrelevant, as long as “the funds made available are utilized by the benefit-
ciary of the credit …so as to finance its various governmental needs”.45 The Tribu-
nal in CSOB adopts a similar approach, holding that the “in the territory”-
requirement is satisfied where the investment is designed to benefit the economic 
 
39  Treaty between the U.S.A. and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Annex G, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ 
dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf. 
40  http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf, 4. 
41  Fedax v. Venezuela (Jurisdiction), supra note 36, paras. 30 ff. 
42  Id., at 1386.  
43  See U.S. Model BIT Nov. 2004, Preamble (“… investment in the territory of the other 
Party…”), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/USmodelbitnov04.pdf. 
44  U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 39, Annex G, 54. 
45  Fedax v. Venezuala (Jurisdiction), supra note 36, para. 40. 
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development of the receiving state, even where the investment is made in an entirely 
intangible form (such as a loan).46 This also implies that there is no distinction be-
tween domestic law debt and foreign law debt, an important difference to the SDRM 
proposal that expressly excluded domestic law debt.47 
3. Ratione Personae 
Although public debt instruments often fall within the ambit of a BIT ratione mate-
riae, the ratione personae scope of BITs, i.e. the question which investors actually 
benefit from the BIT guarantees, illustrates that BITs are primarily designed for FDI 
and not so much for portfolio investment. The typical BIT/ICSID yardstick is the 
nationality of the investor. In the area of traditional FDI, where the investment can-
not easily be transferred from one investor to the other, this might be adequate a 
standard. By contrast, the nationality criterion could prove inappropriate in globa-
lized financial markets where the investment (public debt) is traded on secondary 
markets and can freely change hands from one national to the other within se-
conds.48 Strictly applying the nationality criterion could lead to the undesirable re-
sult that the investment would be granted different legal protection depending on 
who the holder is. This could not only prejudice the fungibility of the debt instru-
ments49 but would also run counter to the fundamental principle in sovereign debt 
restructuring that requires holders of similar claims be granted similar treatment.50 
Admittedly, most favoured nation (MFN) clauses in BITs could mitigate this prob-
lem and level the playing field with regard to certain treatment obligations (i.e. if 
some BITs of the debtor state contain umbrella clauses, while others do not, even 
those nationals who would not at first glance benefit from the umbrella clause could 
 
46  Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Bank v. Slovakia (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. 
ARB/97/4, 14 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 251 (1999), para. 88. The Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan 
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/01/13, 18 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 307 
(2003), para. 136, held that the “injection of funds into the territory” suffices. However, the 
context of this case was different as it related to the opening of offices in the host state. In SGS 
v. The Philippines (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/02/6, reprinted in 
Crawford/Lee/E. Lauterpacht (eds.), ICSID Reports, Vol. 8 2005, para. 110, the Tribunal no-
ticed that Fedax had adopted a “very broad definition of territoriality” (Fn. 41). Whether the 
SGS decisions support the broad Fedax notion of territoriality, Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” 
of Treaty-based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals, 4 LPICT 19, 47 
(2005), is doubtable against this background. 
47  IMF, supra note 3, 23. 
48  The Tribunal in Fedax implicitely acknowledged this consequence, see Fedax v. Venezuela 
(Jurisdiction), supra note 36, para. 40 (“the identity of the investor will change with every en-
dorsement”). 
49  As to the fundamental value of fungibility, see Kümpel, Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht, 3rd ed. 
2004, 1417. 
50  Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of Treatment between Equivalent Creditors in 
Relation to Comparable Debts, 20 Int’l L. 857, 858 (1986).  
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invoke such a clause relying on MFN in “their” BIT).51 Nonetheless, it is much more 
debatable whether MFN clauses can remedy a situation when the ratione materiae 
scope of BITs varies, i.e. when one BIT does cover public debt (U.S.) while the 
other does not (Canada). Tribunal practice suggests that MFN clauses cannot 
broaden the scope of BIT protection because the other BITs are res inter alios acta 
in this respect.52 To the contrary, it is has been argued that MFN clauses actually do 
entitle investors to choose the most favourable investment definition from all BITs 
the opposing state party has concluded.53 In a setting where a Canadian investor 
holds debt issued by a state that has BITs with both the U.S. and Canada, an ICSID 
Tribunal would have to reach a decision on this difficult question. These problems 
arise whenever portfolio investments are covered by BITs, sovereign debt only  
being one instance where the ratione personae problem could surface. 
II. Contract Claims v. Treaty Claims and the Umbrella Clause 
Our next issue will be of fundamental importance for the outcome and in fact for the 
very nature of ICSID-state insolvency cases. The more regrettable it is that ICSID-
decisions are very difficult to predict on the topic: The relationship between contract 
and treaty claims and the meaning of umbrella clauses. While the problem already 
causes permanent controversy in the classic FDI setting, it is aggravated in the state 
insolvency context. It will be remembered that sovereign bonds, the investments of 
primary interest here, certify contractual obligations by which the debtor promises to 
pay a certain amount of money on a specific date with a fixed (or floating) interest 
rate. In contrast to the recent ICSID cases that sparked the debate on contract/treaty 
claims, the contract claim against the host state is not part of a larger operation (such 
as a concession contract for providing services): The contractual claim is the in-
vestment itself. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the exact elaboration 
on the relationship between contract and treaty claims will be the core task for any 
ICSID Tribunal in future state insolvency cases. A full-fledged analysis of this topic 
would certainly exceed the scope of this study,54 so I will restrain myself to high-
lighting the consequences of the different approaches for our subject of interest. 
 
51  The application of umbrella clauses through MFN clauses was addressed but left undecided in 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/03/3, 22 April 2005, 
para. 223, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/impreglio-decision.pdf.  
52  Maffezini v. Spain (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/97/7, 16 ICSID 
Rev. – F.I.L.J. 212 (2001), para. 45. Impreglio v. Pakistan, supra note 51, para. 223. 
53  Rubins, The Notion of Investment in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in Horn (ed.), Arbitrating 
Foreign Investment Disputes, 2004, 322-323. 
54  For recent analyses see Shany, Contract Claims v. Treaty Claims, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 835-851 
(2005). Cremades/Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of Forum in Foreign In-
vestment Disputes, in Horn (ed.), supra note 53, 325-351. Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – The SGS Cases Considered, in Weiler (ed.), supra 
note 2, 325-347. 
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Although each individual case depends on the wording of the applicable BIT, two 
general approaches in ICSID jurisprudence can be identified, recently described as 
integrationist and disintegrationist.55  
The “integrationist Tribunals” in Fedax,56 SGS v. Philippines and most recently 
Eureko and Noble Ventures v. Romania57 interpret BIT umbrella clauses to elevate 
any contractual investor claim against the state to treaty claim status. Consequently, 
under this approach, every breach of contract amounts to a breach of the treaty. A 
sovereign default would, subject to possible defences under domestic and interna-
tional law, amount to a treaty violation. The “integrationists” would thus do away 
with the long standing view in international law that the non-payment of public debt, 
although being a breach of contract, is not an international wrong.58 From a proce-
dural point of view, “integrationist Tribunals” would have to deal with choice of 
forum clauses in the debt instruments and assess whether they should follow the 
(2:1) decision in SGS v. Philippines and defer the determination of breach of con-
tract to domestic courts to avoid parallel proceedings.59 
“Disintegrationist Tribunals” interpret umbrella clauses in a more restrictive 
manner and draw a distinction between contract claims arising under municipal law 
and treaty claims arising under the BIT. Under this approach, which seemed to pre-
vail until Noble v. Romania, breaches of contract do not constitute treaty violations 
unless the state makes use of its governmental (iure imperii) powers to interfere with 
the contractual rights of the investor.60 It is argued that breaches of contract are the 
commercial risk, a risk that BITs do not seek to insure against. For state insolvency 
cases, this line of argumentation would have implications fundamentally different 
from the “integrationists”: ICSID Tribunals will not decide disputes where the only 
issue is that a state missed due payments under a debt instrument: The non-payment 
 
55  Shany, supra note 54, 844. 
56  Fedax v. Venezuela (Award), Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 1391, 1396 (1998).  
57  SGS v. Philippines (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 116, 117, 127. Eureko B.V. v. Poland 
(Partial Award), Ad hoc Arbitration, 19 Aug. 2005, paras. 244 ff., http://ita.law.uvic 
.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf. Noble Ventures v. Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 5 Oct. 2005, para. 54, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.  
58  García-Amador, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/106, I.L.C. Yb. 
1957-II, 117. Borchard, supra note 9, 118-120. That view was also widely shared during the 
negotiations for the multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), see OECD, The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment – Commentary to the Consolidated Text, 22 April 1998, OECD 
Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV 1, 23. 
59  SGS v. Philippines (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 155 and Declaration by Arbiter 
Crivallero. 
60  CMS v. Argentina (Award), Case No. ARB/01/8, 44 I.L.M. 1205 (Sept. 2005), para. 299. 
Impreglio v, Pakistan, supra note 51, para. 260. Joy Mining v. Egypt (Award on Jurisdiction), 
Case No. ARB/03/11, 44 I.L.M. 73 (Jan. 2005), paras. 77-82. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 46, 
paras. 165 ff. On the even more restrictive general principle of international law, see Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law, § 712 (1987).  
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of one’s debt is an act iure gestionis61 and constitutes the commercial risk that a 
creditor is aware of when purchasing emerging market debt (which often yields 
spectacular returns). ICSID would have to assess whether the government, in one 
way or the other, invokes its genuine iure imperii powers to justify non payment.62  
The importance of the contract claims/treaty claims question cannot be over-
stated. Depending on whether ICSID Tribunals will adjudicate over pure contractual 
disputes or constrain themselves to mere treaty claims, the nature of the proceedings 
will vary significantly. Both options bear their own problems. An “integrationist 
Tribunal” would stigmatize a mere non-payment as an international wrong and poli-
ticize sovereign debt restructurings.63 Moreover, it would (arguably) run the risk of 
being abused as an enforcement tool for domestic court decisions. The latter concern 
holds particularly true if one subscribes to the SGS v. Philippines Tribunal’s view 
that whenever a local judge rules in the investor’s favour, compliance with this 
judgment becomes a treaty obligation.64 “Disintegrationist Tribunals” would have to 
address the highly complex question of the extraterritorial effect of iure imperii acts, 
the issue we will turn to next. 
III. Extraterritorial Application of Emergency Laws  
The distinction between iure imperii and iure gestionis acts is certainly of some 
helpful guidance in the context of traditional FDI where the investor enters the host 
state’s territory and subjects its investment to the laws of that state. However, in the 
context of external public debt, where it is often the state that subjects itself to the 
laws of some other country upon the express request of the investor,65 the distinction 
of iure imperii and iure gestionis acts gives rise to the problem of the extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws (conflicts of public law norms). How can a sovereign 
debtor ever assume iure imperii powers to interfere with an investment (and thereby 
trigger a treaty claim) when the investment is exclusively governed by the laws of 
the State of New York, is to be repaid in New York on an account with a New York 
bank? 
The general question of the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is cer-
tainly one of the most disputed fields in International Economic Law, and scholars 
of private international law even deny that it is a matter of public international law at 
 
61  Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, 15 June 1925, stating that “the refusal to pay … has never been an 
act of sovereignty, or an act of public authority, because any private individual may do the 
same. The mere fact that the debtor is a state can make no difference”, quoted after Borchard, 
supra note 9, 11 (Fn. 7). 
62  Wälde, supra note 2, 408. 
63  Especially regarding the diplomatic tools in the hands of the creditors’ home governments, see 
infra. IV. 2. 
64  SGS v. Philippinies (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, paras. 127, 128, 163. 
65  See supra II. 1. 
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all.66 However, when faced with an investment dispute, ICSID cannot help but make 
a decision. 
1. Domestic Law Debt 
The situation of domestic law debt in this regard appears to be less complex than 
foreign law debt as it resembles the traditional FDI situation where the foreign in-
vestor submits to the laws of the debtor state. Let us assume arguendo that the 
choice of domestic law renders the sovereign competent to amend its laws and 
thereby affect its debt servicing obligations towards foreigners.67 If the state actually 
makes use of this competence, this exercise of classic iure imperii powers will be 
tested against the state’s obligations under international law (i.e. BITs).68 One pos-
sible argument for the debtor state could be that the creditor assumed the risk by 
voluntarily submitting to the local laws and receiving a higher risk premium as 
compensation and therefore acts in bad faith bringing an ICSID claim. It is unlikely 
that this would indeed prevent an in depth analysis of BIT investment disciplines. 
2. Foreign Law Debt 
Let me now turn to the more complicated issue on how treaty claims stemming from 
the use of iure imperii powers could possibly arise in the context of debt contracts 
governed by foreign law. We have already seen that generally, the mere non-
payment of one’s debts is not an act iure imperii, just as the conclusion of the very 
debt contract is a commercial and not a sovereign act. Every private debtor can do 
the same. The difference between corporate and state insolvency is that states tend to 
adopt debt moratoria in the form of emergency laws to declare the cessation of pay-
 
66  Sonnenberger, in Münchener Kommentar zum EGBGB, 4th ed. 2006, intro. to EGBGB, paras. 
123, 413. 
67  Unfortunately, this question is far from settled. In English law the above assumption is correct, 
Kahler v. Midland Bank, [1950] A.C. 24, 56 per Lord Radcliffe. To the contrary, German 
courts have a strictly territorial approach, refusing to give effect to foreign public law norms 
even when that is the proper law of the contract, BGH NJW 1960, 1101, 1102. The traditional 
French doctrine of contract international adopts an approach similar to the German one and 
was applied in the classic Serbian Loans Cases before the PCIJ in 1929, but purely as a matter 
of French law, Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, PCIJ 
Ser. A Nos. 20/21, 46-47. The ICJ case had ample opportunity to rule on the issue but refused 
to hear the case on the merits, ICJ, Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Rep. 1957, 9, 27, 
diss. op. by Judge Read, 85. 
68  On this general principle of international law see Sir H. Lauterpacht, Case of Certain Norwe-
gian Loans, sep. op., supra note 67, 37.  
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ments on their external debts.69 By intention, these laws have an extraterritorial 
reach. Prior to any examination on whether the emergency laws comply with sub-
stantive BIT obligations, an ICSID Tribunal has to assess whether it gives effect to a 
debt moratorium despite its extraterritorial reach. Although, as far as the author is 
aware, ICSID Tribunals have not had to deal with this issue, two alternative solu-
tions can be identified. Arguably, the outcome of ICSID proceedings on the issue 
will depend on whether the arbiters have a public international law or private inter-
national law background.  
The private international law approach: Arbiters regarding the question of extra-
territorial application of public law norms primarily as a question of conflicts of 
laws would presumably rely on jurisprudence in the forum of the proper law, espe-
cially when there are judgments on the very same issue of state insolvency. Where a 
local court has already declined to give effect to the debtor state’s emergency laws 
because of their extraterritorial reach (as is the case in U.S. 2nd Circuit law),70 a 
“disintegrationist” Tribunal could defer to such a ruling and consequently refuse to 
analyze the specific BIT disciplines. This would be advantageous since, firstly, it 
would avoid diverging decisions between ICSID and domestic courts on the same 
case and, secondly, it would also mitigate the “abuse-threat” (i.e. judgment creditors 
taking to ICSID who have been unsuccessful in collecting on their domestic law 
judgments). Yet, the major disadvantage lies in the fact that domestic fora them-
selves are inconsistent on whether to recognize extraterritorially reaching emergency 
laws. A look at the recent Argentine insolvency highlights the dilemma of the pri-
vate international law approach: The Italian Corte di Cassazione is diametrically 
opposed to 2nd Circuit jurisprudence as it expressly acknowledges that the emer-
gency laws on the cessation of payments constitute non-justiceable iure imperii acts, 
thus implicitly giving them the sought extraterritorial effect without even elaborating 
on the extraterritoriality problem.71 In an Italian Bondholder v. Argentina case be-
fore a “disintegrationist” Tribunal, Argentina would probably be estopped from 
raising a “contract-claim-defence” as it (successfully) invoked its sovereign powers 
in Italian courts in the very same case.72 Thus, under a private international law 
approach, the inconsistencies of national jurisprudence could cause another line of 
inconsistent ICSID decisions. Ironically, at the end of the day, the Italian investor 
might be better off than his U.S. counterpart because ICSID awards can be better 
enforced than U.S. judgments. 
The public international law approach: As an alternative solution, ICSID could 
engage in an autonomous assessment on whether a debt moratorium can, despite its 
extraterritorial reach, affect foreign law debt contracts. Although this approach has 
 
69  See the Argentine Emergency Law No. 25. 561 dated 6 Jan. 2002 and the debt moratorium 
under this Emergency Law No. 256/2002, dated 6 Feb. 2002. 
70  See supra II. 3. 
71  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, supra note 26, 5. 
72  In SGS v. Pakistan (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 139, an ICSID Tribunal held Pakistan to 
its pleadings in foreign (Swiss) courts that certain acts were non-justiceable iure imperii acts.  
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the advantage of allowing a coherent ICSID jurisprudence to develop, it would soon 
face the problem that practice-proof international law rules on the extraterritorial 
application of domestic law are very difficult to detect.73 One possible yardstick 
would be the requirement of a bona fide connection between the subject matter and 
the respective state laws,74 a test that would presumably be satisfied where a state 
enacts laws specifically designed to affect its own contracts. This is of course not to 
say that the emergency measures are BIT-legal, quite the contrary is true: The (ap-
plicable) measures would in a later step have to be tested against the BIT obligations 
of the state. The fundamental problem with an autonomous assessment is that the 
outcome will necessarily conflict with some national court judgment, which is most 
drastic when domestic courts and ICSID decide over the very same emergency 
measures (as could be the case with U.S. courts, Italian courts and ICSID deciding 
on the Argentine emergency measures). For the sake of coherent ICSID jurispru-
dence, the public international law approach would have to choose between either 
denying justice to Italian bondholders or (arguably) being abused by American 
creditors.75 
The analysis shows that both possible approaches have material disadvantages, 
and there does not seem to be a way to escape this dilemma. Nonetheless, the issue 
would have to be solved in one way or the other by a “disintegrationist” Tribunal 
that only looks at cases where the state has made use of its iure imperii powers. 
IV. Treatment Obligations under BITs 
We now head back to the more known territory of Investment Law, the individual 
BIT treatment obligations. Whether or not a Tribunal actually reaches this stage will 
largely depend on its stance on the two prior issues. This study does not provide a 
full-fledged analysis on every individual investment discipline, given that much is 
still in flux and that some topics are also addressed separately at this conference. In 
 
73  Dolzer, Extraterritoriale Anwendung von nationalem Recht aus der Sicht des Völkerrechts, 
Bitburger Gespräche, Jahrbuch 2003, 71, 79. 
74  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. 2003, 309, with further references. 
The WTO Appellate Body employs a “sufficient nexus”-test, Report of the WTO Appellate 
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct. 1998, para. 133. 
75  The deni de justice claim from Italian bondholders would sound like this: While Italian Courts 
are not hearing our case because the measures complained of are considered non-justiceable 
iure imperii acts, the “disintegrationist” ICSID Tribunal considers them ineffective and thus 
refuses to hear our pure iure gestionis contract claims. The abuse claim against U.S. creditors 
would be that U.S. creditors already had the emergency laws declared ineffective in U.S. 
courts. Bringing the claim to ICSID alleging that Argentina made use of its iure imperii pow-
ers to tamper with their contractual rights seems abusive since investors would be allowed to 
exploit enforcement possibilities not enjoyed in domestic lawsuits. 
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addition, any ex ante analysis must remain vague since every Tribunal will have to 
decide on the case specific measures.  
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that while ICSID Tribunals will not 
judge on the monetary policy of the insolvent state (such as an abandonment of a 
currency peg), they will not be willing to accept a “general measures of economic 
policy” objection in order to sustain debt moratoria: Tribunals have “jurisdiction to 
examine whether specific measures affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures 
of general economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have been 
adopted in violation of legally binding commitments made to the investor …”76  
One overriding question that will determine any analysis of specific treatment ob-
ligations will be whether account shall be taken of the circumstances under which a 
state adopted the challenged measures, as constantly raised by Argentine in the cur-
rent ICSID proceedings.77 In the alternative, the Tribunal would disregard the state’s 
motivation and merely assess the effects of the emergency measures on investments, 
regarding the circumstances only on the “defences“ stage. 
1. Expropriation  
The “circumstances-question” is currently debated in the context of expropriation 
and has given rise to diverging ICSID decisions.78 An outright repudiation of sove-
reign debt would certainly be a clear case of direct expropriation which, in the ab-
sence of prompt, effective and adequate compensation, is a BIT violation.79 The 
more intricate question is whether emergency measures could constitute a creeping 
or indirect expropriation The NAFTA-Metalclad decision suggested that a depriva-
tion of reasonable to be expected economic benefit constitutes an indirect expropria-
tion.80 Presumably, the Tribunal, both in and outside the state insolvency context, 
would require a certain degree of interference with this reasonable-to-be-expected 
benefit.81 A legislative fiat that stretches the maturity date of certain debt instrument 
to a limited extent could be acceptable while changing maturity for a significant 
 
76  CMS v. Argentina (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/01/8, 42 I.L.M. 799 
(2003), para. 33 (emphasis added). 
77  CMS v. Argentina (Application for Annulment), 8 Sept. 2005, paras. 19-23, http://ita.law.uvic 
.ca/documents/cmsannulmentapplication.pdf. 
78  Kunoy, Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration, 
6 J. World Investment & Trade, 467, 469-472 (2005). 
79  Wälde, supra note 2, 409. Argentine bondholders state that the recent Argentine law adopted in 
the aftermath of the June-2005 restructuring actually constitutes such repudiation, see White & 
Case, Recent Argentine Legislation and Bondholder Remedies, Memorandum to the Global 
Committee of Argentine Bondholders, 3. http://www.gcab.org/images/GCAB_ICSID_Postion 
_Paper_2-15-05.pdf. 
80  Metalclad v. Mexico(Award), Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 35 (2001), para. 103. 
81  There are diverging decisions on whether the degree of interference matters, Kunoy, supra note 
78, 485-487. 
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time (i.e. from 5 to 30 years) could be viewed differently. It is to be noted that the 
CMS decision of May 2005 is of little avail in our context as it has to be seen in the 
specific minority-shareholder setting.82 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment  
Although the discussion on what fair and equitable treatment means is still contro-
versial, recent ICSID jurisprudence strongly relies on the legitimate expectations of 
the investor at the time of the investment decision.83 In CMS, the Tribunal held that 
the conversion of dollar based claims to a local currency “entirely transform[ed] and 
alter[ed]” the business environment of the investment and thus violated the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.84 A Tribunal would thus have to determine which 
investor expectations are actually so material to be covered by this “entirely alter 
and transform the legal and business environment-test”. This could be tricky an 
exercise because on international securities markets, the legal features of debt in-
struments minutiously affect the price investors are willing to pay. One could make 
the argument that all characteristics of a debt security have an influence on the in-
vestment decision and are therefore material. A more narrow interpretation could 
regard as material only some key financial terms of a debt instrument, such as cur-
rency, maturity or, as the case may be, collateral features.85  
3. Transfer Rights  
Other treatment obligations of interest are provisions whereby states grant investors 
the right to freely transfer any received payment into a freely convertible, stable 
currency.86 These guarantees, which trump the states’ rights to adopt capital export 
control laws under Art. VI (3) of the IMF Agreement,87 could be raised in a case like 
the Russian restructuring where ruble-payments were made into blocked accounts 
 
82  Schill, From Calvo to CMS: Burying an International Law Legacy, SchiedsVZ 2005, 285, 289-
290. 
83  Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Terms, 39 Int’l L. 87 
(2005). 
84  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 275. 
85  I.e. when a state undertakes to use certain revenues exclusively for debt servicing purposes and 
later removes this collateral feature by unilateral legislative action. 
86  Inter alia see U.S. Model BIT Nov. 2004, supra note 43, Art. 7. 
87  Reinisch, State Responsibility for Debts, 1995, 101. In Hood Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran et. al., the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had the chance to rule on the relationship between 
the IMF Articles of Agreement, 22 July 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 124, as amended through 28 June 
1990, and the Iran-U.S. Treaty of Amity which contained a transfer guarantee similar to the 
BIT provisions. The Tribunal held the Treaty of Amity inapplicable on other grounds, see     
Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1996, 393. 
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that did not allow the investors to withdraw the funds and exchange them into dol-
lars.  
4. Umbrella Clauses 
Even if umbrella clauses are not interpreted to elevate every contractual claim to a 
treaty claim,88 they can still have a significant impact on a state’s ability to adopt 
measures in situations of financial distress. In fact, a respective BIT clause could be 
interpreted to prohibit a state to adopt any iure imperi measures that would affect 
debt contracts held by foreigners. Umbrella clauses could thereby have the effect of 
a stabilization clause, a curious result as debt contracts hardly ever contain stabiliza-
tion clauses.89 Such an interpretation would render false the long standing perception 
that with respect to domestic law debt, the debtor state is free to change the law to 
adapt it to its public policy needs. It would be interesting to see markets reaction if 
an ICSID Tribunal in fact gives umbrella clauses so broad a meaning, because ge-
nerally, the debtor state’s (perceived) law making powers make domestic law debt 
much more risky, yielding much higher risk returns.90 A more narrow interpretation 
would subject the umbrella clause to a public policy exemption to the benefit of the 
debtor state. 
5. Non Discrimination, National Treatment and MFN 
Last but certainly not least, the treatment obligations of national treatment, MFN and 
non-discrimination could play a major role in state insolvency cases under BITs. 
Inter-creditor equity has always been the fundamental concern for creditors.91 At the 
outset it has to be noted that these provisions can become relevant for both “intergra-
tionist” and “disintegrationist” Tribunals.  
Generally speaking, the major task for Tribunals would be to assess whether or 
not an alleged unequal treatment occurred among similarly situated investors, a 
concept known to investment law92 and state insolvency “law”93 as well. This would 
 
88  See supra III. 2. 
89  Siebel, supra note 14, 190. 
90  Argentina recently called off a domestic law bond launch because investors demanded too high 
a risk premium, see Bloomberg News, Argentina Cancels Bond Sale, Won't Pay 8.8% Yield, 
21 Sept. 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_us&refer=news_index&sid 
=ak3QHaN1eXLk. 
91  Historically, discrimination based on the nationality of creditors has been a cause for diplo-
matic intervention by the investors’ home governments, Borchard, supra note 9, 260-266. 
92  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 293. Wälde, supra note 2, 411-414, stressing 
the parallel to the “like-products” problems in WTO law. 
93  Clark, supra note 50. 
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surely require the state to treat holders of identical debt instruments identically. A 
highly political issue in this regard is whether a state is entitled to grant domestic 
creditors, such as domestic banks, better restructuring terms (or even entirely save 
them restructuring) compared to foreign creditors holding the same debt instru-
ments. While de jure this looks like a clear-cut violation of national treatment com-
mitments,94 at least an economic case can be made for treating local creditors on a 
preferential basis.95 Besides the national treatment question, BIT-MFN-obligations 
outlaw playing favourites among foreign creditors for political reasons. Where 
creditors are not holding identical debt instruments, the Tribunal would have to 
develop its own criteria to assess which groups of creditors are similarly situated and 
thus have to receive equal treatment. While developing these criteria could some-
times be burdensome (such as the question of whether or not a state is justified in 
paying multilateral institutions ahead of private foreign lenders),96 at least some 
situations seem straightforward. Inter alia, trade creditors and bondholders are not 
similarly situated, a fact acknowledged by major creditor organizations.97 Through a 
sophisticated classification of creditors, ICSID could help the state regain a stable 
current account and maintain basic services provided by foreigners (by allowing the 
state to pay inter alia foreign providers of airport security services).  
Again, much of the outcome will depend on whether the circumstances of the cri-
sis and public policy considerations will be considered for an examination of the 
treatment obligation assessment or only for possible defences. 
V. Sovereign Defences  
1. Acceptance of Majority Restructurings 
As it is most likely that potential ICSID claimants would be holdout creditors (who 
are not participating in a voluntary debt swap), it is worth examining whether a 
sovereign could raise a defence that ICSID should not interfere with majority re-
structurings, i.e. where a (qualified) majority of creditors has accepted a restructur-
ing plan. Such an objection, which would presumably be more prominent with “in-
 
94  In the Russian restructuring in 1998, local banks received significant secret side payments not 
made to foreign creditors, see Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 90s: Factbook, Toolkit 
and Preliminary Lessons, June 2003, 23, http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/pinto2.pdf.  
95  Roubini, Why Should Foreign Creditors of Argentina Take a Greater Hit/Haircut than the 
Domestic Ones?, 14 Dec. 2001 (First Draft), 4, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/papers 
/discriminationforeigndebt.doc.  
96  See Martha, Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The case of the International 
Monetary Fund, 39 ICLQ 801-826 (1990). 
97  Institute for International Finance, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restruc-
turings in Emerging Markets, 31 March 2005, 14, www.iif.com/data/public/principles_final 
_0305.pdf. 
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tegrationist Tribunals”, was envisaged by financial experts during the negotiations 
for the MAI.98 But while there is no question that ICSID should give effect to a 
majority restructuring under CACs,99 it is doubtable whether ICSID Tribunals can 
do the same in the absence of CACs, i.e. where the holdouts hold on to their old, 
unchanged debt claims. Annex G of the 2004 U.S.-Uruguay BIT actually has this 
effect, barring investor claims where creditors representing 75% of outstanding debt 
have accepted a restructuring offer, regardless of whether the original debt instru-
ments allow for a majority restructuring or not.100 The same approach was envisaged 
by the SDRM.101 This might be a desirable result to enable more orderly debt re-
structurings and prevent a “rush to ICSID”. However, there is no legal foundation 
for ICSID to uphold such a defence absent a clear treaty provision to that effect. The 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT and the IMF’s SDRM proposal can certainly not be seen as evi-
dence of a new customary international law rule that can limit BIT obligations.  
2. State of Necessity and Debt Sustainability 
A question common to those familiar with the current Argentina proceedings is 
whether a state in a situation of financial distress can invoke a State of Necessity, 
based on both BIT- and customary international law, to excuse BIT violations.102  
A preliminary objection to such a defence was that BITs are intended to bite in 
times of economic difficulty and that the BITs’ object and purpose exclude a State 
of Necessity defence (Notstandsfestigkeit). The CMS Tribunal seems to embrace 
such an objection, stating that only in a situation of total collapse could a State of 
Necessity defence be raised The Argentine crisis, although being severe, would not 
qualify as a situation of total collapse.103 Nonetheless, the Tribunal engaged in a 
(sometimes poorly argued)104 substantive discussion of both Art. 25 of the 2001 
I.L.C. Draft on State Responsibility105 and the emergency clause Art. XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. I will briefly reproduce this discussion, highlighting some state in-
solvency specific questions that have not yet arisen in the pending proceedings. 
The first prong a Tribunal has to assess when faced with a creditor claim against 
an insolvent state is whether a state is facing a grave and imminent peril for an es-
 
98  OECD, supra note 58, 23. 
99  See supra II. 2. After a CAC restructuring, a creditor is only entitled to receive the restructured 
amounts. These restructurings thereby automatically affect claims under umbrella clauses. 
100  Supra note 39, 54. 
101  IMF, supra note 3, 26. 
102  As to other possible public international law defences see Leyendecker, Auslandsverschuldung 
und Völkerrecht, 1988, 150-240. 
103  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 354-356. 
104  Schill, supra note 82, 291. 
105  As adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12 Dec. 2001, Official Records 
of the General Assembly, 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10). 
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sential interest when paying the claimant. Any definitive answer to this question 
would presumably require an assessment of the country’s debt sustainability, the 
notion developed by the IMF that (in the IMF’s view) justifies a sovereign debt 
restructuring.106 The major problem here lies in the fact that states, invoking their 
fiscal and monetary sovereignty, fiercely oppose a legally binding determination of 
their debt sustainability by an international body. Consequently, the SDRM would 
have lacked the power to assess the debt sustainability of a country.107 By contrast, 
in international law, as applied by the CMS-Tribunal, Necessity is not a self-judging 
concept.108 Accordingly, an ICSID Tribunal has to make its own assessment of the 
Necessity/debt sustainability situation in a two step analysis: What are the foreign 
exchange reserves of the state? And what exactly are the recognizable essential 
interests (the beneficium competentiae) of a state that are protected by the State of 
Necessity notion? Arguably, ICSID Tribunals lack the resources to engage in such 
an analysis, so using more capable authority would be appropriate. Unfortunately, at 
least in the Argentina case, the IMF constantly refused to state whether, in its opi-
nion, Argentina is unable or only unwilling to pay.109 A related problem would be 
how to treat a creditor that only sues for a small amount, the payment of which can-
not be said to cause a grave and imminent peril.110 
Another crucial element of the State of Necessity test is whether the contested 
measure is the only way for the state to remedy the situation of necessity, Art. 
25 (1) (a) I.L.C. Draft. The CMS-Tribunal is very (too?) restrictive on that point, 
leaving the state practically no discretion on how to react in an emergency situa-
tion.111 It goes without saying that every individual state insolvency situation would 
warrant a case-specific analysis.  
Lastly, the delicate question of contribution (a state cannot invoke Necessity 
where it has itself contributed to the situation of Necessity, Art. 25 (2) (b) I.L.C. 
Draft) could eliminate any State of Necessity defence in the state insolvency con-
text. Of course the state has contributed to its debt burden when it voluntarily tapped 
capital markets. The CMS-Tribunal indicates that this could in fact be the end of the 
story, basically restricting the State of Necessity to cases of purely external in-
 
106  IMF, supra note 3, 22. 
107  IMF, supra note 3, 28. In general see Gianviti, The Prevention and Resolution of International 
Financial Crisis: A Perspective from the International Monetary Fund, in Giovanoli (ed.), In-
ternational Monetary Law – Issues for the New Millennium, 2000, 97, 108. 
108  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, paras. 373-374. ICJ, Case Concerning the Gabcí-
kovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Rep. 1997, 7, 40 with references to the work of the I.L.C.  
109  Gelpern, After Argentina, Policy Briefs in International Economics, IIE Paper No. PB05-2, 
Sept. 2005, 5, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf. 
110  See Pfeiffer, Zahlungskrisen ausländischer Staaten im deutschen und internationalen Rechts-
verkehr, 102 ZVglRWiss 141, 163-164 (2003), promoting an examination of the overall debt 
situation (Gesamtbetrachtung). 
111  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, paras. 323-324. As to the criticism see Schill, supra 
note 82, 291; CMS v. Argentina (Annulment Application), supra note 77, paras. 81-82. 
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fluences.112 Whether or not this restrictive interpretation will stand remains for the 
Annulment Committee to decide.113 
D. Procedural Questions  
After this analysis of the substantive treaty obligations, let me now turn to two pro-
cedural aspects that will be relevant in proceedings against an insolvent sovereign. 
I. Stay of Proceedings During Restructuring Negotiations 
In the discussions on the SDRM, the IMF insisted on a stay of court (enforcement) 
proceedings during ongoing restructuring negotiations in order to prevent obstruc-
tive creditor behaviour.114 While U.S. courts have occasionally granted temporary 
stays,115 Tribunals do not have the authority to stay proceedings until the end of 
restructuring negotiations, once the waiting period usually stipulated in BITs has 
lapsed.116 Under current ICSID Rules, stays from enforcement are only permissible 
pending Interpretation, Revision and Annulment Proceedings, Art. 50-52 ICSID 
Convention.117 To allow for a stay of proceedings pending restructuring negotia-
tions, the Administrative Council would have to amend the Arbitration Rules under 
Art. 6 (1) (c) of the Convention.  
II. Enforcing Creditor Claims and Diplomatic Protection 
We have already come across the possibility of enforcement of ICSID awards on 
some occasions. Enforcement issues have so far rarely arisen because states gene-
 
112  CMS v. Argentine (Award), supra note 60, para. 329. Schill, supra note 82, 291. This deprives 
Art. 25 of any relevance. Cases “beyond the control of the state” are governed by Art. 23 
(Force Majeure) I.L.C. Draft.  
113  See CMS v. Argentina (Annulment Application), supra note 77, paras. 83-84. 
114  IMF, supra note 3, 25 (subjecting a stay to the approval of a 75% creditor majority). 
115  Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru and the Republic of Peru, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2003, 23-33 (S.D.N.Y. 24 Feb. 1994). Lightwater Corp. v. Argentina, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16868 (S.D.N.Y. 29 Aug. 2003, stay of execution). Allied Bank International et. al. v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago et. al. 733 F2d 23, 27 (2nd Cir. 1984). Skeel, Why Con-
tracts are Saving Sovereign Bankruptcy, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. March 2006, 23, sums up the efforts 
as “mixed results”. 
116  Even these requirements could be rendered obsolete by virtue of MFN Clauses, see Siemens v. 
Argentina (Decision on Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/02/8, 44 I.L.M. 137 (Jan. 2005), paras. 
79-109. 
117  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter the Convention). 
 164
rally pay their ICSID awards.118 However, the Argentine case suggests that this 
perception is invalid in state insolvency cases,119 even though states clearly are un-
der an international law obligation to comply with ICSID awards, Art. 53 (1) ICSID 
Convention. Hence, execution becomes a material concern for creditors, debtors and 
the entire ICSID system alike.  
Enforcement is governed by Art. 54, 55 ICSID-Convention. Any contracting state 
is under an obligation to enforce an ICSID award as if it were a final judgment in 
that state, Art. 54 (1). The enforcement procedure is subject to the laws concerning 
execution of judgments in the state where enforcement is sought, without prejudice 
to local laws on immunity from enforcement, Art. 54 (3), 55. By virtue of this latter 
limitation, the traditional obstacles to execution outside of the debtor state’s territory 
will also play out in the ICSID context. The restrictive immunity from enforcement 
theory (as predominantly applied among ICSID member states), as well as interna-
tional law on diplomatic immunities, will prevent creditors from attaching assets of 
the diplomatic mission and other assets used for iure imperii purposes.120 Although 
this causes inconveniences for the debtor state by impeding its commercial activities 
abroad, commercial assets will in most cases not be available for the creditor outside 
the debtor’s territory.  
One (perceived) advantage of Investment Treaty Arbitration from an investor’s 
point of view is that, compared to domestic court judgments, ICSID awards can be 
enforced easier in the debtor state itself, at least in theory.121 ICSID awards have the 
status of a final judgment of the debtor state’s courts and must not be subjected to a 
public policy review by local enforcement authorities, clearly constituting an im-
provement compared to the enforcement of foreign court judgments and arbitral 
awards.122. A local court is by international law obliged to enforce an ICSID award 
without testing it against local emergency laws. Although the reference to local 
enforcement laws in Art. 54 (3) cannot introduce a public policy review through the 
backdoor,123 it mitigates the advantages of ICSID proceedings. The debtor state is 
 
118  Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 Cornell 
L. Rev. 959, 1028 (2000). 
119  Alfaro/Lorenti, The Growing Opposition if Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals, 6 J. World 
Investment & Trade, 417-430.  
120  See supra II. 3. As to the immunity from attachment of diplomatic assets, see Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 550 U.N.T.S. 95, Art. 22 (3). 
121  Griffin/Farren, How ICSID can protect sovereign bondholders, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. Sept. 2005, 
21, 23. 
122  See The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, Art. V. For exquatur proceedings, see Baars/Böckel, 
supra note 33, 463. 
123  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention – A Commentary, 2001, Art. 54 para. 104. Argentine at-
tempts to that effect, see Alfaro/Lorenti, Argentina: The Enforcement Process of the ICSID 
Awards, Mondaq Business Briefing, 1 June 2005, www.mondaq.com, gravely err on that point 
of law. 
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free to invoke its own laws on immunity from enforcement to evade execution, and 
these local enforcement laws themselves are not subject to ICSID review.124  
A more real enforcement prospect brings us to the more traditional sphere of in-
ternational law, that of diplomatic protection. Failure of the debtor state to comply 
with an award (or a local judge striking down an award on local public policy 
grounds) triggers the state’s international responsibility and can give rise to diplo-
matic protection of the creditors’ home states, Art. 27 Convention, including taking 
the case to the ICJ, see also Art. 64 Convention.125 Even more effective sanctions to 
compel the debtor state to pay could be exerted by ICSID’s parent institution, the 
World Bank, as well as the latter’s Bretton Woods twin, the IMF. U.S. lawyers have 
already pointed at the Helms Amendment under which the U.S. government is by 
law prohibited from making financial contributions to a country that repudiates or 
nullifies contracts with a U.S. person. This prohibition, which would presumably 
cover a default on ICSID awards, includes contributions through the IMF and the 
World Bank.126 Given U.S. voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
Helms Amendment could be a very powerful tool in the creditors’ hands. 
Tribunals should have these political and diplomatic consequences in mind when 
deciding on the substantive issues outlined above, especially when creditors already 
have obtained judgments in local courts and have recourse to ICSID merely for the 
better enforcement prospects.  
E. Conclusion 
I. How Could State Insolvency Change Investment Treaty Arbitration? 
In our analysis, we have seen some key challenges ICSID Tribunals will face when 
confronted with the phenomenon of state insolvency. The first challenge, both in 
procedural and substantive terms, is that the potential number of claimants (who are 
 
124  Schreuer, supra note 123, Art. 55 para. 99, emphasizes that ICSID drafters contemplated 
withdrawing immunity under the laws of the host state but abandoned that idea. Many states 
have immunized their domestic assets from enforcement, Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated 
Debt and State Loans, 1995, 154. 
125  A case before the ICJ under Art. 64 ICSID seems straightforward where the state does not pay 
the award. The debtor state could claim that it is simply unable to honour its obligation under 
Art. 53 (1) ICSID because it lacks sufficient funds, see Lowe, Some Comments on Procedural 
Weaknesses in International Law, 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 37, 39 (2004) on Argentina’s 
situation. The ICJ might engage in an analysis under Art. 61, 62 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, thus further fragmenting international law. 
126  22 U.S.C.S. § 2370a. See Maiden, Argentina Ruling Calls Halt to Holdout Litigation, Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. June 2005, 6, 7. The Helms Amendment was already employed by an American inves-
tor to stop payments by the Inter-American-Development Bank to Costa Rica as long as Costa 
Rica did not accept ICSID Arbitration, Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa 
Rica (Final Award), Case No. ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 169, paras. 24 ff. (2000). 
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everything but a homogenous group) largely exceeds that known from prior ICSID 
proceedings. Moreover, state insolvency raises some known substantive investment 
treaty questions in a new context, such as the State of Necessity/debt sustainability 
problem. Other issues such as the extraterritoriality issue are entirely new and reflect 
the structural differences between classic FDI and sovereign debt. 
Undoubtedly, the sticking point to predict the outcome and the very nature of 
state insolvency proceedings in Investment Treaty Arbitration lies in the distinction 
between contract claims and treaty claims. Tribunal consistency on this issue is of 
fundamental importance for states and creditors. If the integrationist view prevails, 
and every sovereign default constitutes a BIT violation, ICSID could become very 
prominent a forum for an insolvent sovereign’s creditors.  
II. How Could ICISD Change the “Law” of  State Insolvency 
How then does Investment Treaty Arbitration have the potential to change the “law” 
of state insolvency? One instance where BITs and ICSID can have a significant 
impact is domestic law debt. If the monetary and exchange control laws of the 
debtor state are tested against the state’s BIT obligations, investors’ risk awareness 
towards domestic law debt could wane, especially if umbrella clauses are given the 
effect of stabilization clauses (see supra III. 4. d.). More importantly, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, if enforced through the Helms Amendment, could significantly 
change multilateral emergency lending. If ICSID Tribunals rule in favour of holdout 
creditors, and if the Helms Amendment applies, the IMF and the World Bank would 
be barred from issuing emergency packages beyond its current policies that allow 
for lending into arrears under certain circumstances.127 This could mean a significant 
shift in bargaining power during sovereign debt restructuring negotiations. 
The future of sovereign debt workouts seems to lie in CACs that can mitigate the 
collective action problems. Investment Treaty Arbitration is not likely to tamper 
with CAC restructurings.128  
 
127  Salmon, Sovereign Finally Closes Debt Restructuring, Euromoney July 2005, 42, 43. For the 
IMF, see IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears – Further Considerations on the Good 
Faith Criterion, 30 July 2002, 5. 
128  We have so far overlooked majority enforcement clauses often used in trust indentures under 
U.K. law and becoming more prominent in New York law debt. Under these clauses, the initia-
tion of lawsuits in domestic courts requires approval by 25% of the represented outstanding 
principal, see Drage/Hovaguimian, supra note 18, 5. How, under these circumstances, an “in-
tegrationist” Tribunal will react if a minority bondholder sues individually invoking an um-
brella clause would be interesting to observe. 
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III. Would ICSID Make a Good SDRM? 
In light of the preceding analysis, how can Investment Treaty Arbitration under 
ICSID (a World Bank institution after all) be reconciled with the ambitious IMF 
proposal for an SDRM? Could ICSID perform functions of such a body where sup-
port for an institutionalized SDRM is lacking? Or would ICSID Arbitration actually 
run counter to the general SDRM principles identified by the IMF? It is obvious that 
Investment Treaty Arbitration cannot function as a full-fledged SDRM The IMF 
heavily borrowed from national insolvency proceedings when designing its SDRM. 
ICSID Tribunals are not – without amendment of the Convention – intended to per-
form administrative functions of a national insolvency court. ICSID Tribunals are 
certainly not a forum where a distressed sovereign could file for bankruptcy (i.e. 
initiate a debt restructuring). As outlined above, ICSID would not even have the 
procedural competence to suspend holdout proceedings to await restructuring nego-
tiations (supra IV. 1.), let alone certify a restructuring plan like a national insolvency 
judge would.  
However, the IMF proposal also introduced a Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF) 
for creditor/debtor disputes that in fact relied on ICSID as a role model, though 
primarily for procedural matters.129 Whether or not ICSID could perform functions 
of the (rejected) DRF will heavily depend on ICSID’s self perception, especially 
with regard to the contract /treaty claims distinction. The DRF was designed as a 
“contract” forum that could inter alia rule on the validity of individual creditor 
claims. “Integrationist” Tribunals will face many of the substantive issues discussed 
in the SDRM context. The above analysis has shown that ICSID Arbitration and the 
SDRM principles are not always congruent. This firstly goes for the scope of ICSID 
Arbitration, which would include domestic law debt but would exclude nationals of 
the debtor state, contrary to the proposed DRF.130 More significantly, under ICSID, 
a majority restructuring would not bind holdout creditors, a key feature of the 
SDRM. The same goes for a stay on creditor enforcement actions. Lastly, if the 
CMS decision stands, ICSID would have to make an autonomous assessment of the 
state’s debt sustainability, which the DRF was expressly prohibited from doing.131 A 
thorough interpretation of the BIT principles of national treatment, MFN and non 
 
129  IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Further Considerations, 
27 Nov. 2002, 63, 69, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf. See 
Schwarcz, supra note 118, 1024-1030. 
130  IMF, supra note 3, 23. 
131  Id., 28 
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discrimination could, however, contribute to enhanced inter-creditor equity (supra 
III. 4. e.).  
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State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties         
                     
Comment by Peter Gnam∗ 
A. 
From time to time there are situations also on the economic as well as political plat-
form where “it takes two to tango”. Facing insolvency and making efforts to get 
along with it could very well be such a “tango situation“. The debtor makes short 
and long strides in all directions, but not getting away that much from those eager to 
dance with him, cheek to cheek, so as to get as much feeling as possible for the 
debtor´s movements and for what is left of the body to represent an asset which is 
worth dancing for it. Well, tango is popular in a way, but not everybody likes to 
dance it, in particular if the dancing part of the debtor is acted by a state, and if there 
are too many creditors bound to dance this kind of tango on a too small dancing 
floor. 
B. 
Mr. Szodruch has already thoroughly dealt with issues arising from portfolio in-
vestment under a sovereign debt default scenario. So I would like to focus my com-
ments on the more traditional Foreign Direct Investment and its potential risk expo-
sure in case of a state insolvency.     
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are designed to support national companies 
(or even individuals) of one state who want to invest in the other contracting state by 
safeguarding as much as possible a predictable and reliable legal framework for such 
investment; this way an investor should be encouraged but also promoted to make 
direct investments into countries which are in need of them but lack the financial 
and/or technical capabilities to do it on their own. The purpose of any such Treaty is 
expressed in its respective Title and Preamble and is “to protect” and “to promote” 
investments.  
BITs are not specifically designed to protect and promote sovereign bondholders, 
be it individuals or classes of them. We have learned from the paper presented by 
Mr. Szodruch whether and under which criteria they can qualify for being treated as 
“investors”, and that it needs a little bit of doing to get the sovereign bondholders 
 
∗  Peter Gnam, Attorney and former Deputy General Counsel Siemens, Munich.  
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into and under the protection scheme of a BIT and onto the Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration road. 
As opposed to Foreign Investors, sovereign bondholders - under the respective 
terms and conditions for the emission of the bonds -  a priori have a direct financial 
claim on repayment of the bond and interest; when they want to make use of a BIT 
and its possible arbitration clause, they do it to get an enforceable award on such 
repayment and thus to improve their chances for its execution. A Foreign Investor 
does not necessarily have financial claims against a state from the outset; but he has 
a claim that the state complies with all and any non-financial and legal commitments 
it has undertaken so as to make the investment feasible and its implementation safe-
guarded. Only in case the state does not meet any such commitment, the BIT ap-
pears on the scene so as to verify whether there is a breach of the BIT, and whether 
this breach has lead to a damage to the investor which then may or may not consti-
tute a claim for money (compensation of damages) against the state in default under 
the BIT. However, such claim, when raised under a BIT, does not per se qualify to 
be added to the “debt pool“ of a state insolvency and to give the claiming investor 
the position of a creditor in such insolvency. There is still a long way to go, if the 
state does not acknowledge such claim from the outset, which he normally does not. 
Before we have a look into the practice of Foreign Direct Investment, a last ob-
servation in this context: it appears that the purpose of a BIT as outlined before and 
the purpose of whatever structure or procedure used for solving a state insolvency, 
do not match; they even seem to be contra-rotating. As there cannot be a liquidation 
of the state and its public assets, all concepts for solving a state insolvency are in the 
end directed to protect the state against its creditors (as opposed to the protection of 
an investor under a BIT); the creditors – so as to have a workable balance towards 
the needs of the state and the welfare of its citizens – are required to contribute to a 
solution of the “crisis” by e.g. writing off substantial parts of their financial claims. 
As for the foreign  investors, the “encourage and protect investment–doctrine” of a 
BIT is turned upside down, and there is not much legal aid left to avoid the partial or 
total sacrifice of the investment. 
Foreign Direct Investment mainly comprises large scale projects. In most cases, 
the investment is invited by a state to build up or strengthen its public service sector 
in the fields of energy or water supply network, oil and gas production, transport 
systems, telecommunication and IT infrastructure, but also to provide medical cen-
ters, hotel and resort complexes and the like. The investment required for such pro-
jects is mostly of substantial magnitude – and the state doesn´t have the money to 
spend on it, although being very often badly in need of accomplishing such projects. 
In the last 2 or 3 decades, there very seldom have been, if at all, investment pro-
jects for which the state had to directly pay money to an investor. Foreign Direct 
Investment does in principle not create a creditor–debtor relation between the inves-
tor and the state per se or require it – at least as far as debt of money is concerned. 
These projects are either financed in the classic way through institutional or private 
lending – the state hereby becoming a financial debtor to the lenders, not to the in-
vestor – or through one of the tools of private project financing ranging from sup-
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plier´s credit to BOT models or business outsourcing; in the latter cases, the investor 
assumes the advance obligation to have the project (or his participation in a priva-
tized company) financed by his own resources or financing instruments, and he gets 
his “Return of and on Investment” from his participation in whole or in part in the 
proceeds of the project as a going concern. 
Under a Foreign Direct Investment scenario, the role of the state is therefore not 
based on assuming payment obligations but is to establish and uphold stable, reliable 
and predictable investment conditions for the investment it is calling in, particularly 
in the administrative and legal environment. So the obligation of the state towards an 
investor is more an immaterial one, without a genuine financial debt exposure. The 
state by granting (non financial) guarantees, authorizations or licenses, or by creat-
ing specific administrative or legal infrastructures, safeguards an environment in 
which the project as a going concern shall be protected and can so pay back the 
investment by itself – and by e.g. paying taxes can even positively contribute to the 
state´s  liquid assets. 
One certainly can say that a state insolvency situation as such does not affect any 
such non financial commitments undertaken by the state. So it should not come as a 
surprise when I tell you, that the factor insolvency of a state – as a potential or given 
situation – is not and, as far as I know, never has been a relevant factor in any risk 
assessment an investor makes, before engaging in a cross border investment;     
honestly spoken: the management in charge of any such project und its legal advi-
sors don´t even think about it. 
It is the BIT which an investor becomes aware of and wants to call in, if and 
when there is a non fulfillment of a state´s commitments towards an investment or 
otherwise a violation of Treaty standards. And it is a default of the state in this re-
spect which can substantially change the investor´s role towards the state: the inves-
tor, having so long been a “beneficiary” of the state under the investment protection 
scheme, mutates into a “creditor” of the same state, provided he suffers a damage 
and has the ius standi to present a financial claim under the Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration scheme; and in case, after 3 to 5 years of arbitration proceeding,  there is an 
enforceable award,  favorable to the investor, the foreign investor from this moment 
on, and not earlier, can join the bandwagon of all the other financial creditors to the 
state and enjoy facing the realities of the actual debt situation of the state, an insol-
vency being imminent, already pending or not. 
From a practical point of view, for the investor there is not much timing or even 
strategy available when and how to structure an Investment Treaty Arbitration along 
a state insolvency. Apart from the fact that one can not predict whether the insol-
vency of a state is of long term or rather short term nature, whether it occurs at the 
beginning of an arbitration proceeding, in the middle of it or thereafter, there is not 
much control on orientating the enforceability of an award to a certain stage of a 
state´s financial indebtedness. On the other hand, the investor needs an enforceable 
award anyway and this as soon as possible, so as to rank properly among other fi-
nancial creditors, if need be. 
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In this context, I do not see much value in a discussion whether to establish rules 
on a “stay” for Investment Treaty Arbitration proceedings as long as an insolvency 
of the defendant state is pending or in a critical stage. An investor is somewhat lost 
in an insolvency as long as his claim is neither acknowledged by the state nor yet 
awarded by a tribunal and enforceable. The mere fact that there might still come up 
the one or other potential enforceable claim against a state in the distant future can-
not have any impact on the need to solve an existing insolvency situation in the 
interest of the state itself and the well-being of its nationals but also in the interest of 
the  financial creditors. A different aspect could be the question of having an “auto-
matic stay” of enforcement of awards once there actually is a state insolvency. But 
this is neither a question under a BIT nor under the ICSID Rules, as an automatic 
stay had to apply to all creditors and would therefore require a statutory regulation 
under the insolvency procedure itself.  
Argentina´s insolvency is over, for the time being; it was a fairly short one, if it 
has been one at all. One should not forget, however, that there still is an avalanche 
of 30 or more Investment Treaty claims pending at ICSID against this state with a 
claim exposure probably exceeding 20 billions of USD. I leave it open whether this 
can lead to another dangerous indebtedness potential of this state, in case all these 
claims succeed and become enforceable awards. I leave it open because Argentina is 
going to develop a strategy to bar such claims from becoming a real threat to the 
state. Argentina intends to run all ICSID awards, when rendered against it, through 
the annulment procedure. A “catch all” annulment scenario as defense against a new 
indebtedness potential - that is something new, apart from having the effect of 
blocking ICSID arbitration to some extent. But what is worse, from a legal point of 
view, is the strong political and legal opposition to ICSID arbitration as such (invok-
ing inter alia the Calvo doctrine again) and the motion of certain members of the 
Government, to prevent enforcement of ICSID awards; it is alleged that both the 
BITs and the system of ICSID arbitration itself could violate the Argentine constitu-
tion and that therefore any award rendered thereunder could be declared null and 
void by a domestic court. Should the Government really dare to invoke such nullity 
in the future, it would block investors, for many years to come, to have a valid and 
enforceable financial claim and become a “creditor” to the state. This might also 
give the politicians of BIT states some headache as it can have consequences on 
future BIT negotiations or prolongations and the value of Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion.  
C.  
So much for the reality of consequences and obligations under Investment Treaties 
in practice. The problem for a foreign investor is not the insolvency as such; the 
problem seems to be rather the bumpy road an investor has to go to acquire the legal 
qualification to present his financial claim in a state insolvency, whenever this might 
happen. Just to close the circle: the foreign investor has a bad dancing card and the 
 173
state is a lousy dancer when it is about to take the dancing floor to dance the “tango 
bancarotta”.  
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State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under               
Investment Treaties        
            
Comment by August Reinisch* 
After the fascination and comprehensive tour de horizon on State insolvency is-
sues and ICSID we have just heard by Mr. Szodruch I would like to focus on one 
particular aspect and that is the question whether ICSID, this highly attractive forum 
for a particular type of international economic disputes, i.e. investment disputes, 
would also make a good sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). In fact, 
mainly in the sovereign debt debate, ICSID has been mentioned time and again as a 
potential insolvency forum.1 Whether this may have been motivated by its affiliation 
with the World Bank or because of a general feeling of its over-all success is not 
always clear. It is interesting, however, that the ICSID community, if I may thus call 
arbitrators, counsel and academics working in and writing on that field of invest-
ment law, has largely ignored, if not outright rejected, this potential role. ICSID 
tribunals like the one in the CMS case2 have expressly rejected a general competence 
to adjudicate on general economic policy measures such as debt moratoria. Ac-
cording to the CMS Tribunal, they do “not have jurisdiction over measures of gen-
eral economic policy adopted by [States] and cannot pass judgment on whether they 
are right or wrong.” Instead, its jurisdiction was narrowly construed “to examine 
whether specific measures affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures of ge-
neral economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have been adopted 
in violation of legally binding commitments made to the investor in treaties, legisla-
tion or contracts.”3 
This is all the more surprising, given the ever increasing scope of ICSID jurisdic-
tion and thus its potential also for creditor claims against sovereign debtors.  
Mr Szodruch has skillfully outlined the possibilities of ICSID in this regard and I 
agree with almost everything he says there. Still, as a commentator I feel a certain 
need, not necessarily to disagree or criticize, but at least to emphasize that there 
might be some considerable jurisdictional obstacles both de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda left.  
 
*  August Reinisch is Professor of International Law and European Law at the University of 
Vienna and Professorial Lecturer at the Bologna Center of SAIS/Johns Hopkins University. 
1  See S. L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 
85 Cornell L.R. 101 (2000). 
2  CMS v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003, Case No. ARB/01/8, 42 ILM 799 
(2003). 
3  CMS v. Argentina, supra note 2, para. 33. 
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Let me first turn to the question of ratione materiae jurisdiction of ICSID panels 
over loan and other debt claims. It is said in the paper that the “traditionally broad 
investment definition of Art. 25 ICSID encompasses loans and bonds, whether is-
sued by private or public entities”4, while it might be more questionable whether 
sovereign debt would always be covered by BIT definitions of investment.5 Indeed, 
some BITs contain rather restrictive language with regard to the definition of in-
vestment which implies that the usual forms of sovereign debt would not be pro-
tected.  
However, I would submit that it is still also a genuine ICSID issue whether sove-
reign debt always falls under the ratione materiae jurisdiction of Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. It is true that, in particular, Fedax6 is a strong precedent and 
supports the proposition that all sovereign debt should qualify as investment under 
the Convention. Nevertheless, if we follow the, by now well-established, practice of 
ICSID tribunals to require, in addition to qualifying under the investment definition 
of the applicable BIT, fulfillment of the Article 25 ICSID Convention criteria of 
“investment”, as they have been elaborated in legal doctrine7 and by the case-law of 
the tribunals,8 I am not so sure whether duration, risk sharing, substantial commit-
ment, etc. are all fulfilled in all cases involving sovereign debt. There are many 
short-term debt instruments with fixed interest rates which may escape the invest-
ment notion under the ICSID Convention.  
Szodruch has rightly reminded us that also the issue of ratione perso-
nae jurisdiction may provide some problems for the use of ICSID as a forum to 
settle sovereign debt disputes. The requirement that the private creditor has to have 
the nationality of a State party to the ICSID Convention and, since ICSID clauses 
are practically non-existent in bond or loan agreements, also of a BIT-partner of the 
debtor State may lead to rather fortuitous results. This is only exacerbated by the 
fact that most modern debt instruments are constantly publicly traded on the interna-
tional financial markets which will make the precise holders of debt claims at a 
specific point in time sometimes hard to ascertain. The suggestion that MFN clauses 
could mitigate the problem that debt claims might have to be treated differently, 
always according to the applicable BIT between the sovereign debtor and the (na-
tional) groups of creditors,9 would not solve the fundamental problem that some 
creditors may not have any access to investment arbitration at all because there is no 
 
4  Szodruch, p. 148.  
5  Idid., p. 149. 
6  Fedax v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 July 
1997, 37 ILM 1378 (1998). 
7  According to Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), 140, the typical fea-
tures an investment would normally exhibit are a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit 
and return, an element of risk for both sides, a substantial commitment and a significance for 
the host State’s development. 
8  See Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004, 44 ILM 73 (2005), para. 53. 
9  Szodruch, p. 151.  
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BIT in force. In addition, apart from a State’s private creditors, an entire group, i.e. 
its public creditors, is necessarily left outside the venue of ICSID, whose ratione 
personae jurisdiction can only extend over “a Contracting State [...] and a national 
of another Contracting State”10. This contrasts with today’s practice of debt relief in 
the form of restructuring and rescheduling of a State’s (public and private) external 
debt, mainly achieved in the so-called Paris and London Clubs. ICSID could cover 
only private debt in this terminology, i.e. debts vis-à-vis private creditors who must 
be regarded as investors in order to qualify as potential users of the ICSID system. 
Admittedly, during the last 20 years public debt has become less important in rela-
tive terms compared to the recent surge of public financing through bond emissions. 
Still, the problem remains that ICSID could not “adjudicate” the claims of public 
creditors. This necessarily narrow jurisdictional scope of ICSID must be regarded as 
an inherent disadvantage for its potential use as an insolvency mechanism which is 
true not only de lege lata, but also de lege ferenda.   
Let me thus now turn to the core policy issue relating to the question whether it 
would be feasible for ICSID to perform functions of a SDRM, i.e. restructuring the 
(private and public) external debt of sovereign States, and what kind of changes 
would be required for that purpose. The main task of a SDRM is the effective re-
structuring of a sovereign’s debt enabling it to continue to operate and guaranteeing 
equal treatment to creditors. This requires compulsory jurisdiction over all creditors. 
ICSID, however, has just “random” jurisdiction over some creditors who seek to 
enforce their individual claims. There is no jurisdictional mechanism of forcing 
potential claimants to institute ICSID proceedings if they prefer not to sue or to sue 
elsewhere, as they are regularly entitled to under the dispute settlement clauses typi-
cally included in BITs. But even if all creditors chose to institute ICSID proceedings 
there is no compulsory consolidation mechanism which would guarantee a consis-
tent outcome. Instead, parallel proceedings would result, with all the concomitant 
risks of conflicting or inconsistent outcomes, etc. To transform ICSID into a genuine 
SDRM with compulsory jurisdiction over all creditors of sovereign debtors by 
amending the ICSID Convention would be theoretically possible. There is, however, 
not only no indication of any political will to do so, it would also fundamentally 
change ICSID which has just started to establish a reputation as a well-functioning 
dispute settlement system for investment claims.   
Instead of changing ICSID, one could consider other functions possibly per-
formed by the Centre. Conceivably, the role of ICSID in situations of sovereign 
insolvency could be one of validating the existence of claims in first line. An effec-
tive SDRM would additionally require a forum competent to reduce the creditors’ 
valid claims to a certain equal proportion and at the same time to achieve a debt 
discharge for the debtor State. Whether this central SDRM task could be performed 
 
10  Article 25(1) ICSID Convention.  
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by the IMF or by a new international judicial or quasi-judicial body will be seen, but 
most likely it will not be ICSID. 
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Third-Party Participation (NGO’s and Private Persons) and Transparency 
in ICSID Proceedings        
                    
Carl-Sebastian Zoellner∗ 
A. Introduction 
“Taking Stock After 40 Years,” the title and purpose of the present conference, 
already suggests that at least de facto, there has to be a certain degree of transpa-
rency as regards the object of our scholarly attention – otherwise any stocktaking 
attempt would have to remain purely speculative and prove to be virtually impos-
sible for all but those participants, among them my commentators, who have perso-
nally contributed to the emerging body of international investment law by sitting as 
arbitrators or by representing parties. Yet the question remains, to what extent, and 
on what basis, third-party participation and transparency have been incorporated in 
ICSID proceedings – and what the future perspectives of those concepts are. 
When the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
was created by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (the Convention),1 some of its most important 
features represented clear and significant new developments in the realm of interna-
tional law.2 Third-party participation and transparency, however, do not fall squarely 
into this category: As far as procedure and organization are concerned, international 
investment dispute settlement in general has borrowed its main elements from the 
system of (private) commercial arbitration,3 with ICSID being no exception to this 
rule. Compared to judicial proceedings before courts of law, commercial arbitration 
is generally characterized by significantly higher degrees of confidentiality and 
 
∗  Carl Sebastian Zoellner is Ph.D Candidate (Martin-Luther-University, Halle); LL.M. (Michi-
gan); Dipl.-Jurist (Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel). This paper has been slightly updated 
after the conference to reflect the official publication of newly adopted changes to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. I am grateful to Dr. Christian Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge) and Alexander 
Szodruch, LL.M. (Indiana) for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  575 U.N.T.S. 159. The Convention was opened for signature in 1965 and came into force on 
14 October, 1966. 
2  Cf. Lauterpacht, Foreword, in: Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, xi (2001), 
who inter alia mentions the right of non-State entities to sue States directly, restrictions to State 
immunity, and the exclusion of the local remedies rule. 
3  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 2, available at: http://www.oecd. 
org/investment. 
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privacy, by closed doors and often unpublished awards.4 Accordingly, allowing 
parties to keep private the details of their dispute is routinely being viewed as one of 
the factors that give arbitration an advantage over court procedures.5 This opacity 
not only appeals to private enterprises which fear exposure of business secrets, but 
scholars have also identified it as key reason why governments accept mixed arbitra-
tion in the first place.6 
With regard to purely commercial arbitration agreed on between privates, deci-
ding a case in camera without registration of the dispute or publication of the final 
award indeed does not offend fundamental principles of justice,7 nor does it as such 
involve questions of democratic legitimacy.8 Given the public policy implications of 
investor-state arbitration, where the proverbial “non-accountable three private indi-
viduals” scrutinize regulatory measures taken by legitimate governments, however, 
this might be very different for the kind of disputes ICSID has successfully adminis-
tered in the last 40 years.9 Therefore, in the context of international investment dis-
putes, knowledge – implying the use of specialized amicus curiae expertise – and 
the accountability provided by publicity become key issues complementing confi-
 
4  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169 (Weiler ed., 2005); Leahy/Bianchi, The Changing Face of International Arbi-
tration, 17(4) J. Int’l Arb. 19, 51 (2000); Prütting, Vertraulichkeit in der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
und in der Mediation, in: Law of International Business and Dispute Settlement in the 21st 
Century – Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 629 (R. Briner et al. eds., 2002); Lew, The 
case for publication of arbitration awards, in: The Art of Arbitration – Liber Amicorum Pieter 
Sanders, 223, 224 et seq. (Schultsz ed., 1982). Privacy is concerned with limiting the rights of 
third parties (i.e. persons other than the arbitrators, the parties and possibly witnesses) to attend 
meetings, hearings and to generally know about or participate in the arbitration, while confi-
dentiality refers to the obligation of arbitrators and the parties not to divulge information relat-
ing to the contents of the proceedings, relevant documents or the award itself. See Lew, Expert 
Report of Dr. Julian D.M. Lew in Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 11(3) Arb. Int’l 285 (1995).  
5  Cf. Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 
14 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 121, 138 (2003); Merkin, Arbitration Law 1 (1991). 
6  See, for instance, as regards states’s acceptance of arbitration before the International Chamber 
of Commerce in Paris, Böckstiegel, Arbitration of Disputes between States and Private Enter-
prises, 59 Am. J. Int’l L. 579, 584 (1965).  
7  Cf. Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Paper delivered at ASA Swiss 
Arbitration Association Conference on Investment Treaties and Arbitration in Zurich (25 Janu-
ary 2002), reprinted in 1 Transnat’l Dispute Management (2004), available at: 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/. 
8  But see Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbi-
tration, 14 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 121, 135 (2003). 
9  It should be noted, however, that of more than 120 cases submitted to ICSID, the vast majority 
were only submitted in the past few years – a trend indicating further dramatic increases in the 
future, see Flores, Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, 36 
Tex. Int’l L. J. 1, 8-9 (2001); Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 
1521, 1538 et seq. (2005) with further references.   
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dentiality and privacy.10 To properly reconcile and balance these at times conflicting 
principles is the task an effective and legitimate institutional framework for invest-
ment dispute settlement needs to achieve. How does ICSID fare in this respect? 
In order to answer this question, I will first of all introduce the various dimen-
sions of transparency and briefly outline its history in international economic law 
(B.). Having set the analytical framework, I will turn to the development and current 
state of third-party participation and transparency in investment disputes adminis-
tered under ICSID rules, comparing it to other investment dispute settlement mecha-
nisms where appropriate (C.). Building up on recent changes ignited by the ICSID 
Secretariat Draft Proposal, I will then discuss benefits and potential costs of trans-
parency in investor-state arbitration and evaluate the present developments against 
this background (D.). 
B. Transparency in International Economic Law 
I. The Notion of Transparency 
In a recent article, transparency has been described as “egregiously overused and 
poorly understood buzzword.”11 Indeed, when looking at international law at large, 
it becomes apparent that not many terms refer to situations as different from each 
other as “transparency” does. First of all, transparency has gained considerable im-
portance in the study of international relations. Given the fundamental structural 
changes in the international legal order, i.e., with a view to the notable shift from 
Westphalian sovereignty to an international law of cooperation and integration, 
states today face more and more obligations stemming from a rapidly growing num-
ber of international law instruments.12 Transparency has been identified as key con-
cept to ensure compliance with these obligations.13 Because this paradigmatic shift 
arguably entails the partial transfer of sovereignty and previously national compe-
tences to international regimes, transparency also increasingly becomes subject of 
 
10  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 170 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
11  Hale/Slaughter, Transparency: Possibilities and Limits, 30 Fletcher F. World Aff. 153, 163 
(2006). 
12  Delbrück, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order: International 
Law in the Era of Globalization, 11 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Eu-
ropäisches Recht 1 (2001), passim. 
13  See Chayes/Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 135-53 (1995); Hansen, Transparency, 
Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 
Va. J. Int’l L. 1017, 1060 (1999). 
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debates circulating around the democratic legitimacy of this phenomenon.14 Fur-
thermore, on the international, regional and national level alike, additional aspects of 
transparency currently enjoy high attention and are constantly gaining importance in 
the respective legal regimes.15 Thus, generally speaking, the current discussion of 
transparency in international law can be grouped along three different contexts: (1) 
as a concept underlying obligations international law places on states’ internal legal 
regimes and procedures;16 (2) as a concept governing the relations between institu-
tions and regimes of international law and (their) member states;17 and (3) as a con-
cept denoting the openness of institutions and procedures of international law, espe-
cially vis-à-vis international civil society.18  
As far as the narrower field of international economic law is concerned, however, 
the notion of transparency is predominantly used in the last sense, i.e., to express 
criticism regarding the way agreements are negotiated, institutions are governed or 
dispute settlement operates – it is the very absence, the proverbial “lack of transpa-
rency” and the allegedly resulting legitimacy or democratic deficit which dominate 
 
14  Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into 
the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
621, 646 (2002); Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational De-
mocracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 29, 42 
(2003). 
15  On the international level, for instance, transparency is currently at the center of the debate 
regarding the problem of corruption,. Ouzounov, Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Cap-
ture and the Role of Multinational Business, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1181, 1198 (2004); Klich, 
Bribery in Economics in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 Stan. J. Int’l L. 121 
(1996). On the regional and national level, the transparency principle is increasingly reflected 
in a right for citizens to access information, cf. Riemann, Die Transparenz der Europäischen 
Union: das neue Recht auf Zugang zu Dokumenten von Parlament, Rat und Kommission, pas-
sim (2004). But see Bradley Pack, FOIA Frustation: Access to Government Documents under 
the Bush Administration, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 815 (2004). 
16  Zoellner, Transparency. An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle of International 
Economic Law, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 579, 582 et seq. (2006); cf. also United Nations, Confe-
rence on Trade and Development, Transparency, Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements, UNCTAD/ITE/IIE/2003/4, 16 et seq. (2004), available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20034_en.pdf; Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles - Which 
Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 111, 119 (2001). 
17  Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 Int'l 
Stud. Q. 109, 110 et seq. (1998); Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Schol-
arship, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 227, 250-51 (1997); see also Abbott, "Trust But Verify": 
The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 
26 Cornell Int'l L. J. 1, 40-45 (1993). 
18  Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l. L. 873, 876 et seq. (2003); 
Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int’l. L. 489, 
493 (2001); cf. also Long, „Democratizing“ Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural 
Inclusion, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217, 259 et seq. (2002). 
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the discourse over transparency in this field of law.19 Focusing in further on invest-
ment dispute settlement, these concerns have not only aggravated civil society 
groups,20 but they have also been voiced by officials working for the US State De-
partment: “Conducting arbitrations implicating the public interest in conditions of 
secrecy is unacceptable.”21 Yet until the beginning of 1981, information relating to 
ICSID proceedings was not available to the public at all.22 Thus, it becomes evident 
that the awareness of transparency and its role in state-investor arbitration has only 
evolved slowly. 
II. Historic Development of Transparency in International Economic Law 
While there is no historical study on the emergence of international norms on trans-
parency and citizen participation, Immanuel Kant’s coining of the phrase “capacity 
for publicity” in his essay Perpetual Peace certainly comes to mind as a key mo-
ment.23 According to Kant, the “transcendental formula of public right [requires 
that] all actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not 
consistent with publicity.”24 A first intergovernmental step to provide for some 
transparency on the international level was Art. 18 of the Treaty of Versailles,25 
following President Wilson’s famous call for “open covenants of peace, openly ar-
rived at” instead of secret diplomacy.26 From the current perspective, this develop-
 
19  Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary 
Fund, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 521 (2004); Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate, and Participation 
by NGOs in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 683, 686 (2004); Waincymer, 
Transparency of Dispute Settlement within the World Trade Organization, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 
797 (2000); Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice 
and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817 (1998). 
20  Atik, Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11 Process, in: 
NAFTA – Investment Law and Arbitration 135, 149-150 with further references (Weiler ed., 
2004); cf. also Hober, Arbitration Involving States 139, 151, in: Leading Arbitrator’s Guide to 
International Arbitration (Newman/Hill eds., 2003). 
21  Barton Legum (then Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department), cited in: The American 
Lawyer, Feature, 1 March 2002. 
22  Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1(2) J. Int’l Arb. 101 (1984). 
23  Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 927, 928 (2004). 
24  Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, in: Werke, Bd. 6, 326 (Toman ed., 1995) (1789). 
25  Art. 18 required that all treaties be registered and then published by the Secretariat of the 
League of Nations, and stipulated that no such treaty or agreement would be binding until re-
gistered. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 
June 1919, in: The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 1.  
26  The citation is from the first of Wilson’s fourteen points, Stavasage, Open-Door or Closed-
Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 International Organizazion 
667, 668 (2004) with an account of transparency’s increasing role in international negotiations 
following World War I. 
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ment may have provided the necessary intellectual stimulus for the emergence of 
transparency as an issue in international economic law.27 
As regards substantive provisions in international economic law, however, the 
first fundamental norm dealing with transparency did not concern the publicity of 
dispute settlement but another dimension of transparency: The Convention Relating 
to the Simplification of Customs Formalities (Customs Convention) subjected mem-
ber states to transparency disciplines by mandating the prompt publication of all 
customs regulations and “clear and most definite” public notice of the conditions for 
export and import licenses.28 The Customs Convention was also remarkably modern 
insofar as it explicitly expanded the group of beneficiaries to “persons concerned,” 
which did not only include state parties but also domestic persons as well as aliens,29 
and provided for dispute settlement.30 Furthermore, and probably most noteworthy, 
private parties played a significant role in the negotiating and drafting process.31 The 
International Chamber of Commerce, for instance, exerted considerable influence on 
the formation of policy on the subjects of publicity and redress.32 
More specifically with regard to investment dispute settlement, however, trans-
parency’s role remained limited for a long time. Even today many Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral instruments like the Energy Charter Treaty do 
not require investors to publicly manifest their intention to launch a dispute, nor do 
they provide for the publication of awards or openness of proceedings – public dis-
closure thus often depends on the arbitral rules chosen by the parties or, in the ab-
sence of any regulation, on the will of the parties.33 In this respect, the default rule 
stemming from investor-state arbitration’s origins in commercial arbitration seems 
to be that unless neither party objects to it, no publication takes place and the pro-
 
27  Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 927, 929 (2004). 
28  International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, 3 November 
1923, 19 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 146 (1925), at art. 3(a) and art. 4. 
29  Id., at art. 4 para. 1. 
30  Id., at art. 7 and art. 22. 
31  This at least holds true for organizations representing the business community, Ridgeway, 
Merchants of Peace 204, 207-08, 211 et seq., 216, 232 (1938); Charnovitz, Transparency and 
Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927, 929 (2004).  
32  Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace 213 (1938). 
33  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
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ceedings remain closed.34 Notable exceptions to this confidentiality rule are the most 
recent versions of the US and Canadian Model BITs.35 In a similar vein, most in-
vestment treaties regularly do not contain rules piercing the privacy of the procee-
dings, i.e., governing the admissibility of amicus curiae submissions.36 Again, the 
current versions of the US and Canadian Model BITs are  prominent deviations from 
a general phenomenon.37 Given this wide-spread lacuna, however, arbitral rules and 
framework norms such as those contained in the Convention gain crucial importance 
as far as third party participation and transparency of proceedings are concerned: In 
the absence of transparency provisions in the applicable substantive law, the proce-
dural norms of the arbitration facility determine the degree of openness in the re-
spective proceedings.38 
 
34  Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 121, 122 
(1995); Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment 
Law and Arbitration 169, 172 (Weiler ed., 2005). Whether there really is a presumption of ab-
solute confidentiality, however, is subject to debate and influenced by the legal traditions at the 
place of arbitration.  See Bagner, Confidentiality - A Fundamental Principle in International 
Commercial Arbitration? 18(3) J. Int’l Arb. 243 (2001); Leahy/Bianchi, The Changing Face of 
International Arbitration, 17(4) J. Int’l Arb. 19, 36 (2000); Gruner, Accounting for the Public 
Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923, 959 (2003);. Buys, The 
Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 Am. Rev. 
Int’l Arb. 121, 125 et seq. (2003). Cf. also Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All 
ER136 with Esso Australia Resources Ltd and Others v. Plowman (Minister for Energy and 
Minerals) and Others, 128 ALR 391 (1995). 
35  See US Model BIT 2004, at art. 29, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors 
/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf; Canadian Model Agreement for Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments (2004), art. 38, available at: http://www.naftaclaims. 
com/files/Canada_Model_BIT.pdf. At least with regard to the United States, this development 
was inter alia prompted by the domestic Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), cf. Loewen 
Group, Inc. and Raymond Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award), 26 June 2003, available at: http://www.investmentclaims.com. In any 
event, the US and Canada were also the first to undertake opening up NAFTA arbitration pro-
ceedings they are involved in, with Mexico joining later. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
Joint Statement on the Decade of achievement (San Antonio, 16 July 2004)), reprinted in: 
Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 17, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/investment. 
36  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 183 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
37  See US Model BIT 2004, at art. 28 para. 2, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade 
_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf; Canadian Model Agreement 
for Promotion and Protection of Investments (2004), at art. 39, available at: http://www.      
naftaclaims.com/files/Canada_Model_BIT.pdf. 
38  Generally, the level of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings will be determined both by the 
applicable arbitration rules as well as the arbitration law at the place of arbitration. In addition, 
Art. 44 of the Convention emphasizes that it remains at the discretion of the parties to deviate 
from the default frame provided by the ICSID arbitral rules. 
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C. Development and Current State of the Game 
I will thus now turn to the law governing the administration of investment dispute 
settlement proceedings by ICSID as it has developed and currently stands. With a 
view to the very recent changes brought about by amendments to the Arbitration 
Rules the Administrative Council adopted pursuant to Art. 6 of the Convention on 
10 April 2006 ((ICSID Arbitration Rules),39 this section will first sketch the norma-
tive framework effective before the amendments, then elaborate on the changes 
originally suggested by the ICSID Secretariat as well as on the actual amendments.  
I. Third-Party Rights and Transparency at Relevant Stages of ICSID Proceedings  
Before the Recent Amendments 
First of all, factors implicating transparency and third-party rights at various stages 
of the proceedings will be analyzed, i.e., norms pertaining to the registration of dis-
putes, access to hearings, right to submit documents, and access to awards and other 
relevant documents. Relevant provisions can be found in the Convention itself as 
well as in Administrative Regulations and in the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003. 
Corresponding norms in the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003 shall also be 
included in the survey.40 
1. Registration of Disputes 
When ICSID is chosen as a arbitration facility, the ICSID secretariat routinely ap-
plies a policy of registering all cases and publishes the register on its website.41 
According to the pertinent regulation, this register includes the names of the in-
volved parties, the date of registration and a short summary of the dispute.42 Admi-
nistrative Regulation 23 (2) further clarifies that the register is open for inspection 
 
39  See ICSID’s website, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm, for regulations 
and rules currently in force. Furthermore, references to the corresponding norms and rules per-
taining to conciliation proceedings administered by ICSID will be provided in the footnotes. 
The rules effective before the recent amendments (hereinafter: ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003) 
are still available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm.  
40  The ICSID Additional Facility Rules have been amended effective 10 April 2006 as well, 
however, the rules effective prior to these changes (hereinafter: ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules 2003)  are still available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm.  
41  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
42  See ICSID Administrative Regulation 22 (1), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. 
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by any person.43 Such a detailed public register guarantees at least a minimum de-
gree of transparency concerning current investment disputes; in this regard, the po-
licy applied by ICSID is a noteworthy contrast to that of other institutions, such as 
for instance the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC), which both do not publish precise information about registra-
tion, number or content of administered investor-state arbitration cases.44 Further-
more, as regards non-institutional ad hoc arbitration, the most commonly used UN-
CITRAL rules do not feature a registration requirement, either.45 
2. Access to Proceedings 
Under this heading, two facets of transparency can be discussed: (1) “passive” ac-
cess to the hearings, for instance by means of broadcast or physical attendance, and 
(2) “active” access, i.e., the right of third parties to participate in the proceedings by 
submitting amicus curiae briefs. 
a) Privacy v. Open Proceedings 
Neither the Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 contained norms 
providing for open hearings or access to submissions and other relevant documents 
absent party consensus. To the contrary, Rule 32 (2) ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 
explicitly stipulated that it was only with the consent of the parties that the Tribunal 
could allow third parties, i.e., “other persons besides the parties, their agents, coun-
sel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the 
 
43  Id., at Regulation 23 (2). 
44  Consequently, there is only “anecdotal evidence” about the exact number of investment arbi-
tration cases administered by these facilities, and “no one” likely knows the precise number of 
UNCITRAL cases, see Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pri-
vatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 
1541 n.75, n. 77 (2005). The ICC does, however, publish general statistics about the number of 
requests for arbitration in the ICC Arbitration Bulletin and indicates the percentage of procee-
dings in which at least one party has been a “state, parastatal or public entity.”  See also 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/right_topics/stat_2005.asp. 
45  UNCITRAL has a secretariat, however, the latter has no mandate to register cases or keep data 
of the use of its rules by investors. Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation 
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, avail-
able at: http://www.oecd.org/investment. It should also be noted that ICSID is increasingly of-
fering administrative support in ad hoc arbitrations based on the UNICTRAL rules, see for in-
stance recently the UPS case, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, available 
at:http://www.investmentclaims.com. 
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Tribunal” to attend the hearings.46 A similar rule had been included in the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules 2003.47 Given this univocal directive contained in the 
applicable rules, it was also clear that a Tribunal could not exercise its powers with 
respect to arbitral procedure to allow attendance by third parties against the will of 
the parties – they effectively enjoyed a veto right.48 Finally, arbitrators had to sign a 
declaration that they “shall keep confidential all information coming to [their] 
knowledge as a result of [their] participation in the proceeding” before the respective 
tribunal can be constituted.49  
Bearing in mind that the Convention explicitly leaves it up to the parties to decide 
on rules applicable in the proceedings,50 however, it would have been nevertheless 
perfectly possible for the parties to agree on completely open proceedings both in 
conciliation as well as in arbitration cases brought before ICSID. Empirically, how-
ever, the necessary party consensus to open up ICSID proceedings or even publicly 
broadcast them has been missing – a stark contrast to a number of cases stemming 
from the investment Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)51 which were decided under UNCITRAL rules.52 
 
46  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 32(2), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid 
/basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm. As to conciliation, the identical standard is laid down in Rule 27 
(2) ICSID Conciliation Rules 2003. In addition, the rule’s preceding paragraph holds that  
hearings shall take place in private and remain, unless the parties otherwise agree, secret.  
47  See ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Schedule B Art. 34 (1) and (2) (Conciliation), 
Schedule C Art. 39 (2) (Arbitration), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/ fa-
cility-2003.htm.  As to factfinding, Schedule A Art. 9 (4) lays down that sessions of the Com-
mission “shall not be public.”  
48  For a recent confirmation of this state of affairs, see Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Pe-
tition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (17 March 2006), para. 7, available at: http://www. 
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0317-AC-en.pdf (hereinafter: Aguas Provinciales); Aguas Ar-
gentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19,  Order in Response to a Petition 
for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005), para. 6, available at: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com (hereinafter: Aguas Argentinas).    
49  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 6 (2); ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Schedule C 
Art. 13 (2); cf. also ICSID Conciliation Rules 2003, Rule 6 (2); ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules 2003, Schedule B Art. 13 (2), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/ 
basicdoc-2003.htm and http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm respectively. 
50  See supra, note 39. 
51  North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.. 
52  The pertinent NAFTA cases are UPS, supra note 46; Methanex Corporation v. United States of 
America, and Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, both available at http://www. 
investmentclaims.com. 
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b) Amicus Curiae Submissions 
aa) Normative Framework 
As far as the “active” access to proceedings is concerned, the general exclusion of 
third parties from the hearings was complemented by the fact that both the Conven-
tion and the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 did not arrange for submission of amicus 
curiae documents to tribunals; the relevant evidence rules were silent on this issue.53 
And again, until recently ICSID proceedings had not produced precedents compa-
rable to NAFTA cases under UNCITRAL rules which confirmed that tribunals had 
broad authority to accept and consider submissions from third parties.54 Because 
ICSID is one of the dispute settlement facilities investors may turn to in disputes 
arising under NAFTA,55 however, this very well could have been different. In its 
2003 interpretative note, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) clarified that 
“no provision of [NAFTA] limits a Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submis-
sions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”56 Furthermore, Art. 44 of 
the Convention stipulates that “if any question of procedure arises which is not co-
vered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the 
Tribunal shall decide the question.” Thus, if the admission of amicus curiae submis-
sions were such a question of procedure, an ICSID tribunal would have been able to 
admit them even on the basis of the old rules, if it deemed the briefs to be helpful in 
justly deciding the dispute.  
bb) Recent Jurisprudence: Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales 
Such a reasoning has recently indeed been employed by the Tribunals in two on-
going arbitrations, Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales. In both cases, the state 
party agreed to allow amicus curiae submissions, whereas the claimant opposed such 
an opening up of the proceedings.57 Acknowledging that neither the Convention nor 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 specifically authorized or prohibited the submis-
 
53  See ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rules 33-37, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm; ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Schedule C Rules 40-44, avail-
able at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm. 
54  Amicus Curiae submissions have been allowed in UPS and Methanex, cf. Methanex Corpora-
tion v. United States of America, supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from 
Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001. 
55  NAFTA, supra note 52, at Art. 1120 Nr. 1 a). 
56  Free Trade Commission, Statement on non-disputing party participation (October 2003), 
reprinted in: Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 15, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/investment. 
57  See Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 8, Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 9. 
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sion by non-parties of amicus curiae briefs while noting the absence of any prece-
dent under ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 granting this right, the Tribunals examined 
two questions: (1) Did they have the power to accept amicus curiae submissions? 
and (2), if they had, what were the conditions under which this right could be exer-
cised?58 Even though at least in Aguas Argentinas the claimant specifically argued 
that allowing amicus curiae submissions would effectively introduce additional 
parties to the dispute and thus yield substantive consequences,59 the Tribunals in 
both cases held that given the traditional concept of acting as “friend of the court” 
and its application in other forums, the question of amicus curiae submissions 
merely concerned an offer of assistance to the court regarding expertise and perspec-
tives the parties themselves could not provide.60 Furthermore, the Tribunals found 
support for their conclusion that the permissibility of amicus curiae briefs was a 
procedural question by comparing Art. 44 of the Convention with Art. 15 (1) of the 
UNCITRAL rules, which had been the legal foundation for amicus curiae participa-
tion in Methanex, and by looking at the practice of other international arbitral pro-
ceedings in the practice of NAFTA, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the 
World Trade Organization.61 In sum, because the Tribunals were also convinced 
they could exercise their discretion to accept third party briefs without putting an 
increased burden on only one of the parties, they held that Art. 44 of the Convention 
indeed granted Tribunals the power to accept amicus curiae submissions from suit-
able nonparties in appropriate cases.62 
Having decided that as a general matter they had the power to accept such sub-
missions, the Tribunals had to answer the second question and develop conditions 
under which they may exercise this right. Accordingly, in order to balance the inte-
rest of third parties to be heard with substantive and procedural rights of the disput-
ing parties, they established three basic criteria: (1) the appropriateness of the sub-
ject matter of the case; (2) the suitability of the given nonparty in the specific case; 
and (3) the procedure by which the amicus curiae submission is made and consid-
ered.63 The first criterion refers to the public interest of a dispute, understood as 
cases in which the decision have the potential to directly or indirectly affect persons 
other than the disputing parties,64 whereas the suitability of a given nonparty prima-
 
58  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 9; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 10. 
59  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 12. 
60  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 13; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 13. 
61  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, paras. 14-15; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, paras. 14-
15. 
62  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 16; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 16. 
63  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 17; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 17. 
64  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 19; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 18. In this 
context, the Tribunal also noted that increasing transparency in proceedings implicating the 
public interest also increased the legitimacy of international arbitral processes in general and 
ICSID in particular, see Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 22; Aguas Provinciales, supra 
note 49, para. 21.  
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rily depends on its expertise, experience, and independence.65 When deciding on an 
application for leave as amicus curiae, the Tribunals would consider the opinion of 
the parties, the additional burden on parties, Tribunal, and proceedings as well as the 
degree to which the proposed amicus curiae brief was likely to aid the Tribunal in 
arriving at its ultimate decision.66 
3. Access to Awards 
In contrast to the issue of amicus curiae briefs and its original drafts, the Convention 
and the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 are perfectly clear as far as the publication of 
awards is concerned: Most fundamentally, Art. 48 (5) of the Convention mandates 
that ICSID may not publish awards without the consent of the parties; Administra-
tive Regulation 22 (2) reiterates this principle.67 Rule 48 (4) ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003 slightly but importantly refined this prohibition by adding that excerpts of legal 
rules applied by the respective Tribunal may be published by the Centre.68 This 
modification was included in the 1984 revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and 
can be interpreted as a reaction to parties selectively disclosing information about 
past proceedings.69 ICSID actively seeks and, statistically, obtains the consent of the 
parties to publish the full award in the ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law 
Journal or, more recently, though its website in about fifty per cent of the cases.70 
Because Art. 48 (5) of the Convention is addressed to ICSID only, however, the 
parties remain free to make awards available to the public unless they have agreed 
otherwise.71 Consequently, even if one party does not consent to ICSID publishing 
 
65  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49¸para. 24; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 23. 
66  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 27; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 26. 
67  ICSID Administrative Regulations, Regulation 22(2). While first drafts leading up to the 
Convention were silent on the question of publication, a later suggestion to authorize the     
ICSID to publish the award “except as the parties otherwise agree” was changed into the pro-
hibition currently in force. See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 mn. 
95 (2001) with further references. 
68  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 48(4), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/ 
basicdoc-2003.htm; see also ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Rule 53 (3), available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm which in addition allows the regis-
tration of awards if this is required by the arbitration law of the country where the award is 
made. In conciliation proceedings, ICSID has no authority to publish the report, cf.  Art. 33 
ICSID Conciliation Rules. 
69  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 MN 96 (2001); implicitly recogni-
zing the challenge to provide a “balanced” account when information about proceedings is dis-
closed by parties or their counsel Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. 
Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 Brit. YB of Int’l L. 123, 132 n.1 (1980). 
70  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 4, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
71  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 MN 100 (2001). 
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the award, the other party frequently releases it for publication in the International 
Legal Materials or other avenues.72 Taken together with ICSID’s competence to 
publish excerpts of the legal rules applied, at least the key holdings of all ICSID 
awards nowadays are available to the public.73 
4. Access to other Documents (Decisions, Memorials, Minutes) 
Even though Art. 48 (5) of the Convention literally refers to awards only, ICSID has 
always handled other (interim) decisions a tribunal may take, such as preliminary 
decisions on jurisdiction (Art. 41), procedural orders or recommendations of provi-
sional measures, congruently, and will thus not publish them without the consent of 
the parties.74 As far as their pleadings and other information about pending proceed-
ings are concerned, publication remains at the individual discretion of the parties, 
i.e., absent an agreement to refrain from disclosure, they may unilaterally do so.75 
Given that the rules are silent on this issue, the unilateral release of such information 
had been subject of a request for provisional measures, however, the Tribunal re-
fused to recommend provisional measures barring the public discussion of the pen-
ding case by the investor.76 Very recently, however, for the first time in ICSID his-
tory, both parties of a case consented to the publication of their pleadings by the 
ICSID Secretariat.77 Finally, as to the keeping of minutes of all hearings, the current 
version of the Administrative Regulations clarifies that the Secretary-General may 
only arrange for publication if both parties consent.78 
5. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding some policies supporting transparency, notably in terms of registra-
tion of disputes and publication of at least legal excerpts of awards, confidentiality 
and privacy notions stemming from its conceptual origins in commercial arbitration 
have dominated state-investor dispute settlement administered by ICSID. This holds 
 
72  See, for instance, AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991); AMT v. 
Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1531 (1997); Fedax v. Venezuela, Decision on Ju-
risdiction, 11 July 1997, Award, 9 March 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1378, 1391 (1998). 
73  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 182 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
74  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 mn. 105 (2001). 
75  Id., MN 107-111. 
76  C. Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Preliminary Measures, 9 December 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 
410. 
77  See ICSID, Documentation Regarding ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Malaysian Historical 
Salvors v. Malaysia, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/caseARB-05-10.htm. 
78  ICSID Administrative Regulations, supra note 40, Regulation 22 (2) c). 
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particularly true as regards third party participation, which had not been envisioned 
by the normative ICSID framework at all. Considering the public policy implica-
tions of cases before mixed tribunals, this was a questionable state of affairs. Fur-
thermore, it was also out of line with some of the more recent NAFTA cases brought 
under UNCITRAL rules and the underlying policy choices by the respective 
NAFTA member states which put an emphasis on transparency and third party par-
ticipation.79 Against this background, the fact that recently the Tribunals in Aguas 
Provinciales and Aguas Argentinas ruled they were competent to accept amicus 
curiae briefs even though one party opposed this step is all the more remarkable. As 
each award is only binding inter partes and cannot function as binding precedent on 
future Tribunals, however, Aguas Provinciales and Aguas Argentinas did not miti-
gate the general need for discussing potential reforms of the normative framework as 
such. 
II. The ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposals 
1. Discussion Paper 
This need for discussion has also been recognized by the ICSID Secretariat: Reflect-
ing on the practice of ICSID and responding to proposals made and concerns voiced 
by different parties, the ICSID Secretariat in 2004 issued a discussion paper on 
“Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration.”80 In addition to 
topics such as interim relief, an increased role for mediation and the possible crea-
tion of an appeals facility, transparency and third party access to ICSID arbitral 
proceedings were raised as potential areas of improvement.81 The ICSID Secretariat 
recognized that even though at least the key legal holdings of awards were eventu-
ally published under the then existing framework, requiring party consent for publi-
cation of the full award raises the issue of timeliness – oftentimes, several months 
pass before the Secretariat obtains consent of both parties.82 Thus, speedy publica-
tion of the legal excerpts is all the more important. It therefore proposed to make 
timely publication of excerpts by the Secretariat mandatory.83 Contrasting previous 
ICSID practice with the NAFTA cases mentioned above, the Secretariat moreover 
suggested amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 to clarify that – and 
under what conditions – panels have the authority to accept third party submissions 
 
79  See NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement on the Decade of achievement, supra 
note 36. 
80  ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discus-
sion Paper, 22 October 2004, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/ Discus-
sionPaper.pdf. 
81  Cf. id., at para. 6.  
82  Id., at para. 12. 
83  Id. 
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from, for instance, civil society organization, business groups, or other States parties 
to investment treaties concerned.84  
2. Working Paper 
Having received feedback from the members of the Administrative Council as well 
as from business and civil society groups, arbitration experts and institutions, the 
Secretariat finally in May 2005 presented a working paper including detailed sug-
gestions how to amend the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 and Administrative Regu-
lations.85 Amending the rules and regulations only requires a majority of two-thirds 
of the members of the Administrative Council.86 Although the proposals regarding 
access of third parties to the proceedings in particular elicited some disagreement, 
reactions to the preceding discussion paper had been generally positive.87 Hence, it 
seemed most of the amendments suggested had a realistic chance to be realized. 
a) Publication of Legal Excerpts 
As far as transparency-related amendments are concerned, the ICSID Secretariat 
first of all suggested clarifying the wording of Rule 48 (4) ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003 to read: “The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its publications ex-
cerpts of the legal conclusions of the Tribunal.”88 Hence, this change aimed at intro-
ducing the qualifier “promptly” in the rule and making publication mandatory, 
thereby guaranteeing early release of such excerpts. A similar rule regarding the 
publication of full awards, however, is barred by Art. 48 (5) of the Convention and 
would thus require the unanimous decision of all contracting parties to amend the 
Convention.89 This seems rather unlikely – in its discussion paper, the ICSID Secre-
tariat itself noted that obtaining “unanimous ratification for an amendment by the 
140 Contracting States would at best be a very long process.”90 Because it is applic-
able to arbitrations not governed by the Convention, however, a different situation 
 
84  Id., at para. 13. 
85  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf. 
86  See Art. 6 (1) of the Convention. 
87  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf, 
para. 6. 
88  Id., 9. The corresponding art. 53 (3) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was to be changed 
accordingly. 
89  See Art. 66 (1) of the Convention. 
90  ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discus-
sion Paper, 22 October 2004, para. 3, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ high-
lights/DiscussionPaper.pdf. 
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arises with respect to Rule 53 (3) ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, which 
could very well be amended to indicate that, in cases of investment arbitration, 
awards shall be published by ICSID unless the parties agree otherwise.91 
b) Access to Proceedings 
In contrast to those pertaining to the publication of excerpts by the ICSID Secre-
tariat, the proposed changes with regard to third party access to proceedings were 
more fundamental and the most controversial, for they would have drastically im-
pacted the traditionally prominent role of party consensus in questions of proce-
dure.92 According to suggested amendments of Rule 32 ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003, allowing third parties to attend or observe parts or all of the hearings would 
have become a discretionary competence of the Tribunal.93 While it would have had 
to consult “as far as possible” with the Secretary and the parties before exercising 
this competence, the final decision would have been vested with the Tribunal, which 
also would have had to establish appropriate procedures.94 Moreover, the proposal 
undertook to fill the lacunae described above regarding amicus curiae submissions 
by amending Rule 37 ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003.95 Analogous to the suggested 
competence as regards passive access, a new paragraph explicitly empowered the 
Tribunal to allow, “after consulting both parties as far as possible,” third parties to 
file written submission with the tribunal. In accordance with the legal reasoning 
sketched above, the Secretariat described these latter amendments as clarification 
rather than as an expansion of the Tribunal’s competences.96 The proposed amend-
ment obligated the Tribunal to consider, among other things, the extent to which (1) 
a potential third party’s new insight, perspective or particular knowledge would aid 
the Tribunal in the determination of factual or legal issues; (2) the third party would 
address a matter within the scope of the dispute; and (3) the third party has a “sig-
nificant interest in the proceedings.”97 Finally, the Tribunal would have to ensure 
 
91  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev., 1521, 1602 (2005). 
92  It is thus not entirely surprising that this part of the proposal has been “watered down” to 
safeguard a de facto veto of either party. See infra, part III.; cf. also Vis-Dunbar/Peterson,    
ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitration process, IISD Invest-
ment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/I 
tn_mar29_ 2006.pdf. 
93  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf, 10. 
The corresponding Art. 39 (2) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was to be changed ac-
cordingly.  
94  Id. 
95  Id., 11. Similar changes were suggested for ICSID Additional Facility Rules Art. 41. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
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that the submission would neither disrupt the proceedings nor unduly burden either 
party.98 
III. The New ICSID Arbitration Rules 
On 5 April 2006, ICSID issued a press release informing the public that voting by 
the members of the Administrative Council on “the amendments recently proposed 
by the Secretariat” had been concluded and that changes were expected to come into 
effect on 10 April 2006.99 It is worth mentioning, however, that the final proposal 
actually voted upon differed in some key aspects from the previous versions of sug-
gested reforms which had been tendered for public comment and that have been 
summarized above.100 As a matter of fact, while voting on the amended proposals 
took place in late 2005 and early 2006, the text being voted upon was not released to 
the public at that time and has only recently been leaked – a few days before the 
official release of the adopted amendments.101 In the context of changes intended to 
create a more transparent framework for improving the legitimacy and acceptance of 
the investor-state arbitration process, this may strike one as rather ironic. 
Be that as it may, as far as substantive changes to the original ICSID Secretariat 
Draft Proposal are concerned, most notably the possibility for Tribunals to open up 
proceedings at their own discretion has been watered down significantly: Instead of 
leaving the decision after consulting “with the parties as far as possible” with the 
Tribunal, ICSID Arbitration Rule 32 (2) now features an introductory “Unless either 
party objects”-qualifier.102 Therefore, parties still enjoy a de facto veto right, and 
accordingly, some commentators have already stated that this change between the 
old rules and the newly adopted ones was “hardly a big difference.”103 Indeed, the 
only difference seems to be that while before open hearings could only be instituted 
in case of an explicit consensus of the parties, it is now the absence of a veto that 
suffices, i.e., one could view the new system as one of an implicit “tacit consent” 
presumption. Nevertheless, effective party control of the privacy of hearings has 
been preserved by the member governments. 
 
98  Id. 
99  See ICSID News Release, Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (5 April 2006), 
available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/03-04-06.htm. 
100  See Vis-Dunbar/Peterson, ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process, IISD Investment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: http://www 
.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mar29_2006.pdf. 
101  Id. 
102  ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 32 (2), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basic 
en.htm. 
103  See Vis-Dunbar/Peterson, ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process, IISD Investment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mar29_2006.pdf, quoting Schreuer. 
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With the exception of the nixed competence of the Tribunal to grant passive ac-
cess even in case of party opposition, however, the other changes with transparency 
implications originally proposed the ICSID secretariat have been adopted. That is to 
say, the modification regarding the mandatory and prompt publication of legal ex-
cerpts by the ICSID Secretariat as well as the clarification that Tribunals may accept 
amicus curiae submission where deemed appropriate have been approved and came 
into effect on 10 April 2006.104 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, the adopted amendments corroborate the reasoning employed by the Aguas 
Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales Tribunals as far as amicus curiae submissions 
are concerned. The additional changes originally proposed by the ICSID Secretariat 
would have further parlayed the role of transparency by leaving the new possibility 
to open up hearings, even in the face of opposition by the parties, at the discretion of 
the Tribunal. This being said, it should not be forgotten that with a view to Art. 44 of 
the Convention, the parties always remain free to agree on different rules which 
should govern the arbitration. In other words, if both parties would have agreed 
beforehand to exclude third parties from the hearings as well as from submitting 
briefs, a Tribunal could not have referred to the proposed amendments in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and decide otherwise. This caveat notwithstanding, the suggested 
changes nevertheless would have had a significant impact, for unlike under the old 
as well as under the newly adopted rules, consensus of both parties would have been 
necessary to have closed hearings – a polar opposite to the hitherto existing situation 
and quite likely the reason why member governments (for now) declined to actually 
adopt this change and instead opted to preserve an effective veto right. 
D. Perspectives and Limits of Transparency 
When looking at the most recent versions of prominent national model BITs, disclo-
sure policies applied by NAFTA countries, and recent practice of investor-state 
arbitration Tribunals as summarized above, one could conclude that there currently 
is a general trend towards transparency in international investment arbitration.105 
The amendments originally suggested by ICSID Secretariat and, at least partially, 
the changes actually adopted pick up on this trend. Some interested parties, how-
ever, oppose these developments for a number of reasons, inter alia because they are 
 
104  Cf. ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rules 48 (4) and 37 (2), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basic-en.htm. 
105  Legum, Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 Arbitration International 143, 
144 (2003). 
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perceived as unduly interfering with the principle that party consensus forms the 
basis of arbitration proceedings.106 In the following, I will thus weigh potential bene-
fits and problems of increasing transparency and third party participation in inves-
tor-state arbitration and assess in how far the proposed and adopted ICSID Arbitra-
tion Rules respectively represent a good compromise between the competing inte-
rests. 
I. Benefits of Transparency and Third Party Participation 
1. Knowledge, Expertise and Coherence 
Dating back as a concept to Roman times,107 the classical reason for allowing non-
disputant parties to file amicus curiae briefs is to inform the court about additional 
aspects of a case which are important, but have not been reflected in the parties’ own 
submissions – be it because they lacked the necessary expertise,108 be it because as a 
party, their individual interest in the outcome of the case did not accommodate rami-
fications of a claim that concern “the public interest,”109 be it because they delibe-
rately chose to.110 Therefore, third party participation is primarily deemed to in-
crease the information available to a tribunal, thereby leading to a better informed 
and thus ideally better quality decision.111 Against this background, common law 
systems embracing the concept of amicus curiae have traditionally restricted third 
 
106  See South Centre, Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework of for 
ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries, South Centre Analytical 
Note, para. 41, available at: http://www.southcentre.org/tadp_webpage/research_papers/invest 
ment_project/icsid_discpaper_feb05.doc.   
107  See Angell, The Amicus Curiae Brief: American Development of English Institutions, 16 Int’l 
Comp. L.Q. 1017 (1967). 
108  Due to the increasing complexity of scientific risk assessment, the tension between risk regula-
tion and investment treaty disciplines might be an area in which governments could indeed 
lack the degree of expertise highly specialized NGOs or individual experts can provide. In a 
similar vein, disputes in the realm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been heavily 
influenced by party submissions which included studies provided by NGOs and academics, 
Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Sug-
gestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817, 836 (1998). 
109 Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 923, 956 (2003). 
110  For instance, in the context of investor-state arbitration, general political considerations or the 
fear to create unfavorable precedent undermining the government’s position in another pending 
case might keep parties from including certain aspects of a case in their pleadings, cf. in the 
context of amicus curiae participation in the WTO, Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel 
and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 
817, 836-837 (1998). 
111  Cf. regarding the WTO, Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organisations in the 
World Trade Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 331, 351 (1996). 
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party submissions to a strictly informative, as opposed to a more advocating role – a 
“friend” is not a party.112  
Transparency has another important “knowledge” dimension: It is only with 
awards being published that the knowledge of legal interpretations of clauses typi-
cally contained in investment treaties leaves the confines of a secretive “network of 
law firms” involved in these proceedings.113 General access to awards thus levels the 
playing field and provides every potential party and their legal counsel with a wider 
array of jurisprudence to litigate with.114 Furthermore, a closely related positive 
effect of transparency provided by published awards lays in its contribution to a 
more coherent formulation of international investment law: Even though commenta-
tors have cautioned to limit expectations about outcome predictability and empha-
sized the peculiar nature of state-investor arbitration, which features highly fact 
dependent doctrines and can thus produce different results in seemingly similar 
cases,115 it can hardly be denied that insofar it is possible, both parties and tribunals 
regularly refer to the legal reasoning employed by prior tribunals. Thus, notwith-
standing the fact that arbitration awards strictly speaking cannot create binding 
precedent,116 publishing the legal reasoning and application of relevant doctrines in 
awards nevertheless fosters at least a certain degree of predictability and coherence 
as far as the interpretation of similar obligations contained in investment protection 
instruments is concerned.117 
This is a very welcome development, not only because it aids tribunals them-
selves to consider more fully the legal issues at hand and to, as the case may be, 
issue a rational distinction based on reasoned opinions.118 Just as importantly, the 
resulting predictability is vital for the effective functioning of the respective invest-
ment treaties, which are geared towards “increasing substantially investment oppor-
 
112  Regarding this distinction and the different schools of thought in US jurisprudence, see gene-
rally Ford, What are „Friends“ for ? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting Amici would 
help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade 
Am. 207, 236-240 (2005).  
113  Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Paper delivered at ASA Swiss 
Arbitration Association Conference on Investment Treaties and Arbitration in Zurich (25 Janu-
ary 2002), reprinted in 1 Transnat’l Dispute Management (2004), available at: http://www. 
transnational-dispute-management.com/. 
114  Id. 
115 Coe, Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes -- A Preliminary 
Sketch, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 7, 21-22 (2005). 
116  An award is binding only on the parties to the dispute and does not give rise to stare decisis 
precedent regarding the interpretation of a given clause or rule. This principle has also been 
stressed by the tribunal interpreting Art. 15 (1) UNCITRAL Rules in Methanex, see Methanex, 
supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici 
Curiae,” 15 January 2001, para. 51. 
117 Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1524, 1616-1617 
(2005). 
118  Id., 1616. 
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tunities in the territories of the parties” by “ensuring a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and investment.”119 
2. Legitimacy and Good Governance 
While informing tribunals, counsels, parties and scholars as demonstrated is an im-
portant facet of transparency and third party participation, their public and scholarly 
discussion alike mostly center around the more prominent notions of democratic 
legitimacy, the “public interest” and good governance.120 In fact, transparency has 
even been labeled “the most basic of good governance principles.”121 Why is this – 
and what does it mean for investment dispute settlement within the ICSID frame-
work? 
It is almost a truism by now that investor-state arbitration has the potential to sig-
nificantly affect the “public interest.”122 This is not merely the case because one of 
the parties is a state,123 however, it is due to the fact that the subject matter of many 
investment disputes impacts on the provision and costs of “public” services such as 
water, waste management, electricity or gas124 or touches on the legality of domestic 
regulatory actions in sensitive fields such as environmental protection125 and emer-
 
119  The quotes are taken from NAFTA’s art. 102 para. 1 and preamble respectively, the underlying 
telos, however, is representative of any investment protection agreement. As to the economic 
investment incentives created by transparency, see generally Zoellner, Transparency. An 
Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle of International Economic Law, part II.B.1, 27 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 579, 587 (2006). 
120  In this respect, see the often cited article by DePalma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Ob-
scure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. Times, 11 March 2001, Sec-
tion 3, 1; cf. also Ford, What are „Friends“ for ? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting 
Amici would help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. 
J. L. & Trade Am. 207, 209-211 (2005); Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11 - The Challenge of 
Private Party Participation, 16 J. Int'l Arb. 8, 10 (1999); Gurudevan, An Evaluation of Current 
Legitimacy-based Objections to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 
6 San Diego Int'l L.J. 399, 425-427 (2005) with further references. 
121 Mann/Cosbey et al., Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
8, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_response .pdf. 
122  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 220 (2001). 
123  Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as “Amici Curiae,” para. 49 (Jan. 15, 2001), available at: www.investmentclaims.com. 
124  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 197 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
125 Hodges, Where the Grass is Always Greener: Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental 
Regulations Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 14 Geo. Int’l L. Rev. 367, 385 (2001); cf. also 
Wälde/Dow, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment, 34(2) J. World Trade 
1, 17 (2000), generally discussing criticisms regarding binding international arbitration under-
mining domestic political processes and regulatory autonomy. 
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gency measures in times of severe economic plight.126 Accordingly, these public 
interest implications create the need for public knowledge and, assuming that there 
was a general duty of confidentiality in arbitration, arguably for a public interest 
exception in investment dispute settlement cases.127 By opening up proceedings to 
the public, publishing awards and allowing civil society’s input by means of amicus 
curiae submissions, stakeholders will be more comfortable that their interests are 
being judged fairly and effectively.128 Consequently, legitimacy and acceptance of 
binding investment arbitration processes, which offer claimants a uniquely strong 
“sword” compared to other international law instruments, will benefit.129 
In terms of legitimacy and good governance, however, we should not focus too 
narrowly on the facilities and institutions of investor-state arbitration. To the con-
trary, from a good governance perspective, the legitimacy of involved governments 
depends at least as much on increased transparency in state-investor arbitrations as 
can be said with regard to the public acceptance of dispute settlement proceedings 
and Tribunals: As a prerequisite for accountability, transparency enables citizens to 
control the actions of their governments.130 In the context of state-investor arbitra-
tion, this is significant for a number of reasons. For one, and most importantly, the 
public policy ramifications sketched above require from a democratic point of view 
that the position taken and the legal arguments made by governments in these pro-
 
126  Regarding the most notorious example of Argentina’s pesification measures and resulting 
implications for ICSID arbitration and international investment law, see the contribution in this 
volume by Szodruch, State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties; Tietje, Die Argentinien-Krise aus rechtlicher Sicht: Staatsanleihen und Staateninsol-
venz, 37 Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht 13-16 (2005). 
127  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 221 (2001). 
128 Clark, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 32 
Int’l Law. 851, 852 (1998). 
129  Regarding the connection between transparency and acceptance of investment arbitration, see 
Methanex, supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Inter-
vene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, para. 49. Concerning the perception that investment 
treaties and awards have moved from providing a “protective shield” against government over-
reaching to granting investors a “sword” to cut into domestic public protection laws, see  
Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Arbitration Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be 
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared? 2002 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 527, 528 (2002).   
130  As to the relation between information provided by transparency and accountability, see gene-
rally Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration: Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Ar-
bitration, 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 279, 289 (2004); Delbrück, Diskussionsbeitrag zum Ref-
erat Hilf, 40 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 386, 387 (2003); Bluemel, 
Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance, 31 Brooklyn J. Int'l 
L. 139, 144 (2005); Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in: Democracy, Ac-
countability, and Representation 329, 335 (Przeworski et al. eds., 1999). 
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ceedings be available to the electorate.131 Thereby, a control mechanism as regards 
the negotiation, conclusion, administration and concrete effects of investment trea-
ties is established; ideally, the populace can respond to unwelcome developments at 
the voting booth. The vast potential effects investment disputes can have on the 
public purse bolster the need for accountability in this respect.132 
More specifically, transparency in arbitration proceedings can prevent capture 
and successful rent-seeking by special interests and functions to reveal a govern-
ment’s responsiveness to genuine domestic preferences and democratic majorities.133 
As a matter of fact, the “filter function” governments traditionally assumed in inter-
national economic law,134 i.e., the denial of amicus curiae submissions and direct 
third party participation in favor of “indirect” representation via government sub-
missions necessarily mandates that domestic interest groups have the possibility to 
check whether their concerns are adequately reflected in government submissions. 
II. Costs and Potential Problems of Increased Transparency and Third Party Partici-
pation 
Having seen the benefits transparency and third party participation have to offer, I 
will now turn to costs and potential problems associated with increasing the open-
ness of investment dispute settlement proceedings. 
First of all, it should be noted that the very concept of transparency is one that is 
nowadays common to many western countries, but not necessarily rooted in other 
societies.135 In a similar vein, the concept of amicus curiae is generally well-known 
 
131  Keohane, quoted after Bluemel, supra note 131, 144: “Accountability refers to relationships in 
which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their pro-
posed or past behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event 
that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.” 
132  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 220 (2001). 
133  For a lucid discussion of the interconnectedness of transparency, accountability and the prob-
lem of capture using cost-benefit analysis, see Hahn/Tetlock, Using Information Markets to 
Improve Public Decision Making, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 213, 264 (2005). 
134  Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Sug-
gestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817, 836 (1998); Ullrich, No Need for Secrecy?, 
34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55, 59-60 (2000). 
135  Morrisson, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 
32 Int’l Law. 851, 860 (1998). For a critical account of the WTO transparency disciplines and 
their impact on developing states’ systems of governance, see also Wolfe, Regulatory Trans-
parency, Developing Countries, and the Fate of the WTO (March 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/wolfe.pdf. 
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to common law systems, but rarely found in the civil law legal tradition.136 There-
fore, increased transparency and amicus curiae briefs could have disparate impacts 
on parties with different legal backgrounds and, accordingly, different levels of 
experience in dealing with such briefs – a possibility that has caused some fear of 
unduly overburdening one party and thus interfering with a neutral and fair pro-
cess.137 
Worries about an undue burden are usually accompanied by the expectation that 
opening up the proceedings would likewise open up “floodgates” and cause uncon-
trollable numbers of submissions.138 Given the limited financial resources particu-
larly developing countries have at their disposal, there is some concern about their 
capacity to respond properly to a high number of amicus curiae submissions.139 
According to some commentators, this potential inequality is further aggravated by 
the difference in funding and experience as far as civil society and business groups 
in the industrialized world on the one hand, in developing countries on the other are 
concerned.140 
In any event, to effectively manage potentially high numbers of amicus curiae 
submissions, conditions as to which third parties may file under what circumstances 
need to be established. While the traditionally informative role of amici curiae and 
their legitimizing function in arbitration proceedings implicating the public interest 
have been elaborated upon above, however, now a number of questions about their 
own legitimacy arise:  If the traditional filter function of an elected government is 
abandoned in favor of direct submissions by interested groups, what does this mean 
in terms of democratic representation of the majority’s will in a given country? How 
are such groups, many of which are not exactly characterized by internal transpa-
rency or democratic structures themselves, legitimized, given that they are not ac-
countable to a constituency?  Therefore, it could be argued that increasing transpa-
rency and allowing amicus curiae submissions opens the door for well-organized, 
vested interests to bypass the domestic decision making and lobbying process, ma-
king capture actually more instead of less likely.141 Distinguishing between groups 
 
136  With respect to amicus curiae submissions in the context of NAFTA, Mexico opposed al-
lowing submissions because this would import a concept known to U.S. and Canadian parties, 
whereas Mexico, as a civil law state, had no experience in this regard. See Methanex, supra 
note 53, para. 9. 
137  To counter such fears, tribunals ruling on their powers to accept amicus curiae submissions 
have emphasized the need to establish procedures safeguarding parties’ equal rights. See for 
instance Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 29; Methanex, supra note 53, paras. 35 et seq.  
138  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 37, refers to the recent case Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3), in which over 300 interested parties petitioned for the right to in-
tervene, attend hearings, and receive full public disclosure of all evidence and pleadings. Cf. 
also Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law, 15 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1321, 1346 (2000), arguing that “evidence does not suggest that the 
floodgates have opened to date.”  
139  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 37. 
140  Id. 
141  Ullrich, No Need for Secrecy?, 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55, 77 (2000). 
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which may legitimately file in a given case and those which may not, however, 
could prove rather difficult, burdensome and expensive.142 In addition, one might 
point out that in private law disputes in many legal systems, amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by government agencies or organs are considered to give a voice to the 
public and deemed to address ramifications of a claim that go beyond the effects on 
the individual parties – that is to say, the very involvement of the government as 
such represents the “public interest.”143 From this angle, allowing third parties to 
address public interest issues in state-investor arbitration, where the government is 
necessarily already involved, might seem superfluous. 
Finally, increasing transparency and allowing third party submissions represent a 
significant step in the process of judicilization of investment arbitration proceedings, 
i.e., moving it closer to “ordinary” litigation.144 This development robs arbitration of 
two of its perceived core strengths, confidentiality and privacy, and might give rise 
to concerns about reputation among both private claimants and states involved.145 
Moreover, from a game theoretic point of view, it may cause problems in terms of 
posture and efficiency losses.146 Accordingly, some commentators have already 
opined that due to this development, conciliation might be the preferable route to go 
in future investment disputes.147 
 
142  This were only different if instead of including a set of criteria in the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
or leaving it generally up to the respective Tribunal, a working system of self-regulation and 
pre-selection among civil society actors could be established. See thereto generally Re-
basti/Vierucci, A Legal Status for NGOs in Contemporary International Law?,7, available at: 
http://www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/VierucciRebasti.PDF. 
143  See, for instance, the U.S.  Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29 (a); cf. also Gruner, Ac-
counting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923, 
956 (2003).   
144  Regarding this trend, see generally Leahy/Bianchi, supra note 5, 51-52. 
145  In the case of states, the potential loss of prestige could further be accompanied by political 
repercussions, see Böckstiegel, supra note 7, 584. It is here submitted, however, that this is but 
one consequence of democratic accountability and thus as such no valid reason to uphold con-
fidentiality in state-investor arbitration.  
146  Transparency provided by open proceedings may particularly affect the negotiation of com-
promises or „amicable settlements“ in the pre-hearing phase (see ICSID Arbitration Rule 21; 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Schedule C Art. 29 (2)), for under public scrutiny, no party 
can afford to give in on their initial stand. Generally as regards game theoretic costs of trans-
parency associated with the “posture” problem, see Stavasage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? 
Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 International Organization 667, 
668 and passim (2004).  
147 Coe, Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary 
Sketch, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 7, 23, 26-27 (2005). 
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III. Evaluation of the Proposal and the Adopted Changes – The Perspectives of  
Increased Transparency 
With a view to the possible costs and benefits of transparency and third party par-
ticipation, how should the latest developments in the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas 
Provinciales arbitrations, the ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and the actual 
amendments be evaluated? 
First of all, it is safe to assume that when the Contracting States signed the Con-
vention, thereby consenting to investor-state arbitration, they certainly did not fore-
see possible future amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules creating a prior 
consensus requirement regarding closed proceedings or Tribunals exercising discre-
tion as to whether admit amicus curiae submissions in spite of party opposition. As a 
matter of fact, even in the NAFTA context, where the US and Canada recently have 
been very active in promoting transparency, the third party to the treaty,  Mexico, 
has only recently and rather hesitatingly joined some of the newly adopted poli-
cies.148 In a similar vein, the ICSID Secretariat has been severely criticized for its 
initiative, for it were too political and bypassed the mandatory legal process for 
amending the Convention, a power which “rests with the political (sovereign) power 
of the Contracting States.”149 In this light, the developments represented by the  
ICSID Draft Proposal, by the adopted changes and by the Aguas Argentinas and 
Aguas Provinciales orders might indeed signal a possible changing of the tide as 
regards confidentiality and the consensus principle in investment dispute arbitration. 
This shift not only affects states, but it also concerns investors fearing loss of busi-
ness secrets and, more importantly, a negative impact on their reputation – it should 
be remembered that in Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales, it was the private 
claimant who opposed third party participation. In any event, against this back-
ground, the fact that the Secretariat considered some of its suggestions merely 
“clarifications” and Tribunals have based their powers to allow third party submis-
sions on interpretations of existing rules does not justify sweeping claims that this 
was a “phenomenon that has emerged with the consent of states, not in spite of 
them.”150 In my opinion, increasing transparency and opening up proceedings is a 
general trend which should not – and ultimately cannot – be stopped, even though 
member governments for now have refused to fully adopt all changes that were 
originally proposed.151 What is nevertheless worth remembering in this context, 
however, is that the whole system of investor-state arbitration, notwithstanding more 
and more elaborate rules, at the end of the day depends on  the good-faith applica-
tion of rules and on the willingness of states to actually enforce awards. It is only in 
 
148  See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Joint Statement on the Decade of Achievement (San 
Antonio, 16 July 2004), supra note 36.   
149  South Centre, supra note 107, paras. 16, 23-28.  
150 Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Reten-
tion of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 235, 243 (2002). 
151  See supra, note 93. 
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this regard that a state’s “general and perpetual consent” to the system, its current 
evolution and potential future developments indeed remains vital.  
That being said, the reforms suggested were rather moderate and well-balanced, 
their only partial adoption is thus somewhat disappointing. Mandatory publication of 
excerpts containing the legal conclusions of a case obligates the Secretariat and will 
have positive effects on coherence and predictability without infringing on parties’ 
rights. The clarification that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae briefs is in line 
with the interpretation of the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales Tribunals 
and seems dogmatically accurate. Conceptually, it is not a radical proposal, but a 
challenging proposal: In order to safeguard efficient, fair and balanced proceedings, 
Tribunals will have to carefully evaluate which third party submissions to accept and 
whether to consider the information contained therein. Moreover, Tribunals need to 
be aware of resource and timing issues and find a balance between public interest 
and traditional party control.152 The indicated criteria are in my view adequate to 
ensure that neither parties nor the Tribunal are excessively burdened by the briefs 
and by and large conform with current practice of NAFTA tribunals operating under 
UNCITRAL rules, assigning a “quasi-expert” status to amici.153 By doing so, Tribu-
nals have acted very responsibly and limited third parties to an informative, “clas-
sic” amicus curiae role. This avoids some of the potential costs feared by opponents 
to third party participation, while preserving its benefits in cases with public interest 
implications. In contrast, a further-reaching “right” to have amicus curiae briefs 
considered or to even actively participate in pleadings, as sought and suggested by 
some commentators,154 should even de lege ferenda not be granted. A friend is a 
friend is a friend – and not a party. Nor is it plausible to assume that amici could not 
make their points effectively through written submissions.155 
As to the originally proposed right of the Tribunal to allow third parties to attend 
all or parts of the hearings, it may be argued that this would have been a more fun-
damental departure from traditional state-investor arbitration than the question of 
amicus curiae briefs. The fact that member government for the time being were not 
prepared to adopt such a measure would further support such a stand. Given the 
absolutely vital impact of such transparency on the legitimacy of the arbitration 
process and, in my eyes even more importantly, on the accountability of the go-
vernments involved, however, this development is – at least in the long run – un-
stoppable. In this respect, some of the arguments advanced against such openness, 
 
152  Cf. with regard to dispute settlement in the WTO Morrisson, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, 
Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 32 Int’l Law. 851, 860 (1998). 
153 Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 198 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
154  See Ford, What are „Friends“ for? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting Amici would 
help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade 
Am. 207, 253 (2005). 
155  Howse, Kantor-Howse Exchange Regarding Restrictions on Public Access to ICSID Arbitra-
tions, available at: http://gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_57.htm. 
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such as possible detrimental effects on foreign investment if the defense brought 
forward by states was exposed to public scrutiny,156 are quite telling and by them-
selves evidence enough that more openness is called for. As a matter of fact, it is 
debatable whether instead of opening the proceedings to additional groups of people, 
there should be a general presumption of open hearings.157 In a similar vein, amend-
ing the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and, albeit an unlikely scenario, the Con-
vention and ICSID Arbitration Rules to provide for the mandatory publication of 
complete awards would be a welcome development.  
Taking everything into account, most, if not all, potential costs of increased trans-
parency can be avoided if Tribunals carefully exercise their discretion in the fields of 
transparency and third party participation. And, because the parties choose their 
arbitrators and trust them to rule on the substantive issues, there is no convincing 
reason why tribunals should be unfit to properly manage these procedural compe-
tence as well. 
E. Conclusion 
We have seen that third party participation and transparency are important notions in 
the field of state-investor arbitration, yet in practice have traditionally been limited. 
The recent amendments following the ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and the 
orders in the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales arbitrations, however, indi-
cate an important change, which is in line a general development in investment dis-
pute settlement arbitration. To conclude our discussion of transparency and third 
party participation in ICSID proceedings, the following theses sum up the issues 
covered: 
Largely modeled after private commercial arbitration, rules governing state-
investor arbitration have traditionally provided very little mandatory transparency 
and virtually no opportunities for third party participation. Consequently, increasing 
transparency and allowing third party input has been at the discretion of the parties, 
often requiring consensus. Insofar, the rules established by the Convention and the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 are more or less typical examples. 
While it is debatable whether there really is a general and absolute confidentiality 
principle in commercial arbitration, keeping these proceedings and their outcome 
private does generally not encounter serious concerns with regard to public interest 
implications or democratic legitimacy. As far as state-investor arbitration is con-
cerned, however, the often highly sensitive subject matter covered and possible 
 
156  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 43.  
157  Mann/Cosbey et al., Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
10-11, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_ response.pdf. 
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wide-reaching ramifications of a case that go beyond the effects on the respective 
parties draw a different picture. 
As a prerequisite for accountability, transparency is vital in ensuring the accep-
tance and democratic legitimacy of investment arbitration and the governments 
involved. Furthermore, it also fosters coherence in the emerging body of interna-
tional investment law and functions as predictability-enhancing incentive for foreign 
direct investment. Amicus curiae briefs can offer unique perspectives, provide tribu-
nals with additional expertise, and mirror civil society’s take on issues bearing on 
the public interest. 
Given both the public pressure for reform and the sketched benefits of transpa-
rency, the NAFTA parties have attempted to radically overhaul existing confidenti-
ality rules and provide for more openness, thereby “judicializing” the arbitration 
process. This trend has been reflected in recent awards rendered under UNCITRAL 
rules. The ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and, to a slightly lesser extent, the 
changes actually adopted, pick up on this trend. 
The reforms are rather moderate, well-balanced and should be applauded. Manda-
tory publication of excerpts containing the legal conclusions of a case as well as the 
clarification that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae briefs if suitable are not radical 
proposals and do as such not unduly infringe parties’ rights. The originally proposed 
right of Tribunals to open proceedings, however, would have been more fundamen-
tal and would have constituted a necessary, highly important and welcomed step 
towards more accountability of governments involved. Therefore, even though the 
Administrative Council for now shied away from adopting this amendment, the 
necessary changes will only be postponed, not abolished.   
Most, if not all, potential costs of increased transparency can be avoided. In order 
to safeguard efficient, fair and balanced proceedings, tribunals will have to carefully 
evaluate which third party submissions to accept and whether to consider the infor-
mation contained therein. There is no reason not to trust their ability to do so. By 
contrast, a “right” to have amicus curiae briefs considered or to even actively par-
ticipate in pleadings should not be granted. 
In addition to the necessity of introducing open hearings, amending the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules and, albeit an unlikely scenario, the Convention and   
ICSID Arbitration Rules to provide for the mandatory publication of complete 
awards would be a welcome development. 
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Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investment Arbitration
                   
Comment by Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel∗ 
First of all, it should be noted that this Frankfurt Conference, so well organized by 
my colleague Rainer Hofmann, in spite of the many meetings now held worldwide 
on investment and particularly ICSID arbitration, by its program and also by the 
involvement of young brilliant researchers in addition to the “usual suspects”, con-
tributes efficiently to the many questions that still need comprehensive examination 
both academically and in practice. 
And further, it should be noted that the paper presented by Carl-Sebastian Zoell-
ner at this conference gives an insight and overview on information and discussion 
on the topic of transparency which has not been available so far and, therefore, will 
be very useful. This is so, irrespective of the fact that some in the field, including 
myself, may not agree with every conclusion he submits. 
I am afraid my own comments, given more or less spontaneously at the Confe-
rence on the basis of my own experience as an arbitrator in investment cases, will 
have to be short, because the task of putting them on paper for this publication falls 
into a time in which other commitments accepted long before, many due to my in-
vestment arbitration cases, leave little time. 
First of all, one has to recall that it is not by accident that arbitration, including in-
ternational arbitration, has traditionally been in camera. The rise of international 
arbitration to the present situation where it is at least internationally the by far most 
frequently accepted method of dispute settlement in international trade and invest-
ment has been and is only possible by agreement of prospective parties to contracts 
or treaties submitting to arbitration. One of the main reasons usually mentioned for 
this submission is the confidentiality of the proceedings. This is particularly so for 
commercial arbitration between private enterprises, but also for arbitration between 
states and private enterprises.  
In this context of course, one has to accept that states or state institutions or state 
enterprises may have additional political and/or legal responsibilities to give account 
of their contracts and disputes to the general public at large or at least to certain 
 
∗  Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel is Professor em. of International Business Law at University of Co-
logne; Chairman of the Board of the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS); recent President 
of the International Law Association (ILA); Hon. Vice-Pres. and former President of the 
LCIA; former President of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague; former Panel 
Chairman of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC); member of the ICC Ar-
bitration Commission; arbitrator and  president of arbitration tribunal in many national and in-
ternational arbitrations of the ICC, ICSID, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, AAA, and others. 
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public administrative or legislative institutions. But, on the other hand, in most states 
such reporting duties are limited by law and practice, because one is aware that 
concluding and performing international contracts efficiently requires a certain de-
gree of trust and cooperation between the parties which is not fit to every step and 
decision being the object of public discussion and justification in what easily may 
become a political debate. Similar considerations prevail for arbitration, where the 
efficient representation of a party’s interests may be hindered by public and particu-
larly political discussions and where due process and the administration of justice 
call for a de-politicized process in the view of both the states and the private enter-
prises involved. 
There is no need to reiterate here the present status and the main considerations 
regarding transparency in international economic law and the development of the 
practice of ICSID and the recent discussion regarding ICSID proceedings well 
summarized by Zoellner. Indeed, in response to a respective invitation, I participated 
in that discussion on the future of ICSID by correspondence and in meetings in Lon-
don and Washington DC. For good reason, proposals for more transparency of IC-
SID proceedings were put forward and have been taken into account by ICSID Tri-
bunals and in the recent process of adopting amendments of various ICSID provi-
sions that came into effect on 10 April 2006. As Zoellner rightly indicates in the 
updated version of his paper, the changes are limited:  
• The new Rule 37(2) provides that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae submis-
sion.  
• The new Rule 32(2) authorizes the Tribunal to allow third persons into the hear-
ing “unless either party objects”, whereby the parties still enjoy a de facto veto 
right.  
• And finally, the new Rule 48(4) provides the mandatory and prompt publication 
of legal excerpts of awards by ICSID while the full publication of awards still 
remains subject to approval of the parties. 
 
But in the context of this rather limited opening in comparison to the former ver-
sion of the ICSID Rules, it should also be noticed that, in responding to much fur-
ther going options presented by the ICSID Secretariat, the replies from the member 
states showed considerable hesitation to go “all the way” into full transparency of 
ICSID proceedings and admitting third parties and particularly national and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations and interest groups to participate in case 
proceedings. 
My own personal experiences as an arbitrator in investment arbitrations are li-
mited in this regard and are obviously under the old version of the Rules. Over many 
years, there were no suggestions or attempts for more transparency or admission of 
third parties to proceedings in which I participated. 
When I chaired the first NAFTA investment arbitration in the Ethyl Case, which 
was between a US investor and the Government of Canada, Mexico made use of the 
opportunity expressly provided for in NAFTA Chapter 11 and did submit additional 
briefs which our Tribunal took into account. 
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In one of my ICSID cases some years ago, though ICSID, according to its usual 
practice, asked the Parties for approval to publish our award and did not receive it 
from both parties, counsel of one of the parties put our award on the website of its 
law firm and, since the award was now public knowledge, no further action or sanc-
tion was taken. 
In one of my other ICSID cases, since the case seemed to raise considerable pub-
lic and political attention in the host state being the respondent in the proceedings, a 
national television station in that country asked for permission to bring live coverage 
of our hearing in Washington DC to the public in the host country. Making use of 
the Tribunal’s discretion under (the old) ICSID Arbitration Rule 32, we decided that 
that provision seemed to imply an only limited attendance of hearings and that such 
a live coverage might change the character of pleadings and was not in the interest 
of an efficient procedure. Permit me to add that I also had difficulties imagining that 
a considerable television audience in a far away country would be interested to fol-
low the technicalities of pleadings, procedural discussion and cross examination in a 
foreign language, English, in Washington DC. 
In the same case, after the hearing in camera was concluded and the transcript of 
the hearing had been distributed to the Parties and the Tribunal, counsel of one of 
the parties put that transcript on the website of its law firm. When the other party 
objected, the Tribunal recommended to withdraw the publication from the website, 
and counsel complied with that recommendation. 
Turning to NAFTA, after considerable discussion on transparency, particularly in 
the United States, NAFTA Chapter 11 investment arbitrations have become more 
transparent in a number of ways. The best illustrations are perhaps the wide scope of 
respective publication made available on all NAFTA cases involving claims against 
the United States on the website of the US Department of State which discloses 
comprehensive information including full texts of procedural documents,as well as 
the website NAFTAClaims.com operated by Prof. Todd Grierson Weiler. 
On the other hand, one has to realize that, for decades, investment disputes have 
been and still are submitted to and decided under the rules of the well known institu-
tions for international commercial arbitration such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and some-
times as well the rules of national arbitral institutions such as those of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC). In fact, of the hundreds of new international arbitra-
tion cases started every year at the ICC, regularly more than 10 % involve states as 
parties. In all of these, the traditional confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings is 
maintained and – as I know from the many of such cases in which I have served as 
an arbitrator – the Parties insist on that confidentiality. 
Zoellner repeats the distinction sometimes made that, in commercial arbitration, 
keeping the arbitral proceedings and their outcome private does generally not en-
counter serious concerns with regard to public interest implications or democratic 
legitimacy, while in state-investor arbitration, the often highly sensitive subject 
matter covered and possible wide-reaching ramifications of a case go beyond the 
effects on the respective parties. With all respect, from my experience, that distinc-
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tion often is not valid. There are ICSID cases which deal with investments of rela-
tively small importance for the respondent host state and small amounts in dispute, 
and commercial arbitration cases under the ICC and UNCITRAL Rules on major 
infrastructure construction, oil, nuclear and geothermal energy, telecommunication 
and similar investments of fundamental importance and high political attention in 
the host state for periods of up to 30 years and for amounts of several billion US-
Dollars in dispute. It is hard to say that transparency is important for the former and 
not for the latter.  
Thus, in conclusion, I submit that, on one hand, there are good reasons for more 
transparency in investment arbitration and more transparency has indeed been real-
ized in recent amendment of relevant provisions and practice. But on the other hand, 
one has to realize that many parties including state parties consider confidentiality of 
the arbitral proceedings as important to them and may decide not to submit to arbi-
tration rules that do not maintain that confidentiality. If we neglect such preferences 
of the parties, we may end up with transparent procedures satisfying understandable 
concerns, but not chosen by parties. 
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Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for What 
Benefit?        
                    
Comment by Noah Rubins* 
A. Introduction 
I first became aware of the issue of “transparency” in investment arbitration in Feb-
ruary 2002, not long after the conclusion of hearings in Loewen v. United States, 
when renowned American journalist Bill Moyers broadcast a television documentary 
called “Trading Democracy.”1  In the program, Moyers attacked the very idea of 
investment arbitration as an “end run around democracy,” where “secret NAFTA 
Tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in lawsuits filed by corpora-
tions against the United States.”  The documentary focused in particular on the 
Loewen case, and expressed shock that “boutique” law firms (a group that expressly 
included the multinational firm of more than 2,000 lawyers to which I then be-
longed) were quietly challenging legitimate regulation and “local traditions” in the 
United States on the basis of “obscure” treaty provisions. 
Continued pressure from various quarters, particularly within the NGO commu-
nity, has given rise to a prolific discussion of the openness of investor-State arbitra-
tion proceedings.2  Practical developments, both at the institutional level and on the 
part of individual treaty-based tribunals, have led to a level of publicity unprece-
dented in the annals of international arbitration, including consistently published 
awards, hearings accessible to the public, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs 
from non-parties.  Despite the rapid change in this area, it appears that insufficient 
consideration has been given to the full scope of interests at stake in bringing so 
much light to the formerly somber recesses of extra-judicial dispute resolution, with 
a number of important issues simply taken for granted in the rush to protect the 
investment arbitration “system” from cries of foul from certain political forces and 
special interest groups. 
 
*  Noah Rubins, Attorney Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Paris. 
1  For a transcript of the program, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB65/transcript. 
html. 
2  See, e.g., Atik, Legitimacy,Ttransparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11 
Process, NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration 135 (Weiler, ed. 2004); Mistelis, Confiden-
tiality and third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corp v. United States, In-
ternational Investment Law and Arbitration 169 (Weiler 2005); Teitelbaum, Privacy, Confiden-
tiality and Third Party Participation: Recent Developments in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitra-
tion, 2  The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 249 (2003). 
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Many of the proponents of increased public access and openness have relied ex-
tensively on the concept of “transparency.”  This is an understandable rhetorical 
approach: there is growing consensus among prestigious international institutions, 
and in particular the World Bank and OECD, that transparency is an essential ele-
ment of good governance, for corporations and States alike.  Transparency in the 
awarding of State contracts, for example, is understood to increase predictability and 
efficiency, reduce the incidence of corruption, and bring important benefits to the 
populations of developing States.  So cloaking arguments related to investment arbi-
tration procedure in the mantle of “transparency” promises a certain level of public 
support by analogy. But the adoption of “good governance” terminology cannot 
convert questions of dispute resolution procedure into questions of good gover-
nance.  The issues and interests at stake are very different, and therefore it is impor-
tant to use concepts appropriate to the task of objectively evaluating the need and 
modalities for additional openness in arbitral proceedings.   
There are three very distinct types of so-called arbitral “transparency,” each with 
its own characteristics, costs and benefits.  The first involves pre-award disclosure, 
allowing the public access to oral and written arbitration proceedings.  Pre-award 
disclosure has a number of aspects, from the publication of basic information about 
a dispute (already carried out systematically by ICSID with regard to the cases it 
administers), to circulation of pleadings and hearing transcripts (practiced until re-
cently only in NAFTA cases),3 to the ultimate pre-award openness, the right of the 
public to attend or observe oral hearings.  The second form of arbitral openness is 
post award disclosure, i.e. the publication of awards and other information about a 
dispute once the proceedings have drawn to a close.  The final type of “transpa-
rency,” the most extreme and controversial, involves privacy rather than disclosure.  
By privacy, I mean to refer to the word “privity,” the state of being a full-fledged 
participant in the dispute.  In practice, the issue of privacy has been expressed 
through the debate as to whether non-party entities might be permitted to make 
amicus curiae submissions to an investment arbitration tribunal.4 
Whether each of these three aspects of “transparency” (or “opacity,” as the case 
may be) presents a problem to be addressed on a systemic basis (to the extent one 
can presume that we are dealing with a unified “system” – more on that later) is a 
question that should be answered only after a serious cost/benefit analysis.  While 
the categories of cost and benefit are similar for each type of transparency, the mag-
nitude of cost and benefit appears to differ for each.  It is also important not to take 
for granted the different costs and benefits that accrue to the variety of different 
 
3  For a recent example of this form of pre-award disclosure in the ICSID context, see Malaysian 
Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, http://www.     
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/caseARB-05-10.htm. 
4  Amicus curiae submissions have become a limited but integral part of litigation before the 
WTOs Appellate Body.  United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, WTO Appellate Body Report of 6 November 1998, paras. 105-
108. 
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stakeholders in and around the investment arbitration “system.”  It should be uncon-
troversial that costs and benefits inure differently to investor-claimants, respondent 
States, national constituencies within the host state, arbitral institutions, non-
governmental environmental protection organizations, etc. 
B. The Perceived Advantages to Openness 
The literature has identified three primary advantages to increased “transparency.”  
These perceived benefits should not be taken for granted, but should rather be 
viewed with a critical eye. 
I. Closing the Democracy Gap 
Closing the “democracy gap” is the benefit most discussed, and was the one empha-
sized in Bill Moyers’ television program, mentioned at the beginning of this paper.  
Investment treaty arbitration has adopted the structure and procedure of “private” 
commercial arbitration systems, with adjudication behind closed doors.  This may be 
appropriate in the private context, where business conflicts have little impact on 
third parties, and where the public disclosure of sensitive commercial information or 
trade secrets may unnecessarily harm the parties.  But in investor-State disputes, 
such secrecy is “un-democratic” (so goes the argument), because it can subject to 
critique the laws and regulations enacted by the duly-elected legislators or execu-
tives of the host State.  But this discussion raises the question as to how broad this 
democracy gap really is.  Is there not a range of activities related to democratic go-
vernance that are outside the public purview?  And perhaps more importantly, how 
is the challenge of a regulation in treaty arbitration different in terms of public inte-
rest and impact on third-party interests from the challenge in commercial arbitration 
of the State’s performance under a contract to buy public goods or services?5  If the 
transparency of arbitration is to depend simply on “public interest,” then separate 
rules will have to govern the process whenever a State is involved, not just in treaty 
cases. 
II. Painting the Full Picture 
A second often-cited benefit of arbitral “openness,” primarily in the context of per-
mitting amicus curiae submissions from non-parties, is that the arbitral tribunal will 
 
5  Indeed, the courts in Australia have curtailed the confidentiality of arbitration in commercial 
cases that substantially affect the “public interest.”  See Esso Australia Resources Ltd & Ors v 
Plowman (Minister for Energy) & Ors (1995) 128 ALR 321. 
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be better able fully to understand the dispute before it once it has received informa-
tion from sources other than the disputing parties.  The theory is that both the   
claimant and respondent State have strategic and political interests that limit the 
scope of information and argumentation they will provide to the arbitrators.  But 
while the parties to investment arbitration (and their counsel) are surely selective 
about the way they present their case, it stands to reason that each of them is best 
positioned to determine the optimal strategy to prevail.   
Given that amicus submissions are normally submitted in support of one of the 
parties (most frequently the respondent State), it would seem that an amicus brief 
offering information extraneous to the supported party’s submissions would threaten 
to undermine the very purpose for which it was created, interfering with the party’s 
strategy for victory.  Some observers contend that certain important information (the 
environmental impact of a measure or its absence, for example) is not at the disposal 
of the host State, or is ignored or discarded for reasons of bureaucratic capture.  But 
these problems would appear best addressed from within the host State by the aspi-
ring amicus.  NGOs often have effective avenues to present their views and data to 
governments where they operate, and to ensure that this information is included in 
submissions. 
It also stands to reason that the effectiveness of non-party submissions in pro-
viding a full picture of the dispute is largely a function of the wholesale opening of 
proceedings to public access.  It is difficult to imagine an amicus brief that effec-
tively fills the gaps in the parties’ submissions, unless the submitting party has had 
the opportunity to scrutinize the case record.  Therefore, in the absence of complete 
“transparency,” with all of the incumbent difficulties and costs to the parties, it is 
questionable whether amicus submissions will advance the tribunal’s analysis at all.6 
III. Harmonization of Jurisprudence 
The third primary benefit of transparency is the increased consistency of investment 
treaty jurisprudence.  The threat of inconsistent decisions came to prominence in the 
wake of the CME and Lauder awards,7 and has since found further impetus in other 
 
6  See Weiler, Restrictions on Submissions of Amicus Briefs to NAFTA investment Arbitral 
Tribunals, TDM, February 2004. 
7  CME Czech Republic, B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award of 13 September 
2003 (finding Czech Republic liable for damages under Netherlands-Czech BIT); Lauder v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award of 3 September 2001 (finding Czech Republic not liable 
under U.S.-Czech BIT). On the conflicting decisions, see Bagner, How to Avoid Conflicting 
Awards: the Lauder and CME Cases, 5 J. World Inv. & Trade 31 (2004). 
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pairs of cases where seemingly similar facts led to different outcomes.8  Setting 
aside for the moment whether inconsistent decisions in investor-State arbitration 
pose a significant problem at all, it is questionable whether additional public access 
to arbitral documentation would in fact harmonize arbitration awards.  For the time 
being, all arbitrators are instructed to decide only the case before them, with due 
regard to the absence of any rule of stare decisis in relation to awards rendered in 
other disputes involving other parties.9  Until this fundamental rule changes, the 
increase of information about other tribunals and the basis on which they ruled 
should have little effect on the way tribunals adjudicate disputes.  Moreover, arbitra-
tors already have access to an unprecedented volume of prior decisions.  Nearly 
every ICSID decision is available to the public within weeks or even days after it is 
issued.  In the absence of binding precedent, is it really necessary or useful to ensure 
access to the voluminous submissions of the parties in prior disputes?10 
C. The Costs of Openness 
In addition to the limitations on the presumed benefits of arbitral openness described 
above, there are also potential costs that are insufficiently explored.     
I. Politicizing Investment Disputes 
Perhaps most important of these is the re-politicization of investment disputes.  
Investment treaties with direct recourse to arbitration were created precisely to 
eliminate the political element of economic disputes, which made outcomes unpre-
dictable and unprincipled. In the words of Horatio Grigera Naón: 
International dispute settlement mechanisms are expected to provide a le-
gal and technical - instead of a political - approach to the resolution of 
disputes regarding foreign investment.  By advancing the resolution of 
disputes through the furtherance of principles of justice rather than politi-
 
8  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 
January 2004. 
9  See, e.g., Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision 
on Jurisdiction of 17 June 2005, para. 36 (“The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has ren-
dered its decision independently, without considering itself bound by any other judgments or 
arbitral awards”). 
10  It is a separate and valid question whether investment arbitration jurisprudence is, on the 
whole, less consistent than other legal systems, and whether lingering conflicts between indi-
vidual case decisions are cause for serious concern.  For the affirmative answer on both points, 
see Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Inter-
national Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2005). 
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cal accommodation (which may, of course, be pursued in parallel by other 
means) private international dispute resolution devices provide a better 
technical and appropriately depoliticized framework for the development 
of substantive law and principles regarding foreign investment protection 
likely to enjoy wide international consensus.11 
The father of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches, envisaged the investor-State 
dispute resolution system as way to create a more predictable and stable investment 
environment, and one in which disputes would be less likely to arise.12  Whereas 
prior dispute resolution practices, such as diplomatic espousal, economic sanctions, 
and even gunboat diplomacy gave the advantage to economically and militarily 
powerful States, the new system was intended to place all States on equal footing, 
and to allow dispute resolution to occur on the basis of principle.  Unfortunately, the 
litigation of disputes in conditions of complete publicity does not lend itself to such 
principled outcomes.  Where parties are free to present their case to the “court” of 
public opinion, the risk of abuse and re-politicization is great.  Of special concern is 
the possibility that claimant investors will relate an extreme and one-sided view of 
the facts underlying an investment dispute, imposing upon the respondent State the 
burden of criticism on a diplomatic level, immediate negative effects on external 
perceptions of its investment climate, pressure from international lenders, and other 
negative effects long before the parties’ positions are assessed by an arbitral tribu-
nal.  In the worst case, an investor-claimant may initiate arbitration precisely with 
these effects in mind, hoping to obtain “nuisance value” compensation through ex-
tensive publicity, without regard to the actual merits (or absence thereof) of its 
claim. 
A related and far from salubrious effect of re-politicization is the reduction of set-
tlement opportunities.  Since the foundation of ICSID, a large proportion of invest-
ment disputes have been resolved through amicable settlement before an award on 
the merits was rendered.  Such an outcome is clearly in the interests of all the pri-
mary stakeholders, both in terms of arbitration cost savings, the possibility of pre-
serving investment activities, and the elimination of any need to engage in enforce-
ment of an arbitral award.  But the early publication of extensive information about 
the merits of an investment dispute can result in the hardening of positions, particu-
larly that of the respondent State.  Government officials, particularly the mid-level 
bureaucrats who are typically charged with managing disputes with foreign inves-
tors, are subject to rather abstract pressures that can discourage settlement even in 
the most propitious circumstances. In a litigation proceeding, a result less than a 
total victory can be blamed on the arbitrator or judge, while the government official 
 
11   Grigera Naón, The Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Private Parties: An 
Overview from the Perspective of the ICC, 1 J. World Inv. 59-60 (2000). 
12  Broches, The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement 75, 77 (Rubin & Nelson, eds. 
1985). See also Shihata, Towards a greater Depoliticiztion of Investment Disuputes: The Roles 
of ICSID and MIGA, 30-32 (1993). 
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himself will have to take responsibility for any concessions included in a settlement 
agreement. This pressure is increased where public opinion has turned against the 
foreign investor, and therefore any compromise viewed as a betrayal of national 
interests.  Likewise, where the investor levels allegations of mismanagement, cor-
ruption, or arbitrary conduct against the State and its officials, settlement may be 
tantamount to political suicide, perceived as (at least partial) admission of the facts 
alleged.  It would seem that increased publicity (particularly one-sided and argumen-
tative) can only intensify these forces, which form a significant barrier to amicable 
settlement in investor-State disputes.  
II. Increased Time and Cost 
Increased openness of arbitral proceedings is bound to have some effect on the 
speed and cost-effectiveness of the dispute resolution process.  For less invasive 
types of “transparency,” such as post-award disclosure of awards and pleadings, the 
added cost is minimal, and delay non-existent by definition.  Other forms of public 
participation, in particular the submission and review of amicus curiae briefs, are of 
greater concern in this regard.  The review of amicus submissions requires arbitra-
tors first to determine whether a brief will be accepted at all, then a review of the 
submission once made, and finally an analysis of whether the contents of the sub-
mission should affect the tribunal’s decision.  Perhaps more significant still are the 
costs and time involved in the parties’ review and response to non-party submis-
sions.  The resulting costs and delays are multiplied if a third party is given the op-
portunity to reply to critiques of its opinion raised by the parties.   
Given the voluminous pleadings and massive legal costs already common in in-
vestment arbitration proceedings, and the burdens placed upon developing State 
respondents and small- to mid-sized corporate (or individual) claimants, even a 
modest increase in expense should be accepted only after careful consideration.  
Likewise, while speedy adjudication is hardly taken for granted in most investment 
arbitration cases, the delay caused by an additional round of briefing in response to 
amicus briefs could be significant. 
III. De-Harmonization of the Procedural “System” 
A final negative consequence of increased “transparency” that has received almost 
no attention is the introduction of additional heterogeneity into a procedural “sys-
tem” that has already drawn criticism for its lack of internal harmonization.  Manda-
tory public access to pleadings, awards, hearings, and the adjudicative process itself 
is generally accepted to require some adjustment to the treaty texts or procedural 
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rules governing investment arbitration.13  Whether this will mean fundamental 
change to the Washington Convention, the ICSID Rules, or widespread alteration of 
individual consent documents such as model BITs, remains to be seen.  Already 
certain modifications have been made to the ICSID Rules and, more drastically, to 
the U.S. Model BIT of 2004.   
As these changes are implemented, the variations in procedural rules will widen 
between, for example, arbitration under the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules, or pur-
suant to the BITs of the United States and the Netherlands.  As a result, claimants 
will gain an additional (and unintended) advantage from their unilateral power to 
select the dispute resolution method of their choice.  The risk of strategic behavior is 
particularly acute in light of recent jurisprudence granting “mailbox companies” 
access to BIT protections in certain circumstances.14  A claimant who stands to 
benefit from broad publicity (a U.S. company investing in a less-developed country 
dependent upon U.S. foreign aid, for example) might seek arbitration at ICSID un-
der the U.S. BIT, while a company preferring confidentiality (whether due to sensi-
tive business information or skeletons in the closet) might choose UNCITRAL arbi-
tration under a more traditional BIT through a corporate subsidiary of the appropri-
ate nationality. 
The result of this new facet of the “treaty shopping” problem is less predictability 
of both process and outcome.  To the extent that investment arbitration is meant to 
stabilize the investment climate and provide both investors and States a view of how 
disputes are likely to be resolved, such a development would appear negative. 
D. What Cost for Which Stakeholder? 
With these (and other) costs and benefits in mind, does the balance tip towards in-
creased openness, or the continued limitation of public access to investment arbitra-
tion?  The answer to this question is likely to differ for each stakeholder in the arbi-
tral process, and with respect to each of the three types of “transparency.”  This 
short presentation is not the place for a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of 
each permutation of stakeholders and publicity, and below I suggest only a few 
relevant thoughts for consideration in this regard. 
 
13  Naturally, the parties to a dispute are free to set the level of publicity for the adjudication of 
their dispute as they see fit.  Moreover, tribunals have ruled that the applicable procedural rules 
(UNCITRAL and ICSID) provide them the authority to take certain steps in the interest of 
“transparency,” should they deem such measures to be necessary and desirable.  Most obser-
vers supporting increased openness, however, appear to favor a more systematic and manda-
tory approach to the issue, with a default rule implemented supporting public disclosure and 
the review of amicus submissions. 
14  See, e.g., Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 Febru-
ary 2005, para. 128 (under ECT, it is “irrelevant who owns or controls the Claimant at any ma-
terial time”). 
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The benefit of most concern to the public at large is clearly the closing of the 
much-touted “democracy gap.”  This defect is largely solved by post-award publica-
tion of decisions.  It is for this reason that the general population in the only host 
State to experience “real time” opening of hearings – the United States – has reacted 
with disinterest to more extensive access.  In the first investment arbitration with 
public hearings, for example, only four people attended.  At the same time, the pub-
lic bears very little of the direct cost associated with additional openness, except to 
the extent that pressure from publicity results in a disadvantageous settlement by 
their government.  Naturally, such an outcome leads (in theory, at least) to an alloca-
tion of tax receipts that could otherwise be used to provide public services.   
Non-governmental organizations, by contrast, glean only scant benefit from post-
award transparency, since they focus upon influencing the outcome of particular 
arbitral disputes in accordance with the particular interests that they represent.  
Moreover, the “democracy gap” is of little concern to many NGOs, which are pre-
cisely created to overcome the under-representation of certain interest groups within 
the structure of democratic decision-making.  NGOs do gain a significant benefit 
from pre-award publicity and the participation of non-parties in the arbitration pro-
cess, since it is they who most often submit amicus filings. 
For obvious reasons, investor-claimants gain only limited benefit from post-
award publicity, since their efforts are centered on victory in the case at hand.  
Moreover, investors do not stand to derive significant advantage from the accep-
tance of amicus submissions.  Most such filings are made on behalf of respondent 
States by non-governmental organizations, rather than by business groups.  As ex-
plained above, however, the possibility of broad publicity before an award is ren-
dered benefits claimants, in that the threat of disclosure can compel early settlement.  
The claimant bears little of the costs incurred as a result of this kind of transparency 
– most of which are carried by the respondent State.  Of course, the claimant will 
have to pay part of the price for transparency, to the extent it results in increased 
legal expenses or delay in the rendering of an award. 
Respondent States bear the brunt of the cost of increased pre-award publicity in 
investment arbitration.  As noted above, the publication of factual allegations can 
increase pressure on respondent States in a number of ways.  While accusations may 
run both ways, counterclaims are exceedingly rare in investment treaty arbitration.  
Therefore, it is primarily the respondent who will fear pre-award openness.  In this 
regard, the increased risk of procedural abuse through the imposition and publicity 
of frivolous or exaggerated claims is an important cost.  The respondent stands to 
benefit from the intervention of non-party actors, who tend to support the host-State 
position in their amicus submissions.  But it is not always clear that such filings are 
wholly welcome, as they may be seen to distract from the more central aspects of the 
respondent government’s defense. 
 222
E. Conclusion 
The concern with pre-award transparency (and amicus submissions, which is 
founded upon the former kind of public access) is that investment treaties were de-
vised to de-politicize investment disputes.  Both claimant and respondent can at-
tempt to use openness as a weapon contrary to this fundamental principle.  Politi-
cized disputes are less predictable in outcome than legal disputes, and therefore 
hinder FDI flows by making them more expensive.  Moreover, the exposure during 
a dispute, and the resulting “parallel proceedings” in the court of public opinion 
hardens positions, exacerbates disputes, and makes amicable settlement less likely. 
This is all above and beyond the relatively minor, but not insignificant cost of 
added time spent arranging for the reviewing third party submissions.  In this regard, 
it seems logical that a system be devised for such intervenors to contribute to arbitra-
tion costs in exchange for the benefit they receive from amicus participation.  Per-
haps this is just part of the practical and logistical details that need to be worked out 
now that - supposedly - we are in consensus about the need for transparency.  But 
such issues are likely to prove more difficult than has generally been recognized.  
Investment arbitration is not limited to adjudication within the ICSID system, and so 
amending the ICSID Rules is not enough.  An inconsistency in confidential and 
privacy provisions between ICSID and UNCITRAL, for example, will only serve to 
deepen the heterogeneity of arbitration procedure of which the proponents of trans-
parency already complain.  Moreover, this variety of provisions can only benefit 
claimant investors, since it is their right in investment treaties to select from a menu 
of arbitration rules in accordance with their strategy in a given case. 
All of this is not to say that awards - and perhaps pleadings – should never be 
made available to the public, after the close of arbitral proceedings.  It would appear 
that the cost of such publication is minimal, and the potential benefit relatively great.  
The analysis for pre-award openness and de-privatization of the arbitration process 
is much more ambiguous.  It appears that claimants stand to benefit most from such 
developments, and States who stand to bear the highest cost.  This may be accep-
table to the architects of the system, because: (1) States are meant to bear such a 
burden, because in return they receive a competitive advantage in FDI placement; 
(2) the third-party (i.e. public) benefit outweighs the cost; or (3) public pressure, not 
matter how irrational, is enough to bring the system crumbling down – a result that 
will adversely affect all stakeholders in the investment arbitration process.  All this 
may be the proper result once the cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken.  But the 
process has yet to begin, as most commentators have skipped to the end, presuming 
an answer that “feels right.” 
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Is There A Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure?    
                   
Christian J. Tams∗ 
A. Introduction 
In October 2004, the ICSID Secretariat issued a Discussion Paper entitled "Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration".1 This paper came at a time 
when ICSID dispute settlement, judging from the number of pending cases, flouri-
shed. Yet the increasing number of proceedings not only signalled a general accep-
tance of the system, but also brought with it new problems – which the Secretariat 
apparently sought to tackle from a position of strength, by leading the debate about a 
number of reforms. The various measures suggested in the Discussion Paper were an 
interesting blend of purely technical issues and drastic measures of a far-reaching 
nature. Among the latter were proposals set out in Chapter VI and the Paper's An-
nex, in which the Secretariat showed itself prepared to "pursue the creation of […] 
an ICSID Appeals Facility",2 and put forward rather concrete proposals for that 
option.3 As commentators did not fail to observe, these proposals went to the heart 
of the ICSID system of dispute settlement and raised many issues of a fundamental 
nature.4 In retrospect, it is curious how lightly they were raised. In fairness, it must 
be admitted that when suggesting the establishment of an appeals facility, the Secre-
tariat responded to calls, by a number of ICSID member States (and notably the 
United States), for a reform of the existing dispute settlement system. Yet, the clear 
majority of ICSID participants voiced concerns during informal debates in late 2005 
and early 2006, or even came out openly hostile against the idea. As a result, ICSID 
officials seem to have discarded any immediate plans for the creation of an appeals 
 
∗  Christian Tams, LL.M. (Cantab. 2000), Ph.D. (Cantab. 2004) is Senior Research Assistant at 
the Walter – Schücking Institute for International Law, University of Kiel, Germany. 
1  'Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration' (22 October 2004), available 
on the internet: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm. 
2  Ibid., para. 23. 
3  Ibid. 
4  See e.g. South Centre Analytical Note, 'Developments on Discussion for the Improvements of 
the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries' 
(SC/TADP/AN/INV/1), available at http://www.southcentre.org. 
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facility, accepting that the earlier proposals had been considered by many as 'prema-
ture'.5  
The present paper proceeds on the assumption that while temporarily off the 
agenda, the debate about an ICSID appellate system is not over. In fact, it may only 
be just beginning – but this time without the time-pressure that the Secretariat's 
reform proposal inevitably introduced. It is submitted that indeed, much more time 
is needed properly to evaluate the pros and cons of an appellate structure. The pre-
sent paper seeks to contribute to that debate. It explores various arguments that 
might possibly militate in favour of a two-tiered system of dispute settlement (infra, 
section C.) but also assesses obstacles to such a reform (section B.), as well as alter-
natives to an appeals structure (section D.).  
B. Obstacles  
Before examining arguments that might support an overhaul of the present system, it 
seems necessary to discuss obstacles to reform. The present section addresses three 
rather different problems that any reform proposal must face. In very brief terms, 
these obstacles can be formulated in the following propositions:  
• The ICSID dispute settlement system at present already allows for a review of 
awards in exceptional circumstances.  
• The ICSID dispute settlement system deliberately restricted review to these 
exceptional circumstances, while otherwise stressing the need for finality. 
• A reform of the ICSID dispute settlement system depends on stringent majority 
requirements and therefore requires broad political backing.  
All three obstacles will be addressed in turn.  
I. The Present System Permits a Review of Awards in Exceptional Circumstances 
The first point to make is that even at present, there is some scope for a review of 
ICSID awards. When assessing that scope, it is necessary to distinguish between 
awards governed by the ICSID Convention proper, and those rendered under the 
Additional Facility Rules.  
 
5  Investment Treaty News: 'ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process' (29 March 2006), available on the internet: <http://www.iisd.org/ invest-
ment/itn/news.asp>. Cf. already the ICSID Working Paper 'Suggested Changes to the ICSID 
Rules and Regulations' (12 May 2005), available on the internet: <http://www.worldbank.org 
/icsid/highlights/sug-changes.htm>, para. 4. 
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1. ICSID Convention Awards 
Awards rendered under the ICSID Convention can only be attacked by the proce-
dures provided by the Convention itself. In particular, Article 54 of the Washington 
Convention obliges States to treat pecuniary6 awards as if they were final judgments 
of the State's own courts. For the purposes of recognition and enforcement,7 the 
ICSID Convention thus excludes any outside re-assessment of awards, or possibility 
of vacatur, by national courts. However, Article 54 is only part of the picture. It is 
one feature of a careful compromise struck during drafting. The other main feature is 
equally relevant and equally remarkable: internally, i.e. by mechanisms set out in the 
Washington Convention itself, ICSID awards can at present be reviewed. Unlike 
most other international dispute settlement mechanisms, the ICSID Convention not 
only recognises narrowly described forms of rectification, revision and interpretation 
of awards. In addition, Article 52 of the Washington Convention permits for a sys-
temic review of awards in the form of an annulment procedure by ad hoc annulment 
committees. The scope of that annulment review has always been much discussed.8 
As the wording of Article 52 clarifies, there are five grounds of annulment: (1) the 
arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) it manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(3) a tribunal member was corrupt; (4) there was a serious departure from a funda-
mental rule of procedure, or (5) the award did not state the reasons upon which it 
was based. 
At least at first glance, this list (which includes some rather vague notions such as 
"manifest excess of powers") may seem impressive. But Article 52 is important both 
for what it says and for what it does not say. While allowing for an unusual review 
procedure on five specific grounds, it implicitly excludes other forms of review.9 In 
fact, clear evidence suggests that the drafters intended annulment to be an excep-
tional remedy and that the five grounds were to be narrowly construed.10 More im-
portantly, they were adamant that Article 52 should not be used as a form of sub-
stantive appellate review. In terms of the applicable standards governing systemic 
 
6  The express reference to pecuniary obligations implies that non-pecuniary injunctions are not 
covered by ICSID's enhanced enforcement regime: see Toope, Mixed International Arbitration 
(1990), 245-246. 
7  The Convention regime is less ambitious with respect to State immunity from execution: As 
Article 55 clarifies, Article 54 does not oblige States to enforce judgments which could not be 
enforced because of immunity from execution. For an explanation cf. the Report of the Execu-
tive Directors, 1 ICSID Reports, 32. 
8  For the most detailed assessment see the commentary on Article 52, in: Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention, and the various contributions in Gaillard/Banifatemi (eds.), Annulment of ICSID 
Awards (Huntington, 2004). 
9  Arnoldt, Praxis des Weltbankübereinkommens (1997), 184; Amadio, Le contentieux interna-
tional de l'investissement privé et la convention de la banque mondiale du 18 Mars 1965 
(1967), 240. 
10  For details see Arnoldt, Praxis des Weltbankübereinkommens, 184 et seq. 
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review, this means that Article 52 is only concerned with the procedural propriety of 
an award rather with its correctness as a matter of substance.11 
Unfortunately, ICSID annulment committees have not always followed the text 
and spirit of Article 52. It is well known that at least some of them have taken a 
rather expansive view of their powers and have effectively used the concepts of 
‘manifest excess of power’12 and ‘failure to state reasons’13 as stepping stones for a 
substantive review of the initial award.14 While subsequent annulment decisions 
have adopted more restrictive approaches, it seems fair to say that the scope of Arti-
cle 52 remains controversial.15 It may simply be that Article 52, by requiring com-
mittee members to turn a blind eye on a potentially wrong decision, asks too much 
of highly qualified lawyers. But at least at the conceptual level, the limited nature of 
annulment under Article 52 is of crucial importance, and the distinction between 
annulment and forms of substantive review needs to be maintained. While not pro-
viding for a comprehensive appeals system, the Washington Convention thus regu-
lates questions of review in a very differentiated manner, striking a careful balance 
between the need for finality on the one hand, and the possibility of review on the 
other. 
2. Additional Facility Awards  
ICSID Additional Facility awards are governed by a rather different regime. Since 
there is no equivalent to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, Additional Facility 
awards are not subject to any internal review procedure comparable to annulment. 
However, they can be attacked externally, before national courts, where recognition 
and enforcement must be sought.16 At the seat of the arbitration, national courts can 
be asked to set aside awards in vacatur applications. During enforcement proper, 
 
11  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review 73 (2005), 1547; van den 
Houtte, Article 52 of the Washington Convention – A Brief Introduction, in: Gail-
lard/Banifatemi (footnote 8), 12; Schreuer, ICSID Convention (footnote 8), Art. 52 mn. 11. 
12  Article 52(1)(b) ICSID Convention. 
13  Article 52(1)(e) ICSID Convention. 
14  For a detailed assessment of annulment jurisprudence see Schreuer, Three Generations of 
ICSID Annulment Proceedings, in: Gaillard/Banifatemi, (footnote 8), 17; Schwartz, Finality at 
What Cost?, ibid., 43. For highly critical reactions to the Klöckner and Amco annulment deci-
sions see e.g. Redfern, ICSID – Losing Its Appeal?, 3 Arbitration International (1989), 98; 
Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 Duke Law 
Journal 739. 
15  The debate between contributors to the volume edited by Gaillard and Banifatemi (footnote 8) 
testifies to this. Contrast e.g. Schreuer's positive assessment of the Wena and Vivendi decisions 
(e.g. at 18: "[T]he ICSID annulment process has found its proper balance.") with the highly 
critical pieces by Schwartz (43-86) and Cremades (87-95). 
16  'Enforcement' is used here to include the recognition of the award; for a similar use of termino-
logy see e.g. Collier/Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (1999), 265. 
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respondents can ask national courts to refuse recognition – typically under the condi-
tions set out in Article V of the 1958 New York Convention.17 The rules governing 
these two forms of review are manifold.18 But very simplistically, it can be said that 
awards can be reviewed for procedural defects broadly similar to the grounds of 
annulment set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.19 In addition, Article 
V(2)(b) as well as many national rules governing vacatur applications allow an 
award to be attacked if it and/or its enforcement is contrary to public policy.20 This 
means that the scope for review is somewhat broader than under Article 52 ICSID 
Convention which deliberately opted against a public policy exception. Both under 
national laws governing vacatur applications and at the stage of enforcement proper, 
some courts have relied on public policy exceptions to perform a substantive review 
of awards. But these attempts are few and far between, and are difficult to bring in 
line with the overall aim of the New York Convention, which intends to enhance the 
prospects for enforcement.21 Although applications of the public policy exception 
will often require national courts to look into the substance of an award, this means 
that enforcement should only be refused in highly exceptional circumstances. Again, 
this was a deliberate choice, aimed at preserving the integrity of arbitral awards, and 
at securing their enforceability. 
II. The ICSID System Deliberately Opted Against Broader Options of Review 
The previous considerations suggest that ICSID, already having some sort of review, 
may be an unlikely candidate for an appeals debate. But there is a second obstacle to 
reform, and that is the fact that the ICSID system deliberately opted against broader 
options of review. To some extent, this argument has been dealt with already, when 
discussing the scope of Article 52 of the Convention. Yet, rather than stressing the 
narrow scope of annulment (or of national court review, for that matter), one might 
equally underline the reasons leading ICSID drafters to restrict the options for re-
view. Three such positive reasons can be distinguished:  
 
17  330 U.N.T.S. 38. Similar provisions are included in the Inter-American [Panama] Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration, OAS Treaty Series, No. 42. 
18  For a more detailed assessment of the points made in the following see Franck (footnote 11), 
Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1548-1557. 
19  See Collier/Lowe (footnote 16), 267-270, for further details. 
20  For comment cf. Toope (footnote 6), 129-138. 
21  In its Report, the New York Convention drafting committee noted that public policy excepti-
ons could only come into play if enforcement would be "distinctly contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of the legal system of the country where the award is invoked" (Report of the Committee 
on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 28 March 1955, UN Doc. E/2704 and 
E/AC.42/4/Rev.1.). For a detailed treatment of national courts' approaches see the ILA Study 
into the application of public policy by enforcement courts, eventually leading to a Resolution 
adopted at the ILA's 2002 New Delhi Session, both reproduced in International Law Associati-
on (ed.), Report of the Seventieth Conference (London, 2002). 
 228
• For a start, drafters were keen to establish a system that would solve disputes 
within a reasonable period of time22 – hence their insistence on time-limits, and 
provisions preventing parties from frustrating proceedings.23 The reason for this 
is not difficult to understand. Proceedings, whether judicial or arbitral, leave le-
gal positions in abeyance and produce uncertainty. As a general matter, dispute 
settlement systems striving for efficiency should therefore seek to minimise the 
time spent on resolving legal and factual questions. In the case of investment ar-
bitration, this rationale would seem to be particularly relevant.24 Often, disputes 
concern important investment projects binding a relevant portion of a com-
pany’s budget. By definition, investments prompting ICSID disputes also occur 
abroad, i.e. in a country in which the investor is not registered. Finally, as the 
sets of Argentine or SGS cases illustrate, parties (whether investors or States) 
may have entered into different contracts of a similar type, which means that 
one decision is likely to affect a variety of legal relations. Given these factors, 
the drafters were certainly correct in stressing the need for a reasonably quick 
resolution of disputes. Whether investment arbitration presently meets that goal 
is of course a matter for discussion. In contrast, it seems evident that whatever 
its design, an appeals structure would not reduce, but increase the amount of 
time lapsing before a definite decision on the merits. While much depends on 
time frames, it seems beyond doubt that introducing an appeals facility would 
complicate the task of resolving disputes quickly. 
• The second point is related. It is based on a simple calculation: the longer the 
proceedings, the higher the costs. Again, much depends on the specific features 
of the appeals structure, but it seems clear that litigation in a two-tiered system 
is more expansive than with only one round of proceedings. This in itself is a 
potential drawback of a reform.25 However, higher costs may have further im-
plications: a more expansive litigation might deter smaller participants (whether 
smaller companies or poor States) from pursuing their rights.26 It might there-
 
22  Cf. South Centre Analytical Note (footnote 4), para. 59. 
23  Cf. e.g. Articles 45, 37(2)(b) and 38 of the ICSID Convention. 
24  See Tawil, An International Appellate System: Progress or Pitfall?, Transnational Dispute 
Management 2/2005, 69 (70): "[I]nvestors require quick decisions as trust is a necessary requi-
rement to be complied for investments to be done." 
25  Cf. South Centre Analytical Note (footnote 4), para. 68: "A particular challenge, for develo-
ping countries, of the appeal facility is the cost of such a proceeding", noting that unlike in in-
vestment arbitration, "[t]he expense of the Appellate Body of WTO is born by the organisation 
itself" (ibid.). 
26  Cf. Wälde, Alternatives for Obtaining Greater Consistency in Investment Arbitration: An 
Appellate Institution after the WTO, Authoritative Treaty Arbitration or Mandatory Consolida-
tion?, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 71 (74): "For a well-resourced government 
facing an under-resourced opponent (typically a smaller, entrepreneurial company with shal-
low pockets), an important strategy is simply to drain away the claimant’s litigation war-chest 
until it is compelled to give up. Adding an appeal will reinforce the strength of such a litigati-
on-resource based strategy." 
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fore act as an external factor harming the bargaining position of some ICSID 
participants. 
• Lastly, ICSID drafters were prepared to place a considerable measure of trust in 
ICSID panels of arbitrators. They were convinced that an award, by these arbi-
trators, should be preserved at nearly all costs – hence the decision against any 
national court review and the narrow scope of annulment proceedings under Ar-
ticle 52.27 This is not to suggest that their approach was the only acceptable one. 
However, it is a decision that was taken in 1965, and one that can certainly be 
described as fundamental to the ICSID dispute settlement system. Reversing it 
would not only mean a departure from the drafters' original intent. More impor-
tantly, the decision in favour of a second level of dispute settlement would also 
risk undermining the authority of the first level decision – i.e. the regular ICSID 
panels of arbitrators. If first-level decisions were regularly appealed, they might 
very well end up de-valued. In fact, experience with the WTO system of dispute 
settlement suggests that this is a risk that needs to be taken seriously.28 In any 
event, that decision would show a considerable degree of distrust in the one 
level of dispute settlement in whose decision the Convention drafters delibera-
tely placed great trust. 
III. A Meaningful Reform Requires Broad Political Support  
The preceding considerations suggest that both ICSID Convention and Additional 
Facility awards can be reviewed in exceptional cases, but are deliberately not subject 
to an appellate procedure. The proposed reform is therefore hard to reconcile with an 
essential feature of the present system. But there is a further, more practical obstacle: 
Meaningful reform proposals depend on stringent majority requirements. The degree 
of support required primarily depends on the type of appeals facility envisaged. 
• The most ambitious proposal would be to introduce a single and comprehensive 
appeals facility competent to re-assess all awards rendered by ICSID tribunals. 
For that to be the case, the proposed appeals structure would have to be estab-
lished by the very ICSID constitutional rules (whether ICSID Convention or 
Additional Facility rules). Unsurprisingly, this ambitious proposal faces the 
most serious problems of implementation. In the case of ICSID Convention 
awards, it would conflict with Article 53 of the Convention, which stipulates in 
no unclear terms that awards "shall not be subject to any appeal".29 The most 
straightforward way of addressing this conflict would be to amend the Conven-
 
27  Supra, section B.I.1. 
28  A statistical analysis shows that between 1995 and 2000, 77% of WTO Panel Reports were 
appealed: see Park, Statistical Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2000), 
in: Petersmann/Ortino, The WTO Dispute Settlement System (2004), 531 (541). 
29  As Sands/Mackenzie/Shany observe (Manual of International Courts and Tribunals, 1999, at 
90): "the exclusion of appeal is absolute". 
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tion. Pursuant to its Article 66, amendments require the ratification (or other 
form of approval) of each of the 143 member States. That far-reaching proposals 
should meet with a unanimous consensus however hardly seems realistic, at 
least in the short term. In the case of Additional Facility awards, matters would 
be less complicated, as there is no equivalent to Article 53. Still, Article 52(4) of 
the Additional Facility Rules (Schedule C)30 declares awards to be "final and 
binding on the parties", which shows that the Additional Facility Rules envisage 
a one-level system of arbitration. To allow for a comprehensive system of ap-
peals, they would thus have to be amended. While this would not require the 
support of all member States, it could only be done through a majority decision 
of the ICSID Administrative Council.31 
• Given these majority requirements, it comes as no surprise that ICSID partici-
pants have begun to look for more feasible ways of allowing at least some par-
ties to appeal some awards rendered by ICSID tribunals. These more realistic 
proposals would give up the goal of establishing a comprehensive appeals facili-
ty, and would open an appeals option for parties that jointly decide to avail 
themselves of it. The easiest way to do so would be to provide for an appeals 
option within the instruments establishing ICSID jurisdiction (typically bilateral 
or multilateral investment treaties). Alternatively, States could agree on a Proto-
col to the ICSID Convention specifically providing for appeals.32 Legally spea-
king, nothing could prevent States and/or investors from so doing. As far as IC-
SID Additional Facility arbitration is concerned, parties of course are free to de-
fine the scope of ICSID arbitration, and could do so by establishing a second 
level of arbitration. With respect to ICSID Convention awards, these proposals 
would clearly circumvent Article 53, but would be justified as a valid inter-se 
modification.33 Yet, while legally possible and politically more feasible, a sys-
tem of appeals established under specific treaties might not be able to fulfil the 
hopes of those arguing for a reform of the ICSID system. This is a matter to be 
assessed more fully in subsequent sections of this paper,34 but the main problem 
may be briefly referred to at this point already. If the appeals option depended 
on the provisions of investment treaties or a Protocol to the Convention, ICSID 
would offer a ‘piecemeal appeal’, open in some, but not in all disputes. If ap-
 
30  Available on the internet: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm. 
31  Cf. Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention, which also served as the basis for the very estab-
lishment of the Additional Facility Rules. For comment see Schreuer, The ICSID Convention 
(footnote 8), Art. 6, mn. 23-26. 
32  Cf. Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and Its Scope of Review, Transnational Dispute 
Management 2/2005, 10. 
33  Cf. Article 41 VCLT, pursuant to which an inter-se modification is permitted if it is not "(b) … 
prohibited by the treaty and: (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; (ii) does not relate to a provi-
sion, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and pur-
pose of the treaty as a whole." 
34  Infra, section D.I.3. 
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peals structures were to be established by different investment treaties, there 
might eventually even be not one single, but different appeals facilities, possibly 
functioning according to different rules and standards. 
C. Arguments for Introducing an Appeals Facility 
The preceding section has sought to underline the difficulties to which the estab-
lishment of an investment appellate structure would give rise. The present section 
addresses arguments suggesting that notwithstanding these difficulties, the reform 
should be pursued. More specifically, it breaks down the different calls for reform 
into four (inter-related) arguments, and addresses each of them in turn. 
I. An Appellate System Would Foster Consistency 
The main argument supporting the establishment of an ICSID appeals facility is that 
such a facility could improve the consistency of international investment law. This 
argument is widely taken up by commentators. For example, in its discussion paper 
of late 2004, right at the start at the section considering an appellate structure, the 
ICSID Secretariat recognised that "the appeal mechanism would be intended to 
foster coherence and consistency in the case law"35 (while also claiming that 
"[s]ignificant inconsistencies have not to date been a general feature of the jurispru-
dence of ICSID"36). Similarly, many commentators stress the need for an investment 
court of appeals uniting a seemingly fragmented body of law.37 The propositions 
underlying this 'consistency argument' are that ICSID awards at present lack consis-
tency, that this is a problem, and that an appellate body could solve it. All three 
issues will be addressed in turn. 
 
35  ICSID Discussion Paper (footnote 5), para. 21. 
36  Ibid. 
37  See e.g. Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1617 et seq.; Bishop (footnote 
32), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 10; Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment 
Court, The American Lawyer, Summer 2004 issue, available on the internet: http://www.       
americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html. For earlier proposals see already 
Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving 
Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in: Hunter et al. (eds.) The Internationalisa-
tion of International Arbitration: The LCIA Centenary Conference (1995), 111; Schwebel, The 
Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards, ibid., 115. 
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1. Are Investment Awards Inconsistent?  
Disaggregating the issues, it is first necessary to assess whether there are at present 
inconsistent investment awards. The answer to this question is in the affirmative. At 
least in some instances, tribunals have rendered diametrically opposed or conflicting 
decisions, and have also openly criticised the reasoning of previous awards. As the 
cases are well-known, it may be sufficient to deal with them en passant, and to focus 
on the different types of inconsistency that they stand for.38 
The Lauder cases39 provide a spectacular example of opposite decisions by dif-
ferent tribunals, concerning the same set of facts, almost identical parties, and nearly 
identical legal norms. In fairness, it must be admitted that they were decided by 
UNCITRAL tribunals. Yet, their treatment may be justified here, as the decisions 
concerned substantive aspects of investment law not depending on a particular arbi-
tral framework, and as they epitomise the problem of inconsistency. In essence, the 
two arbitral tribunals differed on the extent to which the Czech Republic had 
breached its obligations vis-à-vis a US American investor, Mr. Lauder, and a Dutch 
company (CME) controlled by him. A Stockholm arbitral tribunal found that the 
Czech Republic had committed an expropriation in the sense of Art. 5 of the Dutch-
Czech BIT40 when depriving CME of exclusive rights in the television business, 
holding that the relevant conduct (by the Czech Media Council) "smacks of dis-
crimination against the foreign investor."41 Faced with essentially the same expro-
priation standard in the US-Czech BIT,42 the London tribunal held that the measures 
in question did not amount to an expropriation, as there had been no direct interfe-
rence by Czech authorities, as Mr. Lauder's property rights had been maintained, 
and as the measure did not benefit the Czech Republic.43 Based on their respective 
 
38  For a more detailed treatment of the relevant awards see e.g. Franck (footnote 11), Fordham 
Law Journal 73 (2005), 1558 et seq. 
39  CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 13 September 2001 and Final 
Award of 14 March 2003 (the 'Stockholm Award'); Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award of 
3 September 2001 (the 'London Award'). All awards are available on the internet: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. See also the subsequent decision by the Swedish 
Svea Court of Appeals, which decided not to vacate the Stockholm award: Judgment of 15 
May 2003, available on the internet: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
40  Article 5 of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT provides that neither country "shall take any 
measures depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of […] their investments unless the follo-
wing conditions are complied with: (a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under 
due process of law; (b) the measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied 
by just compensation." 
41  Stockholm Award (footnote 39), para. 612. 
42  Article III(1) of the US-Czech Republic BIT provides that: "Investments shall not be expropri-
ated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation 
or nationalization (expropriation) except: for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner; 
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due 
process of law and the general principles or treatment provided for in Article II(2)." 
43  London Award (footnote 39), para. 201. 
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reasoning, the Stockholm tribunal in its final award ordered the defendant to pay 
$355 million to CME, while the London tribunal refused to award Mr. Lauder any 
damages. Whatever the correct result, it is beyond doubt (and is widely accepted 
among commentators), that the contradictory result of the two Lauder cases has 
primarily had one effect: as was aptly put by one observer, it "brings the law into 
disrepute, it brings arbitration into disrepute - the whole thing is highly regret-
able."44 
Instances like the different SGS cases45 concern the conflicting interpretation, 
given by different ICSID tribunals, of a similar legal rule enshrined in different 
treaties, and applicable in similar cases between different parties.46 The legal rules in 
question were versions of the much-discussed ‘umbrella clauses’,47 contained in the 
BIT between Switzerland and Pakistan, and Switzerland and the Philippines. In 
different cases, ICSID tribunals had to assess whether this clause would transmute 
breaches of contract into treaty violations coming within the scope of the relevant 
BITs. In SGS-Pakistan, the tribunal adopted a narrow reading of the umbrella 
clause, which provided that host States "shall constantly guarantee the observance of 
the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the Inves-
tors". Worried that each and every contract breach might be actionable before ICSID 
tribunals, it held there would have to be "clear and convincing evidence" that the 
State parties to the BIT intended to transform contract breaches into treaty claims.48 
In contrast, the tribunal in SGS-Philippines stressed the broad wording of the um-
brella clause, by virtue of which a host State "shall observe any obligation it has 
assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the 
other". While it sought to distinguish the formulations of the two umbrella clauses, 
presumably to avoid being chided for departing from earlier awards, the SGS-
Philippines tribunal expressly criticised the award in the Pakistan case for inventing 
a presumption in favour of restrictive readings of umbrella clauses.49 This suggests 
that the conflict between the two decisions cannot really be explained by the wor-
 
44  Rushton, Clifford Chance Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations, Legal Bus., Oct. 2001, 108 
(cited in Franck, [footnote 11], Fordham Law Journal 73 [2005], at 1559). For similarly 
outspoken criticism see Goldhaber (footnote 37): "Czech taxpayers must think poorly of what 
passes for the world system of investment arbitration. […] The Lauder cases dramatize the te-
nuous legitimacy of investment dispute resolution." 
45  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 
2003 ('SGS-Pakistan'); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 ('SGS-Philippines'), both available on the internet: http://www. 
investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
46  For a brief summary see Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of 
Life?, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 12 (12-13). 
47  On these see e.g. Wälde, The "Umbrella" Clause on Investment Arbitration – A Comment on 
Original Intentions and Recent Case, 6 Journal of World Investment &Trade (2005), 184-236; 
Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protecti-
on, Arbitration International 2004, Vol. 20 (4), 411-434. 
48  SGS-Pakistan (footnote 45), para. 167. 
49  SGS-Philippines (footnote 45), paras. 119-127. 
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ding of the respective treaties. In essence, the two tribunals adopted different inter-
pretations of umbrella clauses. Taken together, the SGS decisions thus leave States 
and investors with a feeling of considerable uncertainty with respect to the meaning 
of such clauses.50 Since the umbrella clauses were contained in different treaties, the 
tribunal’s contradictory approaches, on a conceptual level, are not as problematic as 
the two Lauder cases.51 But given the number of umbrella clauses within modern 
BITs, the practical consequences of the decisions are considerable.  
Finally, a number of NAFTA cases shows that even when applying the same 
treaty norm, as opposed to identically-worded provisions of different treaties, arbi-
tral tribunals do reach different conclusions. The different decisions in the cases of 
S.D. Myers v. Canada,52 Metalclad v. Mexico53 and Pope & Talbot v. Canada54 are 
based on remarkably different interpretations of NAFTA's "fair and equitable treat-
ment" clause, namely Article 1105. The Metalclad and Pope & Talbot tribunals 
seemed to consider Article 1105 to provide companies with a positive right existing 
independent, and going beyond, minimum standards of customary international 
law.55 In contrast, in S.D. Myers, the tribunal took a different approach; it held Arti-
cle 1105 to be violated when "an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbi-
trary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the inter-
national perspective", thereby making Article 1105 dependent on general interna-
tional law.56 Again, for present purposes, it is not relevant to assess which of the 
tribunals took the correct approach. Rather, the three awards show that even within 
one and the same treaty system, different arbitral awards can create a level of uncer-
tainty that is inimical to predictable and reliable dispute settlement.57 
Of course, as always, there is a risk that by presenting three prominent examples, 
one might be taken to imply that these are the rule. It should therefore be underlined 
that in most cases, ICSID tribunals reach consistent decisions. Yet, even if they are 
exceptional, the instances of inconsistent decisions are noteworthy. They would 
seem to be more than occasional aberrations occurring within any system of law. 
Given the popularity of ICSID proceedings, their number is unlikely to decrease in 
 
50  For subsequent decisions on the scope of umbrella clauses see the (non-ICSID) award, in: 
Eureko v. Poland, Partial Award on Liability of 19 August 2005; and the ICSID decision in 
Noble Ventures v. Romania, Final Award of 12 October 2005, both available on the internet: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
51  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 25. 
52  Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award of 13 December 2000 (UNCITRAL), available on 
the internet: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
53  Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, Award of 30 August 2000 (ICSID), available on the inter-
net: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
54  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award of 10 April 2001 (UNCITRAL), available on the inter-
net: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
55  See Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1578-1581 for references. 
56  Myers (foonote 52), para. 263. 
57  For an attempt to influence the matter see the interpretative note issued by the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission: 'Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions' (31 July 2001), 
available on the internet: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp. 
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the future. What is more, inconsistent decisions are clearly visible in a system now 
increasingly moving towards transparency and greater public scrutiny.58 Since they 
will usually concern similar provisions found in different but similarly-phrased trea-
ties, the contradiction between decisions will also be particularly evident. It remains 
to be seen whether the problem is a fact of life with which investors and States have 
to put up, or whether it could be remedied by the establishment of an appeals faci-
lity.  
2. Is Inconsistency a Problem?  
Inconsistent decisions need not necessarily be considered a problem. At least three 
arguments might suggest that it is not.  
•  First, one might take what might be called an "individual approach" to invest-
ment dispute resolution, and argue that the first task of a tribunal really is to 
solve the case rather than to worry about implications. This approach draws at-
tention to one of the specific features of arbitration as opposed to institutiona-
lised adjudication. Indeed, the dispute settlement system established under the 
ICSID Convention (or the Additional Facility Rules, for that matter), is there for 
the parties, and not for interested observers keen on systemic consistency. Yet, 
notwithstanding its correct starting-point, the individual approach is simplistic. 
It neglects that arbitration within the ICSID system is not purely ad hoc, but 
functions according to institutional rules laid down in the ICSID Convention 
and Rules. Perhaps more importantly, it ignores that – at least in practice – the 
ICSID dispute settlement has developed into a system characterised by personal 
continuity between different panels, frequent references to earlier awards (both 
in pleadings and awards), and intense peer discussion requiring arbitrators to 
justify deviations from previous decisions.59 The day-to-day functioning of the 
ICSID system therefore defies the premises of the individual approach. Lastly, 
that approach also ignores that consistency also benefits the parties (and may be 
expected by them), as it reduces the uncertainty inherent in arbitral proceedings.  
• Second, one might argue that with the large number of pending investment 
cases, some degree of inconsistency is normal.60 Just like the first, this second 
argument proceeds from a correct starting-point, but is ultimately unconvincing. 
Of course, one could hardly expect arbitral tribunals to function like robots pro-
ducing identical results in different cases – especially in a system of decentre-
lised dispute settlement rejecting the concept of binding precedent and based on 
 
58  A point stressed by Gill (footnote 46), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 13. 
59  Cf. also Wälde (footnote 26), 77.  
60   Gill, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 12 et seq. 
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tribunals on an ad hoc basis.61 More generally, one might say that ICSID dispute 
settlement lacks 'hard' mechanisms for forcing tribunals to arrive at consistent 
decisions. But again, this does not mean that inconsistency in ICSID dispute set-
tlement was unproblematic. Very simply, it is submitted that while some degree 
of inconsistency has to be accepted as normal litigation risk, the present degree 
of inconsistency is no longer a normal fact of life. Of course, there are few ob-
jective criteria measuring "normal" degrees of inconsistency. Yet, it may be 
helpful to compare ICSID experience to that of other dispute settlement institu-
tions. True, those other bodies have also had to cope with inconsistent decisions. 
In public international law, for example, the ICTY's Tadic decision62 caused an 
outrage, because it deviated from the ICJ’s standard of attribution established in 
the Nicaragua case.63 But despite the number of international tribunals, and the 
host of issues addressed by them, Tadic/Nicaragua has really been the one and 
only high-profile inconsistency.64 In contrast, even on the basis of the few ex-
amples referred to, we can say that investment tribunals openly disagree; they 
do so frequently, and they do so on a variety of issues. The level of inconsis-
tency reached in investment arbitration seems to be more than a fact of life.  
• But there may be yet another reason explaining this high degree of inconsis-
tency. It has to do with the fragmentation of substantive international investment 
law, and the dominance of specific investment treaties in particular. When ap-
plying treaty rules and arriving at different results, so the explanation runs,     
ICSID tribunals might simply give effect to the differing treaty standards – one 
might say that, fragmented as it is, investment law simply cannot be interpreted 
consistently. To take an example, while nearly all BITs prohibit expropriation, 
they need not all define expropriation in an identical way. If this were the case, 
inconsistent decisions would not be problematic, but rather to be welcomed. 
Once more, this argument highlights one of the specific features of investment 
law. It also enables us to distinguish between different types of inconsistencies. 
Clearly, it is more problematic for tribunals to interpret one and the same norm 
inconsistently, as happened with Art. 1105 NAFTA, or to give contrasting deci-
sion in one case (Lauder) than to interpret two similar, but different provisions 
(such as two umbrella clauses) differently.65 However, this does not explain 
away the problem either. For once, notwithstanding the fragmentation of sub-
stantive investment law, there are concepts of general application. A tribunal 
 
61  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Managemant 2/2005, 8 ; Bishop (footnote 32), 
Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 9.  
62 ICTY, Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, ILM, vol. 38 (1999), 1518 (paras. 116-145).  
63  ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 62-65 (especially paras. 109 and 115). 
64  For a detailed treatment of the problem of fragmentation see e.g. Buergenthal, Proliferation of 
International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad? Leiden Journal of International Law 14 
(2001), 267; Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts, Max Planck UNYB 5  
(2001), 67 et seq. 
65  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 25. 
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asked to interpret an umbrella clause will of course be guided by that clause’s 
wording. But it will also proceed on the basis of its understandings of general 
conflict principles (such as the lex specialis rule), or of presumptions in favour 
of or against a specific interpretation. Even where the norm in question is treaty-
specific, a tribunal interpreting it thus will operate on the basis of general con-
cepts. It appears that inconsistent decisions such as the SGS or Lauder cases 
simply did not turn on the specific wording of a given treaty, but were decided 
because tribunals approached these general questions differently.66 To sum up 
on this point, despite the various arguments advanced by commentators, there is 
indeed a problem of inconsistency. This leads to the final question: Could an 
appellate body solve it? 
3. Could an Appellate Body Solve the Problem?  
At first sight, the answer plainly to this question is in the affirmative. Within many 
national legal systems, authoritative pronouncements by highest courts often put an 
end to long-term disputes, between district or regional courts. Similarly, the WTO 
Appellate Body is widely credited for having rendered dispute settlement in world 
trade law coherent and predictable. Why, then, to give but one example, should an 
appellate investment court not authoritatively, determine the proper interpretation of 
regularly-worded umbrella clauses? While that prospect is indeed appealing, one 
major problem remains: It must also be stressed that not all appellate systems are 
likely to render investment law more consistent. Instead, the consistency argument 
presupposes that the future appeals facility would be established in a particular way. 
Three specific features can be distinguished. 
• First, as a minimum requirement, there would have to be one single appeals 
facility.67 As has been noted above, it would be relatively easy for States to 
agree on a right to appeal under specific treaties. It has also been shown that 
these treaty-specific appeals could either be handled by one single appellate 
structure, or by different appellate structures established under the different trea-
ties. If States agreed on various appellate structures for different treaties (such as 
BITs or multilateral investment treaties), these could admittedly exercise a sane 
influence on investment law under that treaty. With respect to some, widely ap-
plicable treaties, this might already be some advantage – for example, a NAFTA 
appellate investment facility might consolidate the inconsistent case-law on 
NAFTA standards of protection. But from an ICSID perspective, this would be 
rather counter-productive, as other appellate structures (for example, an appel-
late body established under the Energy Charter Treaty) could reach different re-
 
66  Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1563 et seq. and 1569 et seq. 
67  Cf. also Bishop (footnote 32), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 8 (10). 
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sults.68 This would add, rather than reduce, uncertainty, and would further frag-
ment dispute settlement under the ICSID system.69 
• Second, the consistency argument depends on the comprehensiveness of the 
would-be appellate system. It would not be sufficient for different investment 
treaties to envisage recourse to one and the same single appellate institution. 
Rather, that appellate institution would be best suited to bring about consistency 
if it was competent to hear appeals in all investment disputes. The reason for 
this is that, given the decentralised character of dispute settlement, appellate de-
cisions would first and foremost have to influence subsequent arbitral awards. 
On that assumption, an appellate decision determining the meaning of an um-
brella clause would have good chances of being followed by subsequent tribu-
nals if these tribunals’ awards were also subject to appellate review (by the same 
appellate institution that had rendered the first appeals decision). The situation 
might be different if the subsequent first-level arbitral tribunal called upon to in-
terpret and apply the umbrella clause would not be part of the ICSID appeals 
system. Of course, the first-level tribunal could still be persuaded to follow the 
previous appellate decision – just as presently, ICSID tribunals can of course opt 
to follow previous arbitral decisions. However, it seems that only the possibility 
of appeal would really increase the likelihood of consistent decisions. In short, 
in order to bring about consistency, and to modify the present situation (in 
which tribunals can opt for consistency, but at times do not seem to do so), the 
future appellate structure would have to be comprehensive, or at least competent 
to hear appeals in a large majority of cases. In contrast, systems of piecemeal 
appeal would probably produce no more than piecemeal consistency. 
• Third, the consistency argument also favours a specific organisational set-up of 
the future appeals facility. Even if there was a single and comprehensive appel-
late structure, the appellate institution would probably have to be organised as 
standing permanent body, or at least composed of members drawn from a rela-
 
68  The point was made very clearly by Sheppard and Warner (Editorial Note, Transnational 
Dispute Management 2/2005, 3 [4]): "If appellate bodies are established on a particular rather 
than universal basis, this runs the risk of undermining the reasons for establishing such a sys-
tem in the first place." See also Bishop (footnote 32), Transnational Dispute Management 
2/2005, 8 (10): " I would suggest that if we wind up with multiple appellate bodies, as opposed 
to a single appellate body, that much of the reason underlying the need for an appellate body is 
going to be undermined." 
69  See also the ICSID Discussion Paper (footnote 1), para. 23: "If, however, multiple appeal 
mechanisms are to be established, ICSID might best abstain from pursuing the creation of an 
Appeals Facility as it might otherwise only add to the number of appeal mechanisms." 
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tively small roster of permanent members.70 Once more, the matter admittedly 
involves a certain degree of speculation. Yet, experience with the present ICSID 
dispute settlement system suggests that consistency requires a certain degree of 
personal and institutional continuity. The point may be illustrated by reference 
to annulment applications under Article 52 ICSID Convention. At present, an-
nulment is – in the terminology used here – based on a single and comprehen-
sive system, as all annulment applications are handled by ICSID annulment 
committees governed by Article 52, and as all awards are in principle subject to 
annulment.71 Still, a quick glance at cases such as Klöckner, Vivendi or MINE 
shows how differently annulment committees have interpreted their task.72 
Much suggests that this difference is largely due to the lack of personal conti-
nuity. Had there been, under Article 52, a standing annulment institution, it 
seems safe to predict that there would not have been such vast differences be-
tween the different generations of annulment decisions. Conversely, the relative 
consistency of WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence (or of ICJ or ITLOS juris-
prudence, to take examples of judicial institutions typically acting as first-level 
courts) is in large measure due to the personal and institutional continuity of the 
respective bodies. The lesson to be drawn from this experience is that if indeed, 
ICSID appellate jurisprudence should bring about consistency, it should best be 
conferred upon a permanent, standing institution composed of a small number 
of arbitrators.73 
4. Interim Assessment 
The preceding considerations significantly affect the force of the consistency argu-
ment. Following the line of argument set out above, one might say that a plurality of 
appellate facilities would probably do more harm than good. A piecemeal appellate 
institution with non-comprehensive competence would probably do little harm, but 
not much good either. (Although of course much may be a question of degree: 90% 
appealibility would be non-comprehensive in theory, but would go quite some way 
in fostering consistency, while 20% would not.) Lastly, in order to bring about con-
 
70  Not surprisingly, such an approach (which clearly follows Article 17:3 of the WTO DSU) is 
indeed suggested in the ICSID Discussion Paper (note 1): see Annex, para 5: "Such a set of 
ICSID Appeals Facility Rules could provide for the establishment of an Appeals Panel compo-
sed of 15 persons elected by the Administrative Council of ICSID on the nomination of the 
Secretary-General of the Centre. The terms of the Panel members would be staggered. Eight of 
the first 15 would serve for three years; all others would be elected for six-year terms. Each 
member would be from a different country. They would all have to be persons of recognized 
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international investment and investment trea-
ties." 
71  See supra, section B.I. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Legum, Visualizing an Appellate System, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 64 (66). 
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sistency, the appeals facility would probably have to have very few members, and 
function on a permanent basis. These considerations are not aimed at discarding the 
consistency argument altogether. As a matter of principle, it remains valid, and 
strongly militates in favour of reforming the present system. However, it has also 
been shown that in order to foster consistency, the ICSID system would have to opt 
for a quite particular form of appeals structure, and one that is not likely to be easily 
agreed on. Lastly, the fragmentation of substantive investment law means that even 
an appeals institution fulfilling these requirements would not solve the problem of 
inconsistency altogether. In short, the consistency argument is much qualified by 
both practical considerations and the specific features of investment law. 
II. An Appellate System Would Be More Likely to Produce Correct Decisions 
The hope for consistency is one argument in favour of reforming the present ICSID 
system. But there is a more basic promise of introducing a second level of dispute 
settlement. Having two levels of dispute settlement could enhance the prospects of 
correct decisions – one might call this the ‘accuracy' or 'correctness argument'. Its 
idea is that an investment appeals court is more likely to 'get it right' than ICSID 
panels of arbitrators at present. This in turn might be more important to investors or 
States than the time and cost spent during litigation – as V.V. Veeder's observation 
suggests:  
"Of course, for the investor or the state, the final successful arbitration award is 
always an undisguised blessing. […] But, for the unsuccessful investor, an adverse 
final award is obviously adversely final and the result or reasoning of the award can 
act as a defect of precedent for other investors facing the same issues. Thus finality 
may be less desirable for the investor and investment arbitration than getting the 
answer right."74 
It is difficult to take issue with the proposition that arbitral tribunals should render 
correct decisions, and therefore proposals aiming at correct decisions should be 
welcomed. But would an appellate system really increase that possibility? At a ge-
neral level, the answer is probably yes. The investment appellate body could focus 
on the issues that divide the parties, and it would have the benefit of having before it 
one fully-reasoned decision. On the other hand, there is of course no guarantee. But 
maybe more important than these general considerations is whether the ICSID sys-
tem needs an appellate level to have bad decisions corrected. This question of course 
can hardly be answered comprehensively – since a comprehensive answer would 
presuppose an exhaustive assessment of ICSID jurisprudence. Yet, it may be helpful 
to approach it from the perspective of ICSID's clients. Does their conduct provide 
evidence for a general dissatisfaction with the present system based on one level of 
dispute settlement? It is submitted that the answer to this question is "no". Of course, 
 
74  Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 6. 
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the decision of some States to draft investment treaties envisaging an appellate struc-
ture is an important factor. However, it is a factor that has to be put into perspective. 
From a more general angle, this State practice is probably less impressive than it 
seems (or than the ICSID Secretariat suggested in its Discussion Paper). It has to be 
contrasted to a number of other factors which are clear evidence of trust placed in 
the ICSID system in its present form. These other factors include  
• the still increasing number of States ratifying the Convention and concluding 
investment treaties with ICSID jurisdictional clauses;  
• the willingness of investors to bring ICSID claims; 
• the readiness of States to comply with ICSID awards; 
 
These factors are not intended to suggest that everything was perfect. However, 
they suggest that in the view of most parties, the present system with one level of 
dispute settlement can still be trusted. As has been shown,75 it is a system that was 
designed after careful deliberation, a system that had to strike a balance between the 
need for correct decisions, and the interests of finality, i.e. time, cost and trust in 
panellists. On balance, the preceding considerations do not show any sustained and 
wide-spread desire among ICSID participants to move away from that system, to-
wards an appellate structure. Proposals for a reform thus rest on abstract proposi-
tions about the relative advantages of appeals structures generally, which cannot be 
simply applied to the ICSID system. With respect to investment law, it seems that 
the drafters' decision to place trust in a single level of arbitration, and to emphasise 
the need for a speedy resolution of disputes, still holds true today. As a consequence, 
the 'accuracy argument' is not really convincing.  
III. An Appellate System Would Increase the Authority of ICSID Awards 
Even if it is not strictly called for in order to bring about consistency, or to eliminate 
errors, setting up an appeals facility may have other positive effects. According to 
some, it might increase the authority of investment awards. For example, Audley 
Sheppard and Hugo Warner, noting the limited legitimacy of investment arbitration, 
argued that "the presence of an appellate mechanism" – which they held "should be 
as authoritative as possible" – "may partially solve this problem".76 Few of course 
would dispute that investment awards lacking authority are problematic. In this 
respect, the basic rationale underlying the 'authority argument' seems appealing. 
Still, it is another question whether the introduction of an appeals facility would 
truly enhance the authority of investment awards. In this respect, it is necessary to 
distinguish between ICSID Convention awards on the one hand, and Additional 
Facility awards on the other. 
 
75  Supra, section II. 
76  Sheppard/Warner (footnote 68), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 4. 
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1. ICSID Convention Awards 
ICSID Convention awards could gain in authority because an appellate body rende-
ring them might enjoy a higher degree of eminence than first-level tribunals. This 
would not necessarily be the case, but would not be unlikely if the appellate body 
was set up as a permanent institution composed of highly-respected lawyers, and if 
its jurisprudence over time earned the respect of the investment community. Expe-
rience with WTO law but also with national legal systems indeed suggests that 
standing higher-level judicial bodies over time can acquire a certain status as institu-
tions, which in turn increases the authority of their pronouncements.77 The same 
would not be unlikely to happen in investment arbitration, if one particular form of 
appellate institution (namely a standing body) was created. This standing appellate 
body could over time gain an institutional respect that ad hoc panels of arbitrators 
could not acquire. Seen from this perspective, the creation of an appeals facility 
might have a positive effect on the authority of investment awards, including awards 
rendered under the ICSID Convention. Just as with respect to the accuracy argu-
ment, the real question however is whether this potential would justify a major over-
haul of the presently decentralised system. The answer to this question does not only 
depend on the reform’s potential effects, but on whether it is necessary. It must 
therefore be asked whether at present, without an appeals facility, investment awards 
rendered under the ICSID Convention lack the required authority. This in turn de-
pends on legal provisions determining the status of awards, as well as on compliance 
in practice. 
As far as legal provisions are concerned, awards leave little to be desired. Article 
53 of the Convention declares them to be binding, while Article 54 equates them to 
decisions of highest national courts. As has been noted already, the Convention 
deliberately rules out any possibility of national court review; instead it provides an 
exceptionally strong enforcement mechanism.78 When looking at the letter of the 
law, ICSID Convention awards thus could hardly be more authoritative than they 
already are at present. 
Ultimately, however, an award’s authority depends on whether it is complied with 
in practice. In this respect, investment awards also perform rather well. Of course, 
States have often expressed dismay when required to pay large sums of damages; 
some have also voiced concern of a more general nature, and have threatened to 
leave the system of investment law altogether.79 These warnings should not be ig-
nored. But they also have to be put in perspective. From a broader angle, it seems 
that States' criticism of the system has remained exceptional, and has not been fol-
 
77  See already supra, section D.I.4. 
78  Supra, section B.I. 
79  See notably Argentina's threats to re-admit a review of ICSID awards by national courts, and to 
re-introduce the Calvo and Drago clauses: cf. Alfaro, ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged 
by the Argentine Government and its Supreme Court, Oil Gas and Energy Law (OGEL) Vol. 
2, Issue 4, 2004, available on the internet: http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel. 
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lowed up by concrete actions. Certainly when compared to other forms of interna-
tional dispute settlement, compliance with investment awards remains largely un-
problematic, despite the high stakes involved. Paraphrasing a famous dictum about 
compliance with international law generally, it seems fair to say that 'almost all 
States comply with almost all investment awards almost all the time'.80 In fact, not-
withstanding a few problematic cases of enforcement,81 all ICSID Convention award 
have so far been complied with; there is thus no investment law equivalent to fa-
mous inter-State instances of non-compliance such as the ICJ Nicaragua decision.82 
Also, investment awards have usually83 been complied with promptly. Again, com-
pared to other international bodies’ track record, there is no equivalent to the de-
cades it took Albania to accept the ICJ’s Corfu Channel decision,84 or Turkey’s 
year-long refusal to pay Mrs. Loizidou.85 
The preceding paragraph should not be taken as a plea for complacency. Of 
course, even systems with good compliance records can break down, and lose their 
authority. What is important to note is that despite repeated warnings, and notwith-
standing the high stakes involved, the ICSID system is a system with a good com-
pliance record. Legally, the Washington Convention imbues awards with a high 
degree of authority. In practice, States have complied with awards. On that basis, it 
does not seem necessary to introduce an appeals system in order to increase the 
authority of ICSID Convention awards. 
2. Additional Facility Awards 
As far as Additional Facility awards are concerned, the different considerations set 
out in the last section equally apply. In particular, it is worth pointing out that de-
spite the possibility of national court review, Additional Facility awards also have a 
good compliance record so far. Still, the aftermath of the Metalclad award86 shows 
the potential for conflict. Figuratively speaking, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court decision87 may have been a shot over the bow, signalling national courts’ 
 
80  Cf. Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn., New York, 1979), 47: "Almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time." 
81  Namely the Benvenuti, SOABI, and LETCO cases. On compliance in the former two see the 
information provided in Schreuer, The ICSID Convention (footnote 8), Article 54, MN 50-60. 
82  ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
83  For exceptions, see notably the cases referred to in footnote 81. 
84  ICJ Reports 1949, 4. 
85  The various awards in the case are available on the internet: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=loizidou&sessionid=6636633&skin=
hudoc-en.  
86  Supra, footnote 54. 
87  Decision of 2 May 2001, [2001] SCBC 664, available on the internet: http://www.investment 
claims.com/oa1.html. 
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unwillingness simply to accept investment awards at face value. Of course, Metal-
clad itself was controversial, and it is worth pointing out that the shot went over the 
bow rather than hitting the ship. However, the proceedings show that investment 
awards rendered outside the ICSID Convention are vulnerable, and do not enjoy the 
protection, or authority, which Arts. 53-54 confer upon Convention awards. 
According to some, the establishment of an appeals mechanism might provide an 
opportunity to remedy this problem. In the words of Daniel Price, "if we are going 
to have an appellate mechanism then it […] has to displace completely the role of 
national courts presently exercised under the New York convention".88 In other 
words, Additional Facility appellate awards would be as immune from national court 
review as ICSID Convention awards. It is not quite clear how that proposal should 
be implemented – probably best by including a waiver clause in the relevant juris-
diction-conferring instruments. But it is clear that it would enhance the status of 
investment arbitration and remedy one of the weaknesses of Additional Facility 
awards compared to awards rendered under the ICSID Convention. In that respect, 
one might indeed be tempted to say that the creation of an appeals facility could 
increase the authority of investment awards rendered outside the ICSID Convention. 
However, it should also be pointed out that this would not be an automatic conse-
quence, but depend on the willingness of States to take the extra step of "elevating" 
Additional Facility awards, as far as their immunity from national court review is 
concerned, to the level of ICSID Convention decisions. Whether States are willing 
to take that step, and whether they would be willing to do so in each and every treaty 
envisaging an appellate investment decision, is another matter. 
3. Interim Assessment 
To sum up, the 'authority argument' provides limited support for the establishment of 
an ICSID appeals facility. A permanent investment appellate institution, possibly 
modelled along the lines of the WTO Appellate Body, might gain an institutional 
prestige increasing the authority of its decisions. With respect to Additional Facility 
awards, States might also be willing to sacrifice national court review of such appel-
late awards. Both factors are speculative though: States need not necessarily recog-
nise the higher status of appeals decisions, and institutional prestige is not gained 
lightly. In any event, investment appeals in practice do not really suffer from serious 
problems of authority, as compliance with them is very good. Also, at least with 
respect to awards rendered under the ICSID Convention, it is difficult to imagine 
how awards, as a matter of law, could be more authoritative. Lastly, one should not 
forget one potential drawback of appeals systems, which may be seen as the 'autho-
rity argument' turned on its head. As has been noted, while potentially increasing the 
 
88  Price, US Trade Promotion Legislation, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 48; simi-
larly Legum (footnote 73), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 64. 
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authority of some decisions, a move towards a two-tiered system of dispute settle-
ment risks undermining the authority of the first level decision.89 Even if a two-level 
process of dispute settlement eventually produced decisions that were more authori-
tative then the ones presently rendered, this increase in authority would have to be 
measured against a loss of authority of the first level awards. On balance, therefore, 
the 'authority argument' provides only rather ambiguous support for the creation of 
an ICSID appellate structure. 
IV. Interim Conclusions 
The preceding sections have examined a rather heterogeneous range of arguments 
put forward to support the establishment of an ICSID appeals facility. They have 
shown that a reasonably good case for introducing an appeals structure can be made. 
Primarily, this case rests on what has been labelled the 'consistency argument', i.e. 
the hope that an appeals facility would render investment law more coherent, and 
would put an end to the worrying series of inconsistent decisions by ICSID and 
other investment tribunals. In contrast, other arguments allegedly supporting the 
establishment of an appellate structure are of lesser value. In particular, it is a matter 
for speculation whether a two-tiered system of dispute settlement would produce 
better, or more authoritative decisions. In any event, judging from the conduct of 
ICSID participants, there do not really seem to be serious problems of authority or 
accuracy within the present system.  
Whether this mixed record is sufficient to overcome the various drawbacks of a 
reform may be a matter of perspective – depending on which the glass may be con-
sidered half-full or half-empty. As has been shown, the drawbacks of a reform 
(some certain, some speculative) weigh rather heavily: not so much because of ab-
stract concepts such as finality, but because the possibility of appeals would make 
investment proceedings more expensive, would prolong the period of uncertainty 
between the application and the eventual decisions and could de-value the authority 
of first-level awards. Perhaps most importantly, anyone considering the opposing 
arguments should bear in mind that in order to achieve the desired results, one 
would have to opt for a specific form of appeals facility: for the various reasons 
explored above, a meaningful reform of the system would have to seek to establish a 
single permanent institution with comprehensive competence. In contrast, treaty-
specific appeals jurisdictions, possibly even organised in multiple fora, would 
probably (at least from an ICSID institutional point of view) increase rather than 
alleviate problems. 
In the light of these considerations, the better arguments suggest that the glass is 
half-empty. The case for establishing an appeals facility is certainly not compelling. 
Given the difficulties of a reform, and the range of ensuing consequential problems 
 
89  Section C.II. 
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which the present paper has not even touched upon, one should probably not risk 
paralysing a still-functioning system by seriously engaging in a far-reaching institu-
tional reform. On balance, the benefits seem too speculative, the institutional costs 
too high, and the chances of success too slim.  
D. Alternatives  
So far, this paper has focused on the rather drastic reform proposals put forward by 
the ICISD Secretariat in its October 2004 Discussion Paper. The preceding section 
suggests that even with more time and a more methodical discussion, that drastic 
reform should not be pursued. Admittedly, the cautious approach thus advocated 
may also cause problems – experience suggests that often, postponing reforms is as 
dangerous as an over-ambitious reform gone awry. To avoid that problem, a number 
of alternatives to an appellate structure will be briefly examined in the following. 
These alternatives are all aimed at remedying the most problematic feature of ICSID 
dispute settlement, namely that of inconsistent awards.  
I. Critical Debate of Inconsistent Awards 
The most obvious of the various alternatives examined in the following is a plea for 
a critical peer review of inconsistent awards. This review should be aimed at high-
lighting the risks of inconsistent awards; it should encourage tribunals to avoid out-
right contradictions in their respective reasoning, or at least to explain contradictory 
approaches with reference to the specificities of the case before them. While ob-
vious, these proposals may indeed be helpful. Experience with inter-State dispute 
settlement suggests that a professional debate about the risks of fragmenting interna-
tional law through inconsistent decisions does exercise a moderating influence on 
tribunals. To come back to the public international law example referred to earlier, it 
bears underlining that since the beginning of the critical debate about inconsistent 
decisions (triggered by the 'Tadic-Nicaragua conflict'), there do not seem to have 
been any further instances of serious conflicts between different international tribu-
nals. Of course, the reasons for this healthy development are difficult to re-establish, 
but it does not seem to be far-fetched to suggest that the existence of a critical debate 
may have been a force for the good. Based on that experience, one might hope that 
"transparency, publication and informed and professional peer discussion"90 would 
reduce the number of inconsistent investment awards. In that respect, the on-going 
discussion, among ICSID officials, ICSID clients, arbitrators, counsel and academ-
ics, about the coherence of investment law, as well as the general trend towards a 
more rigorous scrutiny of ICSID decisions may have a sane influence on future 
 
90  Wälde (footnote 26), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 77. 
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ICSID panels.91 They might be part of an evolution of investment law, a process 
eventually leading to "the development of a common legal opinion of jurisprudence 
constante, to resolve the difficult legal questions [dividing different arbitral tribu-
nals]".92 
II. Consolidating Cases 
As noted above, inconsistent decisions may simply be a consequence of decentral-
ised, ad hoc dispute settlement by different panels of arbitrators. Not surprisingly, 
then, one way of avoiding inconsistent decisions may be to consolidate cases. Ad-
mittedly, consolidation has a number of drawbacks. The most obvious is that it only 
becomes an option if two or more proceedings concern the same subject-matter.93 
Yet, the Argentine experience suggest that this does happen. At least for some types 
of conflicts, consolidation might be a way out of the dilemma. In fact, it would seem 
to be a rather attractive option.94 It is an option already available under the present 
system, which does not prevent parties from joining proceedings and appearing as 
parties in the same interest. Alternatively, parties remain free to consolidate cases in 
an informal way, by agreeing to nominate the same arbitrators – which is what hap-
pened in some of the recent proceedings concerning the Argentine’s privatisation of 
the gas industry.95 If this is done, formal or informal consolidation would seem to 
provide very effective remedies against inconsistent decisions. As a rule, they would 
also be likely to save money and time. Of course, given its drawbacks, it will not 
solve the problem of inconsistent decisions altogether, but at least it may alleviate it 
to some extent, and thus prove a helpful alternative. 
 
91  Wälde, ibid.; similarly Gill (footnote 46), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 13. 
92  Cf. SGS-Phllipines (footnote 45), para. 97. 
93  For an interpretation of what is meant by the general requirement of "same subject-matter" see 
Crivellaro, Consolidation of Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Investment Disputes, 4 Law 
and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2005), 371 (394 et seq.). 
94  See also Blackaby, Testing the Procedural Limits of the Treaty System: The Argentinean 
Experience, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 19, and the brief observation by Wäl-
de (footnote 26), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 76. 
95  Namely Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/3, and Sempra 
Energy International v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/16. In both cases, the tribunal 
was composed of Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Marc Lalonde and Sandra Morelli Rico. The con-
current decisions on objections to jurisdiction are available on the internet: http://www.   
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm. For brief information on other informally consolidated 
cases see Blackaby (footnote 96), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 18-19. 
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III. References to the International Court of Justice 
By the same token, States might consider formulating ICSID disputes as inter-State 
disputes and submit them to the United Nations "principal judicial organ"96, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). This is an option which so far has not been pur-
sued, but which is explicitly foreseen in Article 64 of the ICSID Convention. Just as 
consolidating cases, turning to the ICJ does not offer a proper substitute for an ap-
peals system. In fact, Article 64 only establishes the Court’s jurisdiction over inter-
State disputes "concerning the interpretation or application of th[e] [ICSID] Conven-
tion". The drafting history clearly shows that the provision was not to be used to 
introduce a form of appeal to the ICJ. What is more, according to Article 34 of the 
ICJ Statute, disputes would have to be formulated as disputes between two States. It 
would thus require some creative legal argument to present disputes about specific 
investment treaties (such as the precise interpretation of BIT standards) as "ICSID 
disputes" coming within the ICJ’s jurisdiction.  
Within those limits however, it is submitted that Article 64 of the Convention 
could play a helpful role, and deserves more attention than it is usually given. There 
are good reasons to assume that ICJ judgments on matters of investment law are 
more likely to be generally accepted than decisions by three member ad hoc tribu-
nals or committees. This first of all has to do with the Court's standing: the "World 
Court" is a venerable institution composed of 15 permanent members representing 
"the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world."97 Its 
special status is reflected in the frequent references, in ICSID awards, to ICJ judg-
ments,98 but also in the broad acceptance of important ICJ decisions on issues such 
as diplomatic protection or the nationality of corporations. Contrary to ad hoc arbi-
tral bodies, the Court thus possesses a considerable institutional authority, which 
would imbue its pronouncements on investment law matters with a considerable 
authority. The solemn atmosphere and length of ICJ proceedings might add to this; 
both would mean that an eventual decision would be rendered only after detailed 
argument and would be well considered. In short, there might be some virtue in 
using the ICJ to clarify particularly important matters of investment law.  
 
96  Cf. Art. 92 UN Charter. 
97  Cf. Article 9 ICJ Statute. 
98  A particularly prominent example is the jurisdictional award in CMS, which extensively dis-
cusses the ICJ's Gabcikovo Nagymaros case, and also refers to the Nicaragua and ELSI cases: 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003, pa-
ras. 309, 313, 330, 339, 371, 372. 
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IV. A Reference Procedure Along the Lines of Article 234 TEC 
Finally, a reference procedure along the lines of Article 234 TEC99 might be yet 
another alternative to an appeals facility.100 Under that provision, national courts can 
refer certain matters of law to the ECJ for decision.101 When answering an Art. 234 
reference, the ECJ is not acting as an appellate court, but simply ruling on a point of 
EC law. It remains for the national court to use this information to decide the case. 
Still, experience within Europe suggests that the reference procedure is one of the 
ECJ's most powerful tools in ensuring the uniform application of EC and EU law. Of 
course, this experience cannot simply be used as a blueprint for investment arbitra-
tion. Unlike under Article 234 TEC, references would have to be made not by na-
tional courts, but by arbitral tribunals. In many respects, the institution competent to 
decide on references would face problems similar to those of an appellate institution: 
for example, one would have to agree on the scope of review, or on the types of 
questions that could be referred to it, and on its composition. In addition, one would 
have to decide which parts of its rulings should bind normal ICSID arbitral tribunals, 
whether this binding force should also extend to subsequent cases, and whether 
ICSID tribunals could be under an obligation to make reference. In short, the prob-
lems of implementation would be enormous. Still, introducing a reference procedure 
would have one decisive advantage over plans to establish an appeals system: it 
would not conflict with Art. 53 of the ICSID Convention. Even with a reference 
system, ICSID awards (following a reference decision) would not be "subject to any 
appeal". There would thus be no need for an amendment of the ICSID Convention; 
in contrast, the reference system could be established through an amendment of the 
ICSID Rules. 
 
99  In its entirety, the provision runs as follows:  "The [European] Court of Justice shall have juris-
diction to give preliminary rulings concerning:  
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;                                                                                             
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of  the ECB;  
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an  act of the Council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
  Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the [European] Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such 
question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the 
matter before the [European] Court of Justice.'' 
100  For brief comments in that regard see e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID Awards in 
Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are there Differences?, in: Gaillard/Banifatemi (footnote 8), 
189 (221). 
101  For details on Article 234 see e.g. Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven's Door: Fragmentation, 
Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, Common Market Law Re-
view 40/1 (2003), 9-50; Dauses, Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren nach Artikel 177 EG-
Vertrag (2nd edn., München, 1995). 
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Compared to the other options discussed in the present section, an ICSID refe-
rence procedure is certainly the most ambitious alternative to an appeals system. 
Unlike ICJ references or the consolidation of cases, it would require an amendment 
of ICSID's institutional set-up. However, its establishment would be less cumber-
some than that of an appeals system proper. 
E. Concluding Observations 
The present paper suggests that there are no compelling reasons to move towards an 
investment appellate structure. The drafters' decision to set up ICSID as a single-
level system of dispute settlement remains plausible today. This system, based on 
decentralised dispute resolution by ad hoc tribunals, has very few instruments to 
prevent inconsistent awards, which is a serious problem. However, this problem 
should not be addressed by establishing an appellate structure. Instead, there may be 
virtue in simply highlighting the risk of inconsistent decisions, or to make use of two 
existing alternatives: consolidating cases, or seeking ICJ decisions. If this proves 
insufficient, and if a major reform of the present system becomes unavoidable, then 
it would be preferable to opt for an ICSID reference procedure along the lines of 
Article 234 TEC. 
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A Development Perspective to the Introduction of an Appellate Process 
in International Investment Arbitration    
                    
Comment by Asif H. Qureshi∗ 
I am very grateful to the organisers of the conference for having given me the oppor-
tunity to comment on Dr Tams’s paper. My sincere thanks for the warm hospitality I 
received in Frankfurt.  
I am very impressed by Dr Tam’s paper - which excels in being very informed, 
very considered but most of all very measured. Generally, I would make three ob-
servations.  
First, it seems to me that deconstructionists would have much to say about pro-
posals for reform in the international investment dispute settlement system, given 
that it is largely set against a normative framework that is bilateral, disorganised and 
non-multilateral. Is it really possible to meaningfully evaluate the arguments for and 
the obstacles in setting up an appellate facility in the investment sphere, with the 
objective of providing normative coherence, in circumstances where the multilateral 
consensus on substantive matters is not very evident. Does this institutional debate 
not partake of our concerns and preferences with respect to the normative frame-
work of investment? Indeed, is the suggestion for an appellate facility at a multila-
teral level not an attempt to force an issue on the international agenda - one which 
has not received the endorsement for being negotiated by a significant constituency 
concerned with international investment law? In recent history this lack of endorse-
ment has happened twice, first in the context of the negotiations for a Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MIA) under the auspices of the OECD, and then under the 
Doha Agenda within the WTO.  
Second, in my opinion it is not possible to engage in constructing dispute settle-
ment mechanisms - without reference to the nature of the underlying normative 
structure. The case for an appellate facility must be set against the objectives and 
purposes of the provision of dispute settlement in the international investment 
sphere. It is not possible to de-link institutional building from its substantive sphere 
and its underpinnings. The objects and purposes of the international investment 
system along with its normative framework inform the institutions that govern and 
serve it. The objectives of investment are not confined to the investors’ concerns 
alone. Thus, ‘consistency, accuracy and authority’ in dispute settlement  may be 
significant reasons for institutional reform - but there are other concerns which may 
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seek to trump these considerations - for example human rights, environment and of 
course the development objectives of the host State.  
Third, there is no doubt in my mind that there is a development perspective in the 
establishment of an appellate process in the investment sphere. This involves ensur-
ing inter alia that:  
• the review process facilitates the development objective; 
• that the review process reduces or alleviates the burdens that accompany in-
vestment liberalisation through the interpretative process; 
• that there exist independent, fair and transparent processes in the appellate struc-
ture, through for example ensuring effective participation of developing/host 
countries in the appellate process; 
• that the power of multinational corporations is not unduly strengthened through 
the abusive use of an appellate process;  
• that the national legislative ‘policy space’ developing countries need for their 
development objectives is not undermined through the introduction of an appel-
late process; 
• that the appellate system does not lead to the multilateralization of bilaterally 
negotiated agreements; and thereby compromise the flexibility afforded by a bi-
lateral system along with the collective decision of developing countries not to 
engage in a multilateral system that is not development friendly.   
More specifically with reference to some of the main points made in Dr Tam’s 
paper, the following questions are posed. First, is the justification for an appellate 
system on the basis of ‘consistency and coherence’ in judicial outcomes not really 
an argument for moulding a particular kind of ‘consistency and coherence’ into the 
disorganised international investment system - given that interpretation in an appel-
late process is a form of legislation? Is the objection to ‘inconsistency’ not really a 
call for normative uniformity? Second, should disparate investment norms necessar-
ily be interpreted identically on the basis of equality, fairness, predictably and reli-
ability?   Third, if investment involves and is about ultimately ensuring development 
- should development not be the overriding consideration in the process of interpre-
tation? Should there not be a strive consistently at better facilitating the ‘develop-
ment objective’ and better decisions all round, rather than pursuing a fetish for iden-
tity of interpretation?  Fourth, will a non-ringed fenced appellate system, set against 
a disorganised bilateral investment normative framework, not add to uncertainty and 
complexity - given that the beneficiaries of and parties to bilateral agreements will 
not be clear as to how ultimately their rights and obligations will be ‘coherently and 
consistently’ interpreted, not to mention the added complexity in interpretation aris-
ing from such a system? Finally, will an appellate system not lead to further investor 
bias, by augmenting the capacity of multilateral companies to pursue an appeal? 
In conclusion I would agree with Dr Tams’s negative assessment of the ‘consis-
tency’ basis for an appellate system but for different reasons.  I would not put it on 
such a high pedestal as other objectives - particularly the development objective. 
From a development perspective a treaty specific appeal system is favoured. A prin-
cipal concern about the efforts for introducing a non-ring fenced appellate system in 
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the investment sphere is that it seeks to add to the coherence and development of 
international investment law through a somewhat non-transparent route.  Further, the 
need to inject the development dimension in any proposed appellate system is im-
portant. A development friendly appellate system requires in particular a focus on its 
apparatus of interpretation; on participatory rights and technical assistance.   
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Inconsistent ICSID Awards – Is There a Need for         
an Appellate Structure?       
                     
Comment by Richard H. Kreindler∗ 
 
It is a great pleasure to comment briefly on the excellent presentation and conference 
paper provided by Dr. Tams, entitled "Is There a Need for an ICSID Appellate 
Structure?" Dr. Tams has sought to tackle a thorny question which is of increasing 
relevance both as a scientific inquiry and as a matter of practical relevance.  It af-
fects the everyday life of international investment-related contracts, dispute resolu-
tion provisions and subsequent arbitrations. 
My brief comments and observations use Dr. Tams' paper as a point of departure.  
They admittedly somewhat transcend the specific content of his own paper, and are 
organized into four areas of inquiry as follows:   
• First, Is there a trend in favor of an appellate mechanism in this area?   
• Second, How may this question be addressed in the ICSID Convention1 context 
versus bilateral and multilateral treaty contexts?   
• Third, What arguments exist for and against an appellate mechanism in this 
area?   
• Fourth, What may be said of Dr. Tams' specific proposal respecting "reference 
0proceedings" and could one contemplate analogous application of Article 
1131(2) of the NAFTA2?  
A. Trend in Favor of Appellate Mechanism  
The increase in number and size of investment-related and particularly ICSID Con-
vention-based arbitrations in the last ten and particularly five years – some would 
term it an onslaught – has led various observers to question whether some form of 
appellate mechanism may now be called for.  These observers include consumers of 
arbitration, professors, practitioners and arbitrators, and some wearing more than 
one of these hats simultaneously.  The very transparency of many investment-related 
arbitrations, especially those under the ICSID Convention, has given rise to dis-
 
∗  Richard H. Kreindler, Attorney Shearman & Sterling LLP, Frankfurt. The original presenta-
tion style has intentionally been substantially preserved. 
1 Available, inter alia, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
2 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/NAFTA%20Text%20 
%20Excerpts.pdf. 
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crepancies or disconnects, or perceived discrepancies and disconnects.  Some have 
seen these as providing justification for some form of appellate review at a suprana-
tional level. 
Whether a true trend in this respect has been emerging is difficult to say.  Trends 
with respect to ICSID-related arbitration are sometimes measured by comments in 
doctrine, sometimes by holdings and dicta in awards, sometimes by observations at 
conferences and increasingly by web-based exchanges.  The sum total of the fore-
going does not necessarily suggest, in my mind, a trend in favor of an appellate 
mechanism.   
What it does suggest is that increasing disquiet is emerging in some circles over 
the discrepancies and disconnects, or perceived discrepancies and disconnects, that 
may have emerged from one award to the next.  These relate to such fundamental 
issues as the "fair and equitable treatment" standard and other public international 
law-based measurements which play a role in investment-related contracts, claims 
and disputes.3  On another level, it might be claimed that such a trend is in fact al-
ready emerging, even at an official or semi-official level.  One example of such a 
manifestation might be the October 2004 ICSID "Discussion Paper on Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration" (October 22, 2004).4   
If there is such a trend, is this trend correct?  And even if it is not correct, is it ir-
reversible?  
Whether such a trend is "correct" cannot possibly be answered in a uniform man-
ner.  Indeed Dr. Tams himself does not presume to attach a blanket correctness or 
incorrectness to any such trend.  If for no other reason, it is impossible and in any 
event ill-advised to consider such a trend to be the proper path.  The reason is that 
the factors causing a perceived need for an appellate structure are diverse.  They 
affect only some ICSID matters and not others.  They are in part a sign of the times 
which may change over the next few years.   
The supposed need for and lack of uniformity and harmonization which some 
would see as the justification for an appellate structure may, even if it did exist to-
day, look quite different in five years, with the benefit of further jurisprudence and 
doctrinal development.  And also for that reason, the trend should not be considered 
irreversible.  The need seen by some for harmonization and supra-level control to-
day may be looked at with different colored glasses in the next decade.   
 
3 See, e.g., Kreindler, "Fair and Equitable Treatment – A Comparative International Law Ap-
proach," presented at the Harvard Law School Conference on "International Investment Law at 
a Crossroads," March 3, 2006, and reprinted in Transnational Dispute Management-TDM, 
Vol. 3, Issue 3, June 2006. 
4 Available, inter alia, at http://www.asil.org/ilib/2004/10/ilib041030.htm#d1. 
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B. ICSID Convention versus Other BIT/MIT Contexts  
The focus here is avowedly on ICSID arbitration (both contractual and non-
contractual), and not on ICSID Additional Facility5, NAFTA or other non-ICSID 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or multilateral investment treaty (MIT) bases.  
Indeed in the overflow of discussion that has emerged regarding the possible need 
for an appellate structure, it is sometimes neglected that certain of the phenomena 
which are being experienced in investment-related arbitration, whether for good or 
for ill, have little or nothing to do with ICSID Convention matters per se.  Rather, 
they are rooted in specific, individually – and often idiosyncratically – drafted and 
interpreted BITs and MITs.   
At the same time, discussion in isolation or ignorance of other investment-related 
arbitration would be misleading, illusory and counterproductive, so that the ICSID 
discussion is to a great extent a global discussion.  Many, if not most, of the at least 
publicly accessible ICSID awards which have an influence on the emerging invest-
ment-related jurisprudence respecting such matters as expropriation, minimum stan-
dards and the like may also be seen as influential in non-ICSID based arbitrations 
and awards which address essentially the same issues.  And in reverse, various non-
ICSID based awards which have entered the public domain have been considered by 
ICSID Convention-based tribunals at least as having a certain precedential influence 
or weight.    
C. Arguments for and against Appellate Mechanism  
The arguments for and against an ICSID or supra-ICSID "appellate structure" are 
already well articulated, and to a great extent evenly balanced.  They include the 
following: 
I. First: Predictability   
The rationale is that if all ICSID Convention awards were subject to a largely uni-
form standard and staffing of review and appeal, then both the underlying awards 
and any appellate decisions would ensure or at least promote greater predictability as 
to how recurring issues would or should be decided.   
 
5 Available, inter alia, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm. 
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II. Second: Consistency   
At first blush, consistency might be perceived to pose the same issues as predictabi-
lity, and to be sure they are interrelated.  At the same time, predictability is not ne-
cessarily a guarantee of consistency.   
Consistency is not possible or desirable where a fact-driven analysis demands dif-
ferent results under different circumstances.  On some levels, consistency is no more 
possible in public international law issues, including many affecting investment 
arbitration, than in commercial disputes, since the result is and should often be fact-
dependent. 
III. Third: Coherence   
While arguably a subset of both predictability and consistency, coherence deserves 
its own standard and its own discussion, and is surely part of any debate about the 
need for an appellate structure.   
It might be contended that incoherent awards are not likely to foster predictability 
or consistency.  Yet the primary goal of a coherent award is that its reasoning and 
findings are understandable and defensible internally inter se, within the particular 
factual and legal framework of that dispute, its treaty or contract bases and the evi-
dence adduced.   
Thus on the one hand the coherence of an award, particularly in the transparent 
investment award context, may hinge on both the tenability of the conclusions under 
the particular factual and legal circumstances on the one hand, and on the tenability 
of the result vis à vis similarly situated prior awards.  At the same time, an internally 
coherent award may appear to be incoherent when compared with other awards 
which are perceived as treating the same subject, particularly application or interpre-
tation of the same legal principles or treaties.  
IV. Fourth: Transparency   
Transparency may be seen as affecting each of the factors already addressed above.   
The more transparent or accessible an award or ruling, the more likely it is to at-
tract the attention of judges, arbitrators, parties and counsel in simultaneously pend-
ing or future cases.  In turn, the more likely it is to precipitate agreement or dis-
agreement in subsequent awards or judgments.  This is particularly so if the prior 
ruling breaks new ground, disagrees with a prior line of precedent or otherwise in-
volves noteworthy participants and/or high stakes legally or commercially.  An ap-
pellate structure, it is argued, may serve the goal of transparency by subjecting al-
ready transparent ICSID decisions to a further transparent scrutiny process.   
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This is of course assuming that transparency is accepted as a goal of arbitration or 
at least investment arbitration – which is by no means a uniformly held view. 
V. Fifth: Accountability   
Like predictability, accountability is somehow fused with the other factors discussed 
above.  At the same time, accountability may be seen as portending greater control, 
greater circumspection and even greater mistrust of a process which, without some 
appellate review mechanism, would potentially go off on its own tangent.   
Query whether such control and circumspection are possible or desirable.  The 
same might be said of any appellate process whether in civil litigation or in arbitra-
tion generally.  But it remains that appeal per se, as opposed to challenge or annul-
ment on narrow and substantially procedural grounds, is largely considered ana-
thema to arbitration.  Annulment, on the other hand, including the ad hoc annulment 
scheme as practiced thus far in ICSID arbitration, is already seen as providing a 
certain measure of accountability.   
Those who advocate a further and more elaborate ICSID appellate structure often 
point precisely to the ad hoc annulment scheme as being a partial failure, and as 
engendering not more accountability, but actually less.  One reason for this view 
among those who hold it is that the ad hoc annulment scheme by design has been 
just that, ad hoc.  Most conceptions of an ICSID appellate scheme, by contrast, fore-
see a finite and largely unchanging group of appellate judges or reviewers who, by 
virtue of their tenure over time, might serve the goal of accountability better than in 
an ad hoc process where the judges or reviewers are different from annulment to 
annulment.   
This is all by way of presupposing that accountability in investment arbitration is 
desirable.  While arbitrators should not be "unaccountable," it is not an entirely 
unanimous view that arbitrators chosen for an individual case with a specific seat, 
specific law and specific rules actually owe any "accountability" to anyone – except 
of course to the parties, the institution if any, and the courts at the seat in the context 
of the mandatory norms of due process, equal treatment and other sources of control 
typically considered to be synonymous with the grounds for opposition to enforce-
ment found in Article V.1 and V.2 of the New York Convention.6  In the case of a 
self-enforcing award which is not deemed to be subject to the New York Conven-
tion, then accountability is a matter between the arbitrators, the parties and the insti-
tution.  Whether it extends further to issues of "creating good law" and the like is 
debatable. 
 
6 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art. V, available, inter alia, at http://www.uncitral 
.org/-pdf/english/texts/-arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf. 
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VI. Sixth: Bias   
Proponents and opponents of an appellate structure for ICSID often stray into the 
area of contending or denying that in the case of investor rights versus state rights, 
there is an inherent bias in favor of investor rights.   
Query whether the ICSID (and non-ICSID) awards which have entered the public 
domain, particularly in the last five years, buttress the argument that there is a sys-
temic, inherent or otherwise ineluctable bias in favor of investor protection.  Surely 
the answer overall is largely no.   
If that answer is correct, then a motivation for an appellate structure based on bias 
is misplaced.  On the other hand, there is the perception that this is a moving target.  
That in the next several years more and more developing states will become defen-
dants in ICSID and other investment arbitration.  That more issues of bias may arise 
and that if only for perception reasons, an appellate structure applicable to all state 
parties alike may be politically expedient. 
VII. Seventh: Challenges to Lis Pendens and Res Iudicata   
The discussion surrounding an appellate structure also relates to concerns as to 
whether conflicts or perceived conflicts in legal holdings from one ICSID award to 
another relating to such issues as fair and equitable treatment, fork-in-the-road pro-
visions, contract claims versus treaty claims, etc. are a threat to principles of lis 
pendens or res judicata known principally from the civil litigation field, and increa-
singly from international commercial arbitration.   
This concern is in turn related to the notion that "forum shopping" or "treaty 
shopping" in the ICSID context may do violence to established notions of prior 
claims pending or precedent.7  With the aid of an appellate structure, it is thought, 
disincentives to such shopping around might be created, thereby serving such other 
goals as predictability, consistency and accountability.   
Whether this holds water is debatable, since the addition of an appellate stage to 
one arbitration does not clearly assist in preventing another arbitration (or litigation) 
with overlapping parties and issues from being commenced in parallel.  Nor does an 
appellate structure for ICSID awards necessarily have any way of promoting prece-
dential value of ICSID awards for non-ICSID investment arbitrations having diffe-
rent treaty bases.      
 
7 See, e.g., Kreindler, "Arbitral Forum Shopping," in Parallel Arbitration Tribunals and Awards 
in International Arbitration, Dossiers 3 ICC Institute of World Business Law, 2005. 
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VIII. Eighth: Relative Adequacy of the Existing ICSID Annulment Mechanism    
If the ICSID ad hoc annulment process is deemed to be working satisfactorily, then 
query why an additional appellate structure or an appellate structure in lieu of an-
nulment would be called for.   
Of course, annulment and appeal are not necessarily synonymous, and a two-
tiered system would not be entirely unimaginable.  On the other hand, proponents of 
an appellate structure largely have in mind a one-tier system in lieu of ad hoc an-
nulment.  For some such proponents, the annulment system thus far is perceived to 
have been unhelpful, unwieldy, heavily biased in favor of annulment, and a dis-
guised means of obtaining two bites at the apple.  Even if this were true, which de-
fies the empirical and other experience, it is not entirely clear how an appellate 
structure would remedy or improve upon the annulment mechanism except insofar 
as it would be "staffed" on a consistent basis by a group of judges with long tenure 
who are meant to counteract the ad hoc, piecemeal approach to date.   
Whether the ad hoc, piecemeal approach to date is in need of replacement is an-
other matter altogether.  On a certain level, the ad hoc, piecemeal annulment com-
mittee in an individual ICSID matter is arguably no more or less objectionable than 
the ad hoc, piecemeal judge or panel of judges in an individual ICC, UNCITRAL or 
other challenge proceeding before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Paris Court of 
Appeal or the US District Court for the Southern District of New York.  While those 
state judges are civil servants with long tenure, that tenure per se does not necessa-
rily guarantee long-term expertise in matters relevant to annulment of international 
arbitration awards.  Admittedly, on the other hand, the concentration of competence 
and expertise now being aspired to in precisely these named courts does suggest a 
less ad hoc approach than that of the ICSID annulment committee mechanism. 
Ultimately, each of the grounds addressed briefly above can be seen as providing 
a reasonable basis for considering an ICSID appellate structure, as also elucidated 
by Dr. Tams, but each one can also be turned on its head.  In the final analysis, the 
most compelling obstacle to such a reform would be one of an entirely different, 
pragmatic nature: namely, the relative impracticality of seeking, let alone obtaining 
the necessary amendment to the ICSID Convention8, in fulfillment of the stringent 
requirements for amendment.   
For that reason alone, there may be little utility in taking a black-and-white posi-
tion on the issue, although this can be found in recent other commentary.  
 
8 Article 66(1) ICSID Convention provides: "(1) If the Administrative Council shall so decide 
by a majority of two-thirds of its members, the proposed amendment shall be circulated to all 
Contracting States for ratification, acceptance or approval.  Each amendment shall enter into 
force 30 days after dispatch by the depositary of this Convention of a notification to Contrac-
ting States that all Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the amendment."  
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D. Dr. Tams' Mention of "Reference Proceedings"  
The foregoing tour d'horizon of certain of the arguments for and against the imple-
mentation of an ICSID appellate structure or mechanism may serve, it is hoped, as a 
useful background to appreciate the interesting and creative remarks and study un-
dertaken by Dr. Tams.  In particular, they are meant to help in putting into perspec-
tive his discussion of "reference proceedings" in the context of this debate.  Refe-
rence proceedings may be an alternative to the contemplation of an appellate struc-
ture, especially in view of the practical challenge of attempting to introduce such a 
structure by Convention amendment.  
With the potential exception of intrepretative notes under NAFTA Article 1131, 
there is in fact no system of reference proceedings in ICSID or non-ICSID based 
investment arbitration.  Article 1131(2) NAFTA9 provides: "An interpretation by the 
Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal estab-
lished under this Section."  This is to be compared and contrasted with Article 64 
ICSID Convention, which provides: "Any dispute arising between Contracting 
States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not 
settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the 
application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another 
method of settlement." [emphasis added]  
Is possible analogous application of Article 1131(2) NAFTA a solution to the ap-
pellate structure approach, and in view of Dr. Tams' remarks?   
On one level, the answer may be No, there are too many conceptual and other dif-
ferences between NAFTA and ICSID.  These include differences inherent in the 
simple fact that NAFTA is an MIT while ICSID is a Convention respecting dispute 
resolution relating to disparate BITS, MITS and also non-treaty disputes.  Further-
more, there is a narrow tripartite focus of NAFTA versus the expansive, multilateral 
nature of ICSID.  
On another level, and particularly in view of Dr. Tams' paper, the answer might 
well be Yes: 
 First, the Article 1131(2) NAFTA concept may be seen as existing in all cases as 
a matter of general treaty law.  Thus Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties10 provides: "[When interpreting a treaty], [t]here shall be taken into 
account […]: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions."  The referral mechanism 
in NAFTA may be seen as having become a matter of general treaty law at least 
between and among the member states to the treaty.  An analogous situation might 
 
9 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/NAFTA%20Text%20 
%20-Excerpts.pdf. 
10 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Vienna%20Conventi 
on%20on%20-the%20Law%20of%20Treaties.pdf. 
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be conceivable under ICSID, although again the requirement of an amendment may 
be unavoidable.  
Second, Article 1131(2) NAFTA, at least in the narrow NAFTA context, has 
proven to be an effective, clear, time-efficient method for facilitating or even impo-
sing clarity and uniformity, at least prospectively.  The obvious example here is the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission binding interpretation in 2001 respecting "fair and 
equitable treatment" under Article 1105 NAFTA as "not requir[ing] treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens."  There can be little doubt that – harking 
back to the discussion above of predictability, consistency, coherence and the like – 
this interpretation promptly contributed to a certain realignment of NAFTA juris-
prudence.   
Thus prior to the FTC interpretation the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada Par-
tial Award (2001)11 had held that "fair and equitable treatment" was an independent, 
self-contained, additive treaty standard.  It gave a broad interpretation of Art. 1105 
and imposed no threshold limitation that the conduct at issue be "egregious," "outra-
geous," etc.  Acceptance of the narrower FTC interpretation followed in the Pope & 
Talbot v. Canada Final Award (2002)12.   
Then, in Methanex v. US (2005)13, the tribunal stated that the FTC interpretation 
was binding not only as a matter of NAFTA law, but also pursuant to the general 
law of treaties, and that Article 1105 required showing the existence of an explicit 
rule of customary international law as being applicable to the case in order to estab-
lish a breach of the "Minimum Standard of Treatment."   
NAFTA-based awards since the FTC binding interpretation continue to grapple 
with F&ET, but within the confines of the interpretation: Mondev v. US (2002)14, 
UPS v. Canada (2002)15, ADF v. US (2003)16, Loewen v. US (2003)17, Waste Ma-
nagement v. Mexico (2004)18, GAMI v. Mexico (2004)19, Methanex v. US (2005)20, 
and Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006)21. 
 
11 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Pope-Canada-Award-
10Apr2001.pdf. 
12 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Pope-Canada-Damages-
31May2002.pdf. 
13  Available, inter alia, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_ Fi 
nal_Award.pdf.   
14 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Mondev-US-Award-
11Oct2002.pdf. 
15 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/UPS-Canada-Jurisdiction-
22Nov-2002.pdf. 
16 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/ADF-US-Award-
9Jan2003.pdf. 
17 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Loewen-US-Award-26Ju 
n2003.pdf. 
18 Available, inter alia, at http://naftaclaims.com/-Disputes/Mexico/Waste/WasteFinalAwardMe 
rits.pdf. 
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Third, a system of binding interpretation within ICSID might be seen as doing 
violence to bilateral meetings of the minds in individually negotiated BITs and 
FTAs, including retroactively, but in fact would be fully consistent with Article 
31(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties22.  Such system, assuming it could 
be achieved through the necessary modalities of approval of an amendment to the 
ICSID Convention, would conceivably also prospectively contribute to harmoniza-
tion and unification of drafting of certain typical, potentially open provisions.   
These include respecting, e.g., "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection 
and security" in the context of "customary international law."  They also include 
application of the proper law under the default provision in Article 42(1) ICSID 
Convention and supplementation of interpretation of a BIT through international law 
(e.g., the issue in the Wena annulment proceedings23).  They further include the 
validity of waiver of the right of annulment under Article 52 ICSID Convention, the 
meaning or standard of interpretation of "legal dispute" arising directly out of an 
"investment" under Article 25(1) ICSID Convention (e.g., Mihaly International24), 
and the meaning or standard of interpretation of "nationality" and "foreign control" 
under Article 25(2) ICSID Convention. 
Fourth, issues such as arose in SGS v. Pakistan25 and SGS v. Philippines26 – as-
suming for the sake of argument that that discordance was an undesirable develop-
ment – could be retroactively addressed for future cases, and even for applications 
for interpretation or correction within the current ICSID Convention Article 50(1) 
interpretation and correction scheme (see, e.g., Wena v. Egypt27).  This provision 
states, "If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning or scope of 
an award, either party may request interpretation of the award by an application in 
writing addressed to the Secretary-General." 
Fifth, the initial phase of three to five years would be one of uncertainty, instabil-
ity, but perhaps no greater than what is currently occurring.  After such initial phase, 
 
19 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/GAMI-Mexico-FinalAwa 
rd15Nov-2004.pdf. 
20 Available, inter alia, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_Fin 
al_Award.pdf.   
21 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Thunderbird-Mexico-Aw 
ard.pdf. 
22 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Vienna%20Convention 
%20on%20the-%20Law%20of%20Treaties.pdf. 
23 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Wena-Egypt-Annulment-
5Feb2002.pdf. 
24 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Mihaly-SriLanka-Award-
15Mar2002-.pdf. 
25 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/SGS-Pakistan-Jurisdictio 
n-6Aug2003-.pdf. 
26 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/SGS-Philippines-Jurisd 
iction-29Jan-2004.pdf. 
27 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Wena-Egypt-Annulment-
5Feb2002.pdf. 
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greater stability as to such points would occur: witness the NAFTA F&ET situation.  
Inconsistencies of the Lauder28 variety would still occur, and perhaps should still 
occur, as in general commercial arbitration and litigation, but that would not be the 
focus of binding interpretation.  And insofar as ICSID awards have a persuasive 
effect on non-ICSID investment-related disputes, including NAFTA, ICSID Addi-
tional Facility, UNCITRAL Rules29 and Energy Charter Treaty30, the ICSID binding 
interpretation could have a salutary effect on the uncertainties affecting various 
investment arbitration regimes.  
Sixth, apart from the admittedly considerable obstacle of effectuating the neces-
sary Convention amendment, a system of binding interpretation would be no more 
cumbersome and problematic, and arguably far less so, than various other proposals 
for establishment of an ICSID appellate structure, or for expansion of the ICSID 
annulment mechanism.  
Ultimately, the chances of obtaining unanimous approval for an amendment of 
the ICSID Convention to institute such a mechanism may be slim, but perhaps no 
less slim than the chances of doing so to institute an "appellate structure."  And such 
appellate structure might be far riskier in the conception and implementation, and 
also less consistent with the original goals of finality and unappealability of the 
Convention's original drafters.  In any event, Dr. Tams' analysis of certain of the 
related issues in this debate is a valuable and perceptive contribution to a discussion 
which is likely to be only in its beginning stages.  
 
28 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAwa 
rd-3Sept2001.pdf,http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-PartialAward-13 
Sept2001.-pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-PartialAward-13Sep 
t2001-Dissent.pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-Appealof Partia-
lAward-15May2003.pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAwa 
rd-14Mar2003.pdf, http://www.in-vestmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward-14 
Mar2003-Separate.pdf, http://www.invest-mentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-AppealofFi 
nalAward2003-15May2003.pdf. 
29 Available, inter alia, at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rul 
es.pdf. 
30  Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Energy%20Charter%20 
Treaty.pdf. 
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Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO       
                             
Christina Pfaff∗ 
A. Introduction  
At the dawn of the twenty-first century foreign investment and the protection of 
foreign investor rights belong to the most innovated fields in international law. The 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)1, the specifi-
cally specialized arbitral institution for the settlement of investment disputes has 
shaped, with enormous success, both the development and interpretation of many 
legal standards and guarantees in international investment law2. This success is 
based on certain unique advantages. ICSID is attached to the World Bank, unlike 
any other international arbitral institution. Due to the status of the World Bank3 most 
countries may be more likely to observe ICSID obligations4, which can improve the 
 
∗  Christina Pfaff, LL.M. (European and International Economic Law) is Ph.D Candidate and 
Research Assistant at the Wilhelm Merton Center for European Integration and International 
Economic Order, University Frankfurt, Germany. 
1  BGBl. 1969 II, p. 1191; the convention is also available at <www.worldbank.org/icsid 
/basicdoc/basicdoc>; the implementation of the ICSID Convention was based on the attempt of 
the drafters to attain a „careful balance between the interests of investors and host states,“, see 
further Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 Am. J. Int’l L., p. 784 (1983); Smutny, 
Arbitration before the International Centre fort he Settlement of Investment Disputes (2002), 
Business Law International B.L.I., p. 367; Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitra-
tion (2004), p. 38; Fahmi/Shihata, The experience of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (1999) ICISD Review, p. 299-369. 
2  The number of cases before ICSID increased considerably after the invocation of arbitration 
under the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement); see generally 
Bishop/Crawford/Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes (2005), p. 11; it is important to note, 
however, that the ICSID Convention does not contain any comprehensive rule on the protec-
tion of foreign investment, but only the procedural framework, see Art. 42 (1) ICSID Conven-
tion. 
3  See generally Fahmi/Shihata, The dynamic evolution of international organizations: the case 
of the World Bank (1999), Journal of the History of International Law, p. 217-249; Tschofen, 
The World Bank in a changing world (1995), p. 52. 
4  Fahmi/Shihata, Avoidance and settlement of disputes - the World Bank’s approach and ex-
perience (1999) International Law Forum, p. 90-98; Görs, Internationales Investitionsrecht- 
Vom völkerrechtlichen Enteignungsschutz zum europäischen Binnenmarkt (2005), p. 74; in 
that sense also Slaughter, The future of international law is domestic – or the European way of 
law, Harvard International Law Journal (2006), p. 338. 
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protection of investment in return5. ICSID is based upon an international treaty, the 
ICSID Convention6. Any breach of any obligation under the ICSID Convention 
implies a violation of international law7. Moreover, investment liberalization has 
been carried out primarily by bilateral arrangements8, such as the Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs)9. These agreements are entered into by trading partners and 
determine a consensus on the conditions of foreign investment and investor reme-
dies between the parties10. Most of these BITs refer to ICSID for dispute resolu-
tion11. 
But after forty years of ICSID the time has come to not only to take stock of the 
work of the tribunals under the ICSID Convention, but to take potential alternative 
approaches to the field of foreign investment protection into account. While activi-
ties of the ICSID Tribunal have been in the centre of academic discussion for a long 
 
5  Semler, Schiedsverfahren im Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 97-102.  
6  Lörcher, ICSID Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 12; Semler, Schiedsverfahren im 
Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2003), 
SchiedsVZ, p. 97 (99). 
7  Lörcher, ICSID Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 11.  
8  Stoll, WTO-Handbuch (2002), Chapter C. I. 6., para 2; Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to 
ICSID Arbitration (2004), p. 38-40; Semler, Schiedsverfahren im  Rahmen von Investitions-
schutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 97. 
9  Direct foreign investment is protected by a network of over 2400 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) involving 176 countries and additionally a vast number of provisions in plurilateral and 
multilateral treaties concerning investment protection or international trade. These BITs have 
been set into function over the past 40 years and provide a legal framework for international 
investment on the bilateral level. They contain relatively similar provisions and create action-
able standards of conduct for governments regarding the treatment of foreign investment, 
though the arrangements bind only the parties involved.  
10  The establishment of ICSID led to an increase of legal certainty with regard to investment 
disputes, see Nathan, Submissions to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes in Breach of the Convention (1995) J.Int.Arb., p. 27 and Fahmi/Shihata, Towards a 
Greater Depoliticalization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, (1986), 
ICSID Review FILJ, p. 3; Schäfer, Enteignungsstandards im Völkerrecht, RIW (1998), p. 193.   
11  See <www.worldbank/icsid/about/about.>; ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discussion Paper 22 October 2004, para 5; Semler, 
Schiedsverfahren im Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 99; in addition consensus on jurisdiction of ICSID can also be de-
termined in multilateral agreements such as the NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty, see 
Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (2004), p. 35; Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary (2001), Art. 25, para 257; Broches, Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965 – Explanatory 
Notes and Survey of its Application (1993), YCA, p. 627, 643, para 35; ibid., Denying         
ICSID’s jurisdiction (1996), Journal of International Arbitration, p. 21-30; Hirsch, The Arbi-
tration Mechanism of the International Centre fort he Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(1993), p. 48 (51), Lew/Kröll/Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(2003), Chapter 28, para 48.  
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period and debated extensively12, the protection of foreign investment by other 
mechanisms has been much less considered. A number of international treaties deal-
ing with the protection of (foreign) property are based upon international law13. In 
spite of the presence of property protection in both texts of international human 
rights and international trade law, the role of these instruments in the context of 
foreign investment protection remained largely irrelevant and research on this par-
ticular issue remained scarce. In addressing this gap, the present study, with due 
regard to the complexity of the issues, seeks to increase the level of understanding of 
the role of human rights and international trade mechanisms in the area of foreign 
investment protection, drawing on an analysis on the specific aspects of foreign 
investment protection in international human rights and trade law.    
The emerging code of human rights provides a set of standards that apply to every 
sector of human interaction. In the context of foreign property protection human 
rights law and institutions comply with the basic rules of aliens’ law, which is based 
on the international law principle of diplomatic protection14. The concept of diplo-
matic protection as based on  the traditional view according to which the individual 
constitutes only a mere part of the State is founded on the traditional do ut des ap-
proach15 in general international law. Understanding the instrument in such fashion 
limits the role of international human rights law with respect to foreign property 
protection. A new generation of international human rights treaties emerged and 
tackled this classical approach by granting treaty rights to all individuals16. Thus 
these treaties serve the benefit of all individuals, irrespective of their citizenship, and 
the international legal community, as its observance is monitored by all state parties 
equally. Yet, the protection of foreign investment and the protection of foreign pro-
perty in general international law are footing on different goals: Human rights17 
together with aliens’ law aim at a certain  detachment of the individual from the 
state as well as a civilized conduct among states while the law on foreign investment 
protection focuses at protecting foreign investment as such. These differences have 
 
12  See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention - A Commentary (2001), Art. 25, paras 92 –125 and the 
references cited. 
13  E. g. the European Convention on Human Rights, which talks about international law in ge-
neral in its Art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol. 
14  Diplomatic Protection is to be understood as the protection given by a subject of international 
law to individuals, i. e. legal or natural persons, against a violation of international law by an-
other subject of international law, see Geck, Diplomatic Protection, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), En-
cyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 1046. 
15  The do ut des approach is also defined as the concept of reciprocity; see further Parisi/Ghei, 
The role of reciprocity in international law, Cornell International Law Journal (1968), p. 93-
123. For a methodical approach see Kahan, The logic of reciprocity (2003) Michigan Law Re-
view, p. 71-103. 
16  E. g. the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), see Articles 24 and 44.  
17  Human rights are defined as “those claims made by men, for themselves or on behalf of other 
men, supported by some theory which concentrates on the humanity of man, on man as a hu-
man being, a member of mankind.”, Dorwick, Human Rights, Problems, Perspectives and 
Texts (1979), p. 8. 
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had a strong influence on the protection of (foreign) property by human rights in-
struments with regard to consistency and coherency issues in jurisprudence, and, as 
a consequence thereof, on the entire role of human rights institutions in the field of 
foreign investment. 
Trade and investment are closely linked with each other18. Both are complemen-
tary and substitute strategies for business looking for access to foreign markets, and 
the realisation of new commercial opportunities19. As establishing a commercial 
presence in a foreign country is one of the modes of delivering services investment 
goes often hand in hand with trade in services as well. From an economic perspec-
tive, foreign investment is a core part of the linkage between global markets and 
international trade20, because access to the markets through a commercial presence 
brings about foreign investment, which may lead to additional trade21. Both concepts 
appear as two sides of the same coin. This substantial overlap between trade and 
investment law leads to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their role in the 
context of foreign investment. Some WTO Agreements contain investment provi-
sions, e.g. the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), but more or less as incidental 
matters to some main theme. In addition, the panels set up under the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU) had to deal with investment issues occasionally22. Yet, 
the close linkage between trade and investment sharply contrasts with the current 
role of the WTO in the field of foreign investment protection, in particular since 
investment appears as the “missing panel” in the system and no comprehensive 
multilateral agreement on foreign investment protection under WTO auspices could 
be successfully concluded23.  
 
18  See e.g., WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, The Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, WT/WGTI/W/7, 18 September 1997. 
19  Sauve, Advisor of the OECD’s Trade Directorate (2003) emphasized this assumption by  
stating that „the absence of a creditable and coherent regime for international investment is 
particularly glaring at a time when investment (more than trade) has become the driving force 
of deepening integration in the world economy“, Trade Rules behind Borders, Essays on Ser-
vice, Investment and the New Trade Agenda (2004), p. 22 f.  
20  Lörcher, ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 11; Tietje, Die Beilegung inter-
nationaler Investitionsstreitigkeiten, in Streitbeilegung in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbe-
ziehungen, (Marauhn, ed.) p. 49. 
21  See Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1968) 10, stating that “The function of the law of 
responsibility of States for injuries to aliens … is to provide in the general world interest, ade-
quate protection for the stranger, to the end that travel, trade, and intercourse may be facili-
tated”. 
22  Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R; WT/DS59/R; Canada- Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act 
(FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984). 
23  In this context, Sauve (supra note 19, p. 24) stated that the “patchwork quilt of different bila-
teral treaties, regional arrangements, and limited pluri-lateral or multilateral instruments rela-
ting to investment stands in sharp contrast to the comprehensive system of norms and princi-
ples governing international trade.”  
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The task of this paper consists in illuminating the current state of foreign invest-
ment protection by other mechanisms than the ICSID focusing on human rights 
institutions and the WTO. It attempts to provide a survey on relevant human rights 
institutions and provisions of the WTO agreements dealing with foreign investment 
issues. The conceptual approaches to the issue of foreign investment protection in 
international human rights law and in international trade law are analyzed in order to 
draw conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of each system from the 
investor’s perspective. In addition, a critical look is taken at relevant court decisions 
rendered in the context of foreign investment protection. The paper does not, how-
ever, aim at comparing these mechanisms and their systems but instead points at the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism, in particular as against 
ICSID. These considerations permit an evaluation of the elements which define the 
role of the human rights systems and the WTO system with respect to foreign in-
vestment protection.   
The paper is structured as follows. As a starting point, Chapter B gives a brief 
overview of the historical development of foreign property protection in general 
international law. It focuses on the rule of diplomatic protection which as a concept 
has experienced an on-going adjustment to the development of general international 
law over the last decades. The traditional approach of diplomatic protection24 ap-
pears to have somewhat changed, as rights and entitlements are accrued to the indi-
vidual by human rights conventions. The conceptual understanding of the instrument 
has been defined and clarified by the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Various court 
decisions, such as the Barcelona Traction Case, tackled the concept of the rule of 
diplomatic protection. The analysis of the decisions shows the continuing adjust-
ment of the rule of diplomatic protection in general international law.  
Chapter C provides an overview of the universal and regional human rights insti-
tutions playing a role in the field of foreign investment protection. In this context, 
the paper focuses on the category of treaties which accord treaty rights to all indi-
viduals and thus create a favourable legal position for foreign investors. The respec-
tive treaties as well as the pertinent jurisprudence are introduced and analyzed by 
identifying their specific features which render one instrument more or less suitable 
for foreign investment protection than another. Chapter C illustrates the principal 
characteristics of foreign property and investment protection in international human 
rights law and argues that international investment law and human rights are based 
on different grounds.  
Next, Chapter D points at clarifying the role of the WTO in the field of foreign 
investment. This topic is approached by a short survey on the development of fo-
reign investment protection within the WTO system. The core part of the Chapter 
focuses on the WTO agreements dealing with investment issues. The provisions of 
 
24  The traditional approach of diplomatic protection determined the mediatisation of the individ-
ual entirely.  
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the agreements are examined with regard to the respective jurisprudence. The paper 
argues that despite the close linkage between trade and investment the current ap-
proach of the WTO to the field of foreign investment is dominated by the attempt 
not to include comprehensive investment provisions into the existing agreements 
due to conflicts attached to the issue. This assumption creates obstacles for a poten-
tial multilateral comprehensive agreement on foreign investment. These obstacles 
are illustrated and summarized in Part III which aims at defining overlaps and diver-
gences between trade law and investment law as well as the need for a multilateral 
regime, in particular with regard to consistency and coherence in international juris-
prudence. The paper concludes with part E, which evaluates the results of the ana-
lytical framework and assesses potential as alternative approaches to foreign invest-
ment protection as compared to the ICSID Convention.   
B. The Protection of Foreign Property in General International Law 
Fundamental to the protection of foreign investment is the concept of property. The 
protection of (foreign) property25 by rules of international law has been subject to 
on-going controversial debates26 and the question of property rights of aliens has 
become rather separated from that of a general minimum standard of protection. The 
traditional protection of foreign investment was based on the rules of aliens’ law27, 
in particular the international expropriation rules28, as aliens may have claims 
against natural or legal persons and institutions in a foreign state29. Pursuant to the 
rules of international law only the home state of the foreign investor can assert 
 
25  Alien property is determined by the effective power to enforce measures against such property, 
see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Aliens, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law, vol. I (1992), p. 116. 
26  Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property , American Journal of 
International Law (1981), p. 553- 589; Verwey, The Taking of Foreign Property under Interna-
tional Law: A New Legal Perspective?, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1984), p. 
3-96; Borchardt, The Diplomatic Protection of citizens abroad (1915), p. 8-56; Slaugh-
ter/Tulumello/Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A new Generation 
of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, American Journal of International Law 92 (1998) p. 367-397; 
von Glahn, Law among Nations; An Introduction to Public International Law (1996); Frieden, 
Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of global Finance, 
International Organizations 45 (1991) p. 425-451; Seidl-Hohenveldern (supra note 25) at 116 
with further references.  
27  Ipsen, Individualschutz im Völkerrecht, Zum völkergewohnheitsrechtlichen Mindeststandard, 
in Völkerrecht (Ipsen, ed.), § 50, para 2.  
28  Banz, Völkerrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz durch Investitionschutzabkommen, insbesondere die 
Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1959 (1988), p. 135; Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteig-
nung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 3. 
29  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 135.  
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claims on the basis of diplomatic protection30 in case of interferences with aliens’ 
property. The rule of diplomatic protection reflects the traditional view in interna-
tional law “that a State is in reality asserting its own rights- its right to ensure, in the 
person of its subjects, respect for the rule of international law.”31 Thus the link of 
nationality gives the state the right to protect its nationals against abuses by other 
states. The concept rests on the assumption that not individuals, but their home 
states are the holders of the rights granted in international law, as the individual is a 
mere part of its home state32. In addition the home state of the investor will not ac-
cept the exclusive power of the host state to judge on the legality of the taking and 
the amount of compensation due33. The exhaustion of local remedies is an obligatory 
prerequisite for the application of the rule of diplomatic protection34.  
The scope of the international law norms concerning protection of (foreign) pro-
perty comprises not only the “classical” expropriation cases but also cases where 
measures tolerated or adopted by the host state impair and defeat the effective use of 
alien property as if it were deprivation of it35. International law does not exclude 
interference with alien property entirely, but interference with it may violate interna-
tional discrimination rules, if such measures are directed exclusively against fo-
 
30  Diplomatic Protection is to be understood here as the protection given by a subject of interna-
tional law to individuals, i. e. natural or legal persons, against a violation of international law 
by another subject of international law. The legal institution of diplomatic protection has been 
shaped by some important developments in the international legal community, e. g. by the evo-
lution of human rights and by efforts to raise individuals more and more to the status of sub-
jects of international law.  
31  Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. (1924); PCIJ, Series No. 5 (1925), 
judgment p. 6 at p. 12; c. f.; also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Judgment 
ICJ reports (1970),  45; separate opinion of Judge Morelli, at p. 222 (226). 
32  This viewpoint is backed by the concept of reciprocity (traditional do ut des between states). 
33  United States –Iran Agreement on 19 January 1981 (Hostages and Financial Arrangements); 
see Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the United 
States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 88 American Journal of International Law, (1994), p. 585 (610); 
Baker/Davis, Arbitral Proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules - The Experience of the 
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 23 George Washington Journal of International Law & 
Economics (1989), p. 267 (347); Briner, Luncheon Talk: The United States-Iran Claims Tri-
bunal and Disputes Involving Sovereigns, 18 Arbitration International 299 (2002); Jones, The 
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility, 24 Virginia Jour-
nal of International Law (1984), p. 259 (285); Lillich, The United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 
1981-1983 (1985), p. 15 f.  
34  The requirement that individuals first exhaust local remedies gives states – and particularly 
their domestic courts – an incentive to reach conclusions acceptable to the international institu-
tion so that the international court need not intervene to review the case; see e. g. the Mavrom-
matis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2 (1939), p. 6 at p. 12 of the 1924 judgment; 
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76 (1939), p. 4 at p. 18; Electricity 
Company of Sofia Case, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 77 (1939), p. 64 at p. 78 and Interhandel Case, 
ICJ Reports 1959, p. 6 at p. 27. 
35  These measures are referred to as a „creeping nationalization“ or a so-called „constructive 
taking“. 
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reigners36. The host state has to grant minimum standard compensation37 due for the 
taking of the property to citizens and aliens alike38.  
Recently, the International Law Commission (ILC), a permanent organ for the 
codification of international law39 decided, subject to the approval of the General 
Assembly40, at its forty-seventh session (1995) to include the issue of diplomatic 
protection on its agenda41 and qualified the topic as appropriate for codification and 
progressive development in international law. At the fifty-eighth session (2006) the 
ILC adopted a text of draft articles concerning the rule of diplomatic protection and, 
thus, concluded its work on this issue42. The current draft version of the articles on 
diplomatic protection contains a chapter on general principles of diplomatic protec-
tion, such as a definition of term and scope43. The following chapters address inter 
alia the local remedies rule and the status of legal and natural persons44. The draft 
articles, however, deal only with the secondary rules45, which are the rules relating 
to the conditions that must be met for bringing a claim for diplomatic protection. In 
 
36  This problem was addressed in the Chilean Copper Nationalization Case by the Landgericht 
Hamburg, Chile-Kupfer Streit, Court Decision of 22 January 1973, Außenwirtschaftsdienst des 
Betriebsberaters (AWD), Vol. 19 (1973) p. 163-165 and Court Decision of 13 March 1974, 
AWD, Vol. 20, p. 410-413; English version available in ILM, vol. 12 (1973) p. 251-289 and 
ILM, Vol. 13 (1974), p.1115-1120; and the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Corporación 
de Cobre c. Societé Brade Copper Corporation et Societé du Groupement d’Importation des 
Metaux, 29 novembre 1972, clunet, vol. 100 (1973) p. 227-238, English version available in 
ILM, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 182-189; Behrens, Rechtsfragen im chilenischen Kupferstreit, Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1973), p. 394 (435); Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Chilean Chopper Nationalization Cases before German Courts, American Jour-
nal of International Law , vol. 69, No. 1, (1975), p. 110-119. 
37  The minimum standard is defined as prompt, adequate and effective compensation.  
38  Garcia-Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, YILC (1959 II) 1-36; ibid., 
State Responsibility: Some new Problems; Recueil des Cours, vol. 94 (1958-II) , p. 365 (491); 
Parry/Clive, Some considerations upon the protection of individuals in international law; Re-
cueil des Cours, vol. 90 (1956-II), p. 653 (726). 
39  For a general survey see Sir Vallat; International Law Commission, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. II (1995) p. 1208-1212. 
40  The General Assembly instructed the ILC in 1996 to further examine the topic and to define its 
scope and content in the light of the observations made during debates, Resolution 51/160 of 
16 December 1996; see also A/51/358 and Add. 1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
51/160, the ILC established a Working Group on the topic at its forty-nine session (1997). The 
report of the Working Group was endorsed by the ILC, Yearbook ILC, vol. II, para 171. 
41  See Yearbook ILC (1995), vol. II, para 501. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/160 
of 11 December 1996, the ILC included this topic on its agenda at its forty-ninth session 
(1997), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/52/10), paras 169-171. 
42  Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Chapter IV, p. 16. 
43  See Chapter I, Article 1 and 2; yet, the draft article makes no attempt to provide a complete 
and comprehensive definition of diplomatic protection. It rather defines the salient features of 
the rule in the sense in which the term is used in the present draft articles.  
44  See Chapter II, Article 4 and Chapter III, Article 9. 
45  The primary rules, which govern the treatment of the person and property of aliens, see Report 
of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Chapter IV, p 22 (23).  
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addition, certain weaknesses inherent to the instrument, such as the protection of 
stateless persons46 or the exhaustion of local remedies47 as a prerequisite for the 
application of the rules of diplomatic protection were tackled by the draft codifica-
tion. It is important to note that any rights resulting from either customary interna-
tional law or bilateral or multilateral human rights treaties remain unaffected48. Ul-
timately, draft Article 17 deals with foreign investment, stating that “[t]he present 
draft articles do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent with special rules 
of international law, such as treaty provisions for the protection of investment.” The 
article contributes to treaties, which, within their provisions concerning dispute 
resolution, exclude or depart substantially from the rules governing diplomatic pro-
tection. BITs or the multilateral ICSID Convention are the primary examples of such 
treaties49. Their provisions for dispute resolution allow direct access of the investor 
to international arbitration and dispense with the conditions for the exercise of dip-
lomatic protection. Avoiding political uncertainty as an inherent factor in the nature 
of diplomatic protection is another advantage for dispute resolution in accordance 
with these respective treaty provisions. The ILC draft articles are notably based on 
the jurisprudence rendered by international tribunals with regard to the instrument of 
diplomatic protection.  
 
46  Article 8 of the draft version.  
47  Article 14 of the draft version; Article 15 determines recognized exceptions from the local 
remedies rule. 
48  A state may protect an individual in inter-state proceedings under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171), the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (article 11), the Conven-
tion on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (United Na-
tions, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, art. 21), the European Convention on Human Rights (ar-
ticle 24), the American Convention on Human Rights (art. 45) and the African Charter on Hu-
man and People’s Rights ( United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1520, p. 217, arts. 47-54), see 
draft article 16.  
49  Article 27 (1) of the ICSID Convention reads: „No Contracting State shall give diplomatic 
protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals 
and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbi-
tration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by 
and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.“, see United Nations, Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), p. 89 (90).  
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I. Historical Development of Investment Protection in International Law 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign investment was largely made 
in the context of colonial ambitions50. Notions of collective ownership of property 
which were widely prevalent in the colonies were replaced by European notions of 
individual property51. The common form of foreign investment of these days was 
indirect, through loans and government bonds, and foreign direct investment, on 
which this paper is focused, started to take shape only in the late nineteenth century. 
The increase of such foreign direct investment was promoted by two independent, 
but interrelated developments, which were, on the one hand, the rapidly increasing 
rate of technological invention and, on the other hand, the growth of corporations. 
When the host governments expropriated property of investors from another state, 
the government of the investor would provide diplomatic protection52, which is 
defined as the exclusive right of the state to pursue treaty rights beneficial to its 
nationals in the international context53. The claims based on the rule of diplomatic 
protection were commonly dealt with by ad hoc tribunals or mixed claims commis-
sions to adjudicate the claims. The instrument of diplomatic protection allowing for 
the intervention of the government of the investor led to conflicts with the host go-
vernment. This development culminated in the formulation of the “Calvo-
Doctrine”54, which embodied the Latin American version of the principle of equality 
between nationals and aliens due to the abusive exercise of the right of diplomatic 
protection55. The doctrine promulgated that foreign investors were entitled to treat-
 
50  During the nineteenth century, optional treaty standards hardened into rules of international 
customary law or became considered as general principles of law recognised by civilised na-
tions. These standards require the compliance of the rule of law (in the meaning of the conti-
nental Rechtsstaat), the right to full, prompt and effective compensation and the exhaustion of 
local remedies.  
51  This protection was to ensure that colonial legal systems were changed in order to accommo-
date European notions of individual rights of property and freedom of contract.  
52  See Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of 
International Law Under Attack, American Journal of International Law, vol. 69, No. 2 (1975), 
p. 359-365; Gramlich, Diplomatic Protection Against Acts of Intergovernmental Organs, Ger-
man Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, (1984), p. 386 (428). 
53  At that time diplomatic protection was usually pursued through exchanges of diplomatic notes 
between the governments or espousing a formal claim on behalf of the investor as a state na-
tional on a government to government basis. 
54  The name of the doctrine refers to the Argentinean diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo, who 
shaped the „Calvo-Doctrine“ in 1868. The doctrine states that “aliens who established them-
selves in a country are certainly entitled to the same rights of protection as nationals, but they 
cannot claim any greater measure of protection.”  
55  Some American States suspected diplomatic protection to be a potential instrument for 
stronger states in order to achieve economic intervention, intrusion into their domestic jurisdic-
tion, imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
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ment no different or better than citizens of the host state56. According to the doc-
trine, foreign investors were to have their claims heard by the courts of the countries 
where they invested, but they were not entitled to seek the diplomatic protection of 
their governments or to have claims presented to international tribunals. The doc-
trine has been embodied in some international instruments: on the Seventh Interna-
tional Conference of the American States57 the Calvo-Doctrine was explicitly incor-
porated into the Convention on Rights and Duties of States58. Nevertheless the 
Calvo-Doctrine proved to be no obstacle to legal actions based on violations of 
established international obligations referring to the treatment of aliens, as the inter-
national responsibility was drawn into question59.  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign investment disputes were 
widely brought about by land reform measures in certain countries, such as the 
transformation of the entire Czarist economy in the Soviet Union to socialism in 
1917 and the disruptions of World War I. Prior to 1917 a common understanding, 
the traditional consensus among the principal nations existed which embodied the 
obligatory rule of prompt and adequate compensation in case of a state taking an 
alien’s property60. In addition, states adhered to the rule of diplomatic protection in 
its traditional sense. This situation changed in connection with the Russian Revolu-
tion61 and World War I and led to the denial of private property in the Soviet Union 
 
56  Calvo assumed that the acknowledgment of the minimum international standard would lead to 
„an exorbitant and fatal privilege, essentially favourable to the powerful States and injurious to 
the weaker nations, establishing an unjustifiable inequality between nationals and foreigners, 
Garcia-Amador, Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 521, 522; Shea, The Calvo Clause, A Problem of Inter-
American and International Law and Diplomacy; Modern Law Review, vol. 20, No. 4, (1957), 
p. 428-429.  
57  The First International Conference of American States was held in Washington in 1889/1890 
and the Seventh Conference in Montevideo in 1933. The formulation was officially adopted in 
the following words: “1. Foreigners are entitled to enjoy all the civil rights enjoyed by natives; 
and they shall be afforded all the benefits of said rights in all that is essential as well as in the 
form or procedure, and the legal remedies incident thereto, absolutely in like manners as said 
natives; 2. A nation has not, nor recognizes in favour of foreigners, any other obligations or re-
sponsibilities than those which in favour of the natives are established, in like cases, by the 
constitution and the laws.”, see also Scott, The International Conferences of American States, 
1889 to 1928 (1931), p. 45.  
58  The Convention states that „Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law 
and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other more extensive than 
those of the nationals“ (Art. 9); the doctrine was also taken up in another inter-American in-
strument, the 1902 Convention Relative to the Rights of Aliens (Art. 2).  
59  Shea, The Calvo Clause, A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy, 
Modern Law Review, vol. 20, No. 4, (1957), p. 428-429. 
60  See Art. 46 II Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which states that „private property cannot be 
confiscated“. 
61 See Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 18 
and references cited there in footnote 24.  
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between 1917 and 196262. The end of World War I witnessed the establishment of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)63. This court rendered two   
leading decisions referring to the matter of diplomatic protection and the protection 
of alien’s property in the 1920s: the Oscar Chinn Case and the Mavrommatis Con-
cessions Case.  
The end of World War II was accompanied by the imposition of socialist econo-
mies in Eastern Europe, the nationalization of certain industries in Western Europe64 
and the independence of former colonial territories. These developments caused an 
increasing number of foreign investment disputes which needed to be resolved. Thus 
the rules of international customary law were reaffirmed65. In this period of time 
property rights including the right to compensation for expropriation have been 
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(1969) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981)66. These in-
struments grant, irrespective of the principle of reciprocity (do ut des), the treaty 
rights to everyone regardless of e. g. nationality, which brought about a legal eman-
cipation of the individual and led to a somewhat different understanding of the con-
cept of diplomatic protection. The Cold War period brought further conflicts67, as a 
section of the world proclaimed its adherence to the “Hull-Rule”68, while other large 
 
62  See Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. I (1951), p. 98 (Decree of the Council 
of People’s commissars on the General and Legal Conditions for Concessions, 23 November 
1920); Mexico followed Russia by changing its constitution in the sense that no protection of 
property whatsoever was guaranteed.  
63  The Permanent Court of International Justice did its best to stigmatise the measures of liquida-
tion of enemy property under the Peace Treaties of 1919 as exceptions from the traditional 
rules of international law as well as to reaffirm the minimum standard of international law on 
the protection of foreign property. The court made it clear beyond doubt that once a breach of 
international standards occurred, it was irrelevant if the state concerned applied the same 
treatment to its own nationals. Non-discrimination was not to be regarded as a justification for 
a violation of the minimum standard of international law, see Roth, The Minimum Standard of 
International Law applied to Aliens (1949), p. 81. 
64  France and the United Kingdom. 
65  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 187. 
66  In addition, these rights have been included in the constitutions of many countries and private 
initiatives to address the treatment of foreign investors were set off: the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) adopted the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investors in 
1949. 
67  See inter alia the United States Supreme Court, stating in 1962: “There are few if any issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s 
power to expropriate the property of aliens”, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, at p. 428 (1964). The “social function of property” and the “redistribution of wealth” 
competed with the traditional Western concepts of private property and protection of aliens. 
68  The Hull-Rule is named after the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cordell Hull, calling 
for prompt, adequate and effective compensation, see 32 Am.J. Int’l L., Supp., p. 181-207 
(1938). The Hull-Rule proclaimed adequate and partial rather than full compensation and was 
therefore met by heavy criticism, see further Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and Inter-
national Law (1969), p. 7 (8).  
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sections of it regarded this rule and its equivalents as tailor-made for imperialist 
powers. Many socialist countries banned foreign direct investment in their territories 
altogether. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) were nego-
tiated by a few countries in the upcoming period to regulate the treatment of foreign 
investment. Furthermore the International Court of Justice was newly formed69. In 
1962 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 180370 to express the traditional 
consensus71 determining specific conditions in case of expropriation or nationaliza-
tion of property72.  
After the pronouncement of Resolution 1803 the World Bank drafted a Conven-
tion, which was supposed to set up a proper institutional framework for the settle-
ment of investment disputes73. The result of these endeavours is the ICSID-
Convention74, which came into force in October 1966 only eighteen months after its 
drafting75. The Convention created the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes to administer arbitrations between contracting governments and 
investors of other states. The Convention does not provide a specific rule of interna-
tional law on a comprehensive basis for the future development of the protection of 
international investment, but institutional rules and administrative and financial 
 
69  In 1952 the ICJ found it lacked jurisdiction on an investment dispute between the British 
government and Iran in the case Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Judgment of 
22 July 1952. 
70  UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources. 
71  The traditional consensus determined that “nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning 
have to be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest. These 
have to be recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with 
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with international law…”, General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 
1962, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (UN G. A. Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of December 12, 1974) stipulates that 
each State has the right „ to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, 
in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, 
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State con-
siders pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it 
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless 
[otherwise agreed]“ (Art. 2 (2) (c)).  
72  The resolution was met by heavy criticism, as it determined a trend towards further vagueness, 
which was illustrated by terms such as „appropriate compensation“ (adopted in Res. 1803) or 
the formula of „reasonable, adequate and reasonable prompt“ compensation, see further 
Friedmann, A.S.I.L. Proceedings (1963), p. 127 (128); ibid., Restatement of the Law, Second 
– Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965), p. 563; Metzger, Law of International 
Trade, vol. I (1966), p. 112 et seq.  
73  So far it can be stated that the ICSID Convention is still representing the consensus reached in 
Resolution 1803. 
74  See BGBL. 1969 II 369. 
75  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), p. 4, mn. 10.  
 280
regulations for the settlement of disputes76. In the 1970s the consensus found in 
Resolution 1803 and the standards for treatment of foreign investment as well as the 
content of the international law that governs it began to be drawn into question by a 
growing number of developing states regarding the issue of economic decoloniza-
tion77. As a result thereof, many industries were nationalized by Third World gov-
ernments78. In 1974 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolutions 3201 
(S-VI) and 3281 (XXIX) in order to establish a so-called “New International Eco-
nomic Order”. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States accorded to 
reach state the right “to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adop-
ting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law 
of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless [otherwise agreed].”79 
Both resolutions were backed by a majority of the developing states, as they as-
serted each country’s right to a free choice of its economic system as well as the 
right to exercise sovereignty over its natural resources. But the assumptions of the 
1960s and 1970s regarding the tension between foreign investment and economic 
decolonization revealed to be erroneous80: In the 1980s it became evident that coun-
 
76  Pursuant to Article 42 of ICSID Convention “the responsible arbitration courts have to settle 
the dispute on the grounds of the law of the state involved” and to apply “such rules of interna-
tional law as may be applicable”.  
77  This relates to the issue of „permanent sovereignty of natural resources“, the matter of the 
“New Economic Order” and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 
(UNYB 1974, 402); see Dolzer, Wirtschaft und Kultur im Völkerrecht, in Völkerrecht, (Vitz-
thum, ed.), 6. Abschnitt I 3 e, para 30, 31 and 6. Abschnitt I 3 a , para 44-47; Gloria, Völker-
rechtlicher Eigentumsschutz, in Völkerrecht (Ipsen ed.), § 47, para 1; United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, The External Financing of Economic Development 
(1968 – E.68.II D.10), Section 84, p.31; Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and Internatio-
nal Law (1969), p. 7; Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völ-
kerrecht (1985), p. 24 (25). 
78  Implementing such policies the Libyan government under the leadership of Mu’ammar Qad-
dafi nationalized in 1971 the petroleum industry, Kuwait in 1980 the petroleum interests of the 
American Independent Oil Company and Chile from 1955 to 1973 the copper mining compa-
nies, see generally Sornarajah, The Clash of Gobalisation and the International Law on Fo-
reign Investment, at a Symposium at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs on 
12 September 2002, p. 4. 
79  Art. 2 (2) (c) UN-Res. 3281; legal sovereignty in international law determines that a sovereign 
state may exercise its sovereignty only subject to compliance with all other rules of interna-
tional law, see Larson, Sovereignty within the Law (1965), p. 332. 
80  The world total investment abroad at the end of 1966 was estimated at $ 90 billion. Accumu-
lated foreign direct investment by capital exporters in less developed countries were estimated 
to have amounted to $ 30 billion at the end of 1966. Between 1964 and 1966, the annual pri-
vate capital export from members of the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to developing countries 
averaged $ 3, 5 billion, of which $ 2 billion were private investment, OECD Background Paper 
on Private Investment in Less Developed Countries, 6 May 1968 (Press/A (68) 23, p. 2).   
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tries acting hostile to foreign investment were being left behind in the race for eco-
nomic growth and aliens’ property was considered as an asset of the host state.81 The 
law on foreign investment has witnessed an explosive growth ever since82. In the 
1990s the fall of socialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave a significant 
impetus for an improvement of the climate for foreign investment. A remarkable 
consensus83 could be generated concerning the standards for treatment of foreign 
investment. The USA drafted a Model BIT, which served as a role model for many 
BITs coming into effect and concluded a regional Free Trade Agreement, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s84. These BITs were fol-
lowed by the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994 which is dealing with investment issues 
in the energy sector, and the idea to bring about an international foreign investment 
regime accelerated. In 1996 the WTO implemented a “Working Group on Foreign 
Investment” with the task to negotiate such multilateral agreement which, however, 
failed to achieve this goal85. The dynamic development of foreign investment law 
found its most ambitious initiative in the unsuccessful effort taken by the OECD to 
 
81  Developing countries are becoming more important as host countries for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) activities. Their share of global FDI flows increased from 21 % in 1991 to 36 % in 
1997. Despite the crisis in financial markets in Asia at the end of the twentieth century, FDI 
flows into developing countries in Asia remain strong and reached the mark of $ 78 billion, 
UNCTAD, Investment Report (1999). Today the 48 less-developed countries (LDCs) remain 
marginal recipients of FDI receiving only 2% of all FDI to developing countries and 0.5% of 
the global total. But among the top ten in terms of absolute increases, eight were developing 
countries, led by Mexico, China and South Africa. Conversely, among the ten countries ex-
periencing the steepest declines in FDI in flows, eight were developed countries (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the United States and Germany reported the largest declines). 
82  From 1980 until today the world-wide investment flows increased enormously: compared with 
the world-wide trade increase the annual percentage has increased about six fold. These num-
bers fluctuate depending on the state of the world-wide economy, see 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005overview_en.pdf>. The global FDI Stock is a meas-
ure of the investment underlying international production. In 1996, the global FDI stock valued 
$ 3.2 trillion. Its rate of growth over the past decade was more than twice that of fixed capital 
formation, indicating an increasing internationalization of production systems, see UNCTAD, 
Investment Report (1998); in 2001 the book value of the FDI valued approximately $ 6, 8 tril-
lion, International Monetary Fund Statistics Department, Foreign Investment Trends and Sta-
tistics (2003). 
83  The consensus was named the “Washington Consensus”. The term referred to the alliance 
between the US Government, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are 
all located in Washington D. C.  
84  Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalisations and the international law on foreign investment, The 
Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy, Symposium at the Norman Paterson 
School of International Affairs on 12 September 2002, p. 3. 
85  Graham, A note why multilateral negotiations failed at the OECD, and how such negotiations 
might be crafted to succeed at the WTO, Private Investments abroad – Problems and Solutions 
in international Business (1999), p. 3-9; for a comparative study see Kurtz, A general invest-
ment agreement in the WTO – Lessons from Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the OECD Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, Jean Monnet Working Paper (2002), p. 73.  
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draft a comprehensive Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)86. The favour-
able climate for foreign investment was damped by a succession of economic crises, 
in particular in Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century and set the initial 
stage for a new evaluation of foreign investment law.  
II. Leading Court Decisions  
Not only scholars were involved in the process of the conceptual evolution of pro-
perty protection in international law and the interpretation of pertinent treaty law, 
which shaped the development of alien property and investment protection, but also 
certain courts and arbitral tribunals: In particular, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to deal with 
cases raising issues of alien property and investment protection.   
1. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
The Permanent Court of International Justice was the precedessor of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice87. The idea of furthering the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes was first raised in 1899 and 1907 at The Hague Peace Conference. 
The Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was adopted, 
which dealt not only with arbitration but also with other methods of peaceful settle-
ment such as good offices and mediation. The convention made provisions for the 
creation of permanent machinery for dispute resolution88 and in 1902 the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration started operating89. At the Second Conference proposals were 
made to establish a Permanent International Court which resulted in a draft for the 
 
86  The MAI resulted in the abandonment of the initiative because of anti-globalisation protests 
aiming at the implementation of restrictions for multinational corporations. As consequence, 
many countries withdrew from the initiative; see generally Muchlinski, Towards a multilateral 
agreement on investment (MAI), the OECD and WTO models and sustainable development, in 
International economic law with a human face (Weiss ed.), (1998) p. 429-451; Karl, Das Mul-
tilaterale Investitionsschutzabkommen (MAI), RIW, (1998), p. 432 (440); ibid., On the way to 
multilateral investment rules- some recent policy issues (2002), ICSID Review, p. 293-319; 
ibid., Internationaler Investitionsschutz - Quo vadis? (2000), Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, p. 143 (169); Brewer, Investment Issues at the WTO: the Architecture of 
Rules and the Settlement of Disputes, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 1, No. 3 
(1998), pp. 457. 
87  See <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibluebook.pdf>. 
88  The said machinery was to enable arbitral tribunals to be set up as desired and to facilitate their 
work.  
89  The convention further created a Permanent Bureau, which was and still is located at The 
Hague. The Bureau assumed functions corresponding to those of a court registry and laid down 
a set of rules of procedure to govern the conduct of arbitration. 
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initial set up of an international tribunal90. Between 1911 and 1919 several plans 
were submitted by national and international bodies and governments for the estab-
lishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal after the war91. After 35 ses-
sions the Committee of Jurists, which was convened by the Council of the League of 
Nations, adopted a draft scheme for the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ). These endeavours culminated in the creation of the PCIJ 
within the framework of the new international system after World War I by the 
League of Nations. The PCIJ started its operative work in 1922 and was dissolved in 
1946.  
a) The Chinn Case92 
In Congo, then a colony of Belgium, a British citizen93 established a transport busi-
ness on the sea. The business was attached to a company, Unatra, with a majority of 
its shares held by the Belgian State itself. Because of the commercial depression in 
1930/1931 the Belgian government decided to subsidize the export trade of Congo 
by decreasing tariffs for certain products up to 75 %. Unatra experienced a loss of 
profits in return and received compensation. As a result of this change of tariffs, the 
British citizen was unable to compete and closed down his business without re-
ceiving any reimbursement or compensation. Thereupon the United Kingdom, in 
consent with the Belgian government, submitted the case to the PCIJ raising the 
question whether the Belgian measures constituted a breach of international law. In 
its judgment, the court held the measures of the Belgian government to be in accor-
dance with international law. In this respect, the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye served legal basis for the judgment94. In the interpretation given the court 
stressed that the said convention would not oblige Belgium to create an atmosphere 
of equal commercial conditions95. Therefore alleging unlawful discrimination on 
behalf of its citizen by the British government could not prevail as Unatra was in a 
different position. In line with these findings the court held that the measures of the 
 
90  The draft was not adopted at the Second Conference because of differences of opinion con-
cerning issues of jurisdiction. The draft was attached to the Final Act of the 1907 Conference 
under the title „Projet d’une Cour de Justice Arbitrale“. 
91  These plans, sometimes in conjunction with plans for a world organization, were mostly based 
on initiatives of independent academic bodies, notably the British Fabians Society and the 
American Society for the Judicial Settlement of Disputes.  
92  Oscar Chinn Case, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 65-152. 
93  Oscar Chinn, PCIJ, Series C, No. 75. 
94  Dolzer, Chinn Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. I 
(1992), p. 579-580. 
95  The court assumed that Oscar Chinn had been aware of the favourable position of Unatra, see 
Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 69. 
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Belgian government in question did not result in a violation of vested rights96. The 
judgment received much attention due to its pronouncements on expropriation and 
discrimination, although the court’s understanding of these terms hardly mirrors the 
current approach to international law in this respect.   
b) The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case97 
The Permanent Court of International Justice also addressed the issue of diplomatic 
protection in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case98. Before World War I, a 
Greek national, Mavrommatis, signed two agreements with the Ottoman Empire, on 
concessions for the construction and exploitation of works necessary for the distri-
bution of public electricity and water in Palestine. After the beginning of World War 
I the parties of the agreements postponed their execution. After the peace settlement 
process Mavrommatis addressed the government of Palestine with the question when 
to put the concessions into operation. According to the Peace Treaties signed after 
World War I, the Allied Powers should continue to enjoy the rights acquired in Pa-
lestine before the beginning of World War I. In addition, Great Britain was entrusted 
with the mandate for Palestine. For this reason the British government concluded an 
equivalent agreement with another applicant, which provided for the right of the 
applicant to require the expropriation of any concessions conflicting with his rights. 
Mavrommatis continued to submit plans for execution of the concessions to the 
British government, but when these were eventually rejected, he claimed restitution 
for violation of his rights.  
On behalf of its national, the Greek government exercised diplomatic protection 
by addressing the PCIJ with an application to institute proceedings against the Bri-
tish government. The court accepted jurisdiction after rejecting objections regarding 
the issue of jurisdiction raised by the British government99. In its judgment the court 
 
96  The court excluded the possibility of making profit from the scope of protection of vested 
rights, stating that „Favourable business conditions and good-will are transient circumstances, 
subject to inevitable changes …“, see Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 88.  
97  Mavrommatis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 5 (1925); Doehring, Mavrommatis Con-
cessions Case, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), vol. III, 
(1981), p. 330 (332).  
98 See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925). 
99  See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925), Judgment of 8 August 1924 (PCIJ A 2). 
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held that diplomatic protection was an elementary principle of international law100. 
Thus, in the judgment the court found that Mavrommatis was entitled to require that 
the concessions were being readapted to the new economic conditions, but not to 
compensation payment101. After two years, the Greek government submitted another 
application alleging the breach of international obligations by the British govern-
ment as it refused to approve new plans submitted by Mavrommatis on 5 May 1926 
until December 1926. In return, the British government repeated its objections 
against jurisdiction of the PCIJ as without the express consent of both parties, the 
Court could not claim jurisdiction to decide whether one of its judgments had or had 
not been complied with. In addition, the government denied the violation of interna-
tional obligations within the meaning of the respective mandate. In its judgment102 
the court upheld the objections alleged by the British government on the question 
whether it had jurisdiction to supervise the fulfilment of terms of a previous judg-
ment. Moreover, the court emphasized the exhaustion of local remedies as a substan-
tial requirement for the application of the rules of diplomatic protection103. The 1925 
judgment contributed therefore to the development of the rule of diplomatic protec-
tion. In particular the affirmation of the concept of diplomatic protection was con-
sidered a huge step forward in the context of foreign investment protection by ge-
neral international law.  
2. The International Court of Justice 
After World War II a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes should be set up 
including an international judicial institution104. As a consequence thereof, it was 
agreed upon convening a “United Nations Conference on International Organiza-
tion”. At the Yalta Conference in 1945 the statute for an international court was 
 
100  See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925), p. 6, para 12: “[i]t is an elementary principle of interna-
tional law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to inter-
national law committed by another State; in so doing, a state was in reality asserting its own 
rights … [For] in the eyes of [an international tribunal] the State is the only claimant”, the en-
tire judgment is also available at <http://www.icjcij.org/cijwww/cdecisions/ccpij/serie_A/A_ 
02/06_Mavrommatis_en_Palestine_Arret.pdf>. The dictum was repeated by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), 
P.C.I.J. Reports (1939), Series A/B, No. 76, p. 16. 
101  See PCIL, Series A, No. 5, Judgment of 26 March 1925 (PCIJ A 5). 
102  Readaption of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. 11 (1927), judg-
ment of 10 October 1927 (PCIJ A 11). 
103  Mavrommatis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 5 (1925), p. 6 at para 12 of the 1924 
judgment. 
104  Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, American Journal of International Law, vol. 65 
(1971), p. 261-268; for a short survey see Tornaritis, The review of the Role of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, revHellen, Vol 24 (1971), pp. 34; Lillich, The deliberative Process of 
the International Court of Justice, A Preliminary Critique and Some Possible Reforms, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, vol. 7 (1976), p. 28.  
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drafted which was modelled on the Statute of the PCIJ, as most provisions were 
taken verbatim from the revised version. The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)105, the “World Court”, was adopted in conjunction with the Charter of 
the United Nations on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 1945. So far, 
the ICJ has only infrequently been confronted with investment disputes: Yet, the 
court rendered two post-war106 leading decisions. As only states can appear before 
the ICJ, the claims were espoused by the states on behalf of their nationals. These 
two decisions continue to be of outstanding importance in the context of the devel-
opment of foreign property protection by international law: (1) The Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment107 of 1970 and (2) the 
Elettronica Sipula S.p.A. (USA v. Italy) Judgment108 of 1989.  
a) The Barcelona Traction Case 
The foundations of property protection were indirectly addressed in the ICJ decision 
in Barcelona Traction in connection with matters of diplomatic protection of legal 
persons. Belgian nationals, both natural and legal persons, were shareholders of a 
Canadian holding company, the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. 
The company issued several series of bonds, partly in pesetas and sterling. In con-
text with the Spanish civil war the bonds interest payments were refused and not 
resumed. Spanish shareholders submitted a petition for a declaration on bankruptcy 
which was followed by the Spanish courts and the assets of the company were 
seized. Various legal actions against the declaration of bankruptcy remained unsuc-
cessful. In 1951 the corporate capital was sold entirely in the shape of new shares at 
 
105  According to Article 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice 
is established as the “Principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”  
106  One of the most famous Pre-War Court Decisions together with the Oscar Chinn Case and the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case was the Case concerning Chorzow Factory, PICJ, 
Ser. B, No. 3 (1925), p. 1-36, which dealt with the issue of restitution in international law. The 
dictum affirmed the idea of restitution as a primary remedy in international law. The court 
stated in its judgment that “the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal 
act – a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by 
the decisions of arbitral decisions – is, that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear”, see PICJ 
Series A, No. 17 at 47, which resulted in a pronouncement on the responsibility of the host 
state to foreign investors. The judgment is also available at <http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij 
/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow/>. 
107  Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 42, 
42-50 (Feb 5); see also Wallace, Barcelona Traction Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 346-349. 
108  Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989), p. 115-121, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/ielsi/iels.ijudgments/icsli.ijudgment19890720.pdf>.  
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public auction and purchased by a Spanish company. The Belgium shareholders did 
not receive any reimbursement or compensation for their loss.  
Belgium applied to the ICJ109 and alleged reparation for the damage caused “on 
account of acts said to be contrary to international law committed by organs of the 
Spanish State”, including “the deprivation of the enjoyment of rights”, and leading 
to the “total spoliation of the Barcelona Traction group.”110 In return, the Spanish 
government raised objectives regarding the discontinuance of the proceedings, but 
also a lack of jus standi of Belgium and the exhaustion of local remedies. The court 
acknowledged that Belgium was acting on behalf of natural and legal persons, but 
followed the last two arguments of the Spanish government111. The decisive factor in 
this context was whether the Belgian government was entitled to provide diplomatic 
protection for the Belgian shareholders though their losses resulted not from an 
injury to the “direct rights” of the nationals112. The final judgment rendered rejected 
the claims of Belgium on the grounds of lacking jus standi 113 and concluded the 
application of diplomatic protection only to be granted when exceptional circum-
 
109  ICJ Pleadings, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Application 1958); New 
Application 1962, vols. I-X. 
110  The application was discontinued when in 1961 Belgium attempted to negotiate an out-of-
court settlement, which was objected by the Spanish government. The case was submitted to 
the ICJ by a new application of Belgium in 1962.  
111  See para 102 of the judgment. In addition, the court denied any analogy with regard to the 
Nottebohm Case, Judgment, ICJ-Reports 1955. 
112  The court stated in this respect that “…an act directed against and infringing only the com-
panys rights does not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests are 
affected. … The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed at the direct rights of 
the shareholder as such. It is well known that there are rights which municipal law orders con-
fers upon the latter distinct from those of the company, including the right to any declared 
dividend, the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual as-
sets of the company on liquidation. Whenever one of his direct rights is infringed, the share-
holder has an independent right of action”, see Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports (1970), 
p. 36, paras. 46-47; see also p. 33, where the court held that „From its origins closely linked 
with international commerce, diplomatic protection has sustained a particular impact from the 
growth of international economic relations, and at the same time from the profound transfor-
mations which have taken place in the economic life of nations”. 
113  In this respect, the court stated “that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic protection of 
shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic claims, could create an at-
mosphere of confusion and insecurity in international economic relations. The danger would 
be all the greater inasmuch as the shares of companies whose activity is international are 
widely scattered and frequently change hands;” Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 
4; separate opinions of Judge Jessup paras 44-57, 80 and Judge Gros, paras 22, 24. 
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stances occur114. Likewise, the principle of diplomatic protection of corporations 
was clarified in the sense that a corporation is to be protected by the State of natio-
nality of the corporation and not by the State or States of nationality of shareholders 
in a corporation115. The decision met heavy and well-founded criticism which was 
based mainly on the argument that “the court seems to have raised a host of complex 
issues and to have resolved almost none”116. The opportunity to clarify and develop 
legal standards in international commercial litigation and in international law in 
general had not been taken117. 
b) The Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)118 
The Barcelona Traction Case set the climate for the court decision concerning Elet-
tronica Sicula S.p.A. (USA v. Italy): A company founded in Palermo/Italy, the Ray-
theon ELSI S.p.A. was owned almost entirely by an American company, the United 
 
114  “In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, international 
law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the national-
ity of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corpo-
rate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has 
its registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by a long practice and by numer-
ous international instruments. This notwithstanding, further or different links are at times said 
to be required in order that a right of diplomatic protection should exist. Indeed, it has been the 
practice of some states to give a company incorporated under their law diplomatic protection 
solely when it has its seat or management or centre of control in their territory, or when a ma-
jority or a substantial proportion of the shares has been owned by nationals of the state concer-
ned. Only then, it has been held, does there exist between the corporation and the state in 
question a genuine connection of the kind familiar from other branches of international law. 
However, in the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute 
test of the genuine connection has found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied 
are of a relative nature, and sometimes links with one State have had weighed against those 
with another.” Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports (1970), p. 4 at paras 32, 33, 42 and p. 48, 
para 92, where the court stated that “it is quite true that it has been maintained that, for reasons 
of equity, a State should be able, in certain cases, to take up the protection of its nationals, sha-
reholders in a company which has been the victim of a violation of international law. Thus a 
theory has been developed to the effect that the state of the shareholders has a right of diploma-
tic protection when the state whose responsibility is invoked is the national state of the compa-
ny. Whatever the validity of this theory may be, it is certainly not applicable to the present ca-
se, since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction”.  
115  See Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 34, paras 40 - 44. 
116  Wallace, Elettronica Sicula Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, vol. I (1992), p. 348; in addition it was mentioned that the court in Barcelona Traction 
was guided by a number of policy considerations, see ibid. p. 48-49, paras 94-96, p. 48, paras 
94, 95, p. 38, para 53, p. 50, para 98. 
117  This suggestion is in accordance with the evaluation of Judge Fitzmaurice who stated that 
„general international law obligations in the sphere of the treatment of foreigners“ have not 
been clarified, see separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, ICJ-Report 1064, p. 65.  
118  Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989), p. 15-121. 
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States Corporation Raytheon Company and its subsidiary The Machlett Laborato-
ries. Due to a continuing financial crisis of ELSI, the government of Italy was asked 
to provide subsidies or other governmental support to the company in order to avoid 
liquidation. After a refusal of the Italian authorities, representatives of Raytheon 
provided support for an orderly liquidation. The liquidation was prevented by an 
order released by the Mayor of Palermo which determined the requisitioning of 
ELSI’s assets119. In response, ELSI submitted a petition for bankruptcy. ELSI was 
purchased by a state-controlled subsidiary substantially below its book value. In 
1974 the United States of America declared to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of Raytheon and Machlett. The U.S. government alleged violations of a bilat-
eral treaty between the United States of America and Italy120. Pursuant to Article 
XXVI of this treaty, the ICJ had jurisdiction and thereupon the case was submitted 
to the court in February 1987. Italy argued that local remedies had not been ex-
hausted, as the actions before the Italian courts had not been based on provisions of 
the bilateral treaty. In this respect, the court addressed the rule of customary law 
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies and found that the rule is “an important 
principle of customary international law”121. The ICJ acknowledged jurisdiction but 
then rejected the case122 while discussing the scope of certain standards provided by 
the treaty123. The decision remained, in this respect, to be based mainly on a debat-
able evaluation of the facts124. Nevertheless, the ELSI decision had remarkable im-
pacts on the development and interpretation of BITs, but, as before, the ICJ deprived 
itself of the opportunity to shape and construe international customary law. 
 
119  The representatives of ELSI raised an appeal against the order immediately. The Prefect of 
Palermo declared the actions of the Mayor to have exceeded his power, but the decision was 
issued more than a year later.  
120  The respective treaty is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, concluded on 2 
February 1948. 
121  ELSI case, I.C.J. reports 1989, p. 15 at p. 42, para. 50. In this respect the Court also stated that 
“the local remedies rule does not, indeed cannot, require that a claim be presented to the mu-
nicipal courts in a form, and with arguments, suited to an international tribunal, applying dif-
ferent law to different parties: for an international claim to be admissible, it is sufficient if the 
essence of the claim has been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as far as 
permitted by local law and procedures, and without success.” 
122  The Court stated that “in the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders requires 
that recourse be had to treaty stipulations or special agreements directly concluded between the 
private investor and the State in which the investment was placed. States even more frequently 
provide for protection, (…), either by means of special instruments or within the framework of 
wider economic agreements. (…) No such instrument is in force between the Parties to the pre-
sent case.” 
123  The Court discussed primarily Art. III and Art. V of the bilateral treaty, but dismissed the 
claims put forward by the United States in context with these articles.  
124  See Wengler, Die Entscheidung des IGH im „ELSI“-Fall, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 
43, (1990), p. 619 (620). 
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3. Summary 
The court decisions rendered by international tribunals in the area of foreign invest-
ment protection and presented in the section above mirror the developments carried 
out by international jurisprudence. Principles such as the exhaustion of local reme-
dies125 and the rule of diplomatic protection126 were affirmed and cleared by dictums 
of the courts in the context of cases concerning foreign property protection. Never-
theless, most applicants before the international courts aimed at an award of restitu-
tion or the payment of compensation, but in particular the award of restitution has 
always been considerably rare in the jurisprudence of the World Court127, which 
represents the main reason for the insignificance of the jurisprudence of the World 
Court in the area of foreign investment protection. 
C. The Role of Human Rights Institutions 
As foreign investment protection is fundamentally based on the idea of property, the 
protection of alien property forms an integral part of foreign investment protection 
in international law. In the past the protection of foreign property by human rights 
institutions was carried out by the instrument of classical diplomatic protection. In 
the early years of international law the individual had no own rights in the interna-
tional legal order. As a consequence thereof, the protection of a national abroad was 
to be done only by means of the fiction underlying the instrument of diplomatic 
protection: that the home state was asserting its own rights128. A large number of 
treaties concluded by human rights institutions reflected the traditional approach to 
the rule of diplomatic protection and reciprocity as rules of international law. After 
World War II a new type of human right treaty was launched. The most significant 
characteristic of this treaty type is to grant the treaty rights to all individuals regard-
less of factors such as nationality129. By the emergence of a generation of treaties 
granting human rights to all individuals130, human rights institutions formed a new 
conceptual understanding of the rule of diplomatic protection and diplomatic protec-
tion in terms of the classical conceptual understanding became largely superfluous. 
 
125  See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925). 
126  See Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989).  
127  Gray, The Choice between Restitution and Compensation, European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 10 (1999), p. 413 (416).  
128  In accordance with the traditional approach in international law an individual is a mere part of 
his home state and therefore cannot assert rights out of an international treaty. The State has 
the exclusive procedural right to decide on the material right on the international plane.  
129  The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969) and the United Nations Human Rights Covenants (1966) represent the new ge-
neration of human rights treaties.  
130  See e. g. Article 24 and Article 44 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
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The new approach to the protection of the individual absent of classical diplomatic 
protection led to the emancipation of the individual from his home state under hu-
man rights conventions131.  
Given the existence of an absolute right to property, the investor would receive 
protection in absolute terms. Yet, there is no uniform understanding of property as 
an absolute right132, because the concept is placed uneasily between distinct consti-
tutional systems recognised in different parts of the world, one emphasizing the 
social function of property while the other follows the conceptual approach of an 
absolute right133. International human rights law concerning the protection of alien 
property needs to balance these divergent approaches, thus the international human 
rights law does not prohibit all forms of interferences with foreign property, as e. g. 
limitations on grounds of public good are lawful. The following section contributes 
to the protection of foreign property by human rights institutions by introducing and 
evaluating the applicable mechanisms. 
I. Universal Human Rights Systems 
Since World War II, in particular, human rights have achieved universal recognition 
and constitute a major concern of international law, but the first acknowledgement 
of the right to property as an internationally protected human right dates back to 
1929 when the “Institut de Droit International” established in its “Declaration des 
droits internationaux de’l homme” the right to property as a human right134. Hence-
forth, by international agreements concluded on the universal level, international 
human rights law has created obligations upon States to recognize, respect and en-
sure these rights subject to their jurisdiction and to provide remedies in case of 
breach of obligations135. The international law of human rights includes a number of 
comprehensive international human rights treaties of which the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is the principal instrument and the Uni-
 
131  Geck, Diplomatic Protection, in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
vol. I, (1992), p. 1059 (1060). 
132  Seidl-Hohenveldern, Aliens Property, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of International 
Law, Vol. I, (1992), p. 118. 
133  In the Commonwealth and the European systems of law the idea of property is that all individ-
ual property exists only to the extent that the interests of the society as a whole will permit it.  
134  “Il est du devoir de tout Etat de reconnaitre a tout individu le droit égal a la vie, a la liberté et a 
la propriété, et d’accorder a tous, sur son territoire, pleine et entière protection de ce droit…”; 
see Dolzer, Eigentum, Entschädigung und Enteignung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 127 
(128). 
135  Like all international agreements a human rights covenant or convention gives rise to remedies 
in favour of other State parties, and generally in favour of all other State parties equally; see 
for a general survey Henkin, Human Rights, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public In-
ternational Law, vol. II (1992), p. 886-893. 
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versal Declaration of Human Rights is the accepted general expression of recog-
nized human rights136. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
In 1945 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended to the 
General Assembly to establish a Commission of Human Rights. The task of this 
body  was to formulate an “International Bill of Rights”137. This proposal was fol-
lowed and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established 
a Commission on Human Rights on 15 February 1946138 and instructed the United 
Nations Secretariat to prepare a documented outline of the bill. Finally, on 10 De-
cember 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the pertinent resolution 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights139. For the first time a common com-
prehensive international standard which should be guaranteed to every person was 
defined and the Declaration was the first enumeration, on the universal level, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus it was proclaimed to be “an historic 
act, destined to consolidate world peace through the contribution of the United Na-
tions toward the liberation of individuals from the unjustified oppression and con-
straint to which they are to often subject”140. Hence, it was agreed from the begin-
ning, the Declaration should be followed by a binding convention to determine the 
implementation of the Declaration and establish an appropriate supervisory mecha-
nism, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights141.  
 
136  Henkin, Human Rights, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 
II (1995), p. 888; still, the human rights recognized in the Declaration or the Covenants are not 
declared to be absolute, as Art. 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration provides: „In the exercise 
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined 
by law, solely fort he purpose of securing due recognition and respect fort he rights and free-
doms of others and of meeting the just requirement of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society“. 
137  A draft of a proposed declaration was submitted by the representative of the United States 
which was modelled after the US Bill of Rights, see i. a. Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 7 
1947, p. 1076; see also Carrillo Salcedo, Human Rights, Universal Declaration, in R. Bern-
hardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. II (1995), p. 926. 
138  It was decided that „the present Conference … could not proceed to realize such a draft … The 
Organization, once formed, could better proceed to consider the suggestion and deal with it 
through a special commission or by some other method. The Committee recommends that the 
General Assembly consider the proposal and give it effect”, Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, 1945, vol. VI, p. 456. 
139  UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III); at that time, the United Nations had 56 members. 
48 voted in favour, none against and 8 abstained.  
140  See <http://www.udhr.org/history/A777.htm>. 
141  As a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is not in itself legally binding, but it is considered as an international standard and as such as 
part of the law of nations.  
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Some fundamental concepts constitute the basis of the Declaration: all human   
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights142, everyone is entitled to a so-
cial and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declara-
tion may be fully realized143, and those rights determined in it apply to everyone 
without any form of discrimination whatsoever144. In Article 17 of the Declaration 
the right of every person to own property everywhere and of every kind is recog-
nized145, while the ownership of property is subject to the legislation and the laws of 
the respective country146. The issue of expropriation is addressed in the second para-
graph, stating that “No one shall arbitrarily be deprived of his property”147. The 
wording of the provision is as general as Article 17 (1) and due to the vagueness 
much room is left for the application of national law.  
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)148 provides pro-
tection for an extensive catalogue of fundamental rights. The Covenant establishes a 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) consisting of eighteen members, who are inde-
pendent experts being elected and nominated by the State Parties. These experts 
supervise the compliance of the Contracting Parties with the Covenant. They admin-
ister an optional inter-state complaint mechanism and consider individual petitions 
brought to the Committee pursuant to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol149. The 
Committee is, however, not authorized to take any action but only to raise questions 
 
142  See Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
143  See Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
144  See Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
145  Article 17 reads that (1.) “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in associa-
tion with others”; generally see also Eide, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – A 
Commentary, (1992), Article 17 with further references.  
146  See A7C.3/SR 126, p. 4, Art. 17. The drafting version contained an express reference explicitly 
referring to the situation under domestic law; it read: “the laws of the State in which the prop-
erty is located”, E/CN.4/AC.2/SR 8, p. 3. The reference was deleted during the drafting proc-
ess. 
147  Article 17 (2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  
148  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 May 
1976, G. A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171. 
149  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, in force 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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with the reporting governments and make non-binding “general comments”150 which 
the states that have accepted these optional procedures are expected to implement in 
good faith151. In addition, the ICCPR establishes the obligation for states to ensure 
that any person whose rights have been violated are entitled to “an effective remedy” 
and that it be determined by a competent authority. In case remedies do not exist, 
states must “develop the possibilities of judicial remedy” and ensure that it is af-
forded152. Mere formal incorporation of the treaty protections are considered insuffi-
cient if further measures such as developing new procedural guarantees or other 
legal institutions are required to bring them to full effect153. The right of property is 
not among the specific rights the Covenant grants, but it contains a non-accessory 
non-discrimination rule in its Article 26.154 This rule determines equal treatment 
with regard to property between nationals and aliens. Reasonable and objective 
distinctions do not constitute a breach of Art. 26 ICCPR. Therefore specific distinc-
tions are regarded as permissible differentiations. These permissible differentiations 
have been subject of decisions concerning foreign property protection. 
The Benes-Decrees155, issued in context with expropriations in the Czech Repub-
lic156, gave rise to several communications to the Human Rights Committee. The 
 
150  Under the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, following consideration of an individual complaint, the 
“Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual”, see Ar-
ticle 5 (4) First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Under the inter-state procedure, in cases 
where a solution is agreed to by the alleged violating party, the HRC shall “confine its reports 
to a brief statement of the facts and the solution reached.” Where no solution is reached, “the 
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and 
record of the oral submission made by the State Parties concerned shall be attached to the re-
port”. In either scenario, the reports are issued to the State concerned.  
151  VII United Nations, Blue Book Series, The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995, 61 
(1995). 
152  Article 2 (3) ICCPR.  
153  Furthermore, Article 50 ICCPR obliges all parts of federal states to comply with the treaty 
provisions: “The provisions of the present Covenant shall exceed to all parts of federal states 
without any limitations or exceptions.” 
154  See e.g. Article 26 ICCPR. 
155  The Benes Decrees are a series of decrees which were rendered during World War II and a 
short period after by the then President of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Benes who, as head of the 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile,  exercised emergency powers from London and continued 
to do after his return  Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II, see Europeans Parliament 
Resolution on the Czech Republic’s application for membership of the European Union and 
the states of negotiations (Official Journal C 72 E of 21 March 2002. The following Decrees 
related to property and its confiscation. (a) Decree 5/1945 (19.5.1945) – Invalidity of certain 
property-related acts effected in the period of non-freedom; (b) Decree 12/1945 (21.6.45) – 
Confiscation and expedited distribution of agricultural properties of Germans, Hungarians, 
traitors and collaborators and certain organisations and institutes; (c) Decree 28/1945 
(20.7.1945); (d) Decree 108/1945 (25.10.1945) Confiscation of enemy property and the na-
tional renewal funds.  
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decrees, formally still in force, claimed collective World War II responsibility of 
Germans and Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia. Persons belonging to these mi-
nority groups were deprived of many of their rights, in particular as concerned their 
property rights157 and then expelled. Austria, Germany and Hungary have called for 
the repeal of the decrees. The legal validity of the decrees, though issued by an exe-
cutive authority, has been approved158 and the Czech Republic views the Benes 
Decrees as the basis of post-war Czechoslovak and later Czech legislation159. The 
Committee found in this respective that the restitution procedure as practised by the 
Czech Republic was in violation of Article 26 ICCPR, as it was based on the double 
requirement of Czechoslovak citizenship and permanent residency in the state’s 
territory160.  
 
 
 
156  By virtue of the Benes-Decrees, 2.5 million ethnic Germans (Sudetendeutsche) and approxi-
mately 40.000 Hungarians lost their Czechoslovak citizenship, their landed properties due to 
expropriation measures based on the decrees and were exiled. These measures were carried out 
between 1945 and 1946.  
157  Decree 12/1945 related to “the confiscation and accelerated allocation of agricultural property 
of the German and Hungarian persons and of those having committed treason and acted as 
enemies of the Czech and Slovak people.” 
158  The Benes Decrees were ratified by Constitutional Act No. 57/1946 of 28 March 1946, which 
states that “the Provisional National Assembly passed this Act to approve and declare as law 
the presidential decrees […] All presidential decrees were to be regarded as laws from the very 
beginning and constitutional decrees were to be regarded as constitutional acts.” 
159  The Czechoslovak Republic was transformed into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic 
on 1 January 1993. The legislation of the former Czechoslovak Republic maintained its legal 
validity after the transformation process.  
160  UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 516/1992 Simunek v. Czech Republic, Nr. 
516, para 11.6; confirmed in Adam v. Czech Republic, Nr. 586/1994, para 12.6; and Blazek v. 
Czech Republic, Nr. 857/1999, para. 5.8; see also Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic, Nr. 
747/1997, para. 8.4.  
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The case De Fours Walderode et al. v. the Czech Republic161 which was submit-
ted to the Committee in 2001 is characterized by very specific facts: The applicant 
was born in 1904 in Vienna and a citizen of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, but his 
family had settled in Bohemia since the 17th century, which was a kingdom of the 
empire. After the end of the First World War the applicant, as a resident of Bohemia, 
became a citizen of the newly created Czechoslovak State in 1918. Due to his Ger-
man mother tongue his citizenship was automatically changed into German citizen-
ship in 1939 by virtue of Hitler’s decree of 16 March 1939. After the death of his 
father in 1941 he inherited property, the Hruby Rohozec estate, which was confis-
cated on the basis of Benes decree 12/1945 by the newly formed government and he 
was deprived of his citizenship which he retained some years later on account of his 
proven loyalty during occupation. After in 1948 a Communist government came into 
power the applicant was forced to leave Czechoslovakia in 1949 and returned to 
Prague only in 1991 after the “velvet revolution” of 1989 had taken place. He re-
tained his Czech citizenship in 1992 and subsequently, on the legal basis of Restitu-
tion Law No. 243/1992 he reclaimed possession of the estate he had inherited from 
his father in 1941. The respective restitution law was amended in 1996 by replacing 
the condition of permanent residence by the condition of uninterrupted 
Czech/Czechoslovak citizenship from the end of the war until 1 January 1990. As 
consequence, the restitution agreement of 1992 was invalidated and could not serve 
as the legal basis for restitution, since the applicant has not maintained continuous 
citizenship. Notwithstanding his reacquisition of Czechoslovak citizenship the ap-
plicant has not received any restitution for the loss he suffered. In 2000 the applicant 
died but his wife pursued the claim.  
The Committee found that the amendment of Law No. 243/1992 by the Law No. 
30/1996 implemented a more stringent requirement of citizenship, since citizenship 
had already been required as a condition for restitution under Law No. 243/1992. 
 
161  See UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 747/1997 on 30 October 2001, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/7477/1997, Dr. Karel Des Fours Walderode v. The Czech Republic, 
CCPR/C/73/D/747/1997: 8.4. The Committee recalls its views in cases No. 516/1993 (Simunek 
et al.), 586/1994 (Joseph Adam) and 857/1999 (Blazek et al.) that “a requirement in the law for 
citizenship as an obligatory condition for restitution of property confiscated by the authorities 
makes an arbitrary, and, consequently a discriminatory distinction between individuals who are 
equally victims of prior state confiscations, and constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the 
Covenant. This violation is further expressed by the retroactive operation of the impugned 
Law. 9.1. The Human Rights Committee, acting under Article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional 
Protocol, is of the view that Article 26, in conjunction with Article 2 of the Covenant, has been 
violated by the State Party. 9. 2 In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 (a) of the Covenant, 
the State Party is under an obligation to provide the late author’s surviving spouse, Dr. 
Johanna Kammerlander, with an effective remedy, entailing in this case prompt restitution of 
the property in question or compensation therefore, and, in addition, appropriate compensation 
in respect of the fact that the author and his surviving spouse have been deprived of the enjoy-
ment of their property since its restitution was revoked in 1995. The State party should review 
its legislation and administrative practices to ensure that all persons enjoy both, equality before 
the law as well as equal protection of the law”. 
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The requirement of uninterrupted citizenship added by the amendment in 1996 led to 
an exclusion of the applicant and any others in that situation from restitution162. 
Therefore the Committee considered it discriminatory to require continuous Czech 
citizenship for someone who otherwise had the right to claim restitution of property 
confiscated on the basis of the Benes Decrees163. The Committee found that the 
measures carried out by the Czech government caused a violation of the non-
discrimination rule of the Article 26 of the Covenant, since the Czech law discrimi-
nated aliens against nationals. Since the ICCPR does not grant the protection of 
property specifically, the non-accessory rule of non-discrimination has to serve as 
the legal basis for the equal treatment of aliens and nationals with regard to property 
protection. Nevertheless, the Committee renders only non-binding comments which 
are not enforceable and the implementation of these “views” is optional, thus pro-
ceedings before ICSID tribunals are far more effective and less time-consuming.  
II. Regional Human Rights Systems 
The three regional human rights conventions – European, American and African – 
are all cast in broad language to protect aliens as well as nationals164 generally and 
 
162  The Committee stated that “this raises an issue of arbitrariness and, consequently, of a breach 
of the right to equality before the law, equal protection of the law and non-discrimination un-
der Article 26 of the Covenant”, see No. 747/1997, § 8.3. 
163  The Committee also ruled in favour of the applicant in the Fabryova v. Czech Republic case, 
when eligibility for compensation was denied while in similar cases the plaintiffs obtained res-
titution, see Fabryova v. Czech Republic (765/97), see also Pezoldova v. Czech Republic 
(757/97); the case of Brok and Brokova v. the Czech Republic was more controversial. The 
Committee observed that “legislation must not discriminate among the victims of the prior 
confiscation to which it applies, since all victims are entitled to redress without arbitrary dis-
tinctions”, see No. 774/1997, § 7.3. The Committee found that the restitution laws of 1991 and 
1994 “gave rise to a restitution claim of the author which was denied on the ground that the na-
tionalization took place in 1946/1947 on the basis of Benes-Decree No. 100/1945 falls outside 
the scope of laws of 1991 and 1994. Thus, the author was excluded from the benefit of the res-
titution law although the Czech nationalization in 1946/1947 could only been carried out be-
cause the author’s property was confiscated by the Nazi authorities during the time of German 
occupation. In the Committee’s view this discloses a discriminatory treatment of the author, 
compared to those individuals whose property was confiscated by Nazi authorities without be-
ing subjected, immediately after the war, to Czech nationalization and who, therefore, could 
benefit from the laws of 1991 and 1994. Irrespective of whether the arbitrariness in question 
was inherent in the law itself or whether it resulted from the application of the law by the 
courts of the State party, the Committee finds that the author was denied his right to equal pro-
tection of the law in violation of article 26 of the Covenant”, see id., § 7.4. 
164  See Article 1 ECHR, stating that “the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. 
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with regard to property165, although in detail, the wording of the respective clauses is 
not identical. The two more recent regional systems - the Inter-American and the 
African one - are modelled in part on the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The following chapter introduces and analyzes the three different systems and the 
respective jurisprudence to provide an overview on the human rights institutions 
playing a role on the regional level. 
1. The European Convention on Human Rights  
The drawing up of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms was set up by the Council of Europe and the Convention was 
opened for ratification in Rome on 4 November 1950166. It entered into force three 
years later in September 1953. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
instituted the first regional Human Rights system. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights served as a model for the Convention and it was to pursue the begin-
ning steps for a collective enforcement of certain rights set out in the Universal Dec-
laration. The entry into force of the Convention was followed by fourteen protocols 
which have been adopted since. As amended further rights and liberties to those 
granted in by the Convention were added: Protocol 9 enables individuals to plead 
before the Court and now the Convention permits both states parties and individuals 
to bring communications against states adhering to the Convention. These develop-
ments led hand in hand with the accession of new Contracting States to an enormous 
increase of applications before the Court167 which now functions on a permanent 
basis with full-time judges resident in Strasbourg. The European system was the first 
to establish an international court for the protection of human rights and a procedure 
for individual denunciations of human rights violations168.   
 
165  See e.g. the Preamble of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which states that 
”the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a national of a certain state, but 
are based upon attributes of human personality” and the Preamble of the African Charter: “ … 
the reality and respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights”.  
166 See <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm>. 
167  The number of applications registered by the Commission climbed from 404 in 1981 to 4750 
in 1997 and the number of provisional files opened each year with the Commission over-
stepped 12000. After the implementation of Protocol 11 which came into force on 1 November 
1998, the Court’s case load increased at an unprecedented rate: the number of registered appli-
cations rose from 5979 in 1998 to 13858 in 2001, which equals an increase of approximately 
130%. These circumstances were initiated to be resolved by a Ministerial Conference on Hu-
man Rights, which was held in Rome on 3 and 4 November 2000 to mark the 50th anniversary 
of the Convention. In 2004 44.100 new applications were lodged (a plus of 13% compared to 
2003) and 32.500 applications were allocated to a decision body, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/F2B964EE-57C5-4C86-8B8F-
8B4B6095D89C/0/MicrosoftWordstatistical_charts_2004__internet_.pdf.  
168  Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2005), p. 108. 
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The drafting of a rule for the protection of property provided by the ECHR has 
been shaped by endless discussions and difficulties in finding a consensus on its 
formulation169. This difficulty is born almost entirely out of the historical back-
ground170: The preliminary version of the Convention did not contain any rule for 
the protection of property, but the Advisory Committee, an organ subsequent to the 
European Council endorsed the admission of a rule for the protection of property171. 
The proposal made in this respect by the Advisory Committee172 was not backed on 
a broad basis by the Council, who then asked for an implementation of this guaran-
tee in further amendments. This proposal was followed and the protection of prop-
erty was introduced into Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol which entered into 
force on 20 March 1952173. Article 14 of the Convention prohibits any form of dis-
 
169  The members of the Council of Europe considered themselves sharing an “adequate common 
heritage  of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to implement further cer-
tain of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of 1948 (Cmd. 8969 (1953), p. 2); Ja-
cobs/White, The European Convention on Human Rights (1996), p. 246; Due to the assertion 
of slavery and servitude, the protection of property was covered with oblivion; as in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the term “property” appeared merely as 
a criterion of illegal discrimination; see further Böckstiegel, Die allgemeinen Grundsätze des 
Völkerrechts über Eigentumsentziehung, Eine Untersuchung zu Art. 1 ZP, 1963, p. 11; 
Schwelb, The Protection of the Right of Property of Nationals under the First Protocol, Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law, No. 12, 1964, p. 518; Janis/Kay/Bradley, European Human 
Rights Law (2000), pp. 16.  
170  In addition, the protection of property rights as human rights raises particular problems, see 
generally Schermers, The international Protection of the Right of Property, in Protecting Hu-
man Rights: The European Dimension, in Essays in Honour of Gerard J. Wiarda (Mats-
cher/Petzold ed.) (1988), p. 565.  
171  See Travaux Préparatoires, vol. III (1976), p. 262. 
172  «Toute personne, physique ou morale, a droit au respect de ses biens. Ses biens ne peuvent être 
soumis à confiscation arbitraire. Les présentes dispositions ne sauraient, toutefois, être consi-
dérées comme portant atteinte, de quelque manière que ce soit, au droit que possèdent les Etats 
de promulguer les lois nécessaires pour assurer l’utilisation de ces biens, conformément a 
l’intérêt générale». 
173  See Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which states the following: „ Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Due to the 
vagueness of the wording, difficulties regarding the interpretation of the Article arose, e. g. the 
general principles of international law that are referred to are the rules of general law on the 
expropriation of foreign property and not the general principles of international law recognised 
by civilised nations. Thus the requirement of compensation for expropriation, as postulated by 
international customary law, was incorporated in Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol.   
 300
crimination174. It must be stressed, however, that – in contrast to Article 26 ICCPR – 
Article 14 ECHR provides only for an accessory right to non-discrimination, i.e. 
only insofar as rights guaranteed in the Convention or any of its Additional Protocol 
are at stake. This situation has changed for those states for which Additional Proto-
col N° 12 which provides for a non-accessory right to non-discrimination similar to 
the one enshrined in Article 26 ICCPR has entered into force. The scope of the right 
established in the Additional Protocol is broadly framed and permissible restrictions 
are widely drawn. According to the Court, the respective Article in the Additional 
Protocol No.1 comprises three distinct, but connected rules175, which are the peace-
ful enjoyment of property, the deprivation of possessions as subject to certain condi-
tions and the right of the state to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest. The certain conditions which have to be met when deprivation of 
property is exercised have posed difficulties of interpretation176. The said conditions 
are inter alia the principles of general international law which refer to the principles 
which have been established in general international law with regard to the confisca-
tion of property of aliens.177 Therefore measures exercised by a state against its own 
nationals do not fall within the scope of these general principles of international 
law178 and the nationals are in a different legal position from that of the alien179.  
The impact of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the protection of foreign in-
vestment might appear in a deceptive light, since foreign investment requires in-
vestment undertakings in another state than the national state of the investor and no 
such case has been decided before the ECtHR up to now180. Yet, the Court has given 
 
174  According to Article 14, “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” 
175  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1421; Jacobs/White, The European Convention on Human Rights 
(1996), p. 247. 
176  The European Convention on Human Rights accords priority to social interests over individual 
property rights, in particular when health and safety of the society at large are threatened by the 
recognition of the individual rights to property, in that sense also Ruffert, The Protection of 
Foreign Investment by the European Convention on Human Rights?, German Yearbook of In-
ternational Law, vol. 43 (2000), pp. 117 (131), (139-141). 
177  Schwelb, The Protection of Property of Nationals under the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, American Journal of Comparative Law (1964), No. 12, p. 518.  
178  See App. 1870/63, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 December 1965 (1965) 8 Yearbook, 
218, 226, where the Commission held that Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol does not 
require a state which deprives its nationals of their possessions in the public interest and sub-
ject to the conditions provided for by the law to pay compensation, see also Lithgow and oth-
ers v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, No. 102. 
179  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1458). 
180  Schöbi, Der Schutz des Eigentums in Europa, Recht - Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung 
und Praxis, vol. 18 (2000), p. 78; Peukert, Artikel 1 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls, in EMRK 
Kommentar (Frowein/Peukert eds.), 1996, para 22 with note 67.  
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general interpretations to the text of the Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the Case 
Sporrong and Lönnroth181 the Court ruled that the entitlement to the peaceful en-
joyment of possessions means the right to hold property. According to the state of 
facts two properties had been affected by the existence of construction prohibitions 
and expropriation permits for many years without compensating the owners for their 
losses incurred during these periods. The interference with the propertys’ function 
caused by the said regulations was considered not to equal a deprivation and the 
applicability of the second sentence of the first paragraph was denied182. The Court 
had to determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the indi-
vidual’s fundamental rights183. It concluded, however, that the said balance was, as a 
requirement of proportionality, inherent in the whole of the Convention and con-
cluded a breach of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol184.  
In the Case James v. United Kingdom185, the leading case on the issue of expro-
priation, the ECtHR held that the principles in question are applicable exclusively to 
aliens, because they were specifically developed for their benefit and, as such, they 
would not relate to the treatment of nationals by their own state186. The case con-
cerned the loss of immovable property in Belgravia, London, by virtues of the lease-
hold reform in the late 1960s187. The Court reasoned that the reference to interna-
tional law allowed non-nationals access to the implementation machinery of the 
Convention for property protection instead of seeking for diplomatic protection188 
and concluded that since non-nationals were considered more vulnerable to domestic 
legislation as they were not part of the electorate and could not influence the adop-
tion of laws, nationals were imposed a greater burden in the public interest189. With 
regard to the standard of compensation the Court held that on the legal basis of Arti-
 
181  Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A, No. 52, 81983 5 
EHRR 35. 
182  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1451). 
183  Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A, No. 52, 81983, 
5 EHRR 35, para 69. 
184  In that sense also Wiesinger v. Austria, Judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A, No. 213 
(1993) 16 EHRR 258, and Holy Monasteries v. Greece, Judgment of 9 December 1994, Series 
A, No. 301-A; Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the Euro-
pean Human Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1453). 
185  James v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 21 February 1986. Series A, No. 98, 
para 37. 
186  See footnote 185, paras. 58-66. 
187  See for a survey Mendelson, The United Kingdom Nationalisation Cases and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 57 (1986), p. 33 
(73).  
188  James v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 98, para 62.  
189  See footnote 188, para. 63. 
 302
cle 1 of the First Additional Protocol a full compensation could not be guaranteed in 
every situation190.   
The Wasa Liv Omsesidigt Case191 dealt with two companies which had brought 
an application against the Swedish government and alleged that its tax legislation 
concerning insurance companies constituted a breach of Article 1 of the First Addi-
tional Protocol. The European Commission rejected the case after finding that the 
application was ill-founded. In the Darby Case192 the issue of taxation was also in 
the fore of attention, when a Finnish doctor resident in Sweden was taxed as a Swe-
dish resident by the Swedish administrative authorities and therefore had to pay the 
entire church tax. He opposed these decisions and applied to the ECtHR, which 
rightly held that tax obligations fall within the scope of the second paragraph of 
Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol and opened the admissibility of conside-
ring a discriminatory effect of the Swedish tax regulations under Article 14 ECHR.  
Another case concerning the issue of expropriation of foreign property was ad-
dressed in is the Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany case193. The 
applicant initiated a claim inter alia for restitution of property, namely for a painting 
confiscated by the former Czechoslovakia in 1946 under Benes-Decree 12/1945194 
and alleged a violation of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol195. He argued in 
this respect that the confiscation, as a violation of international law, had to remain 
ineffective. Challenging in particular the validity of the said expropriation, the ap-
plicant argued that, as heir, he was the owner of the painting concerned. In the appli-
cant’s submission, the restitution of the painting in question to the Czech Republic 
amounted to an unlawful interference with his “existing possessions”. The confisca-
tion of the painting by the former Czechoslovakia under Benes Decree No. 12 had 
been unlawful, since his father had been neither “German” nor an “enemy of the 
Czech and Slovak people” 196. The applicant’s father filed a claim, but on 21 No-
vember 1951 the Bratislava Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. In 1991 the 
municipality of Cologne obtained the painting as a temporary loan from the Brno 
Historical Monuments Office in the Czech Republic and the applicant requested for 
an interim injunction ordering to the City of Cologne to hand over the painting. He 
formed a file before the cologne Regional Court requesting for consent to the deli-
 
190  See above note, para. 54.  
191  Wasa Liv Omsesidigt v. Sweden, 58 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (1988). 
192  Darby v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A, No. 187; (1991) 13 EHRR 774; see 
also Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 23 February 
1995, Series A, No. 306-B. 
193  Eur. Court H. R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Ger-
many; Application No. 42527/98.  
194  Decree 12/1945 (21. 6. 1945) – Confiscation and expedited distribution of agricultural proper-
ties of Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators and certain organisations and institutes, 
see Chapter C. I. 2.  
195  The applicant also alleged a violation of Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR. 
196  Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany; 
Application No. 42527/98, para. 79.  
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very of the painting. In several proceedings the German courts found they lacked 
jurisdiction and as consequence the applicant then filed an application before the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR dismissed a violation of property rights under Article 1 of the 
First Protocol on grounds of the scope of the term “possession”197. In this respect the 
Court stated “the hope of recognition of the survival of an old property right cannot 
be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.1. In 
these circumstances, the applicant as his father’s heir cannot, for the purposes of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, be deemed to have retained a title to property nor a claim to 
restitution against the Federal Republic of Germany amounting to a legitimate ex-
pectation in the sense of the Court’s case law. The Court thus concludes that there 
has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and observes that the expropria-
tion carried out by authorities of former Czechoslovakia in 1946, as confirmed by 
the Bratislava Administrative Court in 1951, that is before 3 September 1953, the 
entry into force of the Convention, and before 18 May 1954, the entry into force of 
Protocol No. 1. Accordingly, the Court is not competent ratione temporis to exa-
mine the circumstances of the expropriation or the continuing effects produced by it 
up to the present date”198. The ECtHR ruled that the Benes Decrees could not violate 
the ECHR and rejected the application.  
As discussed above, both the Commission and the ECtHR have taken a broad 
view of the interpretation of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol199. In this 
respect several judgments were rendered defining and clarifying its scope200, but 
foreign direct investment has, up to now, not been addressed directly by the 
Court201. In addition, expropriation of a foreigner’s property was uncommon among 
the traditional members of the members of the Convention202 and the ECtHR is 
considerably reluctant to recognize the existence of an expropriation or any other 
 
197  See also Malhous v. the Czech Republic (Dec.) No. 33071/96, 13 December 2000, ECHR 
2000-XII and Mayer & Others v. Germany , application No. 18890/91, 19048/91 and 
19549/92, Commission Decision of 4 March 1996, Decisions and Reports 85, p. 5-20. 
198  Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, 
paras. 79-87. 
199  See ECHR of 23 September 1982, Series A752; Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden: 60. 
“…Although the expropriation permits left intact in the law the owner’s right to use and dis-
pose of their possessions, they nevertheless in practice significantly reduced the possibility of 
its exercise. They also affected the very substance of ownership…The applicants’ right of 
property thus became precarious and defeasible…the justification for the interference with the 
applicants’ right of property”, and ECHR on 18. February 1991, Series A/192, Fredin; ECHR 
on 19 December 1982, Series 0A/169, Mellacher and ECHR on 7. December 1976, Series 
A724.  
200  Continuous jurisprudence since Eur. Court H.R., Handyside Case, Judgment of 7 December 
1976, Series A, No. 24, para. 62; Marckx Case, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31, 
para. 63.  
201  See footnote 180.  
202  Böckstiegel, Enteignungs- und Nationalisierungsmaßnahmen gegen ausländische Kapitalge-
sellschaften, Völkerrechtliche Aspekte, Bericht der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, 
vol. 13 (1974), pp. 7.   
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measure which would result in restitution and/or compensation203. But in the last few 
years membership to the Convention has grown considerably, since all Central and 
East European States, including Russia and the Ukraine204, joined it and its mecha-
nism of judicial implementation. This development is taking place together with a 
vast boom of foreign direct investment in the Eastern parts of Europe and might 
increase the impact of regional human rights treaties, in particular the European 
Convention upon the protection of foreign direct investment.  
2. The American Convention on Human Rights  
The Inter-American system of human rights protection comprises thirty-four coun-
tries with a population of more than 600 million and is represented by the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS). The economical development and the distribution of 
wealth vary widely in this area205. The protection of human rights is based on a dual 
institutional structure, one having evolved from the Charter of the Organization of 
American States in 1948 and the other established by the entry into force of the 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights in 1978206. Two independent organs safe-
guard implementation of the American Convention: In 1959 a Commission was set 
to serve as a mechanism for the protection of human rights, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights. The Commission is vested with the authority to deal 
with allegations concerning a violation of human rights contained in either the 
American Declarations of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 or the 1969 Ameri-
can Human Rights Convention.  The competence of the Commission was initially 
limited to give recommendations “with the objective to bring about more effective 
observance of Human Rights”. In 1978 the American Convention on Human Rights 
came into force and incorporated the Commission. Moreover, it provided for the 
establishment of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The protection system 
under the American Convention still resembles the one previously applicable under 
the European Convention: Only a state concerned or the Commission can submit a 
case to the Court, provided, moreover, that the state concerned has accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s judgments are binding, but without an enforcement 
mechanism comparable to the European system. Also in contrast to the European 
system, the OAS inter-state complaint mechanism is optional whereas the accep-
 
203  Weber, Menschenrechte (2004), p. 819. 
204  Waelde/Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economics: Western Transplants – A 
short-cut to Social Market Economy Status?, International and Comparative Legal Quarterly, 
vol. 43 (1994), p. 347 et seq. 
205  Reisman, Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a Regional Human Rights 
Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience, St. Louis Warsaw Trans’l 89 
(1995), p. 90-92.  
206  American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978, 
OEA/ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1.  
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tance of the individual petition procedure is mandatory for any State Party to the 
Convention207.  
The instrument preceding this Convention, the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man208, provided for property protection209, adhered to the 
approach to the right of property as a human right and set a rule for compensation in 
case of expropriation210. The American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 con-
tains rules for the protection of property in its Article 21211 and according to Articles 
24 and 25 the right to equal protection and the right to judicial protection. Article 44 
states that juridical persons do not have the capacity to lodge petitions to the Com-
mission212. In deciding not to entertain these kinds of petitions, the Commission is 
excluding a major part of the economic disputes potentially arising under the Ameri-
can Convention. Notwithstanding, a significant case in the context of foreign prop-
erty protection is the case Mevopal S. A. v. Argentina213. Mevopal S. A., a construc-
tion company, entered into three construction contracts with the Provincial Housing 
Institute in the Province of Buenos Aires. The contracts were breached in various 
respects and caused a loss of working capital for Mevopal. The company then filed 
various local suits, but the Argentine Supreme Court rejected the appeals filed. On 
behalf of Mevopal its legal representative filed a petition with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights alleging inter alia the violation of property by the 
State of Argentina. The Commission found that it was lacking competence ratione 
personae, inasmuch as juridicial persons are not entitled to protection by the Con-
vention and declared the petition inadmissible. Although the awards rendered by the 
 
207  All states ratifying the convention accept the right of any person or group of persons, or any 
non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the OAS to pre-
sent petitions to the inter-American Commission, see Art. 44 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.  
208 The Declaration was accepted by the Ninth International Conference of the American States in 
1948 in Bogota and is available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm>. 
209  See Article XXIII: „Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essen-
tial needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.” 
210  „The States shall guarantee the right to private property, and its individual or collective use 
shall be subject to the interests of society, with respect at all times for the dignity of the indi-
vidual and the inherent needs of family life. Expropriation shall be legal in cases of public util-
ity or social interest, in which case compensation shall be made.” 
211  The Article states that “(1) everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. 
The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interests of society. (2) No one shall 
be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public 
utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. (3) 
Usury and other forms of exploitation of man and by man shall be prohibited by law,” see In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, Ten Years of Activity 1971-1981 (1982) 28. 
212  Article 44 states that „any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally 
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the 
Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State 
Party.“ 
213  Case Mevopal, S.A. v. Argentina, Report No. 39/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser. L./V./II.95 
doc. 7 rev. 297 (1998).  
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Commission of the Convention entitle the claimant for compensation214, it has little 
practical relevance in the field of foreign investment.  
3. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights215 was the last regional human 
right Convention entering into force216. It obliges its contracting parties to recognize 
the rights, duties and freedoms contained in the Charter and bring them to full effect 
by adopting the legislative or other measures required217. The Charter functions 
within the framework of the African Union (AU). It emphasizes African traditions 
and values, but also grants peoples’ rights as well as individual rights, particularly 
referring to the right of development. Moreover, the Banjul Charter proclaims eco-
nomic, social, cultural as well as civil and political rights. It protects private property 
as such218, but not the owner. It reflects the specific attitude of the developing coun-
tries towards the right and protection of property as a fundamental right219, but it 
determines no legal consequences in case of expropriation220 and can therefore not 
provide a sufficient protection of property. 
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Charter the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights was founded which duties are to promote human and peoples’ rights 
and ensure their protection in Africa221. The Commission consists of eleven inde-
pendent members and has four functions explicitly conferred to it under the Charter: 
the promotion of human and peoples’ rights in Africa, the protection of those rights 
and the interpretation of the Charter. The Commission is deemed to still explore the 
scope of its powers due to the short time of its being in function, but by the end of its 
 
214  See Art. 68 (3) American Convention on Human Rights. 
215  The Convention is originally called the Banjul-Charter, see African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/687/3 rev. 5, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 58. 
216  Shelton, Remedies in International Law (2005), p. 113; Mugwanya, Realizing universal human 
rights norms trough regional human rights mechanisms: reinvigorating the African System, 
Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 10, No. 1 (1999), p. 35-50. 
217  See generally Essien, The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights: Eleven Years 
After, 6 State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law Review 93 (2000), p. 93-111. 
218  See Article 14 stating that „The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be en-
croached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
219  Dolzer, Eigentum, Entschädigung und Enteignung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 106. 
220  See Article 14 (2) African Charter on Human Rights.  
221  Before the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 1 January 2004, the 
protection of rights listed in the Banjul-Charter was exercised solely by the African Commis-
sion on Human Rights, a quasi-judicial body, modelled on the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission with no power to adopt binding measures. The Commission’s functions are lim-
ited to examine state reports or to interpret the Charter on request of a state party. 
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first decade it had concluded over 100 cases222. To make the African system for the 
protection of human rights more effective, a new mechanism was taken on in 
1998223. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered into force 
on 25. January 2004 upon its ratification by fifteen Member states224 and resulted in 
the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)225. 
It provides that the Court accepts actions on the basis of any instrument, including 
human right treaties, which have been ratified by state parties in question226. Indi-
viduals as well as NGO’s may submit actions to the Court227. Moreover, the Court 
can apply as legal source of law any relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
respective state228. While its judges have been recently elected, the permanent seat 
of the Court still has to be determined and its statute to be adopted in order to make 
it functionable229.  
 
222  See http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_reports/activity- 
16_en.pdf>; Quashigah, The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, African Human 
Rights Law Journal, vol. 2, No. 2 (2002), p. 261-300.  
223  Ibid.; Nmehielle, Towards an African Court of Human Rights: Structuring and the Court, 6 
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 27 (2000), pp. 27 (29); Udombana, To-
ward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never, 3 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Journal (2000) 45; El-Obaid/Kwadwo, Human Rights in Africa – A 
New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present, 41 McGill Law Journal (1996) 819; 
Akinseye-George, New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Prospects of an African Court 
of Human Rights, University of Miami International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 
(2001/2002), p. 159 (175); Krisch, The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peo-
ple’s Rights, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 58 (1998), 
p. 713(733).  
224  See <http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../ratifications/ratifica- 
 tion_court_en.pdf>; Wundeh Eno, The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights, African Human Rights Law Journal (2002), p. 223-233; Mubangisi, An African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights, South-African Yearbook of International Law (1999), 
pp. 256. 
225  The Court should eventually be merged with the envisaged African Court of Justice the Char-
ter of which has, however, not yet come into force; see further Udombana, An African Human 
Rights Court and African Union Court: A needful Duality or a needless Duplication?, Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 811. 
226  See Art. 3. 1. of the Protocol. 
227  See Occasional Paper, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Presentation , 
analysis and commentary: the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
establishing the Court (2000), IA; further Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Hu-
man Rights Litigation before the African Court of Human and People’s Rights: Lessons from 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, Journal of African Law 377(1999), 
p. 201-213; generally Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-
Governmental Organizations, University of Philadelphia Press (1995), pp. 279. 
228  Art. 7 of the Protocol.  
229  See <http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_reports/activit 
y1 6_en.pdf>.  
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III. Summary  
The above considerations permit a brief evaluation of the role of human rights insti-
tutions in the context of foreign investment protection. While the traditional or clas-
sical concept of diplomatic protection in the sense of inter-state remedy has domina-
ted the area of human rights protection until World War II, the new generation of 
treaties granting human rights to the individual has challenged this approach and 
improved the standing of individuals in international human rights litigation signifi-
cantly. For instance, the ECHR and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights allow individuals to lodge claims against states who have expressly recogni-
zed the competence of the tribunals. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights also acknowledges human rights treaties concluded under the auspices of the 
United Nations as admissible sources of law; given the respective state is party to 
the treaty. The admissible application of the individual under the ECHR and the 
African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights marks a great departure taken by 
these conventions from traditional forms of the international protection of individu-
als for they dispense with nationality as a condition of protection. Thus the deve-
lopments in international human rights law show that the conceptual understanding 
of the rule of diplomatic protection had to face the winds  of change resulting in a 
human rights protection system  which is based on treaty law and limited to the 
means provided by the particular treaty. In sum, the principal achievement of con-
temporary human rights protection is to grant the same protection to all individuals 
regardless of their nationality or other factors, which can be pursued procedurally.  
But there are two sides of the coin. Like all international law, human rights law is 
the law of the political system of nation states and subject to international political 
forces. The rights granted to the individuals by the respective treaties are not entirely 
covered by corresponding procedural rights in international law and it is not at all 
certain that the state parties intend to accept any international decision making and 
enforcement procedures for the protection of individual rights other than the ones 
provided for in the respective treaties. This is no coincidence but rather mirrors the 
underlying structural flaws of international law in general, which are to determine 
the amount of reparation to be paid to meet the requirements of an “adequate com-
pensation” in each given case. Receiving an appropriate reparation payment in case 
of deprivation of property is a major factor to safeguard investment, in particular in 
a foreign country. Invoking a tribunal under the ICSID Convention provides these 
safeguards by a consistent and coherent jurisprudence rendered by experts as well as 
by binding awards. Its structural framework is tailor-made to meet these specific 
requirements and can therefore afford legal certainty by rendering consistent juris-
prudence. The idea of the ICSID Convention at first line is to safeguard foreign 
property by providing a procedural framework in case of disputes, while human 
rights aim at the detachment of the individual from the state and a civilized conduct 
among states, including a non-discriminatory protection of property. Although, 
therefore, both concepts had the same basic purpose, namely the protection of the 
person and his property, they appear both in theory and in past practice as mutually 
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divergent. Ultimately, the exhaustion of local remedies remains a prerequisite for the 
application of diplomatic protection, which might be very time consuming and hin-
der alien investors from invoking human rights tribunals given that the ICISD Con-
vention is ratified by the respective state. Otherwise international and in particular 
regional human rights courts might represent the last legal resort for the investor. An 
institutionalisation of the right of unilateral recourse to a remedy such as ICSID in 
treaties creating investment protection regimes represents a new approach to juris-
diction absent the local remedies rule and caters to the interests of foreign investors. 
If the system established under ICSID can overcome its current state of crisis, inter-
national human rights courts will not draw up level with tribunals under the ICSID 
Convention in the field of foreign investment protection.  
D. The Role of the World Trade Organization 
The following section examines the approach of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to foreign investment in order to draw conclusions on its current role as well 
as on its potential future prospects. Taking in account the close linkage between 
trade and investment, the WTO seems to be the appropriate venue for international 
investment protection, yet investment is the “missing panel” in the WTO’s body of 
trade and trade-related agreements. Consequently, drafting a multilateral agreement 
on foreign investment protection under the auspices of the WTO has been on the 
agenda since the end of the twentieth century, when in the mid-1990s the Uruguay 
Round introduced an investment dimension in multilateral trade rules, bringing 
about new implications for foreign investment230. Notwithstanding this situation it is 
important to note that investment is, however, to some extent already covered by the 
WTO system, yet in a fragmented manner and dotted across a range of agreements. 
Foreign investment-related issues in that sense can now be found in five WTO 
agreements: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM)231. A single multilateral investment agreement on a comprehensive basis 
might be a clearly better approach, since the plethora of diverse bilateral and pluri-
lateral agreements addressing foreign investment issues appears as a tangled web of 
competing and even conflicting commitments and potentially impairs foreign in-
vestment. Yet, significant objections were raised against the drafting of such a multi-
 
230  OECD, Working Papers on International Investment (2004), Relationship between Interna-
tional Investment Agreements, p. 3. 
231  The ASCM is dealing with the prohibition of subsidies contingent upon domestic over foreign 
procurement and export performances. This has implications for access to investment incen-
tives conditioned on performance requirements.  
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lateral agreement and none of the proposals made in this respect could successfully 
be implemented. Opposition against the idea of a multilateral comprehensive agree-
ment within the WTO system was voiced mainly by developing countries which 
demanded, as a minimum, the introduction of exceptions, special treatment and 
escape clauses. It is true that investment law and trade law overlap substantially, but 
as they are heading at different achievements, introducing an investment agreement 
into the WTO system may be of debatable merit. To illustrate the circumstances 
surrounding the negotiations and drafting process of such a multilateral framework 
on foreign investment in the WTO, the development of the issue will be briefly 
described with an emphasis on the conflict provoking aspects of the drafting of a 
multilateral comprehensive investment agreement.  
I. History 
A glance at the history and the development of the WTO elucidates the background 
of the current situation: The Havana Charter in its version of 1947/1948, made for 
the International Trade Organization (ITO)232, which was planned to come into ef-
fect along with other international institutions in this period of time, contained some 
provisions on foreign investment. Two articles of the Charter dealt with the issue of 
foreign direct investment and its protection233. One of these provisions was consid-
ered to give a preference to the developed states and was therefore severely objected 
to by the developing states. Ultimately, the Charter never came into force234 and the 
ITO was whittled down to the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)235. They contained rules on trade in goods and dealt with investment 
only peripherally. This setting was the initial situation for the separate development 
of international trade and investment in the system of the WTO.  
During the Uruguay Round the issue of foreign investment was taken into consi-
deration again and efforts were made to agree on measures regarding investment in 
international trade236. However, the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade-related 
investment measures were marked by strong disagreement among participants over 
 
232  United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, UNYB 1947-1948, 522 et seq. 
233  Article 11 provided that no member “shall take unreasonable or unjustifiable action” against 
investment and determined “fair and equitable” treatment. Article 12 entitled the members to 
take appropriate safety valves against foreign investment and to “determine whether and to 
what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investment“. 
234  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 136 (137). 
235  Dated 30 October 1947, in the version valid since 1 March 1969, UNTS 55, 94. 
236  Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este; see Senti, WTO – Regulation of World Trade after 
the Uruguay Round (1998), para 1143; Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and the GATT, Moving toward a multilateral investment treaty, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 55, No. 2 (1994), pp. 541; Mashayeki/Gibbs, Lessons 
from the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Investment, Journal of World Trade, vol. 33 (1999), 
pp. 1 (26). 
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the coverage and nature of possible new disciplines237 and proved to be highly frus-
trating;238 finally, the implementation of the TRIMS-Agreement was due to the de-
creasing interest of the U.S.A. on extensive investment liberalisation239. At the Min-
isterial Summit in Singapore in 1996 the WTO received the mandate to establish a 
“Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI)”240. The committee was to 
evaluate the feasibility of drafting a comprehensive regime on investment that could 
be administered by the WTO. Within the WGTI several aspects raised by the mem-
bers of the Working Group were discussed during the first sessions. This check list 
of trade and investment contained the issues of the implications of the linkage be-
tween trade and investment for development and economic growth, in particular the 
economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability, the degree of correlation 
between trade and investment flows and the determinants between this relationship 
as well as a stocktaking exercise regarding existing WTO provisions and implica-
tions for trade and investment flows of existing international instruments. The man-
date was then renewed and specified at the Ministerial Summit in Doha in 2001241. 
The Doha Declaration announced commitment to the continuation of the WGTI and 
instructed the group to consider and clarify diverse issues, but is does not commit 
the WTO to formally launch comprehensive negotiations on a “General Agreement 
 
237  Some developed countries made proposals for regulations that would prohibit a wide range of 
measures in addition to the local content requirements, which were found to be inconsistent 
with Article III in the FIRA panel case. Many developing countries raised objections and  
heavily opposed this approach. 
238  Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System – a history of the Uruguay Round (1999), p. 
116; <http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto05/wto0f_3.htm#note4>.  
239  The GATT rules only extend to a relatively narrow range of investment measures with direct 
and immediately identifiable impacts on trade. In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, 
the United States in particular favoured a much more comprehensive GATT code on invest-
ment based upon the principle of free access to foreign markets. Unlike the United States, most 
other Contracting States were sceptical of the free access approach, and saw the task of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on investment as that of developing more detailed and explicit 
rules with respect to measures that appear inconsistent with well-established GATT-principles, 
such as national treatment with respect to products, which would also require an extension of 
the kind of analysis to a broader set of measures such as trade balancing requirements or export 
performance requirements that directly affect trade flows. 
240  Stoll, The World Trade Organization (WTO), in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, vol. IV (1999), p. 1541; Gallagher, Guide to the WTO and Developing 
Countries (2000), p. 67; for a later stage see generally Correa/Kumar, Protecting Foreign In-
vestment, Implications of a WTO regime and policy options, (2003), p. 35 (50); a general sur-
vey is provided by Sauve, Qs and As on trade, investment and the WTO, Journal of World 
Trade, vol. 31, No. 4 (1997), p. 55 (79). 
241  The Doha-Ministerial Declaration, 14. November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
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on Investment”242. In addition, the development issue was levelled into play and, in 
accordance with the Doha mandate the needs of the poorer states were to be taken 
into account within the considerations of the WGTI243.  
At Cancún in 2003, the EC’s insistence on the launching of investment negotia-
tions and the adamant stance of a large group of developing countries that invest-
ment should be put on hold were a major factor244. With neither the USA nor the EC 
prepared to support negotiations in the face of the developing countries resistance, 
investment is effectively off the table at the WTO for a foreseeable future, which is 
clearly reflected in the results of the Ministerial Summit in Hong Kong in December 
2005245.  
II. The WTO Agreements 
Currently, the five agreements mentioned above address issues of foreign invest-
ment in their provisions. This section introduces three of them: the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Agreement on Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures (TRIMs). The regimes appear to be not entirely compatible, as the 
GATS seeks to provide market access by its non-discrimination rules, addressing 
primarily macroeconomic issues, while the TRIPs focuses on the microeconomic 
aspects of foreign direct investment246 and the TRIMs aims at prohibiting measures 
of WTO member states making the approval of investment conditional on compli-
ance with any regulations that favour domestic products. This section explores the 
agreements and provides a short analysis and evaluation.  
 
242  These issues were inter alia scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities 
for pre-establishment based on GATS-type positive list approach; development provisions; ex-
ceptions and balance of payments safeguards; and consultation and the settlement of disputes; 
for an evaluation see Kurtz, A general investment agreement in the WTO – Lessons from 
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (2002), pp. 48; see also Kentin, Prospects for rules on investment in the new 
WTO round, Legal issues for economic integration (2002), p. 61 (77).  
243  Some states contributing to the work of the WGTI claimed that a comprehensive multilateral 
instrument should be based on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), see also 
WTO Secretariat, Modalities for Pre-Establishment – Commitments based on a GATS-Type, 
Positive List Approach (WT/WGTI/W/120), 19 June 2002. 
244  Generally Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the possibility of a multilateral framework 
on investment at the WTO – are poor economics caught in between?, North-western Journal of 
International Law (2005), p. 95-138; Davenport, Investment incentives in commonwealth de-
veloped countries and the WTO investment negotiations, (2003).  
245  WTO-Doc. of the Ministerial Conference, 13-18 December 2005 in Hong Kong, WT/MIN 
(05)/DEC. 
246  See Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Harvard International Law 
Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2000), pp. 469. 
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1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)  
The Uruguay Round Final Act reflects a subtle compromise247 between varying 
perspectives of the negotiating parties: the TRIMs Agreement248, which contains 
new disciplines for investment measures, aims at safeguarding investment benefits 
for national economy and development249. The main purpose of the agreement is to 
prohibit discrimination between imported and domestic goods. It applies to invest-
ment measures related to trade in goods, but not to general issues in the field and 
prohibits certain of these measures.250 As the TRIMs is no comprehensive agreement 
and partly linked to the GATT, the respective measures need to be consistent with 
the national treatment obligations of the GATT251 according to Article III252 and 
XI253 of GATT 94 as foreseen in Article 2 TRIMs254. An illustrative list255 has been 
attached to the TRIMs listing examples of potential measures considered inconsis-
 
247  The compromise eventually reached during the negotiations is essentially limited to an inter-
pretation and clarification of the application to trade-related investment measures of GATT 
provisions on national treatment for imported goods (Article III) and on quantitative restric-
tions on imports or exports (Article XI). 
248  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN/FA), Geneva, 15 December 1993, II. 7 “Agreement on Trade-Related Investment   
Measures”, which came into effect on 1 January 1995; thus, the TRIMs Agreement does not 
cover many of the measures that were discussed in the Uruguay Round negotiations, such as 
export performance and transfer of technology requirements. 
249  These measures are inter alia local content, local manufacturing requirements, trade balance 
targets, production mandates, foreign exchange restrictions, mandatory technology transfer re-
quirements and equity restrictions.  
250  Rai, Trade Related Investment Measures under the WTO, The Indian Journal of International 
Law, vol. 41, No. 3 (2001), p. 435-477; OECD Working Paper, Working Paper on Interna-
tional Investment, Relationship between International Investment Agreements, p. 7.  
251  This concerns the treatment of imported goods versus domestic goods.  
252  National Treatment. 
253  See Article 1 TRIMs: Prohibition on quotas and other measures prohibiting or restricting the 
importation, exportation or sale for export of any product, except for duties, taxes or other 
charges.  
254  See Panel WT/DS4/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para 14.61. 
255  The list is non-exhaustive but provides a very concise definition of the respective measures 
including local content, sourcing and some trade-balancing requirements, which violate na-
tional treatment, and import and export restrictions, which violate the ban on quantitative re-
strictions, see Article XI of the GATT. In the case discussed below the panel stated moreover 
that “[A]n examination of whether the measures (in question) are covered by Item (1) of the Il-
lustrative List … will not only indicate whether they are trade-related but also whether they are 
inconsistent with Article III:4 GATT and thus in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agree-
ment, see Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, para 
14.83. 
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tent with Article III:4 or Article XI:1 of the GATT 94256. In addition, the TRIMs 
provides for a transition period257, during which properly notified measures are not 
regarded inconsistent with GATT 94258. By now, however, all non-conforming 
measures should have been eliminated, but a number of waivers have been granted 
to some states259.  
In spite of the cautious approach of the TRIMs to comprehensive investment pro-
visions, the WTO panels were invoked to decide on conflicts based on an interpreta-
tion of TRIMs provisions. Yet, it was considerably notable that the panels largely 
attempted to avoid considering claims under the TRIMs by choosing to consider the 
related claims of violation of national treatment prior to examine alleged violations 
of TRIMs. Nevertheless, one of the first cases where the issue of foreign investment 
was brought on the table by a panel was the Case Indonesia- Certain Measures Af-
fecting the Automobile Industry260. Pursuant to an Indonesian Car Programme tax 
benefits were linked to domestic content requirements applicably solely to cars pro-
duced and manufactured in Indonesia. In addition, custom duty benefits for imported 
components for cars were also linked to similar domestic content requirements. The 
panel regarded these local content requirements as investment measures because 
they had a significant impact on investment in the automotive sector261 and consid-
ered them trade-related because they affected trade262. As a result, the Indonesian 
car programme providing for local content requirements was considered a breach of 
 
256  The Annex shall “provide additional guidance as to the identification of certain measures 
considered to be inconsistent with GATT Article III: 4 and XI: 1 of the GATT 1994”. Panel 
Report, India-Auto Sector, para 7.157. The India-Auto Sector Case involved a TRIM requiring 
“trade balancing”. Domestic auto manufactures were allowed to import components and parts 
conditioned on a certain FOB (free on board) value of exports of cars and components over the 
same period. The panel addressed this measure considering it a restriction, contrary to the 
terms of Article XI: 1 (paras 7.277-7.278). After finding the trade balancing requirements vio-
late GATT Article X: 1, the India-Auto Sector panel invoked the principle of judicial economy 
and concluded that it was not necessary to analyse the measures under the TRIMS Agreement.  
257  In accordance with Article 5.2-5; moreover, Article 5:4 contains a “stand-still” obligation, see 
Senti, WTO – Regulation of World trade after the Uruguay Round (1998), para 1147; Stoll, 
WTO-Handbuch – Welthandelsordnung und Welthandelsrecht (2006), Chapter C.I.6, para 24. 
258  In this respect, the TRIMS Agreement is a “one-stop shop”. 
259  In particular Columbia and Thailand benefit from a waiver. The measures in question were to 
be lifted by the end of 2003 at the latest.  
260  Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, paras 14.97-14, 99; Falke, Vertragskonkurrenz und Vertragskon-
flikt im Recht der WTO: Erste Erfahrungen der Rechtsprechung 1995-1999, ZEuS 2000, 307. 
261  Id. para 14.80. 
262  Id. para 14.82; The panel also held that compliance with the requirements for the purchase and 
use of products of domestic origin was necessary to obtain the tax and customs duty benefits 
and those benefits were advantages within the meaning of the Illustrative List, see ibid paras 
14.89-14.91. 
 315
the TRIMS Agreement263. Another panel decision dealing with a potential violation 
of TRIMs obligations was the India-Auto Case264, where the panel found a breach of 
the national treatment obligation265. The panel followed the common strategy to 
avoid addressing a potential breach of TRIMs obligations directly and thus consi-
dered the allegations regarding the TRIMs solely on the basis of judicial economy266. 
Referring to the case, the panel stated that “the TRIMs Agreement might not be 
considered more specific than the GATT Article III:4”, which seems peculiar, as the 
TRIMS, only applicable to a specified subset of investment measures, appears to be 
an elaboration of Article III:4 GATT 94267.  
Perhaps the most significant development with respect to investment was a ruling 
by a panel in a dispute settlement proceeding between the United States and Canada: 
the FIRA Panel Decision268. The decision is the only case concerning foreign in-
vestment measures directly as a GATT dispute settlement panel considered a com-
plaint by the United States regarding specific types of undertakings which were 
required from foreign investors by the Canadian authorities as conditions for the 
approval of investment projects. At issue was the “Canadian Foreign Investment 
Review Act”, which established a governmental agency, the Foreign Investment 
Agency. The Agency’s task was to evaluate investment applications submitted by 
 
263  Id. para 14.91; Therefore any measure affecting investment matters should be regarded as an 
investment measure falling within the scope of the TRIMS Agreement, see Panel, 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para 14.80: “On the basis of our read-
ing of these measures which have investment objectives and investment features and which re-
fer to investment programmes, we find that these measures are aimed at encouraging the de-
velopment of a local manufacturing capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and com-
ponents in Indonesia.” 
264  India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R (21 De-
cember 2001). 
265  India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R (21 De-
cember 2001). 
266  Paras 7.151-7.161; the respective approach seems to be based to some extent on the considera-
bly superficial discussion of TRIMs in the early Bananas Case, see EC-Bananas III, Report of 
the Panel, para 7.186, where the Panel, however, considered the claims simultaneously; in the 
Canada-Auto dispute [Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 
WT/DS139/R (11 February 2000)], the Panel ruled moreover that the particular measure in 
question did not result in a breach of the national treatment Article III:4 of GATT, and there-
fore there could be no violation of the TRIMs Agreement, see para 10.150. 
267  In the Canada-Autos dispute (WT/DS139/R), the panel rejected an argument by Canada con-
cluding that a different aspect of its policies did not bring about a breach of Article III: 4 since 
the questionable measure was not listed in the TRIMs illustrative list of investment measures. 
Referring thereto the panel stated that since the list was non-exhaustive, the fact that a particu-
lar measure was not on the list expressed nothing in itself about whether the measure could be 
a national treatment violation, at para 10.89; the assumption that it is appropriate to consider a 
claim of national treatment violation prior to a claim of TRIMs violation appears at odds with 
the view of the Appellate Body in the Sardines case that claims under an agreement considered 
as lex specialis ought to be considered prior to those under the more general norms like na-
tional treatment; this view is also found in the early Appellate Body ruling in Bananas. 
268  Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984). 
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foreign investors. Applications were followed when investment could carry out a 
significant benefit for the country itself focusing on the advancement of national 
industrial and economic policies. The purchase of certain products from domestic 
sources were determined as well as the export of a certain amount or percentage of 
output in the sense of an export performance requirement. The Panel concluded that 
the local content requirements were inconsistent with the national treatment obliga-
tion of Article III:4 of the GATT but that the export performance requirements were 
not inconsistent with GATT obligations269. The panel decision in the FIRA case was 
significant in that it confirmed that existing obligations under the GATT were ap-
plicable to performance requirements imposed by governments in an investment 
context in so far as such requirements involve trade-distorting measures. But sum-
marizing the impact of the TRIMs, it appears that it merely emphasizes the validity 
of rules already in force under the GATT and does therefore not carry much of de-
velopment on foreign investment protection.   
2. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
As services are not covered by the GATT but play a significant role in contemporary 
international trade, the WTO system required the adoption of a new, separate and 
comprehensive agreement concerning trade in services. The General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) has partly been modelled on the GATT and mirrors its 
structure widely. Of all WTO agreements, the GATS addresses investment issues 
most directly270. In parallel to the GATT, some GATS provisions provide for most 
favoured nation (MFN) standards271 and national treatment272.  
In accordance with the MFN obligation, service suppliers from one member state 
must not be treated in a less favourable way than like services and service providers 
from any other member state which is regarded as an “immediate” and “uncondi-
tional” obligation273. National treatment, however, applies only to scheduled sectors. 
The GATS aims at liberalization in trade in services and contains therefore provi-
sions concerning general obligations and disciplines and provisions concerning 
additional standards applicable in liberalized sectors. The GATS provisions do not 
 
269  Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984), 
ibid. 
270  OECD Working Paper, Working Papers on International Investment, Relationships between 
International Investment Agreements (2004), p. 6.  
271  See Article II GATS.  
272  See Article XVII GATS. 
273  Part II: “General Obligations and Disciplines”, Article II Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, 
paragraph 1 reads: ”with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member 
shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and services suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers 
of any other country”. 
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deal with investment directly, but the issue is being dealt with through the term of a 
“commercial presence mode of supply”, which is in essence an investment activity. 
Commercial presence in the sense of the provisions requires the establishment of 
commercial presence in the country where the service is supplied, which is there-
fore, in fact, a mechanism to provide market access274. Due to its inherent flexibility 
the GATS was considered to serve as a role model for the comprehensive multilat-
eral agreement and thus simply to extend the GATS style approach275. But the sug-
gested GATS style approach to liberalization holds various weaknesses: the level of 
liberalization might place constant pressure on certain countries to open sectors for 
liberalization and under the GATS countries are subject to uncertain terms for 
GATS rules are only poorly defined. Finally, negotiations under the GATS are bila-
teral, while a substantive agreement would bind multilaterally and create obligations 
in that sense.  
3. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
was initiated to address the growing importance of intellectual property rights and is 
therefore heading at adequately protecting intellectual property rights. The agree-
ment is building upon existing intellectual property conventions276 and provides for 
both, national treatment and MFN for the protection of specific sectors277. It contains 
three different sets of provisions, but none addresses issues of investment278. Yet, it 
helps to open up economies to foreign investment by protecting technology which 
 
274  The WTO members can impose restrictions with respect to the commercial presence through 
e.g. a limitation of the number of economic operators (Article XVI GATS) or take exceptions 
from MFN to foreign services suppliers or from the obligation to accord national treatment 
(Article II:2 and Article XVII GATS). 
275  As a consequence, this would mean the subjection of sectors to liberalization, while other 
exceptions and qualifications would be maintained. 
276  Such conventions include the 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the 1961 Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Or-
ganisations, 1961, and the 1989 Washington Convention on Intellectual Property in respect of 
Integrated Circuits.   
277  Such as copyright, patents, trademarks, etc. 
278  The different sets of provisions are (1) institutional arrangements and procedures to deal with 
intellectual property matters within the WTO system, (2) substantive standards relating to in-
tellectual property rights and (3) standards for enforcement of such rights.  
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plays an important role for investment abroad279. In addition, the TRIPs provides 
standards of protection which are also comprised by the scope of investment in re-
gional and bilateral investment treaties. The respective rights are created in domestic 
law and apply within these legal systems, as the TRIPs determines standards that are 
supposed to be transformed into national law. Holders of these rights are entitled to 
benefit from certain standards with respect to the domestic enforcement structures 
and their rights in terms of access to judicial remedies280. A breach of such standards 
does not imply a failure to an obligation resulting out of an international treaty, but 
has to be addressed in national and domestic law281.  
III. Summary 
Adding investment to the WTO agenda clearly goes beyond the traditional notion of 
trade and thus indicates an inclination to broaden the scope of the WTO system in 
order to comprise general commercial issues as well. Negotiations on a “General 
Agreement on Investment”, however, have an advantage as compared with other 
fora because of their capacity for trade-offs with other fields, such as intellectual 
property and trade in services. But it also sparked a contentious and complex debate 
within the system and the approach of the WTO system to draft a multilateral com-
prehensive regime on foreign investment has been challenged consistently. The 
recent history of the WTO may explain some of the circumstances, but in this con-
text the question must be raised as to the  benefits which would result from the draft-
ing of a multilateral comprehensive agreement by the WTO. The attempts to negoti-
ate such an instrument failed, however, and have been struck off the agenda since. 
At the present period the drafting of such a regime is being put on hold. Still, various 
benefits of such multilateral agreement could be asserted: A comprehensive invest-
ment agreement would provide for both, greater transparency and well-defined in-
vestor rights, and could thereby bring order to international investment law. Trade 
and investment are connected by a close linkage, which would be reflected in a 
comprehensive multilateral investment agreement drafted by the WTO. Ultimately, 
a substantive multilateral investment agreement may increase investment flows, in 
particular to developing countries.  
 
279 See Burt, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct In-
vestment in the World Trade Organization, 12 Am.U. Int’l L. Rev. 1015, 1039 (1997), stating 
that “[t]he transfers of technology accompany the great majority of foreign investment from 
multinational corporations in home countries to their subsidiaries in host countries” and the 
protection of technology “[r]emoves another source of insecurity for foreign investors and pro-
motes the transfer of technology between countries, in particular between developed and de-
veloping countries”, ibid. at 1039. 
280  OECD Working Paper, Working Papers on International Investment, Relationships between 
International Investment Agreements (2004), p. 7. 
281  Conversely, investment treaties create such international obligations. 
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But the approach of the WTO to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on foreign 
investment also meets strong criticism, based on the idea of the different concepts 
and goals of international trade law and investment law. Including an agreement on 
foreign investment into the WTO system would require a basic equal concept of 
investment law and trade law. This is lacking. Despite the close linkage between 
trade and investment their diversity with regard to goals and achievements predomi-
nates. The WTO has its competence in trade issues and the principles governing 
trade are not suitable for investment282. In view of this situation, it can be stated that 
an investment agreement does not belong into the WTO system, because it simply 
might not be the right forum for a multilateral investment agreement. The factors 
stability, policy predictability and finally profit cannot be guaranteed by an invest-
ment agreement, but are of high importance for the success of investment abroad. In 
addition, there is no empirical proof that an investment agreement would promote 
foreign investment or increase investment flows. Another point of criticism is based 
on the fact that the mission of the WTO is of a fundamentally liberalizing character. 
This is a substantial objection to draft an instrument without such liberalization as its 
main object. Another weakness of the WTO system is its adherence to solely inter-
state remedies, which might be not as enforcement effective as the investor-state 
dispute resolution system under the ICSID.  
The issues raised here mirror first and foremost the interests of an investor, and 
the question as to whether the WTO is the appropriate venue for an international 
investment agreement implies at first place the question where one is needed. From 
an investor’s perspective, undertakings in certain developing countries bring about 
an immense risk with regard to potential rates of return and the WTO does not pro-
vide for the respective dispute settlement and enforcement processes. After all, it 
seems unlikely that negotiations on a comprehensive investment agreement will be 
able to proceed since there is no consensus on modalities, both procedural and sub-
stantive.  
E. Conclusion 
The roles of human rights institutions and the WTO in the context of foreign in-
vestment protection have been at issue in this paper and as a debate over the roles of 
these mechanisms in the context of foreign investment protection suggests, they, as 
mechanisms, seem only second choice when foreign investment litigation or arbitra-
tion is considered. Nevertheless, the coming period in ICSID jurisprudence is one in 
which the matter of consistency will be of utmost relevance. The challenge of the 
Argentine cases which are currently being dealt with extensively by the respective 
 
282  In particular the application of non-discrimination and national treatment were inappropriate 
and would damage development. Moreover, a treaty of investors rights would be against the 
principle of reciprocity. 
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tribunals is indeed remarkable. The tribunals need to achieve a substantial degree of 
consistency - otherwise the ICSID might slide into a substantial crisis. Likewise, the 
alternative approach to foreign investment protection is given a special emphasis. 
The vast network of human rights conventions concluded on both regional and uni-
versal level provides for foreign property protection and non-discriminatory treat-
ment of aliens. In particular in the regional human rights instruments, relatively 
effective human rights have been accorded to individuals irrespective of their na-
tionality. As each member state can demand the respect of treaty obligations by the 
other member states, all are on an equal footing. Consequently, no state rights as 
such are encroached upon  in case of a violation of such human rights held by any 
individual, but , a state party to a human rights convention can provide assistance to 
its national in order to secure his/her treaty rights. Thus the assistance is not dif-
ferent from any other state may provide. Given this assumption the rule of diplo-
matic protection in its classical conceptual inter-state understanding is not applica-
ble. The state rather has to apply human rights assistance in the sense presented 
above, which is based on treaty law and limited to the means provided by the par-
ticular treaty. Ultimately, the prerequisites for diplomatic protection - especially the 
local remedies rule - and various legal limitations on the means of protection help to 
prevent an overly frequent use and abuses by powerful states.  
Like any other mode the idea of investment protection by means of human rights 
institutions and human rights assistance is open to criticism. Obviously, the instru-
ment of diplomatic protection and the concept of human rights assistance are 
founded on somewhat different bases and the expectation that the instrument of 
diplomatic protection would become superfluous through the new generation of 
human rights conventions has not been fulfilled. On the international plane, the 
individual has no equivalent corresponding procedural rights to achieve the respect 
of the substantive rights provided for in the human rights treaties. The ECHR might 
serve as an exception, since every member state acknowledged jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR. From the current perspective these treaties establish quite far reaching sub-
stantive rights for individuals but not as a corresponding basis for diplomatic protec-
tion by their home countries. This has proved to be ineffective due to failures in the 
institutional system of the respective treaty and the unwillingness of states to ob-
serve international treaty obligations. Yet, there is no general obligation for all states 
to submit their relevant disputes to a peaceful settlement through the binding deci-
sion of an independent and neutral authority. In particular in the field of foreign 
investment protection with its inherent underlying risks, there is a strong need for 
reliance on effective remedies and even more effective enforcement mechanisms.  
One characteristic element of foreign investment law is that several concepts di-
verging with regard to their goal and nature are at clash at every moment. Foreign 
investment law and the protection of foreign investment are shaped by the goal of 
avoiding or at least reducing the element of risk for the investor in a long-term pro-
ject. Safeguarding foreign investment undertakings is the core idea of the law on 
international investment protection, while human rights law as provided for by the 
new type of human rights treaties aims at the independence of the individual from 
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the state with regard to the protection of human rights. Instead, trade law focuses on 
liberalisation for the exchange of goods. International investment law needs to com-
prise elements of all of these concepts, and as with most clashes of legal concepts, 
there will be no complete triumph of any conceptual approach. This assessment is 
backed and mirrored by the current developments of international investment litiga-
tion. In the light of the preceding analysis the paper argues that foreign investment 
protection as provided for by the ICSID system is, in spite of its current crisis, not at 
all a bad outcome. The advantages of arbitrating under the auspices of the ICSID are 
manifold and it seems unlikely that the mechanisms offered by human rights institu-
tions as well as the WTO can be considered as equal to ICSID. Each mechanism to 
protect foreign investment has to follow its own course in serving their task of fo-
reign property protection, although sometimes their courses may run parallel. 
 
 323
Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO      
                             
Comment by Sabine Konrad∗ 
A.  Introduction  
I would like to address two questions:  
• Is the European Convention of Human Rights (the “ECHR” or the “Conven-
tion”) an instrument of investment protection, and  
• Is there something to be learned from the ECHR on the topic of the state's right 
to regulate as opposed the rights of the investor to protection?  
B. The ECHR as an Instrument of Investment Protection  
The ECHR is certainly not an instrument of investment protection in the formal 
sense.   
However, the Convention has specific elements of investment protection in addi-
tion to the general protection of Human Rights of nationals and non-nationals alike.  
The case law of the Strasbourg court confirms this.   
At a conference on "Stocktaking after 40 years" of ICSID, it is perhaps fitting to 
refer to a seminal case on the Convention’s regime on expropriation which is 20 
years old: Lithgow vs UK1. 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention contains the right to property and 
deals with expropriation. 
Its relevant passage reads: 
"No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and sub-
ject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of interna-
tional law." 
The court held in James vs UK2 and Lithgow vs UK that there are two different 
regimes, one for national and one for non-national investors.  Whereas non-nationals 
are entitled to protection by the general principles of international law, including 
 
∗  Sabine Konrad, Attorney Lovells, Frankfurt. 
1  Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, ECHR, Series A No. 
102.  
2  James and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, ECHR, Series A No. 
98. 
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inter alia a right to compensation under the Hull-doctrine, nationals are not; for 
nationals, a right to compensation exists only as an emanation of the proportionality 
requirement.  Thus only the regime for non-nationals is comparable to protection 
under a BIT. 
Since most of its cases concern expropriation of the property of nationals, the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights on expropriation has to be looked 
at with caution.  Nonetheless it is possible to point to investment protection-type 
cases under the ECHR regime.  
One example is Sovtransavto Holding vs Ukraine.3   
This case concerns the rights of a Russian minority shareholder, Sovtransavto, in 
an Ukrainian public limited company, Sovtransavto-Lugansk. The management of 
Sovtransavto-Lugansk increased the shares of Sovtransavto-Lugansk thereby redu-
cing the overall shareholding of Sovtransavto from 49% to just under 21%, in effect 
curtailing Sovtransavto’s voting rights and taking control of the company. It further 
appears assets of Sovtransavto-Lugansk were sold to various entities set up by its 
managing director. 
The investor challenged the actions of the management of Sotransavto-Lugansk 
in the national courts. The President of Ukraine in person interceded on behalf of the 
government in the court proceedings citing "national interests". This was done at the 
instigation of the management of the Ukrainian company, which by this time had 
become a private company. The investor lost his case and subsequent appeals. Ulti-
mately Sotransavto-Lugansk was wound up and the investor received payments 
which "had not been in proportion to its initial 49% shareholding". 
Had Sovtransavto’s shareholding in question been an investment in the Energy 
Sector or had the 1998 Russian-Ukraine BIT of 17 November 1998 been in force (as 
of  December 2006 it has yet to be implemented), Sovtransavto would surely have 
travelled the BIT route. It can be speculated that it went to the European Court of 
Human Rights – where it won - precisely because neither of these two avenues was 
available to it. 
Sovtransavto did exactly what the European Court of Human Rights suggested in 
Lithgow: it employed the convention mechanism for investment protection. In the 
words of Lithgow: 
“[The reference to general principles of international law] enables non-nationals 
to resort directly to the machinery of the Convention to enforce their rights on the 
basis of the relevant principles of international law, whereas otherwise they would 
have to seek recourse to diplomatic channels or to other available means of dispute 
settlement to do so."4 
Article1 (1) 2nd sentence of Protocol No 1 is not an umbrella clause that “mirrors” 
customary law rules on expropriation of property belonging to non-nationals. It 
 
3  Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, No. 48553/99, ECHR 2002-VII. 
4  Infra., paragraph 115. 
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imports standards of customary international law into the Convention.  The effects, 
however, are equivalent.  
C. The Convention Perspective on the State’s Right to Regulate 
It is also worth observing that the Lithgow judgment contains a very interesting 
explanation of the difference between the protection of property rights afforded to 
nationals and non-nationals under the ECHR: 
“Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social re-
form or an economic restructuring, there may well be good grounds for drawing a 
distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. 
To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its 
authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of 
property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may 
apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for 
requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-
nationals”.5 
This explanation is based on two reasons for differential treatment: 
• The first is what one might call the 'Boston Tea Party' rule: "No regulation 
without representation." 
• The second reason is the fact that the national of the State in question is a mem-
ber of the public in whose interest the measure has been taken; a consideration 
which is not relevant in the case of a non-national. The non-national has in-
vested in the country but is not necessarily integrated to such an extent that he 
would enjoy the benefits of the regulation. 
Both reasons are relevant in the context of the present discussion on a host state's 
right to regulate in a BIT context. They militate for investor protection and against 
 
5  Supra., paragraph 116. The Lithgow arguments are echoed by Paulsson in support of a general 
distinction between human rights and investment protection. He does not address Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, which provides for a distinction between national and non-nationals; Paulsson, 
"Indirect expropriation is the right to regulate at risk," at the joint  UNCTAD, OECD and     
ICSID Conference "Making the Most  of International Investment Agreements", 12 December 
2005,  http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_33783766_35501697_1_1_1_1 
 ,00.html. 
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an unlimited right of the host state to regulate unless such a regulation is combined 
with an obligation to compensate if investor and investment specific considerations 
so required. This 20 year-old reasoning in Lithgow is fresh as well as topical and it 
deserves to be explored further. 
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Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO       
                   
Comment by Rudolf Dolzer∗ 
Our speaker has presented an impressive panorama of the diversity of international 
rules governing private property. These rules emanate from customary international 
law governing aliens, from the body of rules protecting human rights, from treaties 
regulating international trade and from conventions on the promotion and protection 
of foreign investment. Even a cursory consideration of the various rules on property 
as contained in these diverse areas of international law points to differences and to 
divergences in their content and the level of protection granted to the owners of the 
property.  
In view of these obvious differences, the question will be raised whether the dif-
ferentiations must be seen as undesirable fragmentations of diverse lawyers of inter-
national law in need of a comprehensive synthesis or as expressions of appropriate 
distinctions inherent in the diversity of objectives of international law. The debate 
on the possible integration of a future global investment regime into the scheme of 
the World Trade Organisation has carried overtones of the view that more integra-
tion is necessary and that the diversity of the existing rules will need to be reconsi-
dered. Also, the occasional drawing of analogies, in the legal analysis of individual 
issues, from one of the four areas to another one, has implicitly assumed that uni-
formity among these areas is appropriate and desirable.  
In my own view, the diversity of the rules echoes the diversity of objectives, and 
there is no reason to alter the existing scheme of rules. All of the four areas have 
their own legal characteristics. Customary law regarding the status of property held 
by an alien is an expression of the minimum standard of decency and civilisation 
which states have come to expect from each other and which each state has to accept 
as a member of the community of nations. The rules on property contained in human 
rights investment are meant to reflect and secure the well-being and the dignity of 
each person which a state has to respect in its treatment of all persons, including its 
own nationals. Trade law essentially focuses on creating a level playing field for all 
actors involved in the international exchange of goods, allowing for sound competi-
tion and the optimal allocation of resources. And, again different, treaties on foreign 
investment aim a reducing the political risks of the foreign investor who acquires an 
 
∗  Rudolf Dolzer is Professor and Director of the Institute for International Law at the University 
of Bonn, Germany.  
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investment, often for high initial costs and expects a fair rate of return, often over a 
long period. 
Thus, the differences in the content of the rules are dictated by the different objec-
tives, and they cannot be seen as accidental characteristics of uncoordinated frag-
mentation. Specific conclusions result from this diversity inherent in the difference 
of goals. 
On the doctrinal level, every effort to draw analogies between the different fields 
in principle runs the danger to ignore the differences in the legal context and purpose 
of each set of rules. Under certain circumstances, cross-references may still be pos-
sible; for instance, it is reasonable to assume that the standard afforded in an invest-
ment treaty will not be lower than the protection afforded in a human rights agree-
ment. An example of the limits of drawing on the notions and results in other fields 
concern the understanding of the requirement of national treatment which at first 
sight would seem to be identical in all areas concerned. However, recent jurispru-
dence convincingly demonstrates that the legal context of trade rules and investment 
rules does not permit analogies in every case and indeed may require different ap-
proaches (see R. Dolzer, National Treatment, OECD 2005). 
Given the diversity of purpose and objective, an effort to synthesize and harmo-
nize or unify the rules concerned seems neither possible nor desirable. With regard 
to the difference between the status of human rights and the law of aliens, in particu-
lar, it is reasonable to assume that the difference will remain existent for the foresee-
able future. 
Consistent with my emphasis on the fact that the differences are inherent in na-
ture, I am also sceptical on any effort to bring trade and investment rules under one 
organizational roof. Of course, it may be argued that both areas should retain their 
characteristics and nevertheless be managed by the same organization, in concreto 
the World Trade Organization. In my view, the advantages of such a re-organization 
are not apparent. In the first place, it seems to be obvious that the WTO continues to 
struggle with its own complexity and that an addition of a new major task such as 
the administration of investment rules would add to this complexity and thus lead to 
more stagnation, Moreover, the addition of investment rules would move the WTO 
into the direction of a world economic organization, in danger of imposing uniform 
policies where diversity may be more appropriate and where mistakes would be 
multiplied in their effects. Form this perspective, the decision not to pursue global 
investment rules specifically within the WTO may not have to be deplored.  
Our speaker has also addressed the different question whether the present patch-
work of bilateral and multilateral treaties on investment might not better be replaced 
by a single global convention. In my view, it is in any event useful to separate this 
question from the issue of an institutional link with the WTO and to consider it on 
its own merits. At first sight at least, it is far from obvious why a global framework 
would be appropriate for trade matters but not for the rules on investment. This is so 
especially today when developing states no longer see investment treaties as an 
undue impediment to their economic sovereignty but as an entrance card to the 
growing international markets of foreign investment and thus to gain access to fo-
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reign capital and know how. In recent years, developing states have concluded more 
investment treaties among themselves than with industrialised states. In my view, a 
global convention, if accepted widely, would also contribute to introduce and 
strengthen those disciplines necessary for good governance in the host states and 
thus to contribute to growth and the reduction of poverty in countries and regions 
which have fallen behind in the competition for foreign investment in the past de-
cade, in particular in Africa. Finally, a global agreement could replace the current 
multitude of rules with much more simplicity and transparency.  
It is not overlooked her that the negotiation of a global investment convention, 
outside the WTO would face major hurdles. Firstly, the time and effort needed for 
such negotiations would be enormous. Secondly, the industrialized countries would 
not be inclined to accept a convention providing less protection than their bilateral 
treaty programmes, while developing countries might be inclined to further insist on 
regulatory space for changing policy concepts. The issue of the further status of the 
existing treaties would also have to be resolved on another level, even among in-
dustrialized countries, significant differences in their policies remain, particularly in 
regard to the function of treaties as a vehicle for the opening of domestic markets. 
Given these open issues, it remains a matter of political will whether or not a new 
round of negotiation should be opened for a global investment treaty, this time out-
side the WTO. It is true that after the failures within the OECD in the 90’s and 
within the WTO more recently, a certain fatigue to renew these efforts has taken 
over, not surprisingly. At the same time, the advantages of a global investment treaty 
remain on the table, and the topic remains on the international economic agenda. 
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FOREWORD 
On 18 October 1966, the International Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) entered into force. After a rather slow start, the system of mixed 
dispute settlement established by the ICSID Convention has begun to develop at a 
remarkable pace and is today rightly seen as a corner-stone of international dispute 
settlement in the field of international economic law. In addition to its immense 
practical relevance, international investment arbitration has developed in such a way 
that it is – equally rightly – held to be one of the intellectually most fascinating and 
challenging areas of modern international law. Consequently, the Wilhelm Merton 
Center for European Integration and International Economic Order has always con-
sidered international investment law to be one of its major fields of scholarly inte-
rest. 
Therefore, its directors strongly welcomed the initiative taken by Dr. Christian J. 
Tams, Senior Research Assistant with the Walther Schücking Institute for Interna-
tional Law at the University of Kiel, to organise a symposium on current issues of 
ICSID law. This symposium took place on 26 – 28 April 2006 in Frankfurt am 
Main, and brought together a large number of investment experts from all over 
Europe. Opened with a keynote speech by Professor Dr. Christoph Schreuer, Uni-
versity of Vienna, who gave a general assessment of modern developments in in-
vestment law, the symposium was designed to allow six younger scholars and prac-
titioners to present papers on salient issues of ICSID law. The ensuing discussions 
were initiated by comments from more experienced participants, again from both 
academia and practice. The present volume brings together the keynote speech as 
well as these various papers and comments, and, it is hoped, will give readers a good 
insight into the major problems currently faced by international investment arbitra-
tion under the ICSID Convention. 
The directors of the Wilhelm Merton Center wish to use this opportunity to ex-
press their sincere gratitude to the Frankfurt am Main based sponsors of this sympo-
sium, namely Baker & McKenzie, Clifford Chance LLP, Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer, Lovells, and Shearman & Sterling LLP, for their financial support. They 
also wish to thank Dr. Christian J. Tams for his strong and continuous intellectual 
input throughout the project. Finally, the editors of this volume wish to thank Ms 
Christina Pfaff, LL.M., for her most valuable assistance before, during and after the 
symposium, and Mr Gennadi Rudak for his editorial skills. 
 
 
Frankfurt am Main, 25 January 2007 
 
 
Rainer Hofmann               Stefan Kadelbach               Rainer Klump
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Introduction: The International Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) – Taking Stock after 40 Years    
                    
Rainer Hofmann/Christian J. Tams∗  
Forty years ago, on 18 October 1966, the International Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) entered into force. It was quickly ratified by a rather 
large number of States and was received very favourably by most commentators, 
one of whom, Georg Schwarzenberger (not otherwise known for over-enthusiasm or 
idealism), considered it a "remarkable" and "astounding" "essay in multilateral law-
making".1 Notwithstanding this positive assessment, and the great expectations co-
ming with it, ICSID dispute settlement took a very slow start and for a long while 
looked destined to fail. Few cases were brought in the 1970s and 1980s, and those 
that were often dragged on for years before an eventual award was rendered (which 
then faced the risk of annulment by ad hoc committees).  
As is well-known, the pendulum has swung back again, and most commentators 
today would happily subscribe to Schwarzenberger's initial assessment. From the 
1990s, the system of mixed dispute settlement established by the ICSID Convention 
has begun to develop at a remarkable pace. The simplest, and yet most impressive, 
figure attesting to that development is the number of cases submitted to dispute 
settlement by ICSID arbitral tribunals. Whereas there tended to be an average of one 
case per year in the period between 1966-1996, the last decade has witnessed a sharp 
increase in the number of ICSID proceedings, with currently 108 cases pending 
before arbitral tribunals.2 There is no shortage of metaphors describing this dynamic, 
or frantic, development. Some have spoken of a “baby-boom” of investment arbitra-
tion,3 while others have likened ICSID to Sleeping Beauty, kissed awake by Prince 
Charming some time during the 1990s.4 But apart from inspiring writers to use 
 
∗  Rainer Hofmann is Professor of Public Law, European Law and International Law at the 
University of Frankfurt, Germany and Co-Director of the Wilhelm Merton Center for Euro-
pean Integration and International Economic Order. Christian J. Tams is Senior Research As-
sistant at the Walter-Schücking Institute for International Law at the University of Kiel, Ger-
many. 
1  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and International Law (1969), at p. 152. 
2  See the list of cases provided on the ICSID website: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ 
pending.htm (visited 19 January 2007).   
3  Alexandrov, 'The "Baby Boom" of Treaty-based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID 
Tribunals: Shareholders as "Investors" and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis', The Law and Prac-
tice of International Courts and Tribunals 4 (2005) , pp. 19. 
4  Obadia, “ICSID, Investment treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging Issues”, in ICSID 
News, Vol. 18/2 (2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-4.htm. 
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flowery language, investment law, with increasing numbers of ICSID proceedings 
and increasing amounts of damages sought, has gained an immense practical rele-
vance, while also raising ever more complex conceptual issues.  
While the pace of this development is astonishing, ICSID's increase in relevance 
has been facilitated by a number of factors. Two of them are regularly mentioned 
and remain valid. (i) The conclusion, by States, of ever more (bilateral and multila-
teral) investment treaties providing for dispute settlement by ICSID arbitral tribu-
nals, has been decisive, as has been (ii) the solid increase in foreign investment. But 
these 'structural' reasons alone cannot explain the flood of new cases submitted to 
ICSID arbitration. As anyone looking at the list of pending ICSID cases will quickly 
realise, one particular State's economic policy has been equally influential: Argen-
tina's response to the economic crisis of 2000-2002 is responsible for more than 1/3 
of the proceedings currently pending, and without it, the increase in the number of 
ICSID proceedings (while still impressive) would be less astounding. In addition, 
though this is not always fully appreciated, ICSID arbitral tribunals themselves have 
played an important part. When called upon to interpret and apply key concepts of 
investment protection, they have generally adopted rather expansive approaches. 
Recent ICSID jurisprudence has notably widened the notion of 'investment' and has 
adopted an broad analysis of core substantive standards of investment protection 
(e.g. expropriation or fair and equitable treatment). In addition, arbitral tribunals 
have relied on umbrella clauses found in many bilateral investment treaties to widen 
the circle of potential claimants, and have also embraced claims by minority share-
holders. This in turn has greatly expanded the scope of ICSID arbitration, both ra-
tione personae and ratione materiae – not always to the liking of States, and at times 
provoking harsh responses by governments suffering defeats before ICSID arbitral 
tribunals.  
At the same time, the developments sketched out in the preceding paragraphs 
have changed the character of investment arbitration: ICSID arbitration is no longer 
seen as the prerogative of a handful of specialists, but faces new challenges. Among 
them is what might be called the challenge of legitimacy, fuelling demands for a 
more transparent process of dispute settlement and a move away from traditional 
and confidential proceedings behind closed doors, especially in proceedings invol-
ving questions of environmental protection or labour standards. To exemplify the 
perception of investment arbitration as illegitimate, it may be helpful simply to cite 
Anthony DePalma's oft-quoted remark about the working of investment tribunals: 
"Their meetings are secret. Their members are generally unknown. The decisions 
they reach need not be fully disclosed. Yet the way a group of international tribunals 
handles disputes between investors and foreign governments can lead to national 
laws being revoked and environmental regulations changed. And it is all in the name 
of protecting foreign investors under NAFTA."5  
 
5  DePalma, 'NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too 
Far, Critics Say', in: New York Times, 11 March 2001, Section 3, p. 1. 
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But legitimacy is not the only challenge facing investment arbitration. Another 
challenge is that of (in)consistency: a mechanism relying on ad hoc tribunals runs a 
considerable risk of producing inconsistent awards. Even in the 1970s or 1980s, 
when few cases were submitted, that risk of course could never be completely 
avoided; however, with proceedings mushrooming, it seems more acute than ever 
and can no longer be neglected. In fact, ICSID tribunals have openly criticised pre-
vious awards, and some of the decisions involving similar or identical questions of 
law and fact seem to hard to square. This in turn endangers the reliability and pre-
dictability of ICSID dispute settlement, i.e. reasons for which the mechanism has 
been established in the first place.  
Finally, ICSID faces a challenge of coordination: paraphrasing a famous dictum 
about WTO law, one might say that investment law "cannot be read in clinical isola-
tion”,6 or that in any event, that its days of splendid isolationism are over. ICSID 
tribunals regularly apply the rules of State responsibility, cite decisions of other 
international courts and tribunals, and interpret treaties according to the general rules 
of treaty interpretation. Conversely, ICSID jurisprudence contributes (and is increas-
ingly recognised as a contributing element) to the development of international law 
generally. What is more, ICSID dispute settlement does not exist in isolation either. 
Given the continued debate about the role of investment within the WTO frame-
work, ICSID might turn out to be an attractive forum for the litigation of some viola-
tions of WTO law. At the same time, bearing in mind the close connection between 
investment protection and property rights, investors that fail to establish standing 
before ICSID tribunals might eventually be tempted to seek relief before human 
rights institutions. 
The papers put together in the present volume do not purport to analyse these de-
velopments exhaustively. Yet they address some of the more important controver-
sies facing the ICSID Convention's dispute settlement mechanism as it enters its 
fifth decade. They have grown out of a conference convened by the Wilhelm Merton 
Center at the University of Frankfurt, on 25-27 April 2006, which brought together 
academics and practitioners with an interest in investment arbitration.  
As the conference, the book opens with "The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID 
System" by Christoph Schreuer. This paper, which was the keynote speech of the 
conference, provides a general assessment of modern developments in investment 
law (fittingly, given the number of Argentine cases, following the moves of a tango). 
Situating the ICSID Convention in the broader historical context, Schreuer stresses 
the many advantages of investment arbitration, which provides for conditions con-
ducive to foreign investment, while also helping to defuse political tensions between 
developing and industrialised countries. However he also underlines that, faced with 
concerns by host States, ICSID must remind some of its clients of these benefits, and 
must avoid to be perceived as a one-sided mechanism favouring investors. 
 
6 Cf. the WTO Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline (WT/DS2/AB/R), p. 17. 
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Schreuer's introduction is followed by three papers exploring reasons of ICSID's 
recent popularity. Stephan Schill's paper (with comments by Kaj Hober and Jo De-
laney) provides a detailed analysis of the fair and equitable treatment standard. Al-
though found in a great number of bi- and multilateral investment treaties, that stan-
dard has been unduly neglected in the literature. Schill identifies its core elements 
and shows that it emerges as one of the key concepts in international investment 
law.  
Next in line is Richard Happ (with comments by Michael Kerling and Anthony 
Sinclair) who addresses two concepts that traditionally were considered to restrict 
the competence of ICSID tribunals, namely the 'foreign nationality' requirement and 
the 'exhaustion of local remedies' clause. Assessing recent ICSID jurisprudence, 
Happ notably shows that arbitral tribunals have yet to find a consistent and convin-
cing approach to claims by companies controlled by nationals of the host State (as in 
the case of Tokios Tokeles7), or to claims by companies that are mere shells.  
Alexander Szodruch then deals with a more specific problem, but one of immense 
practical and conceptual interest: that is the problem raised by the insolvency of a 
host State. In his paper (commented on by Peter Gnam and August Reinisch), he 
analyses the legal standards applicable to Argentina's pesification measures and, 
inter alia, clarifies how arbitral tribunals have rejected Argentina's defence based on 
the concept of 'necessity'. Beyond that, he shows how the present debate forces us to 
abandon cherished distinctions between the law of international investment and the 
international finance, and inquires how State insolvency could change (and could be 
changed by) investment law.  
The final three chapters then take up the different challenges to ICSID dispute 
settlement alluded to above. Carl Zöllner's paper (with comments by Karl-Heinz 
Böckstiegel and Noah Rubins), analyses what has been called the challenge of le-
gitimacy, and in so doing offers a first analysis of the recent ICSID institutional 
reform debate. Zöllner argues that transparency and broader public participation are 
vital in ensuring the acceptance and democratic legitimacy of investment arbitration 
and could also foster coherence in international investment law. This approach also 
leads him to welcome recent ICSID decisions admitting amicus curiae briefs8 and 
the results of the recent reform of the ICSID Arbitration Rules.  
Christian J. Tams (with comments by Richard H. Kreindler and Asif H. Qureshi) 
then inquires whether "There [Is] a Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure?", thus 
assessing whether faced with a challenge of (in)consistency, investment arbitration 
 
7  Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine (Case No. ARB/02/18), Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 
(Weil (presiding), Bernardini, Price).  
8  Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi 
Universal, S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to 
a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005); Aguas Provin-
ciales de Santa Fe S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas 
Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 
Order in Response to a Petition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (17 March 2006). 
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should move towards a two-level system of dispute settlement. He suggests that at 
present, there are no compelling reasons to move towards an investment appellate 
structure. Instead, the risk of inconsistency could be reduced by consolidating cases 
or ICJ proceedings, or (if a reform should prove unavoidable) through the introduc-
tion of a reference procedure along the lines of Art. 234 TEC.  
Finally, Christina Pfaff's paper (with comments by Rudolf Dolzer and Sabine 
Konrad) leaves the framework of ICSID arbitration proper. Taking up the challenge 
of coordination, it discusses the role (if any) that human rights institutions and also 
the WTO may play in the process of investment protection. While noting that there 
is a potential for overlap, Pfaff stresses the advantages of ICSID arbitration and 
argues that human rights institutions or the WTO are unable to safeguard foreign 
investment effectively.  
Taken together, the seven papers and twelve comments provide a broad spectre of 
views on the current state of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention.    
Readers expecting one single grand theory explaining the successes and failures of 
forty years of ICSID dispute settlement will look in vain. Yet the contributions to 
the present volume underline reasons for ICSID remarkable success and highlight 
future challenges. It is the editors' hope that in addition, at least implicitly, they will 
convince readers that investment arbitration is rightly regarded as one of the most 
fascinating areas of modern international law. 
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The Dynamic Evolution of the ICSID System    
                  
Christoph Schreuer∗ 
A. Investment and Development 
There is broad consensus, that private investment is the most important factor in 
economic development. This has led most developing countries to revise their previ-
ously reserved attitudes towards FDI and to adopt an open and welcoming attitude 
towards foreign investors.1 
Much of the investment climate in a country will consist of economic and politi-
cal factors such as market access, the availability and cost of production factors, 
taxation, the existence of infrastructures, the existence of a functioning public ad-
ministration, the level of corruption and political stability. 
In addition to economic and political factors, the legal framework for FDI is also 
important in determining its investment climate. A particularly important aspect of 
the legal protection of foreign investments is the settlement of disputes between host 
States and foreign investors. Impartial and effective dispute settlement is an essential 
element in the protection of investments. 
B. Protecting Foreign Investments - Procedural Alternatives 
In the absence of other arrangements, a dispute between a host State and a foreign 
investor will normally be settled by the domestic courts of the host State. From the 
investor’s perspective, this type of dispute settlement carries important disadvan-
tages. Rightly or wrongly, the courts of the host State are often not seen as suffi-
ciently impartial in this type of situation. In addition, domestic courts are bound to 
apply domestic law even if that law should fail to protect the investor’s rights under 
international law. In addition, the regular courts will often lack the technical exper-
tise required to resolve complex international investment disputes. 
Domestic courts of other States are usually not a realistic alternative. In most ca-
ses, they will lack territorial jurisdiction over investment operations taking place in 
another country. In addition, sovereign immunity and other judicial doctrines will 
usually make such proceedings impossible. 
 
∗  Christoph Schreuer is Professor of International Law at the University of Vienna, Austria.  
1  See World Investment Report 2003, FDI Policies for Development: National and International 
Perspectives, UNCTAD (2003). 
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Diplomatic protection was a frequently used method to settle investment disputes. 
It requires the espousal of the investor’s claim by his home State and the pursuit of 
this claim against the host State. This may be done through negotiations or through 
litigation between the two States before an international court or arbitral tribunal. 
But diplomatic protection has several disadvantages. The investor must have ex-
hausted all local remedies in the host country. Moreover, diplomatic protection is 
discretionary and the investor has no right to it. Also, diplomatic protection is un-
popular with States against which it is exercised and may lead to tensions in the 
relations of the States concerned.  
Today, direct arbitration between the host State and the foreign investor is the 
preferred option for the settlement of investment disputes. International arbitration 
provides an attractive alternative to the settlement of investment disputes by national 
courts or through diplomatic protection. Arbitration is usually less costly and more 
efficient than litigation through regular courts. It offers the parties the opportunity to 
select arbitrators who enjoy their confidence and who have the necessary expertise 
in the field. Moreover, the private nature of arbitration, assuring the confidentiality 
of proceedings, is often valued by parties to major economic development projects. 
If arbitration is not supported by a particular arbitration institution, it is referred to 
as ad hoc arbitration. Ad hoc arbitration requires an arbitration agreement that regu-
lates a number of issues. These include the selection of arbitrators, the applicable 
law and a large number of procedural questions. A number of institutions, like   
UNCITRAL, have developed standard rules that may be incorporated into the par-
ties’ agreement. But Ad hoc arbitration is subject to the rules of the arbitration law of 
the country in which the tribunal has its seat. The enforcement of awards rendered 
by such tribunals is subject to the same rules as awards by tribunals dealing with 
commercial cases. 
C. Tango: Two Steps Forward - One Step Back 
I. Step One: The ICSID Convention 
In this situation, the ICSID Convention2 was a major step forward. It is designed to 
close an important procedural gap. It was drafted in the 1960ies and entered into 
force in 1966. It currently has 143 Parties.  
 
2  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 575 UNTS 159 (1966); 4 ILM 532 (1965). 
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1. Purpose and Advantages 
The idea of the ICSID Convention is to stimulate investment and hence economic 
development3 by improving the standard of protection for foreign investments and 
the overall investment climate. 
Compared to ad hoc arbitration, the ICSID Convention offers considerable advan-
tages: it offers a system for dispute settlement that contains not only standard 
clauses for submission and rules of procedure but also institutional support for the 
conduct of proceedings. It assures the non-frustration of proceedings and provides 
for an award’s recognition and enforcement. 
2. Jurisdiction 
The ICSID Convention is specialized in the settlement of investment disputes. 
Therefore, the existence of a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment is a 
prerequisite for ICSID’s jurisdiction.4 The concept of an investment is not defined in 
the Convention but many BITs and multilateral treaties contain definitions of in-
vestment. 
In actual practice, the concept of “investment” has been given a wide meaning. A 
variety of activities in a large number of economic fields have been accepted as 
investments. In addition to traditional typical investment activities, these include 
pure financial instruments like the purchase of government bonds and the extension 
of loans.5 They also include civil engineering contracts like the construction of a 
highway6 and certain other services.7 Decisive criteria are a certain duration of the 
relevant activities, an element of profit, the presence of a certain economic risk, a 
substantial commitment as well as the relevance of the project for the host State’s 
development. 
Proceedings under the Convention are always mixed. One party (the host State) 
must be a State party to the Convention. The other party (the investor) must be a 
national of another Contracting State. Either party may initiate the proceedings but 
in actual practice it is nearly always the investor who is the claimant.  
 
 
3  ICSID Convention, Preamble, para. 1. 
4  ICSID Convention, Article 25(1). 
5  Fedax v. Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 July 1997, 5 ICSID Reports 186; Českoslo-
venská Obchodní Banka A.S. v. Slovakia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 24 May 1999, 5 ICSID Re-
ports 335; CDC v. Seychelles, Award, 17 December 2003. 
6  Salini Costruttori v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 June 2001, 42 ILM 609 (2003); 
Bayindir v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 November 2005.  
7  SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406; SGS v. Phi-
lippines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518. 
 18 
An additional requirement is that the investor must not be a national of the host 
State. But if a foreign investor operates through a company that is registered in the 
host State, it is possible for the investor and the host State to agree that the company 
will be treated as a foreign investor because of foreign control.8 The nationality 
requirements under the ICSID Convention as well as under bilateral treaties have led 
to some creative nationality planning. For instance, an investor may create a com-
pany in a particular State for the primary purpose of gaining access to international 
arbitration. 
Access to investment arbitration, including ICSID arbitration, requires consent to 
jurisdiction by both parties. Participation in the ICSID Convention does not amount 
to consent to jurisdiction.9 This consent may be given in several ways. Consent may 
be contained in a direct agreement between the investor and the host State such as a 
concession contract. Alternatively, the basis for consent can be a standing offer by 
the host State which may be accepted by the investor in appropriate form. Such a 
standing offer may be contained in the host State’s legislation. A standing offer may 
also be contained in a treaty to which the host State and the investor’s State of na-
tionality are parties. Most BITs and some regional treaties dealing with investments 
contain such offers. The more recent cases that have come before ICSID show a 
trend away from consent through direct agreement between the parties towards con-
sent through a general offer by the host State which is later accepted by the investor 
often simply through instituting proceedings.  
3. Characteristics 
Proceedings under the ICSID Convention are self-contained. This means that they 
are independent of the intervention of any outside bodies. In particular, domestic 
courts have no power to stay, to compel or to otherwise influence ICSID procee-
dings.10 Domestic courts would have the power to order provisional measures only 
in the unlikely case that the parties agree thereto.11 An annulment or other form of 
review of an ICSID award by a domestic court is impermissible. 
The principle of non-frustration means that a case will proceed even if one party 
fails to cooperate. This circumstance alone will be a strong incentive to cooperate. 
ICSID proceedings are not threatened by the non-cooperation of a party. If one of 
the parties should fail to act, the proceedings will not be stalled. The Convention 
provides a watertight system against the frustration of proceedings by a recalcitrant 
party. E.g.: arbitrators not appointed by the parties will be appointed by the Centre12; 
 
8  Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention.  
9  ICSID Convention, Preamble, para. 7. 
10  Article 26 of the Convention. 
11  ICSID Arbitration Rules Article 39(6). 
12  Article 38 of the Convention. 
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the decision on whether there is jurisdiction in a particular case is with the tribunal13; 
non-submission of memorials or non-appearance at hearings by a party will not stall 
the proceedings14; non-cooperation by a party will not affect the award’s binding 
force and enforceability. 
The system of arbitration is highly effective. This effectiveness is the result of se-
veral factors: Submission to ICSID’s Jurisdiction is voluntary but once it has been 
given it may not be withdrawn unilaterally.15 
Awards are binding and final and not subject to review except under the narrow 
conditions provided by the Convention itself.16 Non-compliance with an award by a 
State would be a breach of the Convention and would lead to a revival of the right to 
diplomatic protection by the investor’s State of nationality.17 
The Convention provides an effective system of enforcement. Awards are recog-
nized as final in all States parties to the Convention. The pecuniary obligations  
arising from awards are to be enforced like final judgements of the local courts in all 
States parties to the Convention.18 Domestic courts have no power to review ICSID 
awards in the course of their enforcement. However, in the case of an award against 
a State the normal rules on immunity from execution will apply.19 In actual practice 
this will usually mean that execution is not possible against assets that serve the 
State’s public functions. 
The system of dispute settlement under the ICSID Convention is likely to have an 
effect even without its actual use. The mere availability of an effective remedy will 
influence the behaviour of parties to potential disputes. It is likely to have a restrain-
ing influence on investors as well as on host States. Both sides will try to avoid 
actions that might involve them in arbitration that they are likely to lose. In addition, 
the prospect of litigation will strengthen the parties’ willingness to settle a dispute 
amicably. 
4. Caseload 
ICSID had a slow start. The Convention entered into force in 1966 but the fist case 
was not registered before 1972. The 1970ies and 1980ies saw steady but only inter-
mittent action. One or two cases per year were typical for that period.  
The last ten years have seen a dramatic increase in activity.  In 1995 there were 
four ICSID arbitrations pending. Today (26 April 2006) more than 100 are pend-
 
13  Article 41 of the Convention. 
14  Article 45 of the Convention. 
15  Article 25(1) of the Convention. 
16  Article 53(1) of the Convention. 
17  Article 27(1) of the Convention. 
18  Article 54(1) of the Convention. 
19  Article 55 of the Convention. 
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ing.20 During 2005 27 new cases were registered. Therefore, more than two new 
cases per month are registered on average.  
II. Step Two: The BIT Regime 
1. Consent to Jurisdiction 
A second big step forward in investment arbitration was the discovery and use of 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as basis for jurisdiction in investment arbitration. 
BITs have existed for some time. But their number has increased enormously during 
the 1990ies. In addition, regional treaties such as NAFTA and ECT also offer juris-
diction. 
In the earlier cases of investor-State arbitration jurisdiction was always based on 
contracts between investors and host States. During the last 10 years most cases 
were brought on the basis of treaty provisions. 21 This has led to an enormous in-
crease in the number of cases. It has also changed the character of the cases.  
The vast majority of BITs contain clauses referring to investor-State arbitration. 
The States parties to the BIT offer consent to arbitration to investors who are nation-
nals of the other contracting party. 
The dispute settlement clauses in many BITs offer several possibilities. These 
may include the domestic courts of the host State, procedures agreed to by the par-
ties to the dispute, ICSID arbitration, ICC arbitration, and ad hoc arbitration often 
under the UNCITRAL rules. 
A provision on consent to arbitration in a BIT is merely an offer by the respective 
States that requires acceptance by the other party. The arbitration agreement is per-
fected through the acceptance of that offer by an eligible investor, i.e. a national of 
the other State party to the BIT. 
It is established practice that an investor may accept an offer of consent contained 
in a BIT by instituting ICSID proceedings. Therefore, where a BIT of this kind is in 
place, an investor no longer needs a formal arbitration agreement with the host State 
but can simply invoke the BIT. The Tribunal in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine said: 
“... it is firmly established that an investor can accept a State's offer of ICSID ar-
bitration contained in a bilateral investment treaty by instituting ICSID proceedings. 
There is nothing in the BIT to suggest that the investor must communicate its con-
sent in a different form directly to the State; ... It follows that the Claimant validly 
 
20  For detailed information on pending cases see: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending. 
htm. 
21  The first case in which consent was based on a BIT was AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 
1990, 4 ICSID Reports 250. 
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consented to ICSID arbitration by filing its Notice of Arbitration at the ICSID Cen-
tre.”22 
Treaty clauses providing for investor/State arbitration vary in scope. Some refer 
to all disputes concerning investments. Other treaties just refer to violations of the 
treaty itself. For instance, both the NAFTA23 and the ECT24 offer arbitration just for 
violations of the respective treaty itself. 
Some BITs offer consent to jurisdiction in narrow terms. For instance, most BITs 
of China only offer jurisdiction for disputes about the amount of compensation for 
expropriation owed to an investor. But in China's most recent BITs (notably with 
Germany) jurisdiction extends to any dispute with respect to investment.  
2. Umbrella Clauses 
The scope of consent offered in a BIT may also be affected by an umbrella clause 
contained in the treaty. An umbrella clause is a provision in a treaty under which the 
States parties undertake to observe any obligations they may have entered into with 
respect to investments. In other words, contractual obligations are put under the 
treaty’s protective umbrella. After some initial hesitation, most tribunals have now 
accepted that under the regime of an umbrella clause, violations of the contract be-
come treaty violations.25 Therefore, a provision in a BIT offering consent to arbitra-
tion for violations of the BIT extends to contract violations covered by the umbrella 
clause. 
3. MFN Clauses 
Most BITs and some other treaties for the protection of investment26 contain most 
favoured nation or MFN clauses. A MFN clause contained in a treaty will extend the 
better treatment granted to a third State or its nationals to a beneficiary of the treaty. 
This has led to the question of whether the effect of MFN clauses is restricted to 
substantive standards or extends to the provisions on dispute settlement in these 
treaties. Put differently, is it possible to avoid the limitations attached to consent to 
arbitration in a treaty by relying on an MFN clause in the treaty if the respondent 
 
22  Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, paras. 12.2, 12.3. 
23  Article 1116 NAFTA. 
24  Article 26(1) ECT. 
25  SGS  v. Philipines, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518; Eureko v. 
Poland, Partial Award, 19 August 2005; Noble Ventures v. Romania, Award, 12 October 2005; 
MTD v. Chile, Award, 25 May 2004. But see: SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 
August 2003, 8 ICSID Reports 406; El Paso Energy Intl. Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Juris-
diction, 27 April 2006. 
26  See Article 1103 NAFTA. 
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State has entered into a treaty with a third State that contains a consent clause with-
out the limitation? For instance, would a national of a country that has an old style 
BIT with China, providing for jurisdiction only for the amount of compensa-tion, be 
able to invoke an MFN clause to benefit from China's new BIT with Germany with 
its broad jurisdictional clause? Or even more radically, if the treaty con-taining the 
MFN clause does not offer consent to arbitration, is it possible to rely on consent to 
arbitration in a treaty of the respondent State with a third party?  
Tribunals have used MFN clauses in a number of cases to overcome procedural 
obstacles where consent to jurisdiction had been given in the basic treaty.27 But the 
issue whether an MFN clause can be used to establish jurisdiction which does not 
otherwise exist is an open question. I would tend to agree with Emmanuel Gail-
lard28: why not? 
4. Shareholder Protection 
Another area where big strides have been made is shareholder protection.29 Invest-
ments often take place through the acquisition of shares in a company that has a 
nationality different from that of the investor. 
The classical position was represented by Barcelona Traction30: only corporate 
rights would be protected and the corporation had to have the right nationality. Un-
der this doctrine, a company established under the law of the host State would be 
disqualified, in principle, because it did not have the status of a foreign investor. A 
company established under the law of another State would be disqualified if that 
State did not have a BIT or another suitable treaty with the host State or because the 
company's home State was not a party to the ICSID Convention. 
The issue is particularly acute where investments are made through companies in-
corporated in the host State. Many States require a locally incorporated company as 
a precondition for the investment. The local company would not as such qualify as a 
foreign investor and would hence be excluded from resorting to international arbitra-
 
27  Maffezini v. Spain, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 396; Siemens 
v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 44 ILM 138 (2005); Gas Natural v. Ar-
gentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 June 2005. But see: Salini v. Jordan, Decision on Juris-
diction, 29 November 2004; Plama v. Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005. 
28  Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored Nation Clause, New York Law 
Journal, June 2, 2005 p. 3. 
29  See especially Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdic-
tion of ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as “Investors” and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis, 4 The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 19 (2005); Schreuer, Shareholder Pro-
tection in International Investment Law, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 2, Issue N°. 
03, June 2005. 
30  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), Judgement, 5 Febru-
ary 1970, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 4. 
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tion. This would have deprived a large proportion of foreign investment of interna-
tional protection.  
Contemporary treaty law offers a solution that gives independent standing to 
shareholders: most BITs include participation in a company in their definition of 
investment. In this way, the participation in the locally incorporated company be-
comes the investment. Even though the local company is unable to pursue the claim 
internationally, the foreign shareholder in the local company may pursue the claim 
in his own name. Put differently, the local company is not endowed with investor 
status but the participation therein, is seen as the investment. The shareholder may 
then pursue claims for adverse action by the host State against the local company 
that affects its value and profitability. Arbitral practice on this point is extensive and 
uniform.31 
This is not a roundabout way of introducing a control theory to the nationality of 
corporations. Minority shareholders too have been accepted as claimants and have 
been granted protection under the respective treaties.32 This practice has also been 
extended to indirect shareholding through an intermediate company.33 The same 
technique has been employed where the affected company was incorporated not in 
the host State but in a third State.34  
This shareholder protection extends not only to ownership in the shares but also 
to the assets of the company. Adverse action by the host State in violation of treaty 
 
31  See e.g.: Antoine Goetz et consorts c. République du Burundi, Decision of 2 September 1998, 6 
ICSID Reports 3; Emilio Augustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion, 25 January 2000, 5 ICSID Reports 396; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Com-
pagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), Decision on Annulment, 3 
July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340; Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 
8 December 2003, 43 ILM 259 (2004); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2004; Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005; AMT v. Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 ILM 1531 (1997), 
 5 ICSID Reports 11; Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. The Republic 
of Estonia, Award, 25 June 2001, 6 ICSID Reports 241; CME Czech Republic B. V. (The Ne-
therlands) v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 13 September 2001; Camuzzi v. Argentina, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, 11 May 2005. 
32  See e.g.: AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, 4 ICSID Reports 246; LANCO v. Argen-
tina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, 5 ICSID Reports 367; Compañía de Aguas 
del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argentine Republic (the Vivendi case), 
Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340; CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. Republic of Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, 42 ILM 788 (2003); Cham-
pion Trading Co. and Ameritrade International Inc. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 21 October 2003; GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, 15 November 2004; 
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 30 April 2004. 
33  See e.g.: Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004, 44 
ILM  138  (2005); Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004. 
34  Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001, 9 ICSID Reports 66; 
Waste Management INC. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004, 43 ILM 967 
(2004). 
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guarantees affecting the company's economic position gives rise to rights by the 
shareholders.35 
This generous extension of procedural rights to shareholders is likely to lead to 
some interesting situations. Practical problems may arise where claims are pursued 
in parallel, especially by different shareholders. In addition, the affected company 
itself may pursue certain remedies while a group of its shareholders may pursue 
different ones. The situation becomes even more complex where indirect sharehol-
ding through intermediaries is combined with minority shareholding. In such a case 
shareholders and companies at different levels may pursue conflicting or competing 
litigation strategies that may be difficult to reconcile and coordinate.  
III. Step Three: Backing Off? 
Developments have not all been in favour of investors. The enthusiasm for investor 
protection has been dampened by the sometimes painful experience of States in 
losing cases. The pain is particularly acute if the damages awarded are high or if 
there are multiple cases against the State in question. For some countries the mere 
fact of being sued is already a cause of alarm and a reason to think about ways to 
limit the access of investors to international arbitration.  
Signs of retreat from investment arbitration have manifested themselves in a 
number of ways. Here are a few examples. 
1. The Revival of Domestic Remedies 
One is the revival of domestic remedies.36 International investment arbitration dis-
penses with the traditional requirement to exhaust local remedies, at least in prin-
ciple. Article 26 of the ICSID Convention specifically does away with this tradi-
tional requirement “unless otherwise stated”. Arbitral practice confirms that the 
exhaustion of local remedies is not required in contemporary investment arbitra-
tion.37 
But States have attempted to counteract international arbitration by inserting fo-
rum selection clauses in investment contracts. Under these clauses disputes arising 
in the context of the contract are to be taken to national courts or tribunals. When the 
investors instituted international arbitration on the basis of a BIT, the host States 
 
35  GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, 15 November 2004. 
36  Generally see Schreuer, Calvo’s Grandchildren : The Return of Local Remedies in Investment 
Arbitration, 4 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 1-17 (2005). 
37  Lanco v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 1998, para. 39, 40 ILM 457, 469/70 
(2001); Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, paras. 13.1–13.6; Yaung 
Chi Oo v. Myanmar, Award, 31 March 2003, para. 40, 42 ILM 540, 547/48 (2003); Loewen v. 
United States, Award, 26 June 2003, paras. 142 et seq., 42 ILM 811 (2003). 
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would object contending that the contractual forum selection clause, pointing to 
domestic litigation, constituted a waiver of international arbitration. 
Tribunals have reacted by adopting the distinction between treaty claims and con-
tract claims. They have held consistently that the contractual clauses pointing to 
domestic courts did not deprive them of their jurisdiction to hear claims for viola-
tions of international law, especially BIT claims.38  
The distinction between contract claims and treaty claims has become a standard 
feature of recent investment arbitrations. The Respondent's objection, that the case 
only involves contract claims and the Claimant's insistence that treaty rights are 
involved, are routine features of many recent cases. As it turned out, the distinction 
between treaty claims and contract claims is not always easy. A particular course of 
action by the host State may well constitute a breach of contract and a violation of 
international law. The two categories are not mutually exclusive. Rather, two dif-
ferent standards have to be applied to determine whether one or the other or both 
have been violated. The ad hoc Committee in Vivendi39said: 
“... whether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether there has been a 
breach of contract are different questions. Each of these claims will be determined 
by reference to its own proper or applicable law – in the case of the BIT, by interna-
tional law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by the proper law of the contract 
...”
40
 
The situation is made even more complex by the fact that some treaties offer ju-
risdiction for any investment dispute, which probably includes contract claims. Also 
umbrella clauses will convert contract breaches into treaty breaches.41  
The problem with the separate treatment of contract claims and treaty claims is 
less a theoretical than a practical one. It leads to situations where the claimant is 
 
38  See e.g. Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux v. Argen-
tine Republic, Award, 21 November 2000, 16 ICSID Review – FILJ 643 (2001); 5 ICSID Re-
ports 296; 40 ILM 426 (2001); Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S. A. & Vivendi Universal 
(formerly Compagnie Générale des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, 3 
July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports  340, 41 ILM 1135 (2002); Salini Costruttori SpA et Italstrade 
SpA c/ Royaume du Maroc, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001, Journal de Droit Interna-
tional 196 (2002), 6 ICSID Reports 400, 42 ILM 609 (2003); CMS v. Argentina, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 17 July 2003, 42 ILM 788 (2003); SGS v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 
August 2003, 42 ILM 1289 (2003); Azurix v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 December 
2003; Enron v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004; SGS v. Philippines, De-
cision on Jurisdiction, 29 January 2004, 8 ICSID Reports 518; Siemens v. Argentina, Decision 
on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004. For a broader discussion see Schreuer, Investment Treaty Ar-
bitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims - the Vivendi I Case Considered, in Weiler, ed., 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilat-
eral Treaties and Customary International Law 281-323 (2005). 
39  Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S. A. & Vivendi Universal (formerly Compagnie Générale 
des Eaux) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Annulment, 3 July 2002, 6 ICSID Reports 340, 
41 ILM 1135 (2002). 
40  At para. 96. 
41  See above at Fn 25. 
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compelled to pursue part of its claim through national and another part through in-
ternational procedures. This has undesirable results. The need to dissect cases into 
contract claims and treaty claims to be dealt with by separate fora requires claim 
splitting and has the potential of leading to parallel proceedings. This is unecono-
mical and contrary to the goal of reaching final and comprehensive resolutions of 
disputes.  
Even worse, the separation of types of claims arising from the same set of facts 
can lead to a situation where a host State, threatened by a treaty claim before an 
international tribunal, will start domestic proceedings before a local court or domes-
tic tribunal which it can control in order to counteract and frustrate the international 
proceedings. In this way, the host State can exert pressure on the investor to settle or 
withdraw the treaty claim. Alternatively, the host State can use the domestic pro-
ceedings to recoup the money awarded in the international award through an action 
for breach of contract against the investor. Put differently, allowing the host State to 
pursue contract claims from the same dispute in its own domestic forum can under-
mine the procedural protection granted to the foreign investor in the BIT. 
In some cases tribunals have reintroduced domestic remedies in a different way. 
They have at times indicated that a violation of a treaty standard occurs only once 
some redress has been sought and denied through proceedings in domestic courts. 
For instance, a tribunal found that a de facto expropriation could not be assumed in 
the absence of a reasonable effort to obtain correction in the domestic courts.42  
Similarly, another tribunal found that the availability of local remedies was rele-
vant to whether the host State had violated the treaty standard of fair and equitable 
treatment.43 It is not difficult to see that the rationale in these cases can be developed 
into something that reintroduces the local remedies rule through the back door.  
2. Restricting Substantive Standards 
In another attempt to stem the tide of investment claims States have attempted to 
limit the meaning of the substantive standards granted to investors.  
One such attempt concerns the standard of fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
which is contained in most treaties. This standard has created a considerable amount 
of case law and is nowadays invoked in almost every case. Its somewhat open ended 
and flexible nature, has led to attempts to restrict its meaning.  
Article 1105(1) of the NAFTA providing for FET has been the subject of an offi-
cial interpretation by the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC), a body composed 
of representatives of the three States Parties with the power to adopt binding inter-
 
42  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award, 16 September 2003, para. 20.30. See also Lauder 
v. Czech Republic, Award, 3 September 2001, para. 204, 9 ICSID Reports 66. 
43  Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 April 2004, para. 116. 
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pretations.44 The FTC interpretation of July 2001 states that Article 1105(1) reflects 
the customary international law minimum standard and does not require treatment 
beyond what is required by customary international law.45 NAFTA tribunals have 
accepted the FTC interpretation.46 
The recent BITs of the US and Canada incorporate this approach by stating that 
FET does not require treatment beyond what is required by customary IL.47  
Tribunals not operating under such restrictive interpretations have not adopted a 
dogmatic position on whether the fair and equitable treatment standard contained in 
BITs is an autonomous standard or merely reflects customary international law.48 
Rather, they have interpreted the relevant provisions in BITs autonomously as a 
matter of treaty interpretation.49  
Professor Dolzer has pointed out that the attempt to contain the meaning of FET 
by equating it with customary IL may have exactly the opposite effect. The specific 
meaning that tribunals have given to fair and equitable treatment may be projected 
into customary international law. The consequence is that investors may in the fu-
ture invoke the detailed case law on fair and equitable treatment as part of customary 
international law even in situations that are not subject to a treaty provision contain-
ing that standard. 
Another area where there have been recent attempts to dampen the enthusiasm of 
investors to bring claims against host States has been expropriation. There is a lively 
debate surrounding the State's right to regulate in the public interest. Of course it is 
not per se unreasonable for States to insist on their right to regulate. On the other 
hand, investors predictably insist on the protection of their assets even if the State 
purports to act in the public interest. 
 
44  Article 1131 (2) NAFTA. 
45  FTC Note of Interpretation of 31 July 2001. 
46  See e.g.: Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, 11 October 2002, 6 
ICSID Reports 192, paras. 100 et seq.; United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, 
Award, 22 November 2002, 7 ICSID Reports 288, para. 97; ADF Group, Inc. v. United States 
of America, Award, 9 January 2003, 6 ICSID Reports 470, paras. 175–178; Loewen Group, 
Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Award, 26 June 2003, 7 ICSID Re-
ports 442, paras. 124–128; Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, Award, 30 
April 2004, paras. 90–91. See also United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., Judgment, Su-
preme Court of British Columbia, 2 May 2001, 5 ICSID Reports 236, paras. 61–65. 
47  US Model BIT 2004, Article 5(1)(2). 
48  See CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Award, 12 May 2005 at paras. 282-284 
where the Tribunal found that the question whether the standard of fair and equitable treatment 
was identical with customary international law was not relevant in the case before it since “the 
required stability and predictability of the business environment, founded on solemn legal and 
contractual commitments, is not different from the international law minimum standard and its 
evolution under customary law.” At para. 284. 
49  See e.g. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v. The United Mexican States, Award, 29 
May 2003, 43 ILM 133 (2004), paras. 155 and 156; MTD v. Republic of Chile, Award, 25 May 
2004, paras. 110–112; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Award, 1 July 
2004, paras 188–190. 
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Under classical IL and most treaty provisions dealing with expropriation, the    
existence of a public purpose is a requirement for the legality of an expropriation 
together with non-discrimination and appropriate compensation. It would seem to 
follow that a legitimate public purpose cannot be the basis of an argument that no 
expropriation has occurred. Rather, the existence of a public purpose is a require-
ment for the expropriation's legality in addition to compensation. 
Recent treaties, especially of the United States state that except in rare circum-
stances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and ap-
plied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety 
and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.50 
Judge Schwebel has referred to these Developments as a "Regressive Develop-
ment of International Law"51.  Indeed there is a danger that immunizing interfe-
rences with investments on account of their public purpose may seriously undermine 
the protection against indirect expropriations as we know it. 
These ideas have already borne fruit in arbitral practice. In Methanex v US52 the 
Tribunal said quite bluntly that a measure that is taken for a public purpose, is non-
discriminatory and is accomplished with due process is not an expropriation but a 
lawful regulation and hence does not require compensation.53 This position was 
subsequently repeated and expanded in Saluka v. Czech Republic.54 
There are two kinds of problems with that approach. One is a question of logic. 
The other is a matter of policy. As a matter of logic, if a lawful expropriation re-
quires a public purpose and full compensation it seems difficult to say that a legiti-
mate public purpose means there is no expropriation but just regulation and there-
fore no compensation  needs to be paid. 
The policy issue is perhaps more serious. Once it is accepted that regulatory ac-
tion for a public purpose by definition is not an expropriation, one is on a very slip-
pery slope. It will not be difficult to find a legitimate public purpose for most meas-
ures affecting foreign investors. It would then be for the investor to bear the eco-
nomic consequences of such measures even if they radically affect the investment. 
Taken to its logical conclusion this could well spell the end of protection of foreign-
owned property as we know it.  
 
50  US Model BIT 2004, Annex B, Para. 4 (b).  
51  Schwebel, The United States 2004 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: An Exercise in the 
Regressive Development of International Law, Transnational Dispute Management, Vol. 3, N° 
2, April 2006. 
52  Methanex v. United States, Award, 3 August 2005. 
53  At Part IV, Chapter D, paras. 7, 14.  
54  Saluka v. The Czech Republic, Partial Award, 17 March 2006 at paras. 254, 255, 262, 276. 
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3. Tango Argentino: Some Radical Proposals 
Among the States that are unhappy about investment arbitration, Argentina is surely 
the unhappiest. It has several dozen cases pending against it and there are a number 
of adverse decisions already although most of these concern jurisdictional ques-tions 
and are hence preliminary. The aggregate amount in dispute under these cases is 
staggering and goes into the billions.  
Argentina, is considering drastic action. There are a number of proposed bills that 
foresee:  
• denouncing all BITs that foresee international investment arbitration,  
• establishing that claims against Argentina may only be brought to Argentinean 
courts, 
• declaring that international arbitral awards are unenforceable unless they have 
been reviewed by local courts. 
These proposals are obviously contrary to Argentina's treaty obligations under the 
ICSID Convention and under the applicable BITs. From a legal perspective such 
threats may not carry much weight and are easily dismissed. Nevertheless signs of 
States becoming weary with the system of investment arbitration should not be taken 
lightly. Other countries might follow suit and take joint action once they realize that 
they continue to be on the losing side of investment arbitrations. After all, it is the 
States that ultimately control the system. 
So is investor-State arbitration in danger? The answer is probably: not yet but we 
should not necessarily take it for granted. There may well be further curtailments or 
even calls to replace the current system by a State v. State system.  
D. Finale: It Takes Two to Tango          
The Complementary Interests of Investors and Host States 
It is appropriate to keep in mind and to remind States that investment arbitration is 
not a one-sided system that works all in favour of investors. Investment protection is 
also in the longer term interest of host States. It is no coincidence that the ICSID 
Convention was conceived in the framework of the World Bank and that the first 
sentence of its Preamble refers to the need for international cooperation for eco-
nomic development and the role of private international investment therein.  
Investment arbitration carries more than one advantage to host States. The more 
obvious advantage is a country's improved investment climate through the possibi-
lity of international arbitration. The possibility of going to arbitration is an important 
element of the legal security required for an investment decision. In other words, by 
offering arbitration the host State creates an important incentive to foreign invest-
ment. 
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The Tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia55 pointed out that: 
“...to protect investments is to protect the general interest of development and of 
developing countries.”56 
In addition, by consenting to ICSID arbitration the host State protects itself        
against other forms of foreign or international litigation. In particular, a major ad-
vantage of ICSID arbitration is that the host State effectively shields itself against 
diplomatic protection by the State of the investor’s nationality. 
Before investors received the right to pursue claims on their own behalf on the in-
ternational level, the standard practice was for their home States to act on their be-
half. This method carried political disadvantages for both States. It often created 
friction between the States concerned and cast a shadow over their relations. Not 
surprisingly, developing countries do not like being leaned upon by powerful indus-
trialised States.  In an investment dispute the limited inconvenience of having to 
defend a case before an international tribunal may be vastly preferable to the alterna-
tive of feeling the pressure of the United States, of Germany or of the European 
Commission. 
Like most successful human endeavours investment arbitration serves the inte-
rests of all concerned. It is important to make sure that the system keeps its proper 
balance but also that everyone concerned is aware of this mutual interest. 
 
 
55  Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction, 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 389. 
56  At para. 23. See also Award, 20 November 1984, 1 ICSID Reports 413, at para. 249. 
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“Fair and Equitable Treatment” as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law
                         
Stephan Schill∗ 
A. Introduction 
After forty years of ICSID arbitration it is not only time to take stock of past deve-
lopments in international investment arbitration.  Given above all the widespread 
criticism investor-state dispute settlement is facing in regard of its restrictive effect 
on host state law- and policy-making, it is also time to develop more conceptual 
frameworks with respect to the substantive law contained in international investment 
treaties.  Among other factors, the criticism seems to stem to a large extent from the 
considerable vagueness of many standard guarantees in international investment 
treaties1 and the perception that their interpretation by investment tribunals is unpre-
dictable and comprises the risk of inconsistent or even contradictory interpretation.2  
 
∗  Stephan Schill, LL.M. Scholar of the European Recovery Program/Studienstiftung des 
deutschen Volkes (2006/2007); Hauser Global Scholar (New York University School of Law, 
2005/2006); First and Second Legal State Exam (Bavaria, 2001, 2003); LL.M. in European 
and International Economic Law (Universität Augsburg, 2002); LL.M. International Legal 
Studies (New York University, 2006). I hereby gratefully acknowledge financial support for 
the preparation of this article by the Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes/European Recovery 
Program.  This article takes into account the jurisprudence of investment tribunals until the be-
ginning of July 2006.  
1  See Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11: The Challenge of Private Party Participation, 16 J. Int'l 
Arb. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that the “lack of clarity in Chapter 11 prevents the establishment of a 
secure and stable framework for investments”);  Ferguson, California’s MTBE Contaminated 
Water: An Illustration of the Need for an Environmental Interpretative Note on Article 1110 of 
NAFTA, 11 Colo. J. Int’l Envt’l L. & Pol’y 499, 503 (2000) (noting that the “vague language” 
of NAFTA allows for an “abuse” of investor-state dispute resolution);  Beauvais, Regulatory 
Expropriations Under NAFTA: Emerging Principles and Lingering Doubts, 10 N.Y.U. Envt’l 
L. J. 245, 257 et seq. (2001-2002);  Poirier, The NAFTA Chapter 11 Expropriation Debate 
Through the Eyes of a Property Theorist, 33 Environmental Law 851, 902 et seq. (2003);  
Been/Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the Mis-
guided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 125 
et seq. (2003) (all noting the vagueness of the expropriation standard under international law);  
Porterfield, An International Common Law of Investor Rights?, 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 79 
(2006) (arguing that fair and equitable treatment due to its vagueness cannot constitute a le-
gitimate norm of international law); Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment 
Treaties, Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of Investor-State Arbitration, 16 Fla. J. Int'l L. 
301, 350 (2004) (referring to “the vague and unbounded notions of fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security”).  
2  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1558 et seq. (2005).  
 32 
In this context, commentators frequently allude to a “legitimacy crisis” in invest-
ment arbitration.3   
While initially the protection of foreign investors against indirect expropriations 
has been the focus of much political and academic debate,4 more recently another 
key guarantee of international investment treaties is coming to the fore in the on-
going struggle over the appropriate scope of international investment protection: the 
standard of fair and equitable treatment.  Being attested to have “the potential to 
reach further into the traditional ‘domaine réservé’ of the host state than any one of 
the other rules of [investment] treaties”,5 fair and equitable treatment is emerging as 
one of the core concepts governing the relationship between foreign investors and 
host states in international investment law.  The standard appears prominently in 
almost all of the approximately 2400 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as 
regional and multilateral investment treaties, such as Art. 1105(1) of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Art. 10(1) of the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), prior to that figured in the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
Treaties the United States concluded with various countries and played a role in all 
multilateral projects relating to the protection of foreign investment.6   
Despite its textual presence in various international legal instruments over a pe-
riod of over 60 years, fair and equitable treatment has for a long time received sur-
prisingly little attention in academic literature and in the practice of international 
courts and tribunals.  Over the past five years, however, fair and equitable treatment 
has emerged as a central element on the grounds of which host states are increasing-
ly often ordered to pay damages to foreign investors in disputes before international 
 
3  Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, Nat’l L. J., Oct. 7, 2002; Afilalo, Towards a Common Law of 
International Investment: How NAFTA Chapter 11 Panels Should Solve Their Legitimacy Cri-
sis, 17 Geo. Int'l Envt’l L. Rev. 51 (2004); Franck (supra note 2), 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 
(2005).  
4  Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation: New Developments?, 11 N.Y.U. Envt’l L. J. 64 (2002-2003);  
Been/Beauvais (supra note 1), 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30 (2003);  Brunetti, Indirect Expropriation 
in International Law, 5 Int’l L. FORUM du droit int. 150 (2003);  Dolzer/Bloch, Indirect Ex-
propriation: Conceptual Realignments?, 5 Int’l L. FORUM du droit int. 155 (2003);  For-
tier/Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of International Investment: I know It When I 
See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID Rev. — Foreign Inv. L. J. 293 (2004);  Yannaca-Small, 
“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law, OECD  
 Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/4, available at http://www 
.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf (all websites visited last on July 11, 2006);  Kunoy, 
Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration, 6 J. 
World Inv. & Trade 467 (2005);  Newcombe, The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation, 20 
ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. L. J. 1 (2005).  
5  Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 37 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 953, 964 (2005).   
6  See on the history of the fair and equitable treatment standard Vasciannie, The Fair and Equi-
table Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice, 70 Brit. Yb. Int’l Law 
99 (1999);  Yannaca-Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment 
Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Number 2004/3, p. 3 et seq., avail-
able at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf.   
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arbitral tribunals.  Yet, the frequency with which it is invoked by foreign investors 
and applied as a basis for state responsibility by arbitral tribunals contrasts with an 
astonishingly fundamental lack of conceptual understanding about the principle’s 
normative content.  Given that fair and equitable treatment undoubtedly constitutes a 
legal standard, not an empowerment of arbitral tribunals to render decisions ex 
aequo et bono,7 the tribunals are faced with the task to enrich this admittedly vague 
standard with concrete normative content in order to apply it to the factual circum-
stances submitted to them.   
Although the language of the various investment treaties is not uniform, varying 
above all between a plain prescription of fair and equitable treatment and a combina-
tion of the standard with an explicit reference to international law or the customary 
international minimum standard,8 it is questionable whether substantial differences 
result from the different framing of the standard with a view to the actual practice of 
investment tribunals.  This has become apparent in particular in the NAFTA context 
where Art. 1105(1) has to be interpreted – pursuant to a binding interpretation by 
NAFTA’s Free Trade Commission under Art. 1131(2) – in accordance with custom-
ary international law.9  Two factors, in particular, level possible differences between 
treaty law and custom in this context.  First, some tribunals held that the inclusion of 
fair and equitable treatment in the vast web of international investment agreements 
has transformed the standard itself into customary international law.10  Secondly, 
even absent such an explicit transformation, other tribunals interpret the interna-
tional minimum standard as an evolutionary concept that has evolved since the days 
of traditional international law concerning the treatment of aliens.11  This evolution-
 
7  See Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 40;  Schreuer, Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral 
Practice, 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 365 (2005);  see also Case Concerning Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America) – Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 
Dec. 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 803 et seq., Separate Opinion by Judge Higgins, par. 39.  
8  See Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties, 39 Int’l 
Law. 87, 90 (2005) (explaining that the plain approach prevails in the treaty practice of Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, whereas the BITs of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States generally make reference to international law).  See also 
UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment, p. 10 et seq. (1999), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitd11v3.en.pdf.   
9  NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, 31 
July 2001, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp.   
10  See for example Pope & Talbot v. Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award in Respect of Da-
mages of May 31, 2002, par. 62;  similarly Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of 
America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award of Oct. 11, 2002, par. 125 (all investment 
awards are, unless explicitly stated otherwise, available via http://www.investmenclaims.com); 
see also Hindelang, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate – 
The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited, 5 J. World 
Inv. & Trade 789 (2004).   
11  See Pope & Talbot (supra note 10), par. 58 et seq.;  Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), 
par. 125;  ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Final Award of 
Jan. 9, 2003, par. 179;  see also Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? – Defining Fair and  
Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law, 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297 (2005).  
 34 
ary interpretation also levels differences between treaty law and custom concerning 
the fair and equitable treatment standard.   
This paper attempts to contribute to the on-going debate on rule- and decision-
making of investment tribunals with a specific view to the tribunals’ construction 
and application of fair and equitable treatment.  The task in the context of this paper 
does, however, not consist in exhaustively describing the facts of each case and the 
conclusions drawn by arbitral tribunals; the arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equit-
able treatment has been accurately and extensively discussed in a number of scho-
larly contributions.12  Instead, the paper focuses on outlining the elements arbitral 
tribunals attribute to fair and equitable treatment in a more conceptual way and at-
tempts to provide a general framework of analysis for the standard’s application and 
interpretation.   
In Part II, the paper takes a critical look at the way arbitral tribunals interpret and 
apply fair and equitable treatment and points to some shortcomings in the arbitral 
jurisprudence resulting mainly from the standard’s considerable vagueness.  Part III 
subsequently aims at clarifying the normative content of fair and equitable treatment 
and outlines a methodology for the application of fair and equitable treatment to the 
circumstances of a case submitted to arbitration.  This should promote predictability 
in and uniformity of the standard’s interpretation and thus its acceptance by states 
and investors.   
The paper shows how international tribunals have developed certain sub-elements 
of fair and equitable treatment that appear in recurrent fashion in arbitral jurispru-
dence and argues that these elements can be understood as and united under the 
concept of the rule of law (Rechtsstaat in the German, état de droit in the French 
tradition).  The underlying assumption of such an approach is that the fair and equi-
table treatment standard has an independent and genuine normative content that is 
different from other rights granted in international investment treaties.  Understan-
ding fair and equitable treatment in such a fashion attributes to the standard a quasi-
constitutional function that serves as a yardstick for the exercise of the host states’ 
administrative, judicial or legislative activity vis-à-vis foreign investors.  In this 
perspective, the arbitral jurisprudence does not appear as a fragmented and disor-
dered aggregate of awards but as an expression of the continuous emergence of a 
global regime that governs foreign investment and the conduct of host states relating 
to it.  Conceptualizing fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of 
law mainly relies on a comparative public law approach that takes a cross-view of 
the restrictions of governmental activity in domestic legal systems that embrace the 
concept of the rule of law.   
Conversely, the appropriate methodology for concretizing fair and equitable 
treatment the paper suggests, consists in a comparative method that attempts to ex-
 
12  See for recent attempts to sum up the jurisprudence Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 13 et 
seq.; Choudhury (supra note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297 (2005); Schreuer (supra note 7), 
6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357 (2005); Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87 (2005).   
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tract general principles from domestic legal systems and other international legal 
regimes that embrace an institutional design prescribing rule of law standards for the 
exercise of governmental power in administrative and judicial proceedings and le-
gislation.  At the same time, a comparative approach to fair and equitable treatment 
illustrates the tension between the rule of law as a legal value and competing public 
interests that require a proportionate balance.  It underscores that fair and equitable 
treatment cannot be understood as an absolute guarantee but rather as a principle that 
allows for a balance between investment protection and the host state’s public inter-
est.   
This understanding of fair and equitable treatment can, however, not only be used 
as a conceptual explanation of the bulk of the arbitral jurisprudence, but can be 
grounded in the normative framework contained in international investment treaties, 
above all the treaties’ object and purpose.  Part IV therefore provides an analysis of 
the economics of international investment treaties and shows the positive effects the 
adoption of the concept of the rule of law has on the behavior of foreign investors, 
thus promoting foreign investment and economic growth in host countries.   
B. Shortcomings in Arbitral Practice Relating to Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Arbitral tribunals seem generally ill-equipped in tackling the interpretative conun-
drum posed by the vagueness of the fair and equitable treatment standard.  Tribunals 
do not only regularly criticize that the standard is not further defined and clarified in 
investment agreements,13 they have also not achieved to develop a uniform metho-
dology in order to determine whether specific host state conduct violates fair and 
equitable treatment.14  The main reason for this is that traditional interpretative ap-
proaches applying Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties,15 either directly or as an expression of the customary international law of treaty 
 
13  See Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A. S. Baltoil v. The Republic of Estonia, 
ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award of June 25, 2001, par. 367: “the exact content of this stan-
dard is not clear”;  Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Royaume du Maroc, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6, 
Sentence Arbitrale of Dec. 22, 2003, par. 51: “Il n’existe pas de définition précise du traite-
ment just et équitable dans le droit des traités”;  Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UN-
CITRAL, Final Award of Sept. 2, 2001, par. 292: “[T]here is no further definition of the notion 
of fair and equitable treatment in the Treaty.”;  CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Ar-
gentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of May 12, 2005, par. 273: “The Treaty, 
like most bilateral investment treaties, does not define the standard of fair and equitable treat-
ment.”  
14  Criticizing the lack of a uniform methodology, for example, Kantor, Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment: Echoes of FDR’s Court-Packing Plan in the International Law Approach Towards Regu-
latory Expropriation, 5 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 231 
(2006).  
15  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.   
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interpretation,16 are hardly able to clarify the meaning of fair and equitable treat-
ment.  The vagueness of the standard goes beyond the commonplace assertions in 
legal theory that law is inherently vague and indeterminate when it comes to the 
application of abstract standards to concrete cases.  Vagueness and indeterminacy of 
fair and equitable treatment are not a matter of the penumbra of a rule in the Hartian 
sense or the edges of the rule’s frame in the Kelsenian sense, but concern the very 
core of the provision.  It does not have a consolidated and conventional core     
meaning that can easily be applied.  Apart from consensus on the fact that fair and 
equit-able treatment constitutes a standard that is independent from the domestic 
legal order and does not require actions in bad faith by host states,17 it is hardly 
substantiated by state practice or elucidated by travaux preparatoires and difficult to 
narrow down by traditional means of interpretation.   
An interpretation of the ordinary meaning may replace the terms “fair and equit-
able” with similarly vague and empty phrases such as “just”, “even-handed”, “un-
biased” or “legitimate”,18 but does not succeed in clarifying its normative content.19  
In particular, the semantics of fair and equitable treatment do not clarify as against 
which standard “fairness and equitableness” has to be measured.  It could equally 
refer to notions of equality or substantive justice, or to less grand notions of proce-
dural due process.   
Likewise, a plain teleological interpretation hardly provides more specific    
meaning even if the purpose of international investment treaties points to the protec-
tion and promotion of foreign investment and the deepening of the mutual economic 
relations between the contracting states.20  Although this narrows down the possible 
understandings of fair and equitable treatment to an economic framework, a pur-
posive interpretation does not enable tribunals to directly translate the broad lan-
guage into specific guarantees for foreign investors in the sense of hard and fast 
rules.  In particular, it is difficult to foresee and estimate whether a specific interpre-
tation of an international investment treaty will actually encourage investment flows 
or whether, on the contrary, an interpretation that may be too onerous for host states 
 
16  See only Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judg-
ment of Feb. 13, 1994, ICJ Reports 1994, 21, par. 41;  Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic 
Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment of Dec. 12, 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 
803, par. 23;  Case Concerning Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 
Dec. 13, 1999, ICJ Reports 1999, 1045 par. 18.  
17  Concerning the independence of fair and equitable treatment from domestic law Dolzer (supra 
note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005);  on the independence from bad faith Schreuer (supra note 
7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 384 et seq. (2005).  
18  Cf. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award of May 25, 2004, par. 113.  
19  It rather confirms that a terminological approach does not succeed in substantiating and clari-
fying what fair and equitable refers to.  In this sense Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Re-
public, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of Mar. 17, 2006, par. 297;  differently Dolzer (supra note 
8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005).  
20  See on the object and purpose of investment treaties and the statements contained in their 
preambles Dolzer/Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties, p. 11 et seq., 20 et seq. (1995).  
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will have the effect of chilling the investment climate due to host states admitting 
less foreign investment.21   
The traditional methods of treaty interpretation therefore prove to be relatively in-
effective in clarifying the meaning of fair and equitable treatment.  Understandably, 
investment tribunals do not follow a uniform methodology.22  Some tribunals follow 
an approach that extensively describes the facts of a case and simply characterizes 
them as a violation of fair and equitable treatment.23  The problem with this ap-
proach is that it does not elucidate the normative content of fair and equitable treat-
ment and leaves the legal reasoning underlying the decision in the obscure.  Other 
tribunals simply posit an abstract standard as part of fair and equitable treatment and 
subsequently subsume the facts of the case under this standard.24  While this is 
closer to the traditional legal syllogism, the tribunals nevertheless fail to properly 
justify how they ground these abstract standards in fair and equitable treatment.  
Finally, various tribunals apply fair and equitable treatment with a strong reference 
to prior arbitral jurisprudence.25  This approach is critical in two respects.  First, 
treating arbitral decisions as precedent in international law is problematic;26 se-
condly, the awards face the criticism that earlier decisions have themselves applied a 
problematic methodology in terms of failing to grasp the normative content of fair 
and equitable treatment.  
By failing to establish a clear normative, i. e. prescriptive, content of fair and    
equitable treatment, arbitral tribunals run the risk of facing the reproach that they 
handle the standard as a malleable tool of ex post facto control of host states’ meas-
 
21  Accordingly, the Tribunal in Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 
Award of Oct. 12, 2005, par. 52 warned that a teleological interpretation should not simply 
lead to an interpretation of bilateral investment treaties in dubio pro investore: “While it is not 
permissible, as is too often done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of 
investors, here such an interpretation is justified.” (emphasis added).    
22  See Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 93 et seq. (2005) (discerning the three lines of 
reasoning subsequently addressed).  
23  See, for example, Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), par. 118, stressing that “[a] judg-
ment of what is fair and equitable cannot be reached in the abstract; it must depend on the facts 
of the particular case”.   
24  See, for example, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Partial 
Award of Nov. 13, 2000, par. 134.   
25  See for example Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3, Award of 30 April 2004, par. 89 et seq.  
26  Under general international law no doctrine of stare decisis exists, see Articles. 38(1)(d) and 
59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;  see also Verdross/Simma, Universelles 
Völkerrecht, p. 397 et seq. (3rd ed. 1984).  This general observation also holds true in the in-
vestment arbitration context.  Explicitly in this sense Art. 1136(1) NAFTA: “An award made 
by a Tribunal shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect 
of the particular case.”  See also Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 53 
par. 15 (2001) (noting that in the preparatory works for the ICSID Convention nothing implies 
the applicability of a stare decisis rule).  Art. 53(1) ICSID-Convention that provides that “[t]he 
award shall be binding on the parties […]” can therefore be read as “binding only on the par-
ties”.   
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ures based on the arbitrators’ personal conviction and understanding about what is 
fair and equitable.  The assumption that personal convictions, instead of prescriptive 
legal standards, play a major role in applying fair and equitable treatment is nou-
rished by the frequent reference to treatment that “shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of juridical propriety”27 as a yardstick for the standard’s application.28   
Similarly, legal scholarship has not provided much conceptual guidance.29  Like 
arbitral tribunals, commentators have not developed a definition or a methodological 
tool for concretizing fair and equitable treatment.  Above all, they have not at-
tempted to unite the vast jurisprudence under a comprehensive concept in order to 
give a fuller normative explanation of the standard’s content.  Mostly, they concede 
that no agreement on the exact meaning of the principle exists30 and largely confine 
themselves to describing the existing case law in order to extract contextual ele-
ments of fair and equitable treatment31 or attribute to it the function of a gap-filling 
device for judging host state conduct that cannot be subsumed under other, possibly 
more precise, investment treaty guarantees.32  Some commentators therefore suggest 
that fair and equitable treatment constitutes “an intentionally vague term, designed 
to give adjudicators a quasi-legislative authority to articulate a variety of rules ne-
 
27  See for example Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S. A. v. The United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award of May 29, 2003, par. 154 (quoting the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. 
Italy), Judgment of July 20, 1989, ICJ Reports 1989, p. 15, par. 128).  See for a criticism of the 
ICJ’s test for arbitrariness in the ELSI case Hamrock, The ELSI Case: Toward an International 
Definition of “Arbitrary” Conduct, 27 Tex. Int’l L. J. 837, 849 et seq. (1992) (highlighting the 
prevalence of subjective elements in the Court’s test).  
28  See UNCTAD (supra note 8), p. 10 (noting the “inherently subjective” trait of the concepts of 
fairness and equitableness);  see also Yannaca-Small (supra note 6), p. 2 et seq. (mentioning 
the concern of “a number of governments […] that, the less guidance is provided for arbitra-
tors, the more discretion is involved and the closer the process resembles decisions ex aequo et 
bono, i.e [sic] based on the arbitrators’ notions of ‘fairness’and ‘equity’.”).  
29  See also Thomas, Reflections on Art. 1105 NAFTA: History, State Practice and the Influence 
of Commentators, 17 ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. L. J. 21, 51 et seq. (2002). (warning to attach 
too much weight to the opinions of commentators).  
30  Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 88 (2005) (noting that “a review of some attempts at 
defining the standard may invite such thinking inasmuch as the approach is so general in na-
ture that the clause may appear to amount to a catch-all provision which may embrace a very 
broad number of governmental acts”);  Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 
364 (2005);  Choudhury (supra note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297, 298 (2005).  
31  Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 364 et seq. (2005) (stressing the specific 
fact situations considered as a violation of fair and equitable treatment);  Choudhury (supra 
note 11), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 297, 316 et seq. (2005) (providing a working definition of 
fair and equitable treatment that relies on the acceptance of several sub-elements of the stan-
dard in arbitral jurisprudence);  see also Thomas (supra note 29), 17 ICSID Rev. – Foreign Inv. 
L. J. 21, 59 et seq. (2002);  Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, p. 332 et 
seq. (2nd ed. 2004).  
32  Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 90 (2005).  Similarly Mann, British Treaties for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52 Brit. Yb. Int’l L. 241, 243 et seq. (1981) (under-
standing fair and equitable as an “overriding duty”).  
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cessary to achieve the treaty’s object and purpose in particular disputes”.33  Simi-
larly, other commentators support the view that the interpretative problems posed by 
the principle’s vagueness should be solved by simply letting tribunals do the work in 
developing more precise elements of fair and equitable treatment.34   
It is, however, questionable whether states intended such a broad delegation of 
powers to international tribunals.35  In addition, shifting the responsibility of concre-
tizing the meaning of fair and equitable treatment to arbitral tribunals is problematic.  
It does not only fail to meet the need for further guidance regularly uttered by some 
tribunals themselves.  More importantly, it is unsatisfactory from the perspective of 
host states that need to evaluate the way they exercise public authority without ha-
ving to pay damages for the violation of investment treaties.36  Likewise, it is unsa-
tisfactory from the perspective of foreign investors who desire a stable and predict-
able investment climate and need to know beforehand against which political risks 
and government interferences they are protected by the respective investment treaty.  
Unpredictable, or worse arbitrary, outcomes of arbitration proceedings will not only 
dissatisfy the parties involved, but may overall chill the efficiency of investment 
arbitration and the promotion of foreign investment.   
A missing conceptual understanding of fair and equitable treatment may also lead 
to inconsistent decisions in the field of investment protection, possibly lessening the 
stability and predictability necessary for foreign investment and fostering the frag-
mentation of international investment law.  A theoretic approach to the normative 
content of fair and equitable treatment may, therefore, not only clarify the concep-
tual foundations of the standard but is also crucial in order to generate a sustainable 
understanding of the rights and obligations of investors and host states that are criti-
cal to the very basis of international investment protection.  With respect to fair and 
equitable treatment a clearer delineation between investors’ rights and state sove-
reignty is thus needed.   
 
33  Brower, Investor-State Disputes under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Columb. J. 
Transnat’l L. 43, 56 (2003).  Similarly Franck (supra note 2), 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1589 
(2005);  Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice, p. 76 (1992).  See 
also Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 89 (2005) (suggesting that states deliberately in-
cluded this general standard as a gap-filling clause).   
34  See for example Schreuer (supra note 7), 6 J. World Inv. & Trade 357, 365 (2005) (explaning 
that fair and equitable treatment “is susceptible of specification through judicial practice”.);  
Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 105 (2005) (concluding that the task with respect to 
fair and equitable treatment consists in “developing a body of jurisprudence tailored to the spe-
cific structures of foreign investment and acceptable to investors, the host state and the home 
state”.). 
35  Porterfield (supra note 1), 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 79, 103 et seq. (2006).  For the contrary 
view see supra note 33.   
36  Alternatively, host states may even abstain from regulation due to this insecurity.  International 
investment treaties would then result in a “regulatory chill”, possibly even in areas where regu-
lation is not only necessary but even in the interest of foreign investors.  In this sense see 
Franck, Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v Republic of Ecuador, 99 A.J.I.L. 675, 678 
(2005).  
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C. Fair and Equitable Treatment as an Embodiment of the Rule of Law 
In this chapter the paper presents an attempt to provide a normative framework of 
analysis for the interpretation and application of fair and equitable treatment.  The 
argument forwarded is that fair and equitable treatment should properly be under-
stood as an embodiment of the concept of the rule of law (or Rechtsstaat in the 
German, état de droit in the French tradition).  The rule of law is a wide-spread 
concept of positive law that can be found with similar characteristics in most legal 
systems that adhere to liberal constitutionalism.37  Relying on a common tradition,38 
the main thrust of the rule of law is the aspiration to subject public power to legal 
control39 and can be paraphrased with the words of F. A. Hayek: “stripped of all 
technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand – rules which make it possible to foresee with fair cer-
tainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to 
plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”.40   
The rule of law primarily refers to the formal quality of law as providing guid-
ance for human affairs and comprises the institutional aspiration that government 
has to use law as a means of exercising power.41  First, the rule of law translates into 
procedural requirements for the deployment of legal processes42 and mandates that 
“individuals whose interests are affected by the decisions of […] officials have cer-
tain rights”, such as “the right to a hearing before a decision is made, the right to 
have the decision made in an unbiased and impartial fashion, the right to know the 
basis of the decision so that it can be contested, the right to reasons for the official’s 
decision, and the right to a decision that is reasonably justified by all relevant legal 
and factual considerations.”43  Hence, the rule of law requires that the affected indi-
vidual is recognized as a subject with certain rights which have to be taken into 
account in the decision making process of public authorities.  In addition to the re-
cognition of procedural rights, the rule of law is often also at the origin of the idea of 
 
37  See Schulze-Fielitz, in: Dreier (ed.), Grundgesetz – Kommentar, Art. 20 par. 5 et seq. (vol. II 
1998).  
38  See on the development of the rule of law against its politico-philosophical background Ta-
manaha, On the Rule of Law – History, Politics, Theory (2004).  
39  Dyzenhaus, The Rule of (Administrative) Law in International Law, 68 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 127, 130 (2005);  similarly Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Con-
cept (in Florida)?, 21 Law & Philosophy 137, 158 (2002);  Hesse, Der Rechtsstaat im Verfas-
sungssystem des Grundgesetzes, in: Forsthoff (ed.), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit, 
p. 557, 560 et seq. (1968).  As such, it should also be distinguished from other concepts of 
good and desirable government, such as human rights, democracy or justice;  see Raz, The 
Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 L. Quart. Rev. 195 et seq. (1977). 
40  Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 54 (1944).  
41  See Fallon, “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Columb. L. Rev. 
1, 14 et seq. (1997) on the formalist ideal in the rule of law.  
42  See Fallon (supra note 41), 97 Columb. L. Rev. 1, 18 et seq. (1997) on the legal process ideal 
understanding of the rule of law.  
43  Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 129 (2005).  
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proportionality, referring to the proper balance that has to be struck between the 
interests of the individual and competing public interests.44  Secondly, the rule of 
law has implications for the institutional design of government.  It mandates a basic 
separation of powers and the possibility to seek review of public acts by an inde-
pendent judiciary.45  Essentially it is this primarily formal understanding of the rule 
of law that prevails in many domestic legal traditions.46  
In this sense, fair and equitable treatment can be understood as a rule of law stan-
dard that the legal systems of host states have to embrace as a standard for the treat-
ment of foreign investors.  While this may not seem much of a concretization given 
different historic developments and thrusts of the rule of law in different national 
legal systems and in light of the fact that the exact content and the requirements of 
the rule of law are often debated,47 it nevertheless seems to constitute a viable ap-
proach to explain the normative content of fair and equitable treatment.  A compara-
tive analysis of municipal law reveals certain common ideas and standards that can 
be transferred to the international level and help to identify the paradigm features a 
state has to conform to in order to comply with the notion of “fairness and equit-
ableness” in international investment law.  Arguably, a comparative approach also 
constitutes a suitable methodological approach for the standard’s interpretation and 
renders the outcome of investment disputes more predictable.   
I. Principles Derived from Fair and Equitable Treatment 
In view of the existing arbitral jurisprudence on fair and equitable treatment, seven 
specific normative principles can be discerned that occur in recurring fashion in the 
reasoning of arbitral tribunals and are presented as elements of fair and equitable 
treatment.  These principles are (1) the requirement of stability, predictability and 
consistency of the legal framework, (2) the principle of legality, (3) the protection of 
investor confidence or legitimate expectations, (4) procedural due process and denial 
of justice, (5) substantive due process or protection against discrimination and arbi-
trariness, (6) the requirement of transparency and (7) the requirement of reasonable-
 
44  See on this thrust that has been developed particularly in the German tradition and has been 
taken up in the reasoning of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of 
Justice infra note 110.  
45  Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 130 et seq. (2005). 
46  See on the primarily formal tradition in Germany for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), 
Art. 20 par. 13 et seq.  Similarly, the due-process clause of the U.S. Constitution has mainly 
found a procedural interpretation;  see Shell, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Demokratie in den USA, 
in: Tohidipur (ed.), Der bürgerliche Rechtsstaat, p. 377 et seq. (1978).  See also Kantor (supra 
note 14) on the decline of the substantive understanding of due process in the U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence and its emphasis on procedure.  
47  See only Waldron (supra note 39), 21 Law & Philosophy 137 (2002).  
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ness and proportionality.  These principles also figure prominently as sub-elements 
or expressions of the broader concept of the rule of law in domestic legal systems.  
1. Stability, Predictability, Consistency 
International investment treaties in general seek to enhance the stability of the in-
vestment climate and reduce political risk.48  Accordingly, one aspect that is recur-
rently invoked by investment tribunals as part of fair and equitable treatment is the 
concept of stability, predictability and consistency of the host state’s legal frame-
work.  Based on the preamble in the United States-Argentina BIT that provides “that 
fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to maintain a stable 
framework for investment and maximum effective utilization of economic re-
sources”, the Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina, for example, found that “there can be no 
doubt […] that a stable legal and business environment is an essential element of fair 
and equitable treatment”.49  On this basis, the Tribunal found that the Argentine 
emergency legislation in 2001/2002 which entirely and permanently transformed the 
legal framework of the privatized gas sector violated fair and equitable treatment.50  
Likewise, the Tribunal in OEPC v. Ecuador held that “[t]he stability of the legal and 
business framework is thus an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”.51   
Similarly, the predictability of the legal framework governing the activity of fo-
reign investors is frequently considered as an element of fair and equitable treat-
ment.  The Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, based its finding of a vio-
lation of Art. 1105(1) NAFTA inter alia on the argument that Mexico “failed to 
ensure a […] predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and invest-
ment”.52  The predictability of the legal framework was also evoked by the Tribunal 
in Tecmed v. Mexico when stressing that the foreign investor needs to “know be-
forehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as 
the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices and directives, to be 
able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations”.53  Accordingly, a lack 
 
48  Rubins/Kinsella, International Investment, Political Risk and Dispute Resolution, p. 1 et seq. 
(2005).  See also CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction of June 17, 2003, par. 28 
(regarding bilateral investment treaties as one of the “expressions of the search for stability and 
legal certainty” in international economic relations).   
49  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 274.   
50  See for a fuller analysis of the case Schill, From Calvo to CMS: Burying an International Law 
Legacy – Argentina’s Currency Reform in the Face of Investment Protection: The ICSID Case 
CMS v. Argentina, 3 SchiedsVZ/German Arb. J. 285 (2005).  
51  See Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) v. The Republic of Ecuador, 
UNCITRAL, LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award of July 1, 2004, par. 183.   
52  See Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award of Aug. 30, 2000, par. 99.  
53  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.   
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of clarity of the legal framework or excessively vague rules can violate fair and 
equitable treatment.54 
Finally, the concept of consistency plays an important role in the arbitral jurispru-
dence on fair and equitable treatment.  The Tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic, 
for example, stressed this connection when it underscored that fair and equitable 
treatment could be violated if domestic agencies acted inconsistently in applying 
domestic legislation.55  Similarly, in MTD v. Chile the Tribunal found a violation of 
fair and equitable treatment due to “the inconsistency of action between two arms of 
the same Government vis-à-vis the same investor”.56  Likewise, the Tribunal in 
Tecmed v. Mexico emphasized the need of consistency in the decision-making of a 
national agency in order to conform to fair and equitable treatment.57   
These lines of argument run parallel to one of the central elements the concept of 
the rule of law is associated with in domestic legal systems: legal certainty and legal 
security (Rechtssicherheit).58  This element of the rule of law refers to the core as-
pect of normativity of law that allows individuals to adapt their behavior to the re-
quirements of the legal order and form stable social relationships.  Especially in the 
commercial context stability is a critical component for long-term investment.  Legal 
security requires a certain stability of the legal order, legal certainty calls for pre-
dictable and understandable rules and their consistent application.  This interpreta-
tion notably conforms with the object and purpose of international investment trea-
ties, as stability, predictability and consistency are necessary for investors in order to 
plan and calculate their investment and adjust to the legal framework in the host 
country.  
Yet, one has to be aware that stability and predictability of domestic law can only 
relate to the normal deployment of governmental law- and policy-making and, paral-
lel to the function of the rule of law in domestic constitutional law, should not be 
 
54  See for example OEPC v. Ecuador (supra note 51), par. 184 (criticizing the vagueness of a 
change in the domestic tax law that did not “provid[e] any clarity about its meaning and ex-
tent”).  
55  Lauder v. Czech Republic (supra note 13), par. 292 et seq.  In the case at hand, a regulatory 
agency had commenced an administrative proceeding against a television broadcasting com-
pany for non-compliance with the domestic Media Law due to allegedly unauthorized broad-
casting without the necessary license.  The Tribunal declined to find a violation of fair and     
equitable treatment by arguing that there were understandable grounds why the agency had ini-
tiated administrative proceedings.  It also pointed out that inconsistent conduct of domestic 
agencies could not be assumed if the conduct consisted in enforcing domestic law, unless there 
was a specific undertaking to refrain from doing so.   
56  MTD v. Chile (supra note 18), par. 163.  
57  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154, 162 et seq.  See also OEPC v. Ecuador (supra note 
51), par. 184.  
58  As such it is recognized, mostly as a constitutional standard, in many domestic legal systems.  
See for its implementation in the German Constitution Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 
par. 117 et seq.;  see Fallon (supra note 41), 97 Columb. L. Rev. 1, 14 et seq. (1997) with ref-
erences to U.S. constitutional practice;  more generally, see also Raz (supra note 39), 93 L. 
Quart. Rev. 195, 198 (1977).  
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understood as an absolute requirement that would allow foreign investors to be ef-
fectively excluded from regulatory changes in the host state.59  Accordingly, stability 
and predictability should not be misunderstood as a guarantee that the legal frame-
work will never change or even serve as a business guarantee to investment pro-
jects.60  Likewise, the stability of the legal order will vary with the circumstances 
host states might have to react to: a serious crisis or even an emergency situation 
may call for different reactions than the deployment of public power in the normal 
course of things.61  Concerning consistency, one should be aware that domestic 
regulatory frameworks are never completely free of inconsistencies.62  A violation of 
this sub-element should therefore be handled in a prudent manner.  
2. Legality 
Fair and equitable treatment has also been interpreted by arbitral tribunals as inclu-
ding the principle of legality.  In various cases tribunals based their assessment of 
fair and equitable treatment on an appreciation of whether domestic actors obeyed 
national legal provisions governing the conduct in question.  Although tribunals 
diverge on the question to which extent the correct application of domestic law is 
subject to scrutiny by arbitral tribunals, their jurisprudence is consistent in holding 
that a violation of domestic law can constitute a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment.63  This obligation applies to the domestic judiciary as well as to adminis-
 
59  In this sense also Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 105 (2005). 
60  See only Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, 
Award of Nov. 13, 2000, par. 64 (“emphasiz[ing] that Bilateral Investment Treaties are not in-
surance policies against bad business judgments”);  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. The United 
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of Dec. 16, 2002, par. 112 (noting 
“that not every business problem experienced by a foreign investor is an indirect or creeping 
expropriation under Article 1110, or a denial of due process or fair and equitable treatment un-
der Article 1110(1)(c)”).  
61  See, for example, the ELSI Case (supra note 27), par. 74: “Clearly the right [to control and 
manage a company] cannot be interpreted as a sort of warranty that the normal exercise of con-
trol and management shall never be disturbed.  Every system of law must provide, for exam-
ple, for interferences with the normal exercise of rights during public emergencies and the 
like.”  
62  Franck (supra note 36), 99 A.J.I.L. 675, 678 (2005).  
63  Although some tribunals held that a violation of domestic law in itself is not a violation of fair 
and equitable treatment, such as ADF v. United States (supra note 11) (stressing explicitly that 
“something more than simple illegality or lack of authority under the domestic law of a State is 
necessary to render an act or measure inconsistent with the customary international law re-
quirements of Article 1105(1)”), I rather do not interpret this as requiring an additional or 
qualified violation of domestic law but instead see this as a question of the standard of review 
of international tribunals that may depend on the procedural posture of the case, the applicable 
law, the question whether local remedies were exhausted etc.   
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trative agencies, and has even been alluded to concerning the question whether the 
activity of the domestic legislator was in conformity with the national constitution.64   
In Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, one factor for the Tribunal’s finding of a 
violation of fair and equitable treatment was the apparent misapplication of a con-
struction law by a local municipality.65  Similarly, in Pope & Talbot v. Canada the 
Tribunal relied on the lack in competence of a domestic agency for initiating admi-
nistrative proceedings against a foreign investor.  Instead of relying “on naked asser-
tions of authority and on threats that the Investment’s allocation could be cancelled, 
reduced or suspended for failure to accept verification”, the Tribunal emphasized 
that “before seeking to bludgeon the Investment into compliance, the SLD [i. e. the 
administrative agency] should have resolved any doubts on the issue and should 
have advised the Investment of the legal basis for its actions”.66  Here, the failure to 
produce a legal basis for the administrative proceedings under domestic law was 
therefore taken into account as one aspect for the violation of fair and equitable 
treatment.   
Fair and equitable treatment was also interpreted to include an obligation to apply 
domestic law.  In GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico the Tribunal deduced from fair 
and equitable treatment an obligation to not only abide by but also to enforce exis-
ting provisions of national law.67  Similarly, in Tecmed v. Mexico the Tribunal un-
derscored that host states have to make use of “the legal instruments that govern the 
actions of the investor or the investment in conformity with the function usually 
assigned to such instruments”.68   
The connection between fair and equitable treatment and the principle of legality 
does, however, not only become apparent when domestic decision-makers violate 
municipal laws.  On the contrary, the observance of domestic legal rules is often 
relied upon by tribunals in order to deny a violation of fair and equitable treatment.  
In Noble Ventures v. Romania, for example, the Tribunal observed that certain bank-
ruptcy proceedings “were initiated and conducted according to the law and not 
against it”69 and accordingly denied a violation of fair and equitable treatment.  
Similarly, in Lauder v. Czech Republic the Tribunal emphasized that a violation of 
fair and equitable treatment was usually excluded in case of a “regulatory body 
taking the necessary actions to enforce the law”.70  
 
64  See CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 119 et seq.  
65  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 93.  
66  Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Award on the Mer-
its of Phase 2 of April 10, 2001, par. 174 et seq.  
67  GAMI Investments, Inc. v. The Government of the United Mexican States, UN-
CITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of Nov. 15, 2004, par. 91: “It is in this sense that a govern-
ment’s failure to implement or abide by its own law in a manner adversely affecting a foreign 
investor may but will not necessarily lead to a violation of Article 1105.”   
68  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.   
69  Noble Ventures v. Romania (supra note 21), par. 178.  
70  Lauder v. Czech Republic (supra note 13), par. 297.  
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The decisions therefore clearly consider the principle of legality as an element of 
fair and equitable treatment.  The principle of legality also finds its counterpart in 
rule of law concepts that encompass the requirement that public power derives its 
authority from a legal basis and is exercised along the lines of pre-established pro-
cedural and substantive rules.71  The principle of legality should, however, not dis-
tract from the fact that fair and equitable treatment does not simply buttress the ap-
plication of domestic law and provide a claim of the foreign investor against the host 
state to apply its domestic law correctly.  Rather, fair and equitable treatment re-
mains an independent standard of international law against which the domestic legal 
order is measured.   
3. Protection of Confidence and Legitimate Expectations 
While the principle of legality is closely related to the idea that the executive and the 
judicial branch of government have to obey the law enacted by the legislator, legal 
rules are only able to have a stabilizing function for social relationships and create 
the basis of an environment conducive to long-term investment when they are ap-
plied according to how a reasonable investor would expect them to be applied.  The 
ordering function of law therefore requires taking into account the perceptions of the 
law’s subject and their expectations vis-à-vis government activity.   
Accordingly, the concept of legitimate expectations is emerging as another 
prominent sub-element of fair and equitable treatment in arbitral practice.  The Tri-
bunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic referred to the concept of legitimate expectations 
even as “the dominant element of that standard”.72  Its existence can also be traced 
as an element of the rule of law in domestic legal systems73 and as a concept of ge-
neral international law.74  Its main thrust in this context is the protection of confi-
dence against administrative and legislative conduct.  In this sense, the Tribunal in 
 
71  In the German constitutional tradition this element of the rule of law is designated as “Gesetz-
mäßgkeit der Verwaltung” and “Vorrang des Gesetzes”.  See Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), 
Art. 20 par. 83 et seq.  
72  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), 301.  
73  See Dyzenhaus (supra note 39), 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 133 et seq. (2005) with refe-
rence to case law in Australia and the UK;  Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 134 et 
seq. concerning German Constitutional Law; Schønberg, Legitimate Expectations in Adminis-
trative Law (2000) on English, French and EC/EU law;  Dyer, Legitimate Expectations in Pro-
cedural Fairness after Lam, in: Groves (ed.), Law and Government in Australia, p. 184 et seq. 
(2005) on Australian law; see also Woehrling, Le Principe de Confiance Légitime dans la Ju-
risprudence des Tribunaux, in: Bridge (ed.), Comparative Law Facing the 21st Century, p. 815 
et seq. (1998) summarizing a comparative study by the XVth International Congress of Com-
parative Law, Bristol/UK in 1998.  
74  See Müller, Vertrauensschutz im Völkerrecht (1971).  See more specifically in the context of 
the law of expropriation of aliens Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of 
Alien Property, 75 A.J.I.L. 553, 579 et seq. (1981).   
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Tecmed v. Mexico held that fair and equitable treatment requires “provid[ing] to 
international investments treatment that does not affect the basic expectations that 
were taken into account by the foreign investors to make the investment”.75  Simi-
larly, the Tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico 
explained that “the concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ relates […] to a situation 
where a Contracting Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations 
on the part of an investor (or investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that 
a failure by the NAFTA Party to honour those expectations could cause the investor 
(or investment) to suffer damages”.76  
Legitimate expectations can result from a number of actions that are attributable 
to the host state.77 In the first place, a breach of legitimate expectations will come 
into play if there is conduct “in breach of representations made by the host State 
which were reasonably relied on by the [investor]”.78  They can result, for example, 
from opinions and statements released by administrative agencies about the applica-
tion of domestic law.79   
It is, however, not necessary that expectations were induced by administrative ac-
tion that was individually directed towards a foreign investor.  Legitimate expecta-
tions can also originate from the provisions of the general regulatory framework 
which a host state has set into place80 as long as the confidence the framework ge-
 
75  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.  The Tribunal’s approach was also taken up in a 
number of other cases.  See ADF v. United States (supra note 11), par. 189;  MTD v. Chile (su-
pra note 18), par. 114 et seq.;  OEPC  v. Ecuador (supra note 51), par. 185;  CMS v. Argentina 
(supra note 13), par. 279;  Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland, Partial Award of Aug. 19, 2005, 
par. 235, 241.  
76  International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. The United Mexican States, UN-
CITRAL/NAFTA, Arbitral Award of Jan. 26, 2006, par. 147 (internal citation omitted).  
77  See on the connection between the expectations and government conduct ADF v. United States 
(supra note 11), par. 189, where the Tribunal declined to find a violation of Art. 1105(1) 
NAFTA in a case where the claimant argued that existing case law suggested that an agency 
would have to grant a waiver from a statutory local content requirement, noting that “any ex-
pectations that the Investor had with respect to the relevancy or applicability of the case law it 
cited were not created by any misleading representations made by authorized officials of the 
U.S. Federal Government but rather, it appears probable, by legal advice received by the Inves-
tor from private U.S. counsel.”  
78  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98.  Similarly CME Czech Republic B.V. v. 
The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award of Sept. 13, 2001, par. 611 (arguing that the 
Respondent “breached its obligation of fair and equitable treatment by eviscerations of the ar-
rangements in reliance upon which the foreign investor was induced to invest”).  
79  In International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76) the investor wanted to set up a 
gaming business in Mexico and sought a statement of the competent agency as to whether its 
gaming machines were in conformity with Mexican law that prohibited gambling and luck-
related games.   The Tribunal did, however, not consider the opinion given by the administra-
tive agency as sufficiently specific so as to form the basis of legitimate expectations.  See also 
Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 85 et seq. (concerning the violation of fair and equi-
table treatment pursuant to the (incorrect) statement of a government agency that the permits 
necessary to start building a waste landfill had been obtained).  
80  See GAMI v. Mexico (supra note 67), par. 100.  
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nerated is sufficiently specific.  In this context, the concept of legitimate expecta-
tions as an element of the rule of law may even restrict the domestic legislator in its 
decision-making concerning changes of the regulatory framework.  This was the 
case in the dispute in CMS v. Argentina, where the regulatory framework the foreign 
investor relied upon when making his investment was permanently and fundamen-
tally altered at a later stage.81   
The concept entails, however, the danger that domestic legal orders and the ac-
tions of host states are exclusively measured against the expectations of foreign 
investors.  Although the legitimacy of expectations already limits the scope of the 
concept,82 it should not be handled as an inflexible and absolute yard-stick.  Instead, 
tribunals should allow for a certain flexibility for host states to react, for example 
but not exclusively, to emergency situations.  Accordingly, the Tribunal in Eureko v. 
Poland suggested that the breach of basic expectations was not a violation of fair 
and equitable treatment if good reasons existed why the expectations of the investor 
could not be met.83  Similarly, the Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic specifically 
warned of the danger of taking the idea of the investor’s expectation too literally 
since this would “impose upon host States’ [sic] obligations which would be inap-
propriate and unrealistic”.84  Instead, the Tribunal set out to balance the investor’s 
legitimate expectations and the host state’s interests within a broader proportionality 
test.  It reasoned:  
“No investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time 
the investment is made remain totally unchanged.  In order to determine whether 
frustration of the foreign investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the 
host State’s legitimate right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public 
interest must be taken into consideration as well. […]  
The determination of a breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore re-
quires a weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations on the 
one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on the other.   
A foreign investor protected by the Treaty may in any case properly expect that 
the Czech Republic implements its policies bona fide by conduct that is, as far as it 
affects the investors’ investment, reasonably justifiable by public policies and that 
such conduct does not manifestly violate the requirements of consistency, transpa-
rency, even-handedness and non-discrimination.  In particular, any differential 
treatment of a foreign investor must not be based on unreasonable distinctions and 
demands, and must be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to 
 
81  See specifically on the concept of legitimate expectations in the context of this case Co-
stamagna, Investors' Rights and State Regulatory Autonomy: the Role of the Legitimate Ex-
pectation Principle in the CMS v. Argentina Case, 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 6 et seq. 
(available via http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com).  
82  See Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304.  
83  See Eureko v. Poland (supra note 75), par. 232 et seq.  
84  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304.  
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rational policies not motivated by a preference for other investments over the fo-
reign-owned investment.”85 
Overall, the concept of legitimate expectations therefore offers sufficient flexibil-
ity to reconcile the interests of foreign investors and host states.  The aim of achiev-
ing a balance between the protection of confidence and legitimate expectations and 
the public interest can also be mirrored in the concept of protection of confidence 
under domestic legal systems.86  
4. Administrative Due Process and Denial of Justice 
Several cases interpreted fair and equitable treatment so as to include the concept of 
due process.  Due process, in this context, mainly comes in two forms: administra-
tive and judicial due process.87  It is thus closely connected to the proper administra-
tion of civil and criminal justice.88  Recently, both an explicit reference to due pro-
cess and the concept of denial of justice as part of fair and equitable treatment have 
been included in the treaty practice of the United States.  Art. 10.5(2)(a) of the The 
Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement, for 
instance, stipulates that  
“fair and equitable treatment includes the obligation not to deny justice in crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the prin-
ciple of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world”.89 
Even absent this explicit reference, investment tribunals have interpreted fair and 
equitable treatment in this way.  The Tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico, for 
instance, defined a violation of fair and equitable treatment as “involv[ing] a lack of 
due process leading to an outcome which offends judicial propriety – as might be the 
case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a complete 
lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process.”90  Similarly, for the 
 
85  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 305 et seq.   
86  See, for example, on the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court Schulze-Fielitz 
(supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 139 et seq. 
87  The national legislator, so far, has not been subjected to any due process notions in investment 
arbitration.  This could, however, be conceivable in the context of legislative expropriations 
since most BITs explicitly require host states to grant affected investors due process.  See Dol-
zer/Stevens (supra note 20), p. 106 et seq. (1995).  
88  See comprehensibly on the closely related concept of denial of justice in international law 
Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law (2005).   
89  The Dominican Republic – Central America – United States Free Trade Agreement, signed 
Aug. 5, 2004, available at  http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Section 
_Index.html.  Similar provi sions can be found in a number of other recently concluded and 
currently negotiated free trade agreement of the United States, see Kantor (supra note 14).  
90  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98.  
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Tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Canada fair and equitable treatment, among other ele-
ments, included “the international law requirements of due process”.91   
The main thrust of the due process requirement in investment treaty arbitration is 
to establish procedural rights for investors in administrative proceedings.  This was 
emphasized by the Tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico that 
held that the proceedings of a government agency “should be tested against the stan-
dards of due process and procedural fairness applicable to administrative officials”.92  
Fair and equitable treatment is, however, equally relevant for the discharge of judi-
cial proceedings.93  In this context the standard can be violated “if Claimants were 
denied access to the courts […] or if the Claimants were treated unfairly in those 
courts (denial of procedural justice) or if the judgment of those courts were substan-
tively unfair (denial of substantive justice)”.94   
5. Protection against Arbitrariness and Discrimination 
The protection of foreign investors against arbitrary and discriminatory treatment 
also plays a major role in the operation of fair and equitable treatment.  While some-
times international investment treaties contain a specific provision prohibiting such 
treatment, arbitral tribunals also ground this aspect in the concept of fair and equit-
able treatment.  The connection between arbitrariness and the concept of the rule of 
law has been explicitly drawn by the decision of the International Court of Justice in 
the ELSI Case.  Considering whether the requisition by the Mayor of Palermo of a 
foreign-owned factory in order to prevent its closure and the layoff of around 1000 
workers, the Court observed that 
“[a]rbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something 
opposed to the rule of law.  This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum 
case, when it spoke of ‘arbitrary action’ being ‘substituted for the rule of law’.  It is 
wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of juridical propriety.”95 
Although the case arose under the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty 
between the United States and Italy, the decision has been widely accepted as being 
relevant for the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment in international invest-
 
91  S.D. Myers v. Canada (supra note 24), par. 134.   
92  International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76), par. 200.   
93  See Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija, S.A. & Compagnie Générale des Eaux  v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award of Nov. 21, 2000, par. 80;  The Loewen Group, 
Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, 
Award of June 26, 2003, par. 132;  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 132.  
94  Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina (supra note 93), par. 80.  
95  ELSI Case (supra note 27), par. 128 (internal citations omitted).   
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ment treaties.96 The reason for this may be that arbitrary conduct can essentially be 
regarded as a qualified violation of the requirement to act in accordance with domes-
tic law.  Arbitrary conduct therefore can be seen as a sufficient but not as a neces-
sary requirement for the violation of fair and equitable treatment.  It can also be 
linked to the requirement under fair and equitable treatment to act in good faith.97   
The nexus between fair and equitable treatment and the prohibition of discrimina-
tory treatment has been emphasized in Loewen v. United States.  Here, the Tribunal 
stated that fair and equitable treatment is violated by “[a] decision which is in breach 
of municipal law and is discriminatory against the foreign litigant”.98  Similarly, the 
Tribunal in Waste Management v. Mexico elaborated that “fair and equitable treat-
ment is infringed by conduct attributable to the State and harmful to the claimant if 
the conduct is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, is discriminatory and 
exposes the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice”.99   
Other tribunals suggest drawing a clearer distinction between fair and equitable 
treatment and the prohibition of discriminatory conduct.  They emphasize that 
“[c]ustomary international law does not […] require that a state treat all aliens (and 
alien property) equally, or that it treats aliens as favourable as nationals”.100  They 
only consider a violation of fair and equitable treatment if the investor was “specifi-
cally targeted” or if the differential treatment amounted to bad faith.101   
 
96  See for example Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 371;  Waste Management v. Mexi-
co (supra note 25), par. 98;  Noble Ventures v. Romania (supra note 21), par. 176.   
97  See Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 138: “A basic obligation of the State 
under Article 1105(1) is to act in good faith and form, and not deliberately to set out to destroy 
or frustrate the investment by improper means”;  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 
367: “Acts that would violate [fair and equitable treatment] would include acts showing a wil-
ful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far below international standards, or even 
subjective bad faith.”  See also Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154.  
98  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 135.  
99  Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 98;  similarly Eureko v. Poland (supra note 
75), par. 233 (finding that the state “acted not for cause but for purely arbitrary reasons linked 
to the interplay of Polish politics and nationalistic reasons of a discriminatory character” and 
therefore breached fair and equitable treatment).  S.D. Myers v. Canada (supra note 24), par. 
266, also draws a parallel between national treatment and the fair and equitable treatment stan-
dard when stating: “Although […] the Tribunal does not rule out the possibility that there 
could be circumstances in which a denial of the national treatment provisions of the NAFTA 
would not necessarily offend the minimum standard provisions, a majority of the Tribunal de-
termines that on the facts of this particular case the breach of Article 1102 essentially estab-
lishes a breach of Article 1105 as well.” 
100  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 368;  similarly Methanex Corporation v. United 
States of America, UNCITRAL/NAFTA, Final Award of Aug. 3, 2005, Part IV - Chapter C 
par. 25.  
101  Alex Genin v. Estonia (supra note 13), par. 369 and 371.  
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6. Transparency 
A few cases have based a violation of fair and equitable treatment on a lack of trans-
parency.  The Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico, for instance, found that the respon-
dent breached Art. 1105 NAFTA because “Mexico failed to ensure a transparent and 
predictable framework for Metalclad’s business planning and investment”.102  In a 
similar manner, the Tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico connected the element of legiti-
mate expectations to the requirement of transparency by stating:  
“The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a consistent manner, free 
from ambiguity and totally transparently in its relations with the foreign investor, so 
that it may know beforehand any and all rules and regulations that will govern its 
investments, as well as the goals of the relevant policies and administrative practices 
or directives, to be able to plan its investment and comply with such regulations. “103 
Especially, the decision in Metalclad v. Mexico has received major critique for in-
terpreting fair and equitable treatment as including a transparency requirement and 
has been set aside by the Supreme Court of Columbia exercising jurisdiction under 
the British Columbia International Arbitration Act for this reason.104  Yet, the Court 
seems to have over-interpreted the scope of the transparency requirement the Tribu-
nal deduced from fair and equitable treatment.105  Indeed, if transparency is consi-
dered to mean “that all relevant legal requirements for the purpose of initiating, 
completing and successfully operating investments […] should be capable of being 
readily known to all affected investors” and requires the host state “to ensure that the 
correct position is promptly determined and clearly stated so that investors can pro-
ceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident belief that they are acting in 
accordance with all relevant laws”,106 such an onerous standard risks to “overstretch 
the position and function of administrative agencies by developing them into consul-
tative units and insurers for the implementation of foreign investment projects”.107   
Yet, a more restrictive reading of the transparency requirement seems equally 
possible and more closely related to the concept of the rule of law.  In the Tecmed-
 
102  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 99 (emphasis added).  
103  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 154;  similarly Maffezini v. Spain (supra note 60), par. 
83.  
104  See Supreme Court of British Columbia, The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, 
2001 BCSC 644, available via http://www.investmentclaims.com.  
105  In addition, it is questionable whether the domestic courts acted in conformity with the provi-
sions of NAFTA when entertaining a claim to set aside a NAFTA award.  See on this Brower, 
Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 
43  (2001).  
106  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 76 (for both citations).  
107  Schill, Revisiting a Landmark: Indirect Expropriation and Fair and Equitable Treatment in the 
ICSID Case Tecmed, 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 15 (available via http://www. transna-
tional-dispute-management.com);  for the original German version of this article see Schill, 
Völkerrechtlicher Investitions- und Eigentumsschutz in der ICSID-Entscheidung TECMED, 
in: 51 Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 330 (2005).   
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case, for example, transparency mainly referred to procedural aspects of administra-
tive law, such as the requirement to give sufficient reasons108 and the obligation to 
act in a comprehensible and predictable way.109  Essentially, these statements only 
reiterate more general requirement of the rule of law that relate to the procedural 
position of foreign investors in administrative proceedings.  Transparency does 
therefore not necessarily have to be viewed as an additional substantive requirement, 
but rather as an instrument of procedurally resolving uncertainty in the domestic law 
and closely interacts with the burden of proof.  As a matter of procedural fairness 
complete uncertainties of domestic law should not be imposed to the detriment of 
the foreign investor who is less accustomed to the general legal and political culture 
of the host state.   In that sense it is fully compatible with a procedural understand-
ding of the rule of law and does not impose obligations upon host states to counsel 
foreign investors or provide them with comprehensive legal advice.  
7. Reasonableness and Proportionality 
Finally, arbitral tribunals often link fair and equitable treatment to the concept of 
reasonableness and proportionality.  Such criteria also play an important role as part 
of the rule of law in many domestic legal systems, the law of the European Union 
 
108  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 123: “administrative decisions must be duly 
grounded in order to have, among other things, the transparency required so that persons that 
disagree with such decisions may challenge them through all the available legal remedies.”  
Similarly, Tecmed v. Mexico, par. 164.  
109  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 160: “The incidental statements as to the Landfill’s 
relocation in the correspondence exchanged between INE and Cytrar or Tecmed […] cannot be 
considered to be a clear and unequivocal expression of the will of the Mexican authorities to 
change their position as to the extension of the Permit so long as Cytrar’s business was not re-
located, nor can it be considered an explicit, transparent and clear warning addressed to Cytrar 
from the Mexican authorities that rejected conditioning the revocation of the Permit to the re-
location of Cytrar’s operations at the Landfill to another place”.  
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and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.110  Its function, how-
ever, mainly consists in controlling the extent to which interferences of host states 
with foreign investments are permitted.  In this light, the Tribunal in Pope & Talbot 
v. Canada repeatedly referred to the reasonableness of the conduct of an administra-
tive agency in order to decline a violation of fair and equitable treatment.111  The 
mitigating role of the principle of proportionality has also been applied in the deci-
sion in Saluka v. Czech Republic as a way to balance the host state’s interest in up-
holding the stability of its banking sector with the expectations of the foreign inves-
tor.112   
Another award that used proportionality as a concept restricting generally permis-
sible interferences with foreign investments is the decision in Tecmed v. Mexico.  
Here, the Tribunal incorporated a proportionality test as a method to distinguish 
between a compensable indirect expropriation and a non-compensable regulation.113  
In the Tribunal’s reasoning an indirect expropriation occurs whenever a restriction 
of the right to property is disproportionate:   
“[T]he Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be 
characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are proportional to 
the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally 
granted to investments, taking into account that the significance of such impact has a 
key role upon deciding the proportionality. […] There must be a reasonable relation-
ship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor 
and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure.”114  
Although integrating proportionality into the principle of fair and equitable treat-
ment allows to a certain extent for a substantive control of host state conduct, the 
 
110  See for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 167 et seq. on German constitu-
tional law where the proportionality principle arguably finds its origins in modern positive 
constitutional law.  See also Ellis (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(1999);  on proportionality as a principle in EU/EC law Emiliou, The Principle of Proportion-
ality in European Law, p. 23 et seq. (1996);  Nolte, General Principles of German and Euro-
pean Administrative Law - A Comparison in Historic Perspective, 191 Mod. L. Rev. 191 
(1994);  see also Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 Emory Int'l 
L. Rev. 465 (2005).  Proportionality is also a guiding principle in the interpretation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, see van Dijk/van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, p. 80 et seq. (1998). Critical however concerning the 
scope of the proportionality requirement in U.S. constitutional law in particular concerning 
criminal law in the context of the Eighth Amendment see Ristroph, Proportionality as a Princi-
ple of Limited Government, 55 Duke L. J. 263 (2005) with further references;  see also on the 
hesitance in U.S. constitutional law to accept proportiona-lity as a general principle Jackson, 
Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening up the Conversation on 
“Proportionality”, Rights And Federalism, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 583 (1999).  
111  See Pope & Talbot v. Canada (supra note 66), par. 123, 125, 128, 155;  see also MTD v. Chile 
(supra note 18), par. 109 with a reference to an expert opinion by Schwebel.  
112  See above all Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 304 et seq.   
113  Schill (supra note 107), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 9 et seq.  
114  Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 122.  
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proportionality requirement also clarifies that fair and equitable treatment is not an 
inflexible standard, but allows for the balancing of the interests of host states and 
foreign investors.  As long as sufficient leeway is given for the implementation of 
domestic policies and as long as tribunals refrain from using it in order to establish 
an intrusive standard of review, proportionality constitutes a concept that helps to 
counter fears about the dominance of investors’ rights over the interests of host 
states.  Although the concept of proportionality as part of fair and equitable treat-
ment is still in its infancy, it helps to reconcile the interests of foreign investors with 
the necessary implementation of regulatory policies by host states.   
II. Contextualization of Fair and Equitable Treatment in the Separation        
of Powers Framework 
Although the elements arbitral tribunals have developed in order to concretize the 
principle of fair and equitable treatment are of a fairly general nature, they can be 
further concretized in regard of the discharge of public power by the domestic ad-
ministration, in domestic legal proceedings and national legislation.  Fair and equit-
able treatment, thus, develops into increasingly specific requirements that national 
legal systems have to incorporate in order to comply with international investment 
treaties.  Fair and equitable treatment therefore assumes a function that is compare-
able to domestic constitutional law, however with two modifications: it only consti-
tutes a special regime for foreign investors and, only entitling to damages in case the 
host state violates its treaty obligations, does not assume normative supremacy.   
1. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Administrative Law 
National administrative law is particularly prone to the influence of fair and equita-
ble treatment as foreign investors are affected by administrative proceedings at vari-
ous stages of an investment project, reaching from the application for and issuance 
of operating licenses to the general regulatory control and supervision of their under-
taking.  In this context, several sub-elements of the standard establish rule of law 
components that serve as a yardstick for domestic administrative law.  In this con-
text, fair and equitable treatment becomes a leitmotif for structuring the relationship 
between investors and national administrations.115  The rule of law elements that 
mainly influence domestic administrative law are the principle of legality, the pro-
tection of confidence and the requirement of due process.  These elements influence, 
for example, the structure and process of administrative decision-making, account 
 
115  Schill (supra note 107), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006) p. 13 et seq.   
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for procedural rights of foreign investors and may limit the exercise of administra-
tive discretion.   
a) Administrative Procedure 
With respect to administrative procedure, in particular concerning the granting, 
renunciation or renewal of operating licenses, fair and equitable treatment requires 
domestic administrations to grant foreign investors a fair hearing, conduct procee-
dings in a comprehensible way and give reasons for their decisions.  The right to a 
fair hearing and the right to participation in administrative proceedings played a role 
in the NAFTA case Metalclad v. Mexico where the Tribunal found a breach of fair 
and equitable treatment because the investor was not properly involved.  According 
to the Tribunal the investor should have been given the chance to participate in a 
meeting of a local town council that discussed whether a construction permit was to 
be given for the investor’s waste landfill.116  Similarly, the Tribunal in Tecmed v. 
Mexico emphasized the right to a fair hearing as part of fair and equitable treatment 
in the context of an administrative proceeding that concerned the non-prolongation 
of an operating license for a waste landfill.  It also stated that the standard required 
the national administration to take decisions about the requests of a foreign inves-
tor.117   
Fair and equitable treatment further obliges the domestic administration to give 
reasons for their decisions and base them on sufficient factual evidence.  The pur-
pose of this requirement is to rationalize the decision-making process and to secure 
that decisions are taken in accordance with the legal requirements contained in do-
mestic law.  Against this backdrop, the Tribunal in Metalclad v. Mexico determined 
that Mexico had breached the fair and equitable treatment standard because the 
Town Council’s decision to deny the construction permit was not grounded in con-
siderations concerning “construction aspects or flaws of the physical facility”118 but 
was mainly motivated by the opposition of the local population against the landfill.  
In the Tribunal’s view, the decision was therefore not supported by evidence per-
taining to legitimate criteria under the municipal construction law.  The requirement 
to supply sufficient evidence also results in a duty to conduct fact-finding and to 
verify evidence before a final decision is taken.  Furthermore, the requirement to 
give reasons aims at facilitating the legal review of an administrative decision.119  
 
116  The Tribunal particularly pointed out that “the permit was denied at a meeting of the Municipal 
Town Council of which Metalclad received no notice, to which it received no invitation, and at 
which it was given no opportunity to appear”, Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 91.  
117  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 161 et seq.  More specifically on the elements of a 
fair hearing required under fair and equitable treatment Weiler, NAFTA Article 1105 and the 
Principles of International Economic Law, 42 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 35, 79 et seq. (2003).   
118  Metalclad v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 93.  
119  See Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), par. 123. 
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Overall, fair and equitable treatment therefore requires that domestic administrative 
proceedings conform to standards that are derived from a process-oriented under-
standing of the rule of law.120   
b) Exercise of Administrative Discretion 
Fair and equitable treatment can also restrict or channel the exercise of the admini-
stration’s discretionary power.  The standard requires administrative agencies to 
sufficiently take into account the effect of their decisions on foreign investors.  In 
addition, the element of consistency and the concept of legitimate expectations play 
an important role regarding the exercise of administrative discretion.   
The case in Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A. v. Egypt121 in-
volved the seizure and auctioning of the Claimant’s vessel in order to recover debts 
the investor had incurred in relation to a state entity.  Interestingly, the issue focused 
on the question whether the procedural implementation of the auction was valid, in 
particular whether sufficient notice of the seizure was given.122  Arguably in con-
formity with Egyptian law, the notice was given by attaching a copy of a distraint 
report to the vessel, because the Claimant could not be found onboard the ship.  The 
Tribunal, however, considered that the authority had wrongly exercised its discretion 
by using this in absentia notification instead of notifying the Claimant directly at his 
local address.  Relying on the principle of fair and equitable treatment in interpreting 
the due process requirement in the expropriation provision of the Greek-Egyptian 
BIT, the Tribunal reasoned that  
“a matter as important as the seizure and auctioning of a ship of the Claimant 
should have been notified by a direct communication […] irrespective of whether 
there was a legal duty or practice to do so by registered mail with return receipt”.123 
The exercise of administrative discretion can also be limited by the principle of 
consistency and the concept of legitimate expectations.  Consistency requires that 
administrative agencies exercise their discretion according to uniform standards and 
do not deviate from standard procedures or the usual assessment of comparable 
circumstances.  Consistency may not only influence administrative decision-making 
 
120  See for parallel developments of transnational administrative law in the context of administra-
tive proceedings in the EU/EC and similar developments under WTO law della Cananea, Be-
yond the State: the Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 
Eur. Publ. L. 563 (2003).  
121  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/99/6, Award of April 12, 2002.  
122  The issue turned around the question whether the seizure yielded the requirement of due pro-
cess in the provision prohibiting direct and indirect expropriations without compensation in the 
Egyptian-Greek BIT and the principle of fair and equitable treatment.  
123  Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt (supra note 121), par. 143.  
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with respect to the granting of licenses,124 but can also restrict the intervention by 
administrative agencies in order to enforce domestic law.  If, for example, the do-
mestic administration has consistently tolerated a specific unlawful conduct, fair and 
equitable treatment may prevent them from intervening against a foreign investor 
who engaged in the same conduct.  Similarly, legitimate expectations of the investor 
can reduce the administration’s discretionary power.  Acting contrary to representa-
tions made by government officials, for instance, constitutes a breach of fair and 
equitable treatment.125   
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Judicial Proceedings 
The rule of law elements derived from fair and equitable treatment also influence the 
institutional structure of the host state’s judiciary and the procedural law they apply.  
Fair and equitable treatment requires that host states provide a fair and efficient 
system of justice,126 including effective judicial dispute settlement procedures for the 
review of administrative acts127 and dispute settlement between private parties.128  In 
Mondev v. United States the Tribunal, for example, entertained the possibility that 
“the conferral of a general immunity from suit for conduct of a public authority 
affecting a NAFTA investment could amount to a breach of Article 1105(1) of 
NAFTA”.129  In Azinian v. Mexico the Tribunal pointed out that “a denial of justice 
could be pleaded if the relevant courts refused to entertain a suit, if they subject it to 
undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way”.130  Accor-
dingly, fair and equitable treatment grants a right to access to domestic courts for 
foreign investors.   
Similarly, the procedural law applied by domestic courts has to conform to the 
rule of law requirements stemming from fair and equitable treatment.  This requires 
 
124  See MTD v. Chile (supra note 18), par. 107 et seq.  
125  See International Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico (supra note 76), par. 137 et seq.;  Metalclad 
v. Mexico (supra note 52), par. 85 et seq.  
126  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 153 with further references.   
127  Cf, also Waste Management v. Mexico (supra note 25), par. 116: “the availability of local 
remedies to an investor faced with contractual braches is nonetheless relevant to the question 
whether a standard such as article 1105(1) have [sic] been complied with by the State.” 
128  Loewen v. United States (supra note 93), par. 129: “customary law is concerned with the denial 
of justice in litigation between private parties”; ibid., par. 123: “it [is] the responsibility of the 
State under international law and, consequently, of the courts of a State, to provide a fair trial 
of a case to which a foreign investor is a party.  It is the responsibility of the courts of a State 
to ensure that litigation is free from discrimination against a foreign litigant and that the for-
eign litigant should not become the victim of sectional or local prejudice.”  
129  See Mondev v. United States (supra note 10), par. 151 (concluding, however, that the immunity 
granted to a municipal authority in the case at hand was not a violation of fair and equitable 
treatment).   
130  Robert Azinian, Kenneth Davitian, & Ellen Baca v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB (AF)/97/2, Award of Nov. 1, 1999, par. 102.   
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courts to entertain suits in a timely fashion, to give a fair hearing to the foreign in-
vestor on all essential questions, not to base a decision on unexpected legal grounds 
and give reasons for the decisions reached.131  In essence, concerning the judicial 
proceedings the obligations stemming from fair and equitable treatment will be 
similar to the obligations arising under human rights instruments, such as Art. 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights.132   
3. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Domestic Legislation 
Finally, fair and equitable treatment also affects the way national legislation deals 
with foreign investors.133  Although domestic legislation is only rarely subject to the 
assessment of investment tribunals, mainly due to the fact that it often requires spe-
cific implementation by administrative or judicial decisions and does not affect 
foreign investors directly,134 fair and equitable treatment can result in significant 
restrictions of the domestic legislator, mainly based on the rule of law element of 
legitimate expectations or protection of confidence.   
So far the apparently only case that concerned the impact of fair and equitable 
treatment on the domestic legislator is the dispute in CMS v. Argentina.  Although 
the Tribunal emphasized that it “does not have jurisdiction over measures of general 
economic policy […] and cannot pass judgment on whether they are right or wrong 
[…] it has jurisdiction to examine whether specific measures affecting the       
Claimant’s investment or measures of general economic policy having a direct  
 
131  See Azinian v. Mexico (supra footnote 130), par. 102.  To a lesser extent fair and equitable 
treatment may also require the outcome of a legal decision to conform to substantive rule of 
law standards or, as expressed by the Tribunal in Aguas del Aconquija v. Argentina (supra note 
93), par. 80: “substantive justice”. 
132  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
protocols, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.  For this analogy see Mondev v. United States (su-
pra note 10), par. 144.  Compare also Art. 19(4) of the German Basic Law that provides for a 
guarantee to have judicial recourse against acts of public authority.  
133  Under general international law it is established that the internal law of a state cannot be in-
voked as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty, see Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties.  As a consequence, the breach of an international obligation by the 
domestic legislator entails state responsibility since acts of the legislator can constitute interna-
tionally wrongful acts.  Art. 4(1) of the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility.  See for fur-
ther authority International Law Commission, Commentary on the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, Art. 4 par. 4 (2001), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments 
/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf.  
134  Cf. on the question of the self-executing nature of expropriatory legislation Jahangir Mohtadi, 
et al. and The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 573-271-3 (2 Dec. 
1996), 32 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 124, 140 et seq.;  Reza Said Malek and The Government of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, Final Award No. 534-193-3 (11 Aug. 1992), 28 Iran-U.S. C.T.R. 246, 
266 et seq.  
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bearing on such investment have been adopted in violation of legally binding com-
mitments made to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts.”135   
On the merits, the Tribunal in CMS v. Argentina specified that transparency, con-
sistency in the governmental decision making process, orderly process and predict-
ability constituted the core elements of fair and equitable treatment also with respect 
to national legislation.136  Measures that entirely converted the existing legal frame-
work, such as the fundamental change in the U.S. dollar-based tariff calculation that 
the investor relied upon when making its initial investment decision, were found to 
breach fair and equitable treatment.  Arguably, the key factor in this context was the 
permanent abrogation of the existing tariff system that completely waived the cen-
tral promises made vis-à-vis the investor and breached his expectations.137   
Yet, the protection of confidence should not be interpreted as an absolute guaran-
tee.  Rather, as the Tribunal in Saluka v. Czech Republic rightly pointed out, “[n]o 
investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the 
investment is made remain totally unchanged”.138  Although the stability of the legal 
framework is an essential factor for the investment decision of foreign investors, one 
cannot presume that host states denounced their right to legislate and change domes-
tic legal rules by entering into international investment treaties.  Concerning the 
concept of legitimate expectations, it therefore seems appropriate to draw a distinc-
tion between situations where a host state has incited specific confidence in the 
stability of certain regulations and situations where a foreign investor merely relied 
on the regulatory framework of the host state in a more general way.   
In the first case, the concept of legitimate expectations will find its genuine appli-
cation.  Not only are expectations in this context directly attributable to a host state, 
but moreover did the host state know about the specific weight the foreign investor 
placed on the regulatory infrastructure in making its investment decision.  Yet, ab-
sent specific commitments, legitimate expectations will not operate so as to prevent 
any changes in the regulatory framework.  Based on the principle of proportionality, 
in particular emergency situations may justify even severe interferences.139   
In the second case, where a foreign investor merely relies on the general legal 
framework without any specific commitments or intention on behalf of the host state 
to attract foreign investors, the concept of legitimate expectations may only have a 
more marginal scope of application.  It will mostly come into play with respect to 
legislation with a retroactive affect.140  Apart from that, it is difficult to imagine 
 
135  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 48), Decision on Jurisdiction, par. 33.  
136  CMS v. Argentina (supra note 13), par. 276 et seq. with further references.  
137  See also Costamagna (supra note 81), 3 TDM (issue 2, April 2006), p. 6 et seq.  
138  Saluka v. Czech Republic (supra note 19), par. 305.  
139  Compare Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law?, 38 Brit. 
Yb. Int’l L. 307, 331 (1962) (noting that in the context of expropriation the purpose of a host 
state’s conduct may justify “even severe, although by no means complete, restrictions on the 
use of property”).  
140  See for example Schulze-Fielitz (supra note 37), Art. 20 par. 139 et seq.  
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cases of legislative regulatory change that violate fair and equitable treatment but do 
not at the same constitute measures with an expropriatory effect.   
III. Methodological Implications of the Rule of Law Approach  
Understanding fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of law does 
not only clarify its normative content, it also suggests a specific methodology in-
vestment tribunals should follow in concretizing the standard and in solving con-
flicts between the sometimes competing interests of host states and foreign inves-
tors.  Instead of primarily relying on prior arbitral decisions, an approach that is little 
helpful in particular when disputes concern novel circumstances, or positing the 
content of fair and equitable treatment in an abstract way without sufficient justifica-
tion, tribunals should use a comparative method that draws on domestic and interna-
tional law regarding the concept of the rule of law.  These bodies of law can eluci-
date the meaning and specific implications of rule of law requirements.   
1. Comparative Analysis of Domestic Legal Systems 
The first approach relies on a comparative approach to rule of law standards con-
tained in the major domestic legal systems that adhere to a liberal tradition.  This 
approach essentially relies on the attempt to extract general principles of law in 
order to concretize fair and equitable treatment.  This approach has also been pro-
posed in order to concretize the concept of indirect expropriation under international 
law and its distinction from non-compensable regulation.141  With respect to the 
concept of the rule of law, such an approach can be made equally fruitful for the 
application of fair and equitable treatment.  Arbitral tribunals should therefore en-
gage in a comparative analysis of the major domestic legal systems in order to grasp 
common features those legal systems establish for the exercise of public power.   
Such a comparative analysis may influence the interpretation of fair and equitable 
treatment mainly in two respects.  First, it may enable investment tribunals to posi-
tively deduce institutional and procedural requirements from the domestic rule of 
law standards for a context-specific interpretation of fair and equitable treatment.  A 
comparative analysis of domestic legal systems and their understanding of the rule 
of law may, for example, be used to justify the standards administrative proceedings 
 
141  Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht, p. 213 et seq. 
(1985);  Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Inv. L. J. 41 
(1986).  Similarly Salacuse/Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 Harv. Int'l L. J. 67, 115 (2005).   
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affecting foreign investors have to live up to.142  Secondly, a comparative analysis of 
the implications of the rule of law under domestic law may be used to justify the 
conduct of a state vis-à-vis a foreign investor under the fair and equitable treatment 
standard.  If similar conduct, for instance the repudiation of an investor-state con-
tract in an emergency situation, is generally accepted by domestic legal systems as 
being in conformity with their understanding of the (national) rule of law, invest-
ment tribunals can transpose such findings to the level of international investment 
treaties as an expression of a general principle of law.   
2. Comparative Analysis of International Legal Regimes 
The second methodological approach relies on a cross-regime comparison with other 
international law regimes that incorporate rule of law standards.  A particularly 
promising field for such an approach is the comparative evaluation of the jurispru-
dence developed by international courts in the human rights context that address 
specific elements of the rule of law.  The primary example in this context is the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) concerning Art. 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  This provision can be viewed 
as an expression of a more general standard of an institutional and procedural under-
standing of the rule of law.143  The rich jurisprudence of the ECtHR could thus be 
used to further concretize fair and equitable treatment, for example with respect to 
the timely administration of justice or the right to a fair trial.144  Similarly, compara-
tive recourse could be had to the emerging principles of European administrative 
law145 or the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body in order to further develop 
the rule of law requirements with respect to the exercise of public power.146  The 
comparative analysis of rule of law understandings under both domestic legal sys-
 
142  See also della Cananea (supra note 120), 9 Eur. Publ. L. 563, 575 (2003) (explaining that the 
WTO Appellate Body in the Shrimps Case has “subsumed from national legal orders some 
general or ‘global’ principles of administrative law” in order to impose procedural rule of law 
elements on the exercise of public power by WTO Member States).  
143  This approach has occasionally already played a role in investment arbitration. See Mondev v. 
United States (supra note 10), where parallels were considered between Art. 7 ECHR (freedom 
from non-retrospective effect of penal legislation) and Art. 1105 NAFTA (par. 138) and be-
tween the assessment of granting immunity to a state agency under Art. 1105 NAFTA and Art. 
6 ECHR (par. 141 et seq.).  Another example of an investment tribunal that drew a parallel be-
tween the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights in the context of indirect expropriation is Tecmed v. Mexico (supra note 27), 
par. 166, 122.   
144  For an account of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Art. 6 
ECHR, see van Dijk/van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, p. 391 et seq. (1998).  
145  See, for example, Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht (2nd ed. 2005).  
146  See della Cananea (supra note 120), 9 Eur. Publ. L. 563, 575 (2003).  
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tems and other international law regimes should be able to give examples for the 
effect of the rule of law and the scope of restrictions it imposes on states and thus 
help to inform the content of fair and equitable treatment in international investment 
law.  Yet, it will, always be necessary to keep in mind the specific context of inter-
national investment treaties which aim at protecting and promoting foreign invest-
ment between the contracting state parties.   
D. A Normative Justification of the Rule of Law Approach 
Explaining the various context-specific implementations and sub-elements derived 
from fair and equitable treatment as an embodiment of the rule of law can also be 
normatively grounded in international investment treaties by linking this understan-
ding to the intentions of the contracting state parties as expressed in the object and 
purpose of international investment treaties.  This teleology can be instrumentalized 
in order to equate fair and equitable treatment with the concept of the rule of law as 
a guiding and restricting principle for the exercise of public power by host states.  In 
particular, institutional economics suggest that the concept of the rule of law con-
tributes to the promotion of foreign investment and, more generally, economic 
growth and development.  
I. The Teleology of International Investment Treaties  
As expressed in their preambles, international investment treaties aim not only at 
protecting but also at promoting foreign investment.147  Investment flows will, how-
ever, depend on the decision of foreign investors to invest in a certain country.  One 
critical factor for this investment decision is the political risk of the host country.148  
Consequently, international investment treaties intend to establish a legal regime 
 
147  See Dolzer/Stevens (supra note 20), p. 11 et seq., 20 et seq. (1995).  See in general on the 
effects of bilateral investment treaties on actual flows of foreign investment Neumayer/Spess, 
Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Coun-
tries?, 33 World Development 1567 (2005);  Salacuse/Sullivan (supra note 141), 46 Harv. Int'l 
L. J. 67 (2005); Tobin/Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environ-
ment in Developing Countries: the Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Yale Law School 
Center for Law, Economics and Public Policy Research Paper No. 293. (all suggesting, albeit 
to differing degrees the existence of an empirical link between the existence of BITs, the do-
mestic policy framework and actual investment flows). 
148  On the connection between international investment treaties and the reduction of political risk 
see Rubins/Kinsella (supra note 48), p. 1 et seq. (2005). 
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that reduces the political risk associated with foreign investment in order to increase 
investment flows between the contracting parties149.   
The mechanisms for the protection and promotion of foreign investment are, 
however, not an end in themselves.  They are rather closely related to the goals of 
economic growth and development, in particular in developing countries.  This was 
explicitly mentioned as an objective of the ICSID Convention that recognized “the 
need for international cooperation for economic development, and the role of private 
international investment therein”.150  The link between the inflow of foreign invest-
ment and economic development is further reinforced by the character of the World 
Bank as a development institution.151  The implementation of an investor-state dis-
pute settlement mechanism under the ICSID Convention aimed at reducing the po-
litical risk connected with investing in a developing country with weaker domestic 
institutions and a less stable legal and political infrastructure in the interest of 
growth and development.152  Accordingly, from a macroeconomic perspective fo-
reign investment is perceived as “a supplement to a necessarily limited volume of 
public development finance”.153   
II. Institutional Economics and the Role of the Rule of Law 
Institutional economics help to explain the function of the rule of law with respect to 
both objectives of international investment treaties, i. e. the promotion of foreign 
investment and economic growth and development.  Institutional economics analyze 
the relationship between institutions, markets and growth.  Institutions, in this con-
text, are “rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction.”154  Institutions are characterized by con-
 
149  See Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 41 Harv. Int’l L. J. 469, 478 
et seq. (2000) (concluding at 490 that the “principal contribution [of bilateral investment trea-
ties] to increasing investment is to reduce risk for investors and thereby provide some induce-
ments for those investments that the host state desires”).  
150  See the preamble of the ICSID Convention.   
151  Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Natio-
nals of Other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 342 et seq. (1972-II);  Schöbener/Markert, 
Das International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 105 ZVglRWiss 65, 
67 (2006).  
152  See for an overview on the contentious question to what extent foreign investment actually 
contributes to economic growth Cosbey, International Investment Agreements and Sustainable 
Development: Achieving the Millenium Development Goals, p. 11 et seq. (2005), available at 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_iias.pdf.  
153  Broches (supra note 151), 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 343 (1972-II). 
154  North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, p. 3 (1990).  See also 
North, Structure and Change in Economic History, p. 201 et seq. (1981) (defining institutions 
as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to 
constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of 
principals”).  
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straints with a certain permanence and durability which are imposed on actors.155  
They comprise legal rules that impose restrictions on the behavior of individuals as 
well as legal requirements that concern the exercise of public power.  Institutions 
thus have a double thrust in avoiding private disorder, on the one hand, as well as 
public dictatorship on the other.156  They are also essential for the functioning of 
markets as they “structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, 
or economic”.157  In this sense, the rule of law as a concept of restricting public 
power can be properly understood as an institution that constitutes one of the bases 
of market economies.   
With respect to the immediate objective of international investment treaties, the 
concept of the rule of law is important in the context of attracting investment into fo-
reign, particularly developing countries.  This becomes clear from an empirical 
perspective.  According to a survey by the World Bank, investors primarily make 
their decision to invest dependent upon the credibility of states to ensure a predict-
able and stable legal framework, or – in other words – to effectively implement the 
rule of law.158  Conversely, government activity and domestic legal procedures that 
do not adhere to the concept of the rule of law constitute a critical deterrent for an 
investment decision in a specific country.  Government according to the rule of law 
is therefore a prerequisite for risk-adverse investment decisions in a specific country.  
This fact should influence the interpretation of international investment treaties, in 
particular concerning the principle of fair and equitable treatment.   
Yet, the rule of law does not only influence the foreign investor’s microeconomic 
perspective.  Instead, institutional economics also suggest a link between the rule of 
law and the broader objective of international investment treaties, i. e. economic 
growth and development, because “[e]conomic institutions matter for economic 
growth because they shape the incentives of key economic actors in society, in par-
ticular, they influence investments in physical and human capital and technology, 
and the organization of production.”159 
The importance of the rule of law in the decision making process of economic ac-
tors has been highlighted in economic literature since its earliest days.  Max Weber 
was among the first scholars to argue for the interdependence of the emergence of 
modern forms of growth-creating market-economies in Western civilizations and a 
 
155  See Glaeser/La Porta/Shleifer, Do Institutions Cause Growth?, 9 J. Econ. Growth 271, 275 
(2004).  
156  See for this double thrust in evaluating the rule of law as an economic institution 
Djankov/Glaeser/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer, The New Comparative Economics, 31 J. 
Comp. Econ. 595 (2003).  
157  North (supra note 154), p. 3 (1990).   
158  World Bank, World Development Report – The State in a Changing World 5, p. 34 et seq. 
(1997).  
159  Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson, Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Economic Growth, 
Working Paper 10481, NBER Working Paper Series, p. 2, available at http://www.nber.org/pa 
pers/w10481.  
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modern legal system based on rational and predictable rules.160  For him, the core 
explanation for economic growth in Europe was the rationality of the legal institu-
tions, including the existence and enforcement of contracts and property rights, 
which had emerged in the socio-legal discourse in the 18th and 19th century and 
subsequently paved the way for the development of modern market economies.161  
Weber thus showed that modern law “helps structure the free market system”.162   
Although Weber primarily focused on the function of legal institutions to create 
horizontal order between private individuals by enabling them to use private law 
institutions for purposes of private ordering, institutions are also critical in the rela-
tionship between the state and society.  In this context, the rule of law is the primary 
and, at the same time, most general expression for the predictable exercise of public 
power vis-à-vis the individual.  This aspect complements the function of the rule of 
law as an institution that aims at not only avoiding private disorder but also public 
dictatorship.163  It is also the aspect that grasps the public law understanding of the 
concept and its function of limiting the exercise of public power.   
This aspect has been described as an important factor for the functioning of mar-
ket economies and economic growth.  Already Adam Smith noted that  
“[c]ommerce and manufacturers can seldom flourish long in any state which does 
not enjoy a regular administration of justice, in which the people do not feel them-
selves secure in the possession of their property, in which the faith of contracts is not 
supported by law, and in which the authority of the state is not supposed to be regu-
larly employed in enforcing the payment of debts from all those who are able to pay.  
Commerce and manufacturers, in short, can seldom flourish in any state in which 
there is not a certain degree of confidence in the justice of government.”164   
Similarly, F. A. Hayek underscored the importance of the rule of law’s restraining 
function with respect to public authority for modern market economies and eco-
nomic growth.  For him, “[n]othing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free 
country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in 
the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law.”165  In his reasoning, 
 
160  Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (4th ed. J. 
Winckelmann, 1956).  
161  For a short and informative summary of Weber’s account of the relationship between law and 
economic growth see Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay in the Study of Law 
and Development, 82 Yale L. J. 1, 11 et seq. (1972).  
162  Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 15 (1972).   
163  See Djankov/Glaeser/La Porta/Lopez-de-Silanes/Shleifer (supra note 156), 31 J. Comp. Econ. 
595 (2003).  
164  Adam Smith, cited in: Rodrik/Subramanian/Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institu-
tions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. Econ. Growth 131 
(2004).  See also North/Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institu-
tions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. Econ. Hist. 803 (1989);  
De Long/Shleifer, Princes and Merchants: European City Growth Before the Industrial Revolu-
tion, 36 J. Law Econ. 671 (1993).  
165  Hayek, The Road To Serfdom, p. 72 (1944).  
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market economies are based on the initiatives and decision-making of individuals 
who, in order to be able to plan their economic efforts, require governmental actions 
to be restricted according to rules “made in advance, in the shape of formal rules 
which do not aim at the wants and needs of particular people [, but] are intended to 
be merely instrumental in the pursuit of people’s various individual ends.”166   
While the function of legal institutions was initially mainly of interest in explain-
ing the economic development of industrialized nations and was debated in the ideo-
logical conflict between liberalism and socialism, lawyers and social scientists took 
interest in institutional economics after decolonization gained momentum after 
World War II in order to explain and remedy the economic weaknesses of many 
developing countries.  In this context, the “law and development” movement focus-
sed on the function of law in the Third World and its possible impact on sustainable 
economic growth.167  In its core conception, the movement viewed “modern law 
[…] as a functional prerequisite of an industrial economy”, because it promoted the 
development of markets or, in a more state-centered view, enabled the state to use 
law as a tool to guide economic activity.168  Notably, the concept of the rule of law 
figured prominently in the movement’s theoretic framework.169   
More recently, the linkage between institutions, growth and development is ana-
lyzed by new institutional economics.  Scholars in this field particularly emphasize 
the significance of a well-functioning legal system that embodies the rule of law for 
economic growth and development.  Posner, for instance, points to the “empirical 
evidence showing that the rule of law does contribute to a nation’s wealth and its 
 
166  Hayek (supra note 165), p. 73.  
167  See for an overview of the law and development movement with further references see Trubek 
(supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1 (1972).  
168  Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 6 et seq. (1972).   
169  See Trubek/Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law 
and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wisc. L. Rev. 1062, 1071 (1974);  see 
also Trubek (supra note 161), 82 Yale L. J. 1, 6 et seq. (1972) with further references.  Al-
though the scholarly endeavors of the law and development movement ended quickly in the 
United States because the perspective it assumed was criticized as centered on Western thought 
and little receptive to the needs and traditions of third world countries, its legacy continued in 
other countries and was also influential with respect to the development efforts of international 
organisations within the United Nations system.  For an overview of the history of the law and 
development movement see Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 
A.J.I.L. 470, 472 et seq. (1995). 
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rate of economic growth.”170  This evidence is also buttressed by various theoretic 
economic analyses.171   
The findings of new institutional economics have also been at the core of the de-
velopment strategy of the World Bank.  The linkage between the rule of law and 
economic development has, in particular, materialized in the Bank’s legal reform 
program.172  It has also been reiterated in the World Bank’s good governance 
agenda, which comprises, as one of the core concepts that help to establish good 
government in developing countries, the rule of law.  In its 1992 report on Gover-
nance and Development the Bank stated, although not in respect of foreign invest-
ment, that  
“[the] connection of the rule of law with efficient use of resources and productive 
investment, which must be understood and dealt with in highly specific and differen-
tiated cultural and political settings, is the aspect most important to economic deve-
lopment, and hence to World Bank assistance.”173  
While the economic literature consistently points to parallels and interdependen-
cies between economic development and the emergence of stable and reliable insti-
tutions, the nature of the relationship between institutions and economic growth is 
debated, in particular whether, and if so to what extent, a causal relationship be-
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vestment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 903 (1995);  East-
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note 164), 9 J. Econ. Growth 131 (2004). 
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The Logic of Collective Action (1965);  Olson, Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist 
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172  See for an analysis of the economic underpinnings and the development strategy of the World 
Bank’s law reform program from a critical perspective Tshuma, The Political Economy of the 
World Bank’s Legal Framework for Economic Development, 8 Soc. & L. Stud. 75 (1999).   
173  World Bank, Governance and Development, p. 28 (1992).  The concept of the rule of law that 
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Ibid., p. 30 (1992): “(a) there is a set of rules known in advance, (b) the rules are actually in 
force, (c) there are mechanisms ensuring application of the rules, (d) conflicts are resolved 
through binding decisions of an independent judicial body, and (e) there are procedures for 
amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose”. 
 69 
tween institutions and growth exists.174  From this perspective it is unclear whether 
the development of legal institutions, including the rule of law, will result in eco-
nomic growth or whether, in turn, legal institutions are a result of prior economic 
development and the pressure exercised by the respective interests of economic 
actors.  Yet, even if institutions do not trump all other factors in the quest for eco-
nomic growth,175 they nevertheless constitute one important factor for growth and 
development.  In addition, the debate about a causal relationship between institu-
tions and growth seems to be mitigated in the context of foreign investment by the 
fact that a certain institutional infrastructure that reduces the investment risk is ne-
cessary to attract foreign investment.  Therefore the critique concerning the causality 
between institutions and growth seems to be less convincing than in a setting where 
growth is to be based solely on internal and self-induced economic activity.   
Although the rule of law is surely not the only variable that influences economic 
growth,176 institutional economics show the importance of the concept for growth 
and development.  Consequently, it seems appropriate to draw a connection between 
the economic analysis of institutional economics, in particular its emphasis on the 
impact of the rule of law both on the microeconomics of foreign investors and its 
macroeconomic implications, and the normative framework of international invest-
ment treaties.177  This gives a normative foundation for interpreting fair and equit-
able treatment as an embodiment of the concept of the rule of law since states pre-
sumably intended to establish institutions that effectively contribute to the object 
and purpose of international investment treaties and thus to growth and develop-
ment.   
 
174  See, for example, Glaeser/La Porta/Shleifer (supra note 155), 9 J. Econ. Growth 271 (2004) 
(denying a causal relationship and emphasizing the importance of human capital).              
Easterly/Levine (supra note 170), 50 J. Mon. Econ. 3 (2003) (emphasizing the importance of 
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176  See North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 359, 366 (1994): “[…] 
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(2001) (arguing that “[t]he investment rules regime is intended to protect established invest-
ments abroad far into the future by locking countries into predictable regulatory frameworks.  
The objective is to bind states to a version of economic liberalism, to impose the discipline of 
the ‘rule of law’ on state regulation of the market; domestic rules are thereby rendered predict-
able and certain.”).  
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E. Conclusion 
Fair and equitable treatment has become one of the standard guarantees of protection 
in international investment treaties and is regularly applied by investment tribunals 
as a basis for ordering host states to pay damages to foreign investors.  The scope 
given to it in recent investment arbitration is increasingly wide, covering restrictions 
of domestic courts, domestic administrative bodies and even the national legislator.  
This transforms fair and equitable treatment into a quasi-constitutional concept that 
overarches the activity of states vis-à-vis foreign investors.  At the same time, arbi-
tral tribunals and scholars in the field of investment protection and public interna-
tional law frequently note the amorphous structure, the lack of a definition and, in 
more general terms, the lack of a conceptual understanding of the normative content 
of this wide-spread treaty standard.   
The vagueness of the fair and equitable treatment standard constitutes structural 
problems for the principle’s interpretation and construction by arbitral tribunals.  
While the arbitral jurisprudence continuously develops a more precise meaning of 
fair and equitable treatment, it nevertheless meanders around without any clear con-
ceptual vision of the principle’s function.  The reasoning in arbitral awards is there-
fore often weak or even unconvincing in its legal analysis.  It regularly restricts itself 
to invoking equally weakly reasoned precedent or refers in an inconclusive manner 
to the object and purpose of BITs without any deeper justification of how the spe-
cific construction contributes to the treaties’ objective.  Ultimately, these shortcom-
ings endanger the suitability of fair and equitable treatment as a concept against 
which the conduct of host states can be measured.  The main concern in this context 
is that the jurisprudence does not produce predictable results that are accepted by 
states but endorse an approach that allows for a broad ex post facto control of host 
state conduct.  Predictability in its application is, however, essential for host states 
and foreign investors alike who need to know beforehand what kind of measures 
entail the international responsibility of the state and, accordingly, against which 
kind of political risk fair and equitable treatment protects.   
In order to grasp the normative content of fair and equitable treatment, this article 
submitted that the standard can be understood as an embodiment of the rule of law.  
The survey of investment decision shows that the concept underlying fair and equit-
able treatment is functionally equivalent to the understanding of the requirements 
deduced from the rule of law under domestic legal systems and other international 
law regimes.  Investment tribunals have thus interpreted fair and equitable treatment 
so as to encompass sub-elements the rule of law is associated with in various domes-
tic legal systems.  In this respect, the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals concerning 
fair and equitable treatment can be analyzed as including (1) the requirement of 
stability and predictability of the legal framework and consistency in the host state’s 
decision-making, (2) the principle of legality, (3) the protection of investor confi-
dence or legitimate expectations, (4) procedural due process and denial of justice, 
(5) protection against discrimination and arbitrariness, (6) the requirement of trans-
parency and (7) the concept of reasonableness and proportionality.   
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In its core, the rule of law understanding underlying the jurisprudence of invest-
ment tribunals can be described as primarily procedural and institutional in nature.  
Accordingly, the control exercised by investment tribunals over the conduct of host 
states is mainly concerned with the institutional structure and the procedural imple-
mentation of law and policy which affect foreign investors.  Fair and equitable 
treatment, for example, requires the existence of a minimal separation of powers in 
host states, the possibility of recourse to courts for the adjudication of private rights 
and the review of acts of public authorities, legal security, protection of legitimate 
expectations and the observance of procedural rights in administrative and judicial 
proceedings. 
At the same time, such a procedural and institutional understanding of the rule of 
law allows states sufficient leeway in implementing their own substantive policy 
choices and in reacting to newly emerging circumstances, including state emergen-
cies.  Fair and equitable treatment does, however, not only influence the way host 
states change their regulatory frameworks after an investment was made,178 but in a 
more comprehensive way requires them to adapt their domestic legal orders to stan-
dards that are internationally accepted as conforming to the concept of the rule of 
law.  While, the paper only aimed at outlining the general features of a rule of law 
understanding of fair and equitable treatment and tried to explain the concept and 
function of this widely used treaty standard, the exact contours of the various sub-
element still require further elaboration and context-specific analyses.   
Arguably, such an understanding of fair and equitable treatment can be supported 
by an economic analysis of international investment treaties.  This is particularly 
true considering the object and purpose of investment treaties that aim at protecting 
and promoting foreign investment flows and ultimately economic growth and devel-
opment.  This purposive link between the protection standards contained in the trea-
ties and the promotion of investment justifies drawing a parallel to the economic 
literature that expands on the relationship between the rule of law and economic 
growth.  The positive economic impacts that are linked to the rule of law and the 
incentive structure necessary for foreign investors to invest in a specific country 
suggest such an understanding of fair and equitable treatment as appropriate in the 
context of investment treaties.  This can be buttressed by the assumption that states 
intended to have the most efficient structures implemented in order to promote in-
vestment flows.  Finally, the paper suggests that tribunals should draw – in a com-
parative approach – on the jurisprudence of domestic and international courts on rule 
of law standards in order to further concretize fair and equitable treatment.  This 
would help to convincingly justify and apply fair and equitable treatment in various 
context-specific fields of economic activity and state regulation.  At the same time, 
the reference to rule of law concepts under domestic legal orders also illustrates that 
the rule of law is not an absolute guarantee but rather allows for a balance between 
the interests of host states and foreign investors.  In this context, one should keep in 
 
178  In this sense Dolzer (supra note 8), 39 Int’l Law. 87, 100 et seq. (2005).  
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mind the words of Joseph Raz who concluded his seminal article on the The Rule of 
Law and its Virtue by recalling:  
“After all the rule of law is meant to enable the law to promote social good, and 
should not be lightly used to show that it should not do so.  Sacrificing too many 
social goals on the altar of the rule of law may make the law barren and empty.”179  
 
179  Raz (supra note 39), 93 L. Quart. Rev. 195, 211 (1977).  
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“Expropriation” and “Fair and Equitable Treatment” Standards in Recent 
ICSID Jurisprudence        
            
Comment by Jo Delaney∗ 
Thank you to Professor Hofmann and the organisers for their kind invitation and 
giving me, a younger practitioner, an opportunity to present. 
Mr Schill’s comprehensive analysis of the standards of expropriation and fair and 
equitable treatment raises many thought provoking questions.  
I want to focus on the interrelationship between the two standards in the 10 mi-
nutes I have. As Mr Schill has referred to in his analysis, the trend in recent invest-
ment cases, ICSID and non-ICSID, raises questions about the role of the legitimate 
expectations of the investor and how such expectations connect these two standards. 
First, I want to briefly address the increasing emphasis on legitimate expectations as 
an essential element of fair and equitable treatment. Then, I will look at the role of 
the investor's expectations in determining whether there has been an expropriation, 
particularly a "regulatory taking", which is itself a growing concept.  
A. Legitimate Expectations - Fair and Equitable Treatment 
The focus on the legitimate expectations of the investor has widened the standard of 
"fair and equitable" treatment beyond the minimum standard for aliens in customary 
international law. Recent cases have emphasised that fair and equitable treatment not 
only requires the State not to act in an unreasonable or arbitrary manner or to ensure 
good faith or due process, but it also now requires that the State consider and act 
consistently with the legitimate expectations of the investor.  
The respect for the investor's "legitimate expectations" was explained in detail in 
paragraph 154 of the Tribunal's Award in the Tecmed case. I won't read out the 
paragraph as it is very long but the Tribunal referred to the need for the State to act 
consistently, "free from ambiguity and totally transparently", not only in relation to 
regulations but the goals of regulations so the investor can plan its investment and 
comply with the necessary regulations. The Tribunal emphasised that consistency 
requires the State not to arbitrarily revoke any pre-existing decisions or permits 
which the investor has relied upon and to act in conformity with any regulations.  
This approach has been adopted in subsequent cases which have also been ana-
lyzed by Mr Schill: 
 
∗  Jo Delaney, Attorney Clifford Chance LLP, London. 
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• MTD v Chile (ICSID) where the Tribunal found that it was unfair that the State 
(acting through one body) approved an investment and entered into a foreign in-
vestment contract when the investment was against the policy of the State itself 
in that the State would not change a zoning permit in order to grant the neces-
sary permits for the investment. 
• Occidental Petroleum v Ecuador (UNCITRAL) - where the Tribunal found that 
the State had acted without clarity and inconsistently in relation to the tax 
change and its practice and regulations in relation to VAT refunds. The investor 
had entered into participation contracts for the exploration and production of oil 
and had been able to claim VAT refunds but in 2001 there was a change in tax 
policy by the SRI (tax authority) and subsequent VAT refunds were denied. 
• CMS v Argentina  (ICSID) - where the Tribunal found that the State had not 
provided a stable legal and business environment as required as an essential 
element of fair and equitable treatment, these guarantees being crucial for the 
investor's investment decision]  
 
Most recently, it was considered by the NAFTA Tribunal in Thunderbird Gaming 
Corporation v Mexico (UNCITRAL), the ad hoc Tribunal in Eureko v Poland and 
the UNCITRAL Tribunal in Saluka Investments BV v Czech Republic (otherwise 
referred to as Nomura case).   
While Saluka was not an ICSID case but under the UNCITRAL Rules, the Tribu-
nal's comments are still instructive to future ICSID Tribunals. The Tribunal in that 
case emphasised that "legitimate expectations" was the "dominant element" of the 
fair and equitable standard. The investor's expectations included the State's observa-
tion of "good faith, due process and non-discrimination" (para 303). The Tribunal 
stressed that such expectations must be legitimate and reasonable "in light of the 
circumstances" (para 304).  
The Tribunal held that the Czech Republic undertook an obligation not to frus-
trate the legitimate and reasonable expectations of the investor (para 302) and found 
that the Czech Republic had breached the investor's legitimate expectations such that 
it had treated the investor unfairly and inequitably. It is how the Tribunal found this 
breach, while also holding that its conduct did not amount to expropriation because 
of the State's right to regulate that I want to focus on but first I will address the role 
of legitimate expectations in expropriation.  
Similarly in Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v Mexico, the NAFTA Tribunal 
held that if the State's conduct creates legitimate expectations and the investor acts 
in reliance on that conduct, the State must honour those expectations if a failure to 
do so would cause damage to the investor (para 147).  
Professor Thomas Walde expanded upon this concept in his Separate Opinion, 
emphasising that the expectation must be "legitimate" through some official conduct 
and that the investor must have relied upon that conduct to its detriment (para 1, 21, 
119).There must be reasonable detrimental reliance if the investor is to be entitled to 
compensation. 
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B. Legitimate Expectations - Expropriation  
The investor's legitimate expectation is often the starting point for a tribunal's analy-
sis of whether there has been an expropriation of the investment.  
For example, in Metalclad, the Tribunal looked to whether the investor had been 
deprived "in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be expected 
economic benefit of the property" (para 103). 
In Tecmed, the Tribunal looked at the investor's expectations of its return on the 
investment, particularly since it was a long term investment that required time to 
establish the business and recover the investment and obtain an expected return. In 
determining whether there had been an expropriation of the investment, the Tribunal 
analysed (1) the reasonable expectations of the investor for a return; (2) whether the 
State had failed to protect the investor's rights when the State was confronted with 
social opposition; and (3) whether the measures taken were proportionate to the 
investor's expectations or excessive in light of the social protests.  
In both of these cases, the Tribunals found that the State had deprived the investor 
of its legitimate expectations to a return or economic benefit and thus had expropri-
ated the investment.  They also found a breach of fair and equitable treatment. 
However, in some cases, even though the Tribunal found that the State acted in-
consistently with the investor's legitimate expectations and found a breach of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, it did not found that the State's conduct amounted 
to an expropriation of the investment. There is not necessarily any inconsistency 
between these two findings but there may be where the alleged expropriation is 
found to be a legitimate regulation. 
For example, in CMS, the Tribunal found that the State failed to provide a stable 
legal and business environment due to the uncertainty of the period from 2000 to 
2002 and the final determinations under the Emergency Law, thereby in breach of 
the fair and equitable treatment standard. However, it did not find an expropriation 
as (1) CMS retained full ownership and remained in control of the investment; and 
(2) the Government had not managed the day-to-day operations of the company. In 
this case, the Tribunal focused on the investor's continuing ownership, management 
and control rather than whether Argentina's regulatory measures were legitimate.  
But what if the investor does lose its investment, as in the Saluka case? Can a 
regulation that is said to be legitimate also be consistent with the legitimate expecta-
tions of the investor? What if the carrying out of that regulation by the State is in-
consistent with investor's expectations? How is the State's legitimate regulation to be 
balanced against the investor's legitimate expectations? 
The Saluka case raises questions about the interrelationship between an investor's 
legitimate expectations in the context of fair and equitable treatment on the one 
hand, and expropriation, on the other. The alleged expropriation in this case was a 
"regulatory taking". The Tribunal found that the State's regulatory actions were 
justified: i.e. that the Czech National Bank was justified in imposing the forced 
administration on the bank and appointing an administrator, particularly since the 
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decision had been confirmed by the CNB Appellate Board and upheld by the Prague 
City Court twice.  
Yet the Tribunal also found that the State had acted unfairly and inequitably, con-
trary to Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations:  
 
• (1) The State had failed to provide financial assistance to IPB for the bad debt 
problem when it had provided that assistance to three of the Big Four banks. 
The Tribunal recognised that this failure was discriminatory and created an en-
vironment which made it impossible for the IPB to survive. Saluka was justified 
in expecting to be treated in an even-handed and reasonable manner. 
• (2)  The State had also failed to take seriously Saluka's proposals to solve the 
problem and deal with it in an objective, transparent, unbiased and even-handed 
way. The State had failed to address Saluka's proposal and had unreasonably re-
fused to communicate with IPB and Saluka/Nomura in an adequate manner. 
 
What is difficult to digest with this case is that it was the CR's conduct in relation 
to its failure to provide financial assistance and its failure to consider Nomura's 
proposals, these both being contrary to Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations, 
which led to the factual circumstances that resulted in the Czech National Bank 
having to take the decision to place IPB in forced administration leading to the al-
leged expropriation. If Saluka/Nomura's legitimate expectations had been fulfilled, 
then the forced administration may not have been necessary. Yet the Tribunal found 
that the forced administration was a justifiable regulatory step that did not amount to 
expropriation. 
Other tribunals analysing alleged regulatory takings have taken a different ap-
proach, e. g. in the Feldman case, where the Tribunal acknowledged that not all 
regulatory measures amount to an expropriation.   
In Tecmed, which Mr Schill also referred to, the Tribunal emphasised that     
measures, whether or not they were regulatory, amounted to an indirect expropria-
tion if they were "irreversible and permanent" and the "economic value of the use, 
enjoyment or disposition of the assets or rights affected by the administrative action 
or decision have been neutralized or destroyed" (para 116). The Tribunal empha-
sised that it was the effect of the measures, not the intent that was important. The 
Tribunal also looked to whether the measures were proportionate to the public inte-
rest they intended to protect and found that in that case they were disproportionate.  
Beyond looking at the proportionality of the measures, the Tribunal did not offer 
any assistance in determining when a legitimate regulatory measure crosses the line 
and amounts to a regulatory taking or expropriation. However, would the propor-
tionality test have assisted the Tribunal in Saluka? 
The UNICTRAL Tribunal in Saluka acknowledged that the threshold for regula-
tory takings has not yet been defined, but did not offer any suggestions as to what 
would be appropriate criteria in determining that threshold, other than referring to 
the Harvard Draft Convention of the 1960s which recognised that bona-fide non-
discriminatory regulation was not expropriation and set out 4 exceptions, which I 
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will not go into due to time. In the context of analysing the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard, the Tribunal focused on the expectations of the investor and the need 
to balance those expectations with the State's legitimate regulatory interests (para 
305-6). But it did not do so in the context of the expropriation claim. If it did, per-
haps it would have reached a different conclusion. Or if the Tribunal had analysed 
whether the decision of forced administration was proportionate to Saluka's legiti-
mate expectations, it may have reached a different conclusion.  
C. Conclusion 
Accordingly, it appears that we must be content with the vague indications given by 
investment tribunals to date on the role of legitimate expectations in the analysis of 
these two standards:   
• Legitimate expectations of the investor is an essential element of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard;  
• It may be the starting point for an analysis of an expropriation claim; 
• The investor's legitimate expectations may need to be balanced against the le-
gitimate regulatory interests of the State if regulatory measures have allegedly 
led to an expropriation; 
• However, how are these expectations and regulatory interests to be balanced?  
• Is it sufficient to consider whether the regulatory measures are proportionate to 
the investor's expectations?  
 
Hopefully, we will all have an opportunity to encourage future Tribunals to pro-
vide some guidance to these questions, preferably within the next 4-5 years rather 
than the next 40 years.  
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“Fair and Equitable Treatment” – Determining Compensation  
           
Comment by Kaj Hobér∗ 
A. Introduction 
Fair and equitable treatment is one of the standards of treatment of foreigners under 
international law. One of the early sources for a discussion of the treatment of fo-
reigners is the Neer Case.1 The concept of fair and equitable treatment did not exist 
at that time, but the case does address in general terms treatment of foreigners by a 
host State. 
In the post Second World War attempts to regulate the international economy – 
resulting in the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund – the negotiating states also tried to create a world trade organization, later 
referred to as the International Trade Organization. In the 1948 Havana Charter for 
the International Trade Organisation it was stated in Article 11(2)2 that the Interna-
tional Trade Organisation could make recommendations and promote bilateral or 
multilateral agreements on measures designed “to assure just and equitable treat-
ment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology brought from one Mem-
ber country to another”. In the same year the Ninth International Conference of 
American States adopted the Economic Agreement of Bogotá under which foreign 
capital were to receive “equitable treatment” 3 (Article 22). However, neither the 
Havana Charter, nor the Agreement of Bogotá came into force. In the 1950’s refer-
 
∗  Kaj Hobér, Partner Mannheimer Swartling, Stockholm; Professor of East European Commer-
cial Law, Uppsala University. 
1   Neer v. Mexico, Opinion, United States – Mexico General Claims Commission, 15 October 
1926 21 American Journal of International Law (1927) 555.  
2  Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter reads as follows: “The Organization may, in such collabo-
ration with other inter-governmental organizations as may be appropriate: 
 (a) make recommendations for and promote bilateral or multilateral agreements on measures 
designed. 
 (i) to assure just and equitable treatment for the enterprise, skills, capital, arts and technology 
brought from one Member country to another;  
 (ii) to avoid international double taxation in order to stimulate foreign private investments; 
 (iii) to enlarge to the greatest possible extent the benefits to Members from the fulfilment of 
the obligations under this Article; 
 (b) make recommendations and promote agreements designed to facilitate an equitable distri-
bution of skills, arts, technology, materials and equipment, with due regard to the needs of all 
Members;  
 (c) formulate and promote the adoption of a general and treatment of foreign investment.” 
3  “Los capitales extranjeros recibirán tratamiento equitativo”. 
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ences to fair and equitable treatment started to appear in the US Treaties on Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation.4 
As noted by Stephan Schill in his article “’Fair and Equitable Treatment’ as an 
Embodiment of the Rule of Law”, arbitral tribunals have struggled, and continue to 
struggle, with a definition of the rather vague concept of fair and equitable treat-
ment, and have, so far, been unable to develop a uniform methodology for deter-
mining when a violation of fair and equitable treatment has occurred.5  
These difficulties do not come as a surprise. The standard of fair and equitable 
treatment is relatively imprecise and is very much dependent on the specific circum-
stances of the individual case. The principle can thus not be applied in the abstract. 
The standard of fair and equitable treatment is a broad principle of international law 
which must, like other such principles, be specified, refined and supplemented by 
decisions of international tribunals. In fact this is the only realistic approach, since it 
would be virtually impossible to anticipate and specify in detail host State conduct 
that should be covered by this principle. 
The aforementioned lack of precision notwithstanding, Stephan Schill has identi-
fied seven normative elements forming part of the reasoning of arbitral tribunals 
when analysing the principle of fair and equitable treatment, viz., (i) the requirement 
of stability, predictability and consistency of the legal framework, (ii) the principle 
of legality, (iii) the protection of investor confidence or legitimate expectations, (iv) 
procedural due process and denial of justice, (v) substantive due process or protec-
tion against discrimination and arbitrariness, (vi) the requirement of transparency 
and (vii) the requirement of reasonableness and proportionality.6  
The purpose of this contribution is to address another aspect of fair and equitable 
treatment, viz., to analyze arbitral practice with the aim of identifying principles, if 
any, for the determination of the compensation for violation, once established, of the 
fair and equitable treatment standard. 
B. Compensation for Violation of the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard 
I. Introduction 
Almost all recent Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties (BIT:s) require that inves-
tors covered by the treaty in question receive fair and equitable treatment. This prin-
ciple is also enshrined in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)7 as 
 
4  See further Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers on International Investment No. 2004/3, p. 3-4. 
5  See Schill, p. 35-36. 
6  Schill, p. 41-42. 
7  Article 1105(1) of NAFTA reads as follows: “Each Party shall accord to investments of inves-
tors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equita-
ble treatment and full protection and security”. 
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well as in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)8. In none of these treaties, however, is 
there any provision, nor language, addressing the issue of compensation in case of 
violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. The situation is of course dif-
ferent with respect to expropriation. Most investment protection treaties, bilateral as 
well as multilateral, have provisions addressing compensation in case of expropria-
tion. 
II. The Legal Basis for Compensation 
The determination of compensation for violations of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard is, however, not made in a legal vacuum. The legal basis is found in cus-
tomary international law. Article 31 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 
Articles on State Responsibility reads as follows: 
 
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full repara-
tion for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. 
 
2.  Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by 
the internationally wrongful act of State. 
 
The principles expressed in this Article are generally held to represent generally 
accepted customary international law. These principles were formulated already by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Chorzow Factory case.  
 
The Court said: 
 
“It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement in-
volves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation 
therefore is the indispensable complement to a failure to apply a convention 
and there is no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. Dif-
ferences relating to reparations, which may be due by reason of failure to 
apply a convention, are consequently differences relating to its applica-
tion”.9 
 
 
8  Article 10(1) of the ECT reads as follows “Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of 
other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment […]”. 
9  Factory at Chorzów, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 2. 
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Under the Chorzów Factory case, the State violating international law is liable to 
provide full compensation, i.e. to re-establish the situation, which would have exis-
ted had that violation not occurred: 
 
“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a 
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in par-
ticular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, so far 
as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not 
been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a 
sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; the 
award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be cov-
ered by restitution in kind or payment in place of it – such are the principles 
which should serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act 
contrary to international law.”10 
 
 
Article 34 of the ILC Articles then goes on to describe the different forms of repa-
ration. They include restitution, compensation and satisfaction. 
Even though the primary form of reparation under the ILC Articles is restitution, 
from an investment dispute point of view, the practically relevant form is compensa-
tion, which is regulated in Article 36. It reads:  
 
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under 
an obligation to compensate for the damage caused thereby, inso-
far as such damage is not made good by restitution. 
 
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage 
including loss of profit insofar as it is established. 
 
In the context of compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard, 
suffice it to make two comments at this stage.  
 
First, Article 31 refers to “full reparation”. This means, in the words of the Chorzow 
Factory case “to wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been com-
mitted”.11 This principle has been extensively discussed with respect to calculation 
of compensation for expropriation. Difficult as it may be to apply this principle to 
expropriation, it is at least arguable that this is easier than to apply the principle to 
compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard. The typical situation 
 
10  Factory at Chorzów, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47. 
11  See note 10, supra 
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with respect to an expropriation is that it puts an end to the investment in question. 
Violations of the fair and equitable standard do not necessarily lead to this result, but 
the investment, e.g. a business activity, may well continue. The difficulty then is to 
determine what “full reparation” means in this context. 
The foregoing leads to the second observation. It is clear from the language used in 
Articles 31, 34 and 36 that there must be a causal link between the injury and the 
internationally wrongful act. The provisions all refer to the “injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act”. In the context of fair and equitable treatment, it is not 
difficult to envisage situations where it must be very complicated to determine the 
extent to which an injury has been caused by a violation of this standard and not by 
any other event.  
C. Decisions by Arbitral Tribunals 
I. Introduction 
There are few recent decisions by arbitral tribunals in investment disputes, which 
deal with compensation for violations of the fair and equitable standard as a discrete 
and separate matter. This is perhaps not very surprising since many, if not most, 
investment disputes primarily focus on expropriation. Questions of fair and equit-
able treatment then tend to play a secondary role, and are not given separate treat-
ment. There are three recent ICSID cases which address the issue of compensation 
for violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard as a separate matter. The 
only two cases decided so far on the merits under the ECT also deal with these is-
sues, as do at least three NAFTA cases. These cases will be discussed in the fol-
lowing. 
II. ICSID cases 
1. MTD v. Chile 
In MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile12, MTD (Malay-
sia) had invested in Chile by participating in a joint venture which planned to buy 
land for the purpose of constructing a mixed use upscale community. The invest-
ment was made through a local company, MTD Chile, which in turn invested in and 
owned 51 percent of the joint venture company, El Principal, which was to own the 
land and develop the project. The investment was approved by the Foreign Invest-
ment Commission (FIC) and a foreign investment contract was signed. An addi-
 
12  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, Award of 25 May 2004. 
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tional capital contribution by MTD was subsequently approved by the FIC. Thereaf-
ter the project ran into difficulties resulting from the absence of a change of zoning 
legislation for the use of land. In the end the project was not approved by the au-
thorities. 
The applicable Malaysia-Chile BIT contained an MFN-clause, which in the view 
of the Tribunal made substantive protection standards of other Chilean BITs appli-
cable as argued by the Claimants. 
 
In the arbitration the Claimants alleged that the Respondent had breached: 
 
(i) Articles 2(2) and 3(1) of the BIT and Article 4(1) of the Croatia BIT by     
treating their investment unfairly and inequitably; 
(ii) Article 3(1) of the Denmark BIT by breaching the Respondent’s obligations 
under the Foreign Investment Contracts; 
(iii) Article 3(2) and (4) of the Croatia BIT by impairing through unreasonable 
and discriminatory measures the use and enjoyment of the Claimants’ investment 
and by failing to grant the necessary permits to carry out an investment already au-
thorized; and 
(iv) Article 4 of the BIT by expropriating their investment. 
 
In essence the issues under dispute were the following: what was the significance 
to be attached to the approvals of the FIC and the execution of the Foreign Invest-
ment Contracts (i.e. creating legitimate expectations that the project would be 
granted necessary approvals or a mere decision on the legality of inflow of foreign 
capital), whether MTD had been warned of the risks relating to the zoning change, 
whether MTD otherwise had exercised due diligence in making its investment. 
Article 2(2) of the applicable BIT required that “Investments of investors of either 
Contracting Party shall at all time be accorded fair and equitable treatment”. The 
Croatia BIT provided further that the right to fair and equitable treatment shall “not 
be hindered in practice” (Article 4(1)). 
The Tribunal noted that being a Tribunal established under the BIT, it was 
obliged to apply the provisions of the BIT and interpret them in accordance with the 
norms of interpretation established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties, which is binding on the State parties to the BIT. Article 31(1) of the     
Vienna Convention requires that a treaty be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 
The Tribunal found that in their ordinary meaning, the terms “fair” and “equit-
able” used in Article 3(1) of the BIT mean “just”, “even-handed”, “unbiased”, “le-
gitimate”. As regards the object and purpose of the BIT, the Tribunal referred to its 
Preamble where the parties state their desire “to create favourable conditions for 
investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Con-
tracting Party”, and the recognition of “the need to protect investments by investors 
of both Contracting Parties and to stimulate the flow of investments and individual 
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business initiative with a view to the economic prosperity of both Contracting Par-
ties”. Hence, in terms of the BIT, fair and equitable treatment should be understood 
to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to fostering the pro-
motion of foreign investment. Its terms are framed as a pro-active statement –“to 
promote”, “to create”, “to stimulate”- rather than prescriptions for a passive beha-
viour of the State or avoidance of prejudicial conduct to the investors. 
The Tribunal also adopted as its standard the standard suggested by the Tribunal 
in the TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States case: 
 
“to provide to international investments treatment that does not affect the 
basic expectations that were taken into account by the foreign investor to 
make the investment. The foreign investor expects the host State to act in a 
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its rela-
tions with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any and all 
rules and regulations that will govern its investments, as well as the goals of 
the relevant policies and administrative practices or directives, to be able to 
plan its investment and comply with such regulations. Any and all State ac-
tions conforming to such criteria should relate not only to the guidelines, di-
rectives or requirements issued, or the resolutions approved thereunder, but 
also to the goals underlying such regulations. The foreign investor also ex-
pects the host State to act consistently, i.e. without arbitrarily revoking any 
preexisting decisions or permits issued by the state that were relied upon by 
the investor to assume its commitments as well as to plan and launch its 
commercial and business activities. The investor also expects the state to 
use the legal instruments that govern the actions of the investor or the in-
vestment in conformity with the function usually assigned to such instru-
ments, and not to deprive the investor of its investment without the required 
compensation”.13 
 
Taking account of, inter alia, the ministerial membership of the FIC, the duty of 
Chilean state organs to act coherently and to apply its policies consistently, and of 
the fact that the State under international law is to be considered as a unit, the Tribu-
nal was satisfied, based on the evidence presented to it, that approval of an invest-
ment by the FIC for a project that was against the urban policy of the Government, 
amounted to a breach of the obligation to treat an investor fairly and equitably.  
As regards compensation the Tribunal noted that the BIT provided for “prompt, 
adequate and effective” compensation for expropriation. However, the BIT did not 
provide for any standard for compensation for breaches of the BIT on other grounds, 
including fair and equitable treatment. As a starting point, the Tribunal used the 
standard pronounced by the Permanent Court of Justice in the Chorzów Factory 
 
13  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)00/2, award dated May 29, 2003, para. 154. 
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case, viz., that the compensation should “wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
had not been committed”.14    
Based on this principle the Tribunal concluded that the expenditures relating to 
Claimant’s investment in Chile, which were eligible for purposes of the calculation 
of damages amounted to approximately US$ 21.5 million. Such expenditures could 
have been avoided, had there been no breach of the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. 
The Tribunal also underlined, however, that Chile was not responsible for the 
consequences of unwise business decisions or for the lack of diligence of the inves-
tor. Its responsibility was limited to the consequences of its own actions to the extent 
they breached the obligation to treat the Claimants fairly and equitably. In this re-
spect the Tribunal observed, inter alia, that no specialist on urban development had 
been contacted by the Claimants until the deal was closed, that the Claimants ap-
parently did not appreciate the fact that their JV-partner may have had a conflict of 
interest with the Claimants, that they seemed to have accepted his judgment, that 
MTD was in a hurry to start the Project, that BITs are not an insurance against busi-
ness risks, and that the Claimants, as experienced businessmen, must bear the con-
sequences of their own actions. Their choice of partner, the acceptance of a land 
valuation based on future assumptions without protecting themselves contractually 
in case the assumptions would not materialize, including the issuance of the required 
development permits, were risks that the Claimants took irrespective of Chile’s 
actions. Therefore, the Tribunal awarded only 50 per cent of eligible expenditures 
resulting from the fact that the zoning legislation was not changed. 
The starting point for the Tribunal was thus the concept of “full reparation” as 
laid down in the Chorzow Factory case and in the ILC Articles On State Responsi-
bility. The more interesting aspect of the Tribunal’s reasoning is the fact that it re-
duced the amount eligible for compensation by 50 per cent. The percentage as such 
would seem to be the result of the Tribunal exercising its discretion in determining 
the amount of compensation. The justification for the reduction could be explained 
in either of the following ways. First, it is possible that the Tribunal took the view 
that the Claimants had not established a causal link between the violation of the fair 
and equitable treatment standard going beyond 50 per cent of the expenditures. Put 
differently: part of the injury was the result of Claimants’ own doing. In the view of 
the Tribunal, the Claimants had not in all respects acted as a prudent investor. The 
consequences of such conduct had to be borne by the Claimants themselves.   
Second, an alternative explanation – but to a large extent, the other side of the 
same coin – would be to view Claimants’ conduct as a case of contributory negli-
gence. In other words, the Claimants themselves had contributed to their own mis-
fortune. To the extent that this was the case, the host state could not be held respon-
sible.  
 
14  See note 10, supra. 
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2. CMS v. Argentine 
The second ICSID case is CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Argentine Re-
public15  In this case the Argentinean company TGN had been granted a license for 
the transportation of gas. Investors had been invited to invest in the shares of TGN. 
The American company CMS acquired 29.42 per cent of the shares. 
Under the arrangements made for the privatization of this sector of the Argen-
tinean economy, tariffs were to be calculated in US dollars and expressed in pesos at 
the exchange rate at the time of billing. They were also to be adjusted semi-annually 
in accordance with the United States Producer Price Index (the “US PPI”). Fol-
lowing the major economic and financial crisis in the country, the Republic of Ar-
gentina enacted, starting late 1999, various measures which had, in the Claimant’s 
view, an adverse impact on its business and breached the guarantees (i.e. the legal 
regime created by the gas legislation and regulations as well as the terms of the 
license) which were intended to protect its investment in TGN. These measures later 
led to the devaluation of the peso and the adoption of additional financial and ad-
ministrative measures also alleged to have had an adverse impact on the investor. 
The Claimant was of the view that the measures adopted by the Argentine Go-
vernment were in violation of the commitments that the Government made to for-
eign investors in the offering memoranda, relevant laws and regulations and the 
license itself. Such commitments, it was asserted, included the calculation of tariffs 
in US dollars, the semi-annual adjustment in accordance with the US PPI and a 
general adjustment of tariffs every five years, all with the purpose of maintaining the 
real dollar value of the tariffs. The Claimant argued that Argentina further agreed 
expressly not to freeze the tariff structure or subject it to further regulation or price 
controls; and that in the event that price controls were introduced, TGN would be 
compensated for the difference between the tariff it was entitled to and the tariff 
actually charged. Moreover, the basic rules governing the license could not be al-
tered without TGN’s consent. The Claimant was of the view that these guarantees 
constituted essential conditions for CMS’s investment and that it had an acquired 
right to the application of the agreed tariff regime.  
The Claimant argued, inter alia, that Argentina had breached the fair and equit-
able standard insofar as it had profoundly altered the stability and predictability of 
the investment environment, an assurance that was key to CMS’s decision to invest. 
Quoting the preamble of the Argentina – US BIT – that fair and equitable treat-
ment is desirable “to maintain a stable framework for investments and maximum 
effective use of economic resources” – the Tribunal found that a stable legal and 
business environment was an essential element of fair and equitable treatment. The 
Tribunal found that the measures complained of did in fact entirely transform and 
alter the legal and business environment under which the investment was decided 
and made. The Tribunal further noted that a significant number of treaties show that 
 
15  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award of 12 May 2005. 
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fair and equitable treatment was inseparable from stability and predictability and 
that the law of foreign investment and its protection had been developed to avoid 
adverse legal effects when specific commitments had been made. The Tribunal also 
observed that this was an objective requirement unrelated to whether the Respondent 
had had any deliberate intention or bad faith in adopting the measures in question. 
Turning to compensation, the Tribunal initially noted that under international law 
that are three main forms of reparation for injury: restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction.16 It ruled out “satisfaction” since the case was not of reparation due to 
an injured State. As regards “restitution” the Tribunal noted, by reference to the 
Chorzów Factory case, that this is the standard used to re-establish the situation 
which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided that this is not mate-
rially impossible and does not result in a burden out of proportion as compared to 
compensation.17  
As regards “compensation” the Tribunal stated that it is designed to cover any fi-
nancial assessable damage including loss of profits insofar as it is established, and 
that it is only called for when the damage is not made good by restitution.18 Quoting 
the decision in the Lusitania case19, the Tribunal held that the remedy should be 
commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made whole.20 The 
Tribunal was thus inclined to award full compensation for a violation of the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. 
However, when discussing the methods to determine and calculate compensation 
the Tribunal stated that “[d]epending on the circumstances, various methods have 
been used by tribunals to determine the compensation which should be paid but the 
general concept upon which commercial valuation of assets is based is that of ‘fair 
market value.’”21  
 
The Tribunal continued to say that: 
 
“Four ways have generally been relied upon to arrive at such value. (1) the 
‘asset value’ or the ‘replacement cost’ approach which evaluates the assets 
on the basis of their ‘break-up’ or their replacement cost; (2) the ‘compar-
able transaction’ approach which reviews comparable transactions in simi-
lar circumstances; (3) the ‘option’ approach which studies the alternative 
uses which could be made of the assets in question, and their costs and 
benefits; (4) the ‘discounted cash flow’ (‘DCF’) approach under which the 
valuation of the assets is arrived at by determining the present value of fu-
 
16  The Award, para. 399.  
17  The Award, para. 400. 
18  The Award, para. 401. 
19  Lusitania, RIAA, Vol. VII, 1923, p. 32.  
20  The Award, para. 401. 
21  The Award, para. 402. 
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ture predicted cash flows, discounted at a rate which reflects various cate-
gories of risk and uncertainty.”22  
 
Having concluded that reparation by way of restitution was not an alternative for 
the Tribunal in the present situation, because such restitution would require a settle-
ment between the parties, the Tribunal went on to analyze the issue of compensa-
tion.23 It appears that the path eventually chosen by the Tribunal was the method 
commonly used when determining compensation for expropriation.  
 
“[T]he cumulative nature of the breaches discussed here is best dealt with 
by resorting to the standard of fair market value. While this standard figures 
prominently in respect of expropriation, it is not excluded that it might also 
be appropriate for breaches different from expropriation if their effect re-
sults in important long-term losses.”24    
 
The Tribunal had no problem in finding that the standard of compensation to be 
used was that of the fair market value. Likewise, it did not hesitate to use the dis-
counted cash flow (DCF) method as the most appropriate method to calculate the 
compensation. The decisive factor in this respect seems to have been that TGN was a 
going concern. TGN:s license was valid until 2027. With a view to determining the 
actual loss of the Claimant resulting from the violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, the Tribunal had to compare two scenarios. The first scenario 
involved the evaluation of revenue, cash and profits until 2027 on the assumption 
that there had been no change in the regulatory environment. The second scenario 
involved the same evaluation based on the new regulatory framework.25 The Tribu-
nal’s reasoning makes it clear that, in this particular case, it concluded that the fair 
market value and the DCF methodology was the most appropriate way to determine 
the actual loss of the Claimant. It may also be noted that all experts consulted in the 
case agreed with this approach.26 
3. Azurix Corp v. Argentine 
In Azurix Corp v. The Argentine Republic27, decided on 14 July 2006, the Azurix-
Group of the US (at the time of the investment owned by Enron) participted in the 
privatization of water services in the Province of Buenos Aires (the Province). The 
investment was carried out through a local Argentinian company, Azurix Buenos 
 
22  The Award, para. 403. 
23  Cf. Articles 35-36 of ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. 
24  The Award, para. 410. 
25  See Award, paras. 419, 422. 
26  The Award, para. 421. 
27  ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award of 14 July 2006. 
 90 
Aires S.A. (ABA), which was incorporated to act as the concessionaire after the 
Azurix-Group won the bid for the water service concession (the Concession). After 
ABA had made a so-called Canon Payment of 438,555,554 Argentine Pesos on 30 
June 1999, ABA and the Province executed a 30-year concession agreement. The 
concession was overseen and regulated by a regulatory authority established for the 
purpose - Organismo Regulador de Aguas Bonaerense (“ORAB”). 
In the arbitration, the Claimant argued, inter alia, that the Respondent had vio-
lated its obligation, under the U.S.-Argentina BIT, of fair and equitable treatment. 
The Claimant stated that such measures consisted of actions and omissions of the 
Province or its instrumentalities that resulted in the non-application of the tariff 
regime of the Concession Agreement for political reasons; that the Province did not 
complete certain works that were to remedy historical problems and were to be 
transferred to the concessionaire upon completion; that the lack of support for the 
concession regime prevented ABA from obtaining financing for its operations; that 
in 2001, the Province denied that the Canon Payment was recoverable through ta-
riffs; and that “political concerns were always privileged over the financial integrity 
of the Concession”.28 As a result ABA had been forced to give notice of termination 
of the Concession and file for bankruptcy, since it was faced with no hope of recov-
ering its investments in the “politicized regulatory scheme”.29 
The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the dispute was a contractual dis-
pute, and that the difficulties encountered by ABA in the Province were of its own 
making. In particular, Argentina argued that the case presented by the Claimant was 
intimately linked to Enron’s business practices and its bankruptcy; that the price 
paid for the Concession was excessive and opportunistic and related to the forthco-
ming IPO of Azurix at the time Azurix bid for the Concession and that ABA did not 
comply with the Concession Agreement. 
Article II(2)(a) of the applicable BIT provided that “[i]nvestment shall at all times 
be accorded fair and equitable treatment,…and shall in no case be accorded treat-
ment less than required by international law”. 
The Tribunal noted that the BIT is an international treaty that should be inter-
preted in accordance with the norms of interpretation established by the Vienna 
Convention, which is binding on the state parties to the BIT.30 Article 31(1) of the 
Convention requires that a treaty be “interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose”. 
The Tribunal found that it follows from the ordinary meaning of the terms fair 
and equitable and the purpose and object of the BIT that fair and equitable should be 
understood to be treatment in an even-handed and just manner, conducive to foste-
ring the promotion of foreign investment. The text of the BIT reflects a positive 
 
28  The Award, para. 43. 
29  The Award, para. 43. 
30  The Award, para.. 307. 
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attitude towards investment with words such as “promote” and “stimulate”. Fur-
thermore, the parties to the BIT recognize the role that fair and equitable treatment 
plays in maintaining “a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use 
of economic resources”.31  
The Tribunal also found that except for Genin v. Estonia,32 there is a common 
thread in the recent awards under NAFTA and in Tecmed v. Mexico,33 to the effect 
that bad faith or malicious intention of the recipient State is not a necessary element 
in the failure to treat investments fairly and equitably. The Tribunal concurred with 
the Tribunal in CMS, which stated that fair and equitable treatment is an objective 
standard “unrelated to whether the Respondent has had any deliberate intention or 
bad faith in adopting the measures in question. Of course, such intention and bad 
faith can aggravate the situation but are not an essential element of the standard.”34 
 
As to the question whether the standard of fair and equitable treatment had been 
breached, the Tribunal said that it was: 
 
“struck by the conduct of the Province after the the Claimant gave notice of 
termination of the Concession Agreement. ABA had requested to terminate 
the agreement in agreement with the Province. The Province refused what 
was a reasonable request in light of the previous behavior of the Province 
and its agencies. The refusal by the Province to accept that notice of termi-
nation and its insistence on terminating it by itself on account of abandon-
ment of the Concession is a clear case of a breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard. It is evident from the facts before this Tribunal that the 
Concession was not abandoned.”35 
 
The Tribunal countinued to say that: 
 
“Although the Tribunal has rejected to a certain extent the interpretations of 
the Concession Agreement and the Law alleged by the Claimant regarding 
the RPI and the Canon, it is also clear that the tariff regime was politicized 
because of concerns with forthcoming elections or because the Concession 
was awarded by the previous government. The issues of the zoning coeffi-
cients and the construction variations are cases in point. It is significant 
that, once the service was transferred, the new service provider was allowed 
to raise tariffs reflecting the construction variations. 
 
31  The Award, para. 307. 
32  Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 
Award, 25 June 2001. 
33  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)00/2, Award, 29 May 2003. 
34  The Award, para. 372. 
35  The Award, para. 374. 
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Finally, the repeated calls of the Provincial governor and other officials for 
non-payment of bills by customers verges on bad faith in the case of the 
Bahía Blanca incident when the Province itself had not completed the 
works that would have helped to avoid the problem in the first place. 
 
Considered together, these actions reflect a pervasive conduct of the Prov-
ince in breach of the standard of fair and equitable treatment.”36 
 
As regards the question whether Argentina in addition to the above had also taken 
measures that could be considered to be arbitrary and to have impaired “the ma-
nagement, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or dis-
posal”37 of the investment of Azurix in Argentina, the Tribunal found that the actions 
of the provincial authorities calling for non-payment of bills even before the regula-
tory authority had made a decision, threatening the members of the ORAB because 
it had allowed ABA to resume billing, requiring ABA not to apply the new tariff 
resulting from the review of the construction variations and affirming that zone 
coefficients apply in contradiction with the information provided to the bidders at 
the time of bidding for the Concession, restraining ABA from collecting payment 
from its customers for services rendered before March 15, 2002, and denying to 
ABA access to the documentation on the basis of which ABA was sanctioned were 
arbitrary actions without any support in the Law or the Concession Agreement and 
impaired the operation of Azurix’s investment.38 
Turning to compensation, the Tribunal concluded that the BIT did not provide 
any measure of compensation apart from cases of expropriation. The Tribunal re-
ferred to the CMS v. Argentina case (Section 3.2.2 above), in which the tribunal 
found that the standard of fair market value, which frequently figures in respect of 
expropriation, may be appropriate also for other breaches if their “effect results in 
important long-term losses”.39 Turning to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal 
found that “compensation based on the fair market value of the Concession would 
be appropriate, particularly since the Province has taken it over”.40 In measuring the 
fair market value, the Tribunal stated that the function of the Tribunal is “to try and 
determine what an independent and well-informed third party would have been 
willing to pay for the Concession in March 2002, in a context where the Province 
would have honoured its obligations”.41 
 
36  The Award, para. 375-377. 
37  Article II.2(b) of the US-Argentina BIT provides: “Neither Party shall in any way impair by 
arbitrary or discriminatory measures the management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, 
acquisition, expansion, or disposal of investments”. 
38  The Award, para. 390-393. 
39  The Award, para. 420. 
40  The Award, para. 424. 
41  The Award, para. 427. 
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The Claimant had submitted two methodologies for determining the fair market 
value: the actual investment and the book value. The Tribunal agreed with the 
Claimant that “the actual investment method is a valid one in this instance”.42 The 
Tribunal found that the Claimant’s investment in this respect was the price paid for 
the Concession and the additional investments made to finance ABA. 
The Tribunal emphasised, however, that a significant adjustment was required to 
arrive at the real value of the Canon paid by the Claimant for the Concession. Ac-
cording to the Tribunal, no well-informed investor would at the time of the violation 
have paid for the Concession the price (and more particularly, the Canon) paid by 
Azurix in mid-1999, irrespective of the actions taken by the Province and of the 
economic situation of Argentina at that time.43 The primary reason for this conclu-
sion of the Tribunal appears to have been the Tribunal’s findings with regard to the 
tariffs and tariff adjustment review provided by the Concession Agreement. The 
Claimant argued that under the Concession Agreement the Canon Payment should 
be included in the asset base that the concessionaire had the right to recover through 
the tariffs to be applied to the concessionaire’s services under the Concession 
Agreement. However, in the view of the Tribunal, the Canon Payment could not be 
included as a recoverable asset base for the purpose of tariff increases.44 
In light of the above factors, the Tribunal concluded that no more than a fraction 
of the Canon Payment could realistically have been recuperated under the existing 
Concession Agreement. The Tribunal therefore found that the value of the Canon at 
the time of the violation should be established at 60,000,000 US dollars. The Tribu-
nal did not explain, however, how it arrived at this amount. The full Canon Payment 
made by the Claimant amounted to 438,555,551 US dollars.45 
It should also be noted that the Tribunal did not award any compensation for un-
paid bills owed by customers to ABA, which the Province had directed the custom-
ers not to pay, since the Tribunal found that this amount was owed by the Province 
to ABA and, therefore, should not be part of the compensation awarded to Azurix.46 
Nor did the Tribunal award compensation for certain expenditures incurred by the 
Claimant in connection with negotiations with the Province and the termination of 
the Concession, since the Tribunal found that it had not received sufficient evidence 
in support of such costs and that, in any case, these were costs related to the business 
risk that Azurix took when it decided to make the investment. Therefore, although 
agreeing in principle that compensation should wipe out the consequences of an 
illegal act, in the circumstances of this particular case, the Tribunal did not find the 
amount claimed to be justified.47 
 
42  The Award, para. 425. 
43  The Award, para. 426. 
44  The Award, para. 427. 
45  The Award, para. 429. 
46  The Award, para. 431. 
47  The Award, para. 432. 
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III. Cases Decided by Other Tribunals 
1. Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding AB v. Latvia48 
Nykomb v. the Republic of Latvia was the first award on the merits rendered under 
the ECT. It was rendered on 16 December 2003 and concerned a dispute regarding 
the purchase of power by the state-owned Latvian company, Latvenergo, and the 
Latvian company Windau, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swedish company 
Nykomb. Latvenergo and Windau entered into several agreements, according to 
which Windau would build a co-generation electric plant and Latvenergo would 
purchase the surplus electricity produced subsequently. Windau and Latvenergo had 
a dispute over Windau’s tariff. Nykomb argued that Windau was entitled to a double 
tariff in accordance with the Entrepreneurial Law in force at the time when the con-
tract in question was concluded, whereas Latvenergo claimed that Windau only was 
entitled to a lower tariff in accordance with subsequent legislation that had amended 
the Entrepreneurial Law. 
As to the merits of Nykomb’s claim, the Tribunal found that Latvia had breached 
its obligation under Article 10 of the ECT49 not to discriminate against foreign in-
vestors by offering the so-called “double tariff” to certain other companies but not to 
Nykomb’s Latvian subsidiary, Windau, and by failing to present any evidence why 
those companies were different. 
As to the standard of compensation applicable in case of such discrimination, the 
Tribunal noted that the principles of compensation provided for in Article 13(1) of 
the ECT, in case of expropriation, were not applicable to the assessment of damages 
or losses caused by violations of Article 10. The Tribunal found that “the question of 
remedies to compensate for losses or damages caused by the Respondent’s violation 
of its obligations under Article 10 of the Treaty must primarily find its solution in 
accordance with established principles of customary international law. Such princi-
 
48  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 53. See further T. Wälde and K. Hobér, 
The First Energy Charter Award, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2005), 
pp. 83–103. 
49  Article 10 (1) of the ECT reads as follows: “Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such 
conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of 
other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the 
most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by un-
reasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use enjoyment or dis-
posal. In no such case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that 
required by international law, including treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall ob-
serve any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of 
any other Contracting Party.” 
 95 
ples have authoritatively been restated in The International Law Commission’s Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility adopted in November 2001”.50 
The Tribunal further noted that according to Articles 3451 and 3552 of the ILC Ar-
ticles, restitution was the primary remedy. However, with respect to the case before 
it, the Tribunal found that restitution was a suitable remedy primarily where the state 
had instituted actions directly against the investor. Where the actions were directed 
against its subsidiary, the Tribunal instead found the appropriate remedy to be com-
pensation for the losses or damage inflicted on the investor’s investment.53 
Nykomb claimed damages corresponding to the difference between the “double 
tariff” and the tariff that had actually been paid to Windau. However, the Tribunal 
decided not to give Nykomb the full difference between the two sets of tariffs be-
cause the higher payments would not have gone directly to Nykomb but to Windau. 
The Tribunal stated that “the money would have been subject to Latvian taxes etc., 
would have been used to cover Windau’s costs and down payments on Windau’s 
loans etc., and disbursements to the shareholder would be subject to restrictions in 
Latvian company law on payment of dividends”.54 
Taking into account the requirements under applicable customary international 
law of causation, foreseeability and the reasonableness of the result, the Tribunal 
nevertheless found that the reduced earnings of Windau constituted the best avail-
able basis for the assessment also of Nykomb’s losses. It came to the conclusion that 
a discretionary award of one third of the estimated loss in purchase prices of elec-
tricity up to the time of the award would serve as a reasonable basis for the quantifi-
cation of Nykomb’s assumed losses up to the time of the award.55 
As regards Nykomb’s alleged losses on delivery of electric power to Latvenergo 
for the remainder of the eight year contract period, the Tribunal found this potential 
loss too uncertain and speculative to form the basis of an award of monetary com-
pensation. The Tribunal, however, considered it to be a continuing obligation of 
Latvia to ensure payment at the double tariff for electric power delivered under the 
contract for the rest of the eight year contract period. It therefore ordered Latvia to 
 
50  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 104-105. 
51  “Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with 
the provisions of the chapter.” 
52  “A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitu-
tion, that is, to establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, 
provided and to the extent that restitution:  
 (a) Is not materially impossible;  
 (b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefits deriving from restitution 
instead of compensation”. 
53  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 105-108. 
54  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 105. 
55  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 107. 
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fulfil its obligation to pay the double tariff for future deliveries during the remainder 
of the contract period.56 
2. Petrobart Limited v. Kyrgyzstan57 
The second arbitral award on the merits rendered under the ECT was between 
Petrobart Ltd of Gibraltar and the Kyrgyz Republic. It concerned a sales contract 
between Petrobart and the Kyrgyz state owned company KGM for the purchase by 
the latter of 200,000 tonnes of gas condensate. The award was rendered on 29 March 
2005.58 
Petrobart delivered five shipments of gas but was only paid for the first two. At 
the same time as Petrobart turned to domestic courts for recourse, Kyrgyz authori-
ties – as part of a reform of the system for supply of oil and gas in the Kyrgyz Re-
public –took certain measures that made it impossible for Petrobart to enforce its 
rights under the contract. The measures included a decision by the Kyrgyz authori-
ties to privatize KGM, and to transfer its assets, but not its liabilities (including mon-
ies owed to Petrobart), to a new company as well as a request by the Vice Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic who – referring to KGM’s critical financial stan-
ding – asked the chairman of the Kyrgyz court that previously had rendered a judg-
ment in favour of Petrobart, to assist in granting a stay of the enforcement of the 
judgment against KGM. Enforcement was stayed by the court referring to the letter 
of the Vice Prime Minister, and before the period of stay of execution ended, KGM 
was declared bankrupt, which meant that enforcement of the judgment was no 
longer possible. 
The Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Government was liable for certain breaches 
of the ECT, specifically by virtue of its failure to provide fair and equitable treat-
ment by transferring assets from KGM to the above mentioned new company to the 
detriment of KGM’s creditors, including Petrobart (Article 10(1)); and by interve-
ning in court proceedings regarding the stay of execution of a final judgment to the 
detriment of Petrobart (Article 10(12)).59 
The Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Republic had violated its obligations under 
Articles 10(1) and 10(12) of the ECT. With reference to the Chorzów Factory case 
and to ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility, the Tribunal found that Petrobart had 
 
56  Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2005:1, p. 108. 
57  The full text of the award is available e.g. at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions 
 /Petrobart-kyrgyz-rep-Award.pdf. 
58  The award was challenged at the Svea Court of Appeal in Stockholm, but the challenge was 
rejected. 
59  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 76. Article 10(12) of the ECT reads as follows: 
“Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its domestic law provides effective means for the as-
sertion of claims and the enforcement of rights with respect to Investments, investment agree-
ments, and investment authorizations”. 
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suffered damage as a result of the Kyrgyz Republic’s breaches of the ECT and that 
Petrobart had to, as far as possible be placed financially in the position in which it 
would have found itself, had the breaches not occurred.60 
Petrobart essentially claimed compensation for (i) the unpaid invoices for gas 
condensate actually delivered by Petrobart to KGM; and (ii) loss of profit with re-
gard to the remaining deliveries under the contract. 
The Tribunal found that due to the troublesome financial situation of KGM, KGM 
would probably not have survived irrespective of the breaches of the ECT commit-
ted by the Kyrgyz Republic.61 
The Tribunal nevertheless found that the transfer by the Kyrgyz Republic of sub-
stantial assets belonging to KGM to other state entities caused substantial damage to 
KGM’s creditors, including Petrobart. Due to the inadequacy of the information 
submitted by the parties, the Tribunal found that the damage suffered by Petrobart 
could not be established with precision. The Tribunal therefore found it necessary to 
make a general assessment based on its appreciation of the situation as a whole. In 
making such assessment, the Tribunal found that the Kyrgyz Republic “as responsi-
ble for the transfer and lease of KGM’s assets, shall compensate Petrobart for da-
mage which the Arbitral Tribunal estimates at 75% of its justified claims against 
KGM”.62 
With regard to Petrobart’s claim for lost profit, the Tribunal found that there re-
mained a great deal of uncertainty as to the consequences of the breakdown of the 
business relations between Petrobart and KGM. The Tribunal therefore concluded 
that Petrobart had not established that it was entitled to compensation for loss of 
future profits.63 
Since most of the respective Tribunals’ findings regarding damages in Nykomb 
and Petrobart are rather fact specific, only limited conclusions can be drawn from 
such cases. It should be noted, however, that in the absence of express provisions on 
the standard of compensation, the Tribunals in both cases relied on general provi-
sions of customary international law on state responsibility. 
It could also be noted that in Nykomb, where the investment – the local subsidiary 
Windau – was still in operation and the contract for delivery of electric power still in 
force between Windau and Latvenergo, the Tribunal made a clear distinction be-
tween the damage suffered by Nykomb – the foreign investor – and the damage suf-
fered by Windau. The Tribunal only awarded damages that would compensate 
Nykomb for the damage, that it had actually suffered, and not for losses suffered by 
Windau. Nykomb’s damage was quantified as a proportion of the earnings that 
would have been generated by Windau, had there not been any breach of the treaty, 
i.e. the Tribunal estimated the dividends that would have been received by Nykomb 
 
60  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 77-78. 
61  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 81. 
62  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 83-84. 
63  Petrobart Limited v. the Kyrgyz Republic, p. 86-87. 
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from its subsidiary, rather than establishing a reduction of the value (if any) of 
Nykomb’s shares in Windau.  
3. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada 
In S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada64, S.D. Myers, Inc (SDMI) (USA) claimed that Canada 
had failed to comply, inter alia, with its obligation under Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA65 to treat investors of another party to the NAFTA in accordance with inter-
national law, including fair and equitable treatment. SDMI, an Ohio corporation that 
processed and disposed of PCB waste, alleged that Canada’s ban on the export of 
PCB wastes from Canada to the United States in late 1995 had resulted in SDMI 
suffering economic harm to its investment through interference with its operations, 
lost contracts and opportunities in Canada.  
In its first Partial Award of 13 November 2000 the Tribunal held that Canada had 
breached the fair and equitable treatment obligation of Article 1105 of the NAFTA. 
As regards the principles for compensation the Tribunal stated that in non-
expropriation cases the drafters of the NAFTA had left “it open to Tribunals to de-
termine a measure of compensation appropriate to the specific circumstances of the 
case, taking into account the principles of both international law and the provisions 
of the NAFTA”.66 The Tribunal further concluded that in some non-expropriation 
cases a Tribunal might find it appropriate to adopt the fair market approach and in 
some not. In this case the Tribunal found that the fair market value standard was not 
a logical, appropriate or practicable measure of the compensation to be awarded. 
Instead the Tribunal cited the Chorzów Factory case and stated that “whatever pre-
cise approach is taken, it should reflect the general principle of international law that 
compensation should undo the material harm inflicted by a breach of an interna-
tional obligation”.67 Further, the Tribunal made clear that it was for SDMI to prove 
the quantum of the losses. The Tribunal also stated that compensation is payable 
only in respect of harm that is proved to have a sufficient casual link with the spe-
cific NAFTA provision that has been breached, and that double recovery must be 
avoided in situations e.g. when several NAFTA provisions have been breached.68  
In the second Partial Award of 21 October 2002 the Tribunal held that “the ap-
propriate loss to be considered in this particular case is the loss of net income 
stream”.69 The Tribunal noted that this approach formed part of the submissions of 
 
64  8 ICSID Reports (2005) 18. 
65  Article 1105(1) of NAFTA reads as follows: “Each Party shall accord to investments of inves-
tors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equita-
ble treatment and full protection and security”. 
66  First Partial Award para. 309. 
67  First Partial Award para. 315. 
68  First Partial Award para. 317. 
69  Second Partial Award, para. 100. 
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both parties and, further, that expert accountants retained by both sides agreed that 
SDMI’s lost income stream was capable of rational assessment. 
In order to asses the compensation due to SDMI as a result of Canada’s export 
ban on PCB the Tribunal used a 12-step methodology aimed at determining the net 
income stream lost by SDMI plus compensation for abridged opportunity and de-
lay.70 The Tribunal finally determined the total compensation (excluding interest) by 
using this methodology to CAN$6,050,000. 
4. Marvin Feldman v. Mexico 
Marvin Feldman v. Mexico71, concerned a dispute regarding the application of cer-
tain Mexican tax laws to the export of tobacco products by CEMSA, a company 
organized under the laws of Mexico and owned and controlled by the Claimant, Mr. 
Feldman. The Claimant alleged that Mexico’s continuing refusal to recognize 
CEMSA’s right to a refund of certain Mexican taxes in connection with cigarette 
exports constituted a breach of Mexico’s obligations under Chapter Eleven of 
NAFTA. 
In most instances, when cigarettes were purchased in Mexico at a price that in-
cluded tax, and subsequently exported, the tax amounts initially paid could be re-
funded. However, in 1991 the law was changed so that only producers – not resellers 
such as Claimant – became eligible for the refund. Subsequently, resellers again 
became eligible for the refund, but the Claimant did not manage to meet statutory 
invoice requirements, as the invoices from the volume retailers, from which the 
Clamiant purchased, did not itemize the tax on the invoice. This eventually forced 
Claimant to shut down its business. 
Claimant argued, inter alia, that Mexico discriminated against CEMSA, since 
Mexican authorities permitted at least three Mexican owned resellers of cigarettes to 
export cigarettes and to receive refunds, notwithstanding the fact that like the 
Claimant, they purchased their goods from retailers, and, thus, could not have in-
voices stating the tax amounts separately. 
The majority of the Tribunal found that the evidence available supported that the 
Claimant was denied the refunds at a time when at least three Mexican companies in 
like circumstances, i.e. resellers and exporters, were granted them. The majority 
therefore found that Mexico had violated the Claimant’s right to non-discrimination 
under Article 1102 of NAFTA.72 
Concerning the quantum of damages to be awarded to the Claimant, the Tribunal 
observed that NAFTA provides no guidance as to the proper measure of damages or 
compensation for situations that do not fall under Article 1110 (expropriation). The 
 
70  Second Partial Award, para. 229. 
71  ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award 16 December 2002. 
72  The Award, para. 173 et seq. 
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Tribunal found that “in case of discrimination that constitutes a breach of Article 
1102, what is owed by the responding Party is the amount of loss or damage that is 
adequately connected to the breach. In the absence of discrimination that also consti-
tutes indirect expropriation or is tantamount to expropriation, a claimant would not 
be entitled to the full market value of the investment which is granted by NAFTA 
Article 1110”.73 The Tribunal, thus, dismissed the Claimant’s claim for compensa-
tion equivalent to CEMSA’s “going concern value”, because compensation for the 
full market value of CEMSA would require a finding of expropriation.74 Since, most 
parts of the Claimant’s claim for loss of profits were time barred under NAFTA 
Article 1117(2), the only thing that remained of Claimant’s claim was three months 
tax refunds relating to the period after the cut-off date. Compensation for such claim 
was awarded by the Tribunal with 9,464,627.50 Mexican pesos (about 946,462 U.S. 
dollars) after certain adjustments for miscalculations and reductions for amounts 
relating to cigarettes exported to tax havens, since the latter amounts would not have 
been eligible for refunds under Mexican law.75 
5. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada 
In Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada76, Pope & Talbot claimed that Canada’s implemen-
tation of the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) between Canada and the US, 
which among other things regulated the export of softwood lumber from Canada to 
the US, inter alia, violated Article 1105 of the NAFTA, according to which parties 
have an obligation to treat investors of another party to the NAFTA in accordance 
with international law, including fair and equitable treatment. Under the SLA export 
fees were levied on exports of softwood lumber out of Canada to the U.S., unless the 
exports came within a certain annual quota for all such softwood lumber exports. 
There was also a certain export quota on which a lower fee was levied. Pope & 
Talbot alleged that a number of measures taken by Canada with regard to the alloca-
tion of the above export quotas violated Article 1105. 
The tribunal found that whereas Canada’s quota allocations were handled in a 
reasonable manner, the handling of a certain “verification review procedure” regard-
ing information underlying Pope & Talbot’s quota applications initiated by Can-
ada’s Softwood Lumber Division (SLD), constituted a denial of the investor’s fair 
treatment required by NAFTA Article 1005. In the view of the Tribunal, the actions 
undertaken by SLD meant that Pope & Talbot was subjected to threats, denied its 
reasonable requests for pertinent information, required to incur unnecessary expense 
 
73  The Award, para. 194. 
74  The Award, para. 198. 
75  The Award, para. 202 et seq. 
76  UNCITRAL Award, 10 April 2001, www.investmentclaims.com. 
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and disruption in meeting SLD:s requests for information, forced to expend legal 
fees and probably suffer a loss of reputation in government circles.77 
In its award on damages78, the Tribunal did not expressly discuss the standard of 
compensation to be applied in case of violations of fair and equitable treatment un-
der NAFTA Article 1105. In light of the Tribunal’s conclusions with regard to liabil-
ity, the Tribunal simply awarded the investor compensation for costs and expenses 
incurred due to SLD:s “verification review procedure”, which primarily included 
accountants’ and legal fees as well as expenses incurred in lobbying efforts.79 The 
Claimant’s claim for compensation for the value of management time devoted to the 
“verification review procedure” was denied, since the Tribunal found management 
costs to be a fixed cost that the Claimant would have had irrespective of the “verifi-
cation review procedure”.80 
D. Concluding Remarks  
As mentioned above there are few arbitral awards dealing with the issue of compen-
sation for violations of the fair and equitable treatment standard. This means that 
caution is required when trying to draw general conclusions from such awards. It is 
submitted that it is in fact too early to draw any general conclusions at all. The cases 
discussed in this contribution show that there is, for the time being, no general ap-
proach to this issue. Only time will tell if there will ever be such a general approach. 
This notwithstanding, some preliminary observations come to mind. 
First, given the absence of treaty provisions in this area, tribunals rely – as they 
must – on customary international law. Guidance is usually sought from the ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility which in turn build on the principles laid down in 
the Chorzow Factory case. This is, however, only the first step in that it establishes 
the standard of compensation. As stated in Article 31 of the ILC Articles the stan-
dard is “full reparation” 
Second, when it comes to the method of establishing and calculating “full repara-
tion”, customary international law does not provide much guidance. The cases dis-
cussed above illustrate that the method chosen depends on, and varies with, the 
circumstances of each individual case, including, inter alia, the nature of the viola-
tion of the fair and equitable treatment standard and the kind and nature of the in-
vestment in question. Sometimes the starting point might be the amount actually 
invested, in other cases it might be more appropriate to focus on lost future profits as 
established by using the DCF method. 
 
77 The Award, para. 181. 
78 UNCITRAL Award, 31 May 2002, www.investmentclaims.com. 
79 The Award, para. 85. 
80 The Award, para. 82. 
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Third, it would seem that the issue of causality has the potential of creating more 
problems in this context than in relation to compensation for expropriation. One 
possible explanation is that violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard 
does not automatically result in the elimination of the investment, as is mostly the 
case with expropriation, but rather results in a decline in the business in question, or 
in other negative impact on it. The difficulty is to determine the extent to which this 
is caused by the violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and the “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies” in Recent ICSID Jurisprudence     
                    
Richard Happ∗ 
I have been asked to analyse recent jurisprudence1 of arbitral tribunals constituted 
under the auspices of the “International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes” (hereinafter “ICSID tribunals” or “tribunals”) relating to the “foreign 
nationa-lity – requirement” and the rule of exhaustion of local remedies. The scope 
of this report is restricted to awards and decisions rendered between 2001 and 2006. 
A. Introductory Remarks 
I. ICSID Convention and Diplomatic Protection 
The “foreign nationality”-requirement can be located in Article 25 (1) ICSID Con-
vention2 which sets out the general requirements for the jurisdiction of an ICSID 
tribunal. The exhaustion of local remedies is not something which the ICSID Con-
vention requires. To the contrary, Article 26 ICSID Convention sets out that a Con-
tracting State “may require the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition of its 
consent to arbitration under this Convention.”  
Both issues are not privy to the ICSID Convention, but have developed as part of 
the right of states to grant diplomatic protection to their nationals. States are only 
entitled to bring a claim on behalf of their nationals once that national has exhausted 
the local remedies. In the ELSI-case, the International Court of Justice qualified this 
rule as “an important principle of customary international law.”3 
 
∗  Richard Happ, Senior Associate, Practice Group Dispute Resolution, Luther Rechtsanwaltsge-
sellschaft, Hamburg. The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author. 
1  If not explicitly stated, the awards and decisions cited in this paper can be found on the website 
of ICSID at www.worldbank.org/icsid/ or at the following private websites: www.Investmentc 
laims.com or http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronological_list.htm.  
2  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States, Washington, 18. März 1965, I.L.M. 4 (1965), 524; in force since 14.10.1966 (hereinaf-
ter the „ICSID-Convention“). 
3  1989 I.C.J. Reports 42, para. 50.  
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In the area of investment disputes, diplomatic protection has been factually re-
placed by treaty-based investment arbitration as a means of dispute settlement4. The 
current caseload of ICSID consists nearly exclusively of disputes relating to the 
alleged breach of a bi- or multilateral investment treaty (hereinafter “BITs”).  
Notwithstanding this, one must be aware that within the framework of the ICSID 
Convention, the foreign nationality requirement and the exhaustion of local reme-
dies have a different function than they have within the framework of diplomatic 
protection. The jurisdiction of ICSID extends to all kinds of investment disputes, 
whether they are based on contract, national law or treaty, as long as the require-
ments of Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention are fulfilled. In contrast, diplomatic pro-
tection is restricted to alleged breaches of international law. Regard must be had to 
this different function when interpreting the ICSID Convention. 
II. ICSID Convention and Investment Protection Treaties 
The basis for the jurisdiction of an arbitration Tribunal is a respective agreement of 
the parties. Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention incorporates this by requiring the ‘con-
sent’ of the parties to submit their dispute to Centre. 
Where a dispute is based on a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”), the consent of 
the state is contained in the dispute settlement clause of the BIT. In terms of an 
agreement, the dispute settlement clause constitutes the offer of the state made to 
nationals of the other state. The investor consents to arbitration – and accepts the 
offer of the state - by filing its request of arbitration. Thus, provisions in the dispute 
settlement clause dealing with nationality and exhaustion of local remedies become 
part of the arbitration agreement.5 
An arbitration agreement must conform to the requirement of Article 25 ICSID 
Convention in order for an ICSID tribunal to have jurisdiction. It follows that from 
the perspective of the ICSID Convention, the provisions in a BIT dealing with na-
tionality and exhaustion of local remedies are conceptually subordinated to the  
ICSID Convention.  
 
4  For an analysis of that change (and some of its implications) cf. Happ, Schiedsverfahren 
zwischen Staaten und Investoren nach Artikel 26 Energiechartavertrag. Eine Studie zum Wan-
del der Streitbeilegung im Investitionsschutzrecht unter den Bedingungen einer globalen 
Weltwirtschaft (2000). 
5  Schreuer, The ICSID-Convention: A Commentary, Article 25 mn. 481.1. 
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B. The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement 
I. The General Rule 
Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention sets out that the 
“jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an 
investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of 
a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the 
Centre”. 
To fall under the jurisdiction of the Centre, a dispute must thus arise between a 
Contracting State and a national of another Contracting State. The nationality re-
quirement is considered not to have the same importance as in the field of diplo-
matic protection. In the framework of the Convention, the ‘foreign nationality’-
requirement is only the means to bring an investor within the jurisdiction of the 
Centre6.  
In Article 25 (2) (a-b), the Convention clarifies that a “national of another Con-
tracting State” can be an individual or a juridical person. The Convention does not 
define the concept of nationality. Whether an individual or a juridical person is a 
national of a Contracting State is, in the first instance, a matter of the law of that 
Contracting State7. The possession of the nationality of a certain state can be proven 
by passports and/or certificates of nationality, although tribunals are not bound by 
these documents. In Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates8, the Clai-
mant had submitted certificates of nationality issued by the Italian authorities to the 
tribunal. While it agreed with Prof. Schreuer that certificates of nationality should be 
given appropriate weight, it noted that such documents did not preclude a contrary 
decision by the tribunal9. Analyzing the submitted documents in detail, the tribunal 
found no evidence that the Italian officials who issued the certificates were aware 
that the Claimant had lost his Italian nationality. In cross-examination, the Claimant 
also admitted that he had not informed any Italian official of his loss of nationality, 
since he himself did not believe that he had lost it.  Consequently, the tribunal held 
that the Claimant could not rely on any of these certificates or on the letter of the 
Italian foreign ministry10. The tribunal was therefore compelled to determine for 
itself whether the Claimant reacquired Italian nationality after 1991. Italian law 
provided for that possibility, requiring only the taking up of residence in Italy for a 
 
6  Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in Investment Treaty Arbitration (yet 
unpublished paper), p. 3-4 (citing Broches and Amerasinghe). 
7  Schreuer, The ICSID-Convention: A Commentary, Article 25 mn. 429, 460. 
8  Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, Case No. ARB/02/7, Award of 7 July 
2004 (Fortier (presiding), Schwebel, El Kholy). The case arose on the basis of the BIT between 
Italy and the United Arab Emirates.  
9  Id., para. 63. 
10  Id., para. 66-68. 
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period of not less than a year. Reviewing the evidence submitted, it found that the 
Claimant could not prove that he had fulfilled this requirement, and thus concluded 
that he was not an Italian national11. As a result, the tribunal decided that the dispute 
was outside its jurisdiction. The Claimant could not rely on the BIT between Italy 
and the United Arab Emirates.12 
II. Nationality of Individuals  
Article 25 (2) (a) ICSID Convention clarifies that the investor must not have the 
nationality of the Contracting State which is a party to the dispute. The ICSID Con-
vention does not prohibit double nationality as long as the investor has the national-
ity of at least one Contracting State13. It is only where the investor has both the na-
tionality of the host state and of another Contracting State that he will not be able to 
resort to ICSID jurisdiction. This proved fatal for some of the claimants in Cham-
pion Trading et. al v. Arab Republic of Egypt14. The individual claimants had both 
U.S. and Egypt nationality and relied on their Egyptian nationality when making the 
investment in Egypt. The tribunal thus held that their claims were outside its juris-
diction.   
The principle of effective nationality, which the International Court of Justice had 
pronounced in the Nottebohm15 case, seems also have to been accepted with regard 
to investment disputes16. Within the period under review, however, no ICSID tribu-
nal seems to have issued a holding dealing with this principle. It was an issue raised 
by the individual claimants in Champion Trading, but considered not decisive since 
those claimants had US nationality. 
Article 25 (2) (a) imposes two temporal limitations: the investor must have the 
nationality of another Contracting State at the time when both parties consented to 
ICSID jurisdiction and at the time when the request for arbitration17 was registered. 
The continuous nationality - rule proclaimed by the tribunal in Loewen v. United 
 
11  Id., para. 81. 
12  The claimant could not accept the offer made by the United Arab Emirates to nationals of Italy 
to submit disputes to ICSID arbitration, since he was no Italian national. The possible prece-
dential value of the decision is thus not restricted to ICSID cases.  
13  Schreuer, Article 25 mn. 438. 
14  Champion Trading et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/02/09, Decision on Juris-
diction of 21 October 2003 (Briner (presiding), Yves Fortier, Aynès). 
15  ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgement of 6 April 1955, 
ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4 et seq. 
16  Schreuer, mn. 439; cf. Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Interim decision 
on preliminary jurisdictional issues of 6 December 2000 (Bravo, Gantz, Kerameus), para. 32. 
Cf. also Wisner/Gallus, JWIT 2004, 927, 930-933. 
17  ICSID Arbitration is initiated by a request for arbitration, Article 36 (1) ICSID Convention. 
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States18 might apply to treaty-based investment disputes. But since the ICSID sys-
tem is also open for mere contractual disputes, the ICSID Convention does not re-
quire continuous nationality. The investor may change its nationality as long as 
he/she fulfils the requirements of Article 25 (2) (a) ICSID Convention19. Of course, 
this is without prejudice to a possible rule of continuous nationality under applicable 
bi- or multilateral investment treaties or customary international law20 in a treaty-
based investment dispute.  
III. Nationality of Juridical Persons 
1. General Rule 
Article 25 (2) (b) ICSID Convention provides that a “national” is also  
“any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the 
State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such 
dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationa-
lity of the Contracting State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of 
foreign control, the parties have agreed should be treated as a national of another 
Contracting State for the purposes of this Convention.” 
The Convention does not define the concept of “juridical person”. It seems, how-
ever, to be generally accepted that legal personality is a necessary prerequisite for 
being a “juridical person”, and that mere associations of individuals are not suffi-
cient21. In Impregilo v. Pakistan, the Tribunal thus held that the Claimant could not 
bring a claim on behalf of an unincorporated Swiss joint venture, which it consi-
dered to be not a juridical person22. It is to be noted that several BIT’s, inter alia the 
new German-Chinese BIT, provide that “investors” can also be entities without legal 
 
18  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill). For a critical review, see Rubins, 
Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an Investor-Statee Arbitration Claim, Arbitration In-
ternational 21 (2005), 1 set seq. 
19  Schreuer, Article 25 mn. 452, 453. 
20  Cf. Dugard, Addendum to the first report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. 
A/Cn.4/506/Add.1. Dugard concludes (on p.10): “12. The dubious status of the requirement of 
continuity of nationality as a customary rule is emphasized by the uncertainties surrounding 
the content of the alleged rule. There is no clarity on the meaning of the date of injury, nation-
ality, continuity and the dies ad quem (the date until which continuity of the claim is re-
quired).“ 
21  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 457-459. 
22  Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005 (Guillaume (presiding), Cremades, Landau), para. 132. Cf. also 
Consorzio Groupement L.E.S.I. – Dipenta v. Algeria, Award on 10 January 2005 (Tercier (pre-
siding), Faurès, Gaillard), par. 34/37. 
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personality23. Those investors thus will not qualify as”juridical persons” pursuant to 
Article 25 (2) (b) ICSID Convention24.  
The nationality of juridical persons is primarily determined by the national law of 
the state whose nationality is claimed. Usually, corporate nationality is determined 
by the place of incorporation and/or the head office of the juridical person. These 
criteria have been adopted consistently by ICSID Tribunals25. Control of the corpo-
ration by nationals of that state is not considered a necessary criterion26, since Ar-
ticle 25 (2) (b) presupposes that a juridical person has the nationality of the host 
state, but is controlled by nationals of another Contracting state. Provisions on na-
tionality in national investment laws and investment treaties which provide for  
ICSID jurisdiction form part of the legal framework of the Contracting State party to 
the dispute and/or of the arbitration agreement.  
2. Agreement to Treat a Juridical Person as a Foreign National 
Pursuant to Article 25 (2) (b), the parties to the dispute may agree to treat a juridical 
person which has the nationality of the host state, but is controlled by nationals of 
another Contracting State, as a national of another Contracting State. Such an 
agreement should normally be explicit to avoid any doubts27. However, ICSID tri-
bunals have been generous in assuming an implicit agreement at least in cases where 
the state had agreed to ICSID jurisdiction with a locally incorporated company28. 
BIT’s may also contain a respective explicit offer of the State, which upon accep-
tance by the investor becomes part of the arbitration agreement. Absent such an 
explicit offer, no tacit agreement can be deduced from the conclusion of a BIT. 
While parties may agree explicitly or implicitly on treating a juridical person as a 
foreign national, it is an objective requirement that the juridical person must be con-
 
23  Cf. Art. 1(2) (a) of German-Chinese BIT, pursuant to which an investor (as regards the Federal 
Republic of Germany) is: “any juridical person as well as any commercial or other company or 
association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory of the Federal Re-
public of Germany”. An English-language version of the BIT can be found at http://www. 
iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_germany_china_bit_2003.pdf.  
24  It is to be noted that the German-Chinese BIT provides only for ICSID jurisdiction, unless the 
parties agree otherwise. Since it seems extremely unlikely that China would agree to the juris-
diction of a different forum to enable an investor to bring a claim, the consequence seems to be 
that only the individuals behind those entities can file a claim. 
25  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 460. In the period under review, no tribunal seems to have deviated from 
this general rule. 
26  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 463. 
27  ICSID has published several model arbitration clauses. The respective clause no. 7 (to be 
found at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/model-clauses-en/9.htm#c) reads as follows: “It is 
hereby agreed that, although the Investor is a national of the Host State, it is controlled by na-
tionals of name(s) of other Contracting State(s) and shall be treated as a national of 
[that]/[those] State[s] for the purposes of the Convention.” 
28  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 519. 
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trolled by nationals of another Contracting State. Control is primarily exercised via 
majority shareholding29. Often, the foreign national is a juridical person and only the 
first link in a chain of juridical persons of different nationality. In such cases, the 
questions arises whether a Tribunal has to stop at the first level of control, or can 
‘look through the corporate veil’ of the controlling foreign national to determine 
whether there are further controlling companies of different nationality, and deter-
mine which one of them exercises ‘effective’ control. Past tribunals seem to have 
decided differently: in Amco30, the tribunal stayed with the first-tier foreign share-
holder, while in SOABI31 the tribunal searched for real control and went one step 
further to second-tier control.32  
In Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela v. Venezuela (“Aucoven”), Aucoven was 
controlled by the US corporation Icatech, which in turn was 100%-owned by the 
Mexican company ICA Holding. As Venezuela submitted, ICA Holding exercised 
direct control over its subsidiaries, including Aucoven. Venezuela thus argued that 
the ‘effective’ control thus lay with a Mexican company (not a Contracting State). 
The tribunal did not accept that Art. 25 (2) (b) required ‘effective control’, observing 
that the ICSID convention does not know such a requirement, and that it would be 
difficult and impractical to apply.33 The tribunal then considered that the parties in 
their agreement had placed emphasis on the majority shareholding in Aucoven, and 
considered the majority shareholding to be a reasonable test for control34 and within 
the limits imposed by the ICSID Convention. 
The issue of “direct” or “effective control”, albeit with regard to a respective BIT-
clause, was also one of the main contentious issues in Aguas del Tunari S.A. 
 
29  See infra the discussion of the cases Autopista v. Venezuela and Aguas de Tunari v. Boliva. 
This is irrespective of the fact that very often less than majority shareholding can be sufficient 
to control a corporation. Cf., inter alia, International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. 
Mexico, Award of 26 January 2006 (van den Berg (presiding), Ariosa, Waelde), para. 105-110. 
30  Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Jurisdiction of 25 September 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 396. The 
Tribunal held, however, that in exceptional circumstances it might search for the true controller 
of a company (id., para. 14): “… in fact, it could be so where for political or economical rea-
sons, it matters for the Contracting State to know the nationality of the controller or the con-
trollers, and where it is proven that would the Contracting State have known this nationality, it 
would not have agreed to the arbitration clause; such a situation might possibly be met in ex-
ceptional instances”.  
31  SOABI v. Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction of 1. August 1984, 2 ICSID Reports 182/3. 
32  Cf. Wisner/Gallus, JWIT 2004, 927, 936 analyze these two decisions and argue that :”These 
facts suggest that investor-State tribunals will look through holding companies to determine 
control but will not look through companies pursuing activities in the jurisdiction in which 
they are incorporated.” 
33  Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No. 
ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 September 2001 (Böckstiegel, Cremades, Kauf-
mann-Kohler (presiding)), para. 112-113. 
34  Id., para 117-121. Article 64 of the contract between the parties provided that if the majority of 
the shares should be sold to a national of a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention, then 
disputes should be settled at ICSID. 
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v.Republic of Boliva35. Aguas del Tunari S.A. (“AdT”) is a Bolivian company the 
shares of which were owned – after some changes – by a chain of Dutch holding 
companies, the last one of which was held in equal parts by another subsidiary of the 
US company Bechtel Enterprise Holding, Inc (“Bechtel”)and by the Italian company 
Edison S.p.A (“Edison”) directly. 
When a dispute arose, AdT brought a claim on the basis of the Netherlands-
Bolivian BIT, Article 1 (b) (iii) of which provides that “nationals” of a Contracting 
Party (to the BIT) are also “legal persons controlled directly or indirectly, by nation-
als of that Contracting Party, but constituted in accordance with the laws of the other 
Contracting Party”. AdT thus claimed that it should be considered as a Dutch na-
tional, since it was controlled by Dutch companies. Bolivia objected to the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal, arguing that AdT was not controlled by Dutch companies, but 
by Bechtel.  
The Tribunal thus had to determine whether the indirect ownership of AdT’s 
shares was sufficient, or whether the Dutch companies did not exercise control, as 
they in turn were owned by Bechtel and Edison. It noted that majority ownership of 
shares was generally considered to be sufficient for control and that it was nearly 
impossible to draw the line between formal control and ‘actual control’ required by 
Bolivia36. After a lengthy analysis of the holding structure and the provisions of the 
BIT, the Tribunal considered that majority ownership of shares was sufficient for 
‘control’37 and that AdT was controlled by Dutch nationals. 
3. Foreign Juridical Persons Controlled by Nationals of the Host State 
No clear and uniform opinion, however, exists with regard to cases where the fo-
reign juridical person, be it direct investor or only shareholder of the investor, is not 
owned and controlled by third-state nationals, but by nationals of the host state. To 
imagine such a situation might cause a certain kind of uneasiness, since the ‘foreign’ 
investor in fact would not be foreign at all. In his 2000 commentary on the ICSID 
Convention, Prof. Schreuer described this uneasiness as follows: “[I]f the immediate 
controller is a national of a Contracting State which is, in turn, controlled by natio-
nals of non-Contracting States or even by nationals of the host state? Realism would 
militate against jurisdiction in such a case.”38 
The landmark decision in this respect seems to be the decision on jurisdiction in 
Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine39. The dispute arose on the basis of the bilateral invest-
 
35  Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia, Case No. ARB /02/3, Decision on Respondent’s 
Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005 (Caron (presiding), Alberro-Semerena, Alvarez).  
36  Aguas de Tunari, para. 246. 
37  Aguas de Tunari, para. 264. 
38  Schreuer, Art. 25 mn. 562. 
39  Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 2004 
(Weill (presiding), Bernardini, Price).  
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ment treaty between Lithuania and Ukraine (the “BIT”). The Claimant, Tokios Toke-
les, is a business enterprise established under the laws of Lithuania. It is owned and 
controlled by Ukrainian nationals, which hold ninety-nine percent of the company’s 
outstanding shares. In 1994, Tokios Tokeles created Taki spravy, a wholly owned 
subsidiary established under the laws of Ukraine. Tokios Tokeles alleged that, be-
ginning in February 2002, governmental authorities in Ukraine engaged in a series 
of actions with respect to Taky spravy that breached Ukraine’s obligations under the 
BIT.  
Ukraine argued that Tokios Tokeles should not be considered a ‘genuine national’ 
of Lithuania, since it was predominantly owned and controlled by Ukrainian natio-
nals and also had no substantial business activities in Lithuania. To find jurisdiction, 
Ukraine argued, would be tantamount to allowing claims of nationals against their 
own governments and incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICSID con-
vention.40 
The Tribunal considered that under the BIT, the claimant’s incorporation in 
Lithuania was sufficient to qualify it as an ‘investor’ of Lithuania. The Tribunal 
refused to apply a further ‘control’ or ‘substantial business activity’ test. It consid-
ered the lack of ‘denial of benefits’ provision to be a deliberate choice of Ukraine 
and Lithuania. Accordingly, Tokios Tokeles was held to be an ‘investor’ under the 
terms of the BIT.41 The Tribunal then turned to Article 25 of the ICSID Conven-
tion.42 Ukraine had asked the Tribunal to apply Article 25(2)(b) to create an excep-
tion to the state-of-incorporation rule of nationality. The Tribunal found no support 
in the text of the Convention for such an approach. It considered the object and pur-
pose of Article 25(2)(b) to be expansion of jurisdiction, rather than limiting it.43 The 
Tribunal also refused to apply the doctrine of “piercing the corporate veil”. While it 
acknowledged that the doctrine formed part of customary international law, and that 
Barcelona Traction44 was the seminal case affirming that proposition, it noted that 
Ukraine had not demonstrated that the requirements for veil-piercing had been 
met.45 The Tribunal then found that its conclusions were consistent with earlier 
ICSID awards and the views of ICSID scholars.46 
The chairman, Prof. Prosper Weill, dissented. He noted that “the approach taken 
by the Tribunal on the issue of principle raised in this case for the first time in   
ICSID’s history is in my view at odds with the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention and might jeopardize the future of the institution.”47 Professor Weill 
criticized the majority’s assumption that the origin of invested capital was not deci-
 
40  Id., para. 22.  
41  Id., para. 38. 
42  Id., paras. 42-52. 
43  Id., para. 46-49. 
44  Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company, Ltd. (note 9). 
45  Tokios Tokeles Award (note 61), para. 53-56. 
46  Id., para 58-70. 
47  Dissenting Opinion of Professor Prosper Weil, para. 1. 
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sive, denouncing this approach as “flying in the face of the object and purpose of the 
ICSID Convention and system”. Relying inter alia on the preamble of the Conven-
tion and the Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention, he noted that the  
“ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for investments made in a State by 
its own citizens with domestic capital through the channel of a foreign entity, 
whether pre-existent or created for that purpose.”48 
Quite the contrary decision seems to have been reached in the Loewen49 case (an 
ICSID Additional Facility dispute). It is noteworthy that the Tribunal decided to 
pierce the corporate veil (although apparently denying that). After the Claimant had 
filed for bankruptcy in the US, all of its business operations were reorganized under 
the mantle of  a United States corporation. The Canadian Loewen Group, imme-
diately prior to its going out of business, assigned all of its right, title and interest to 
the NAFTA claim to a newly created corporation called Nafcanco. The tribunal 
considered that not Nafcanco, but the new US corporation should be considered as 
‘real’ claimant 
“By the terms of the assignment, the only item being assigned was this NAFTA 
claim. All of the assets and business of TLGI have been reorganized under the mant-
le of an American corporation. All of the benefits of any award would clearly inure 
to the American corporation. Such a naked entity as Nafcanco, even with its catchy 
name, cannot qualify as a continuing national for the purposes of this proceeding.”50  
4. Mail Box-Companies and Shells  
Since ‘control’ is no requirement under the ICSID convention for the nationality of 
juridical persons (with the exception of Article 25 (2) (b)), it is in principle both 
possible and permissible51 for an investor from a non-Contracting State to channel 
investments into a host country via the subsidiary in a third state which is a Con-
tracting State. This may lead to disputes where the ‘formal investor’ is a mere mail-
box company or ‘shell’ created for the purpose of achieving ICSID-jurisdiction52.  
 
48  Id., para. 19. 
49  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill). 
50  Id., para. 237. 
51  Aguas de Tunari, para 330: “[…] it is not uncommon in practice, and - absent a particular 
limitation - not illegal to locate one’s operations in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a benefi-
cial regulatory and legal environment in terms, for example, of taxation or the substantive law 
of the jurisdiction, including the availability of a BIT.” 
52  Although that seems unlikely. The primary driving factor for the structuring of a foreign in-
vestment is the existence of double taxation agreements. To prevent ‘treaty shopping’ in the 
field of double taxation agreements, many states, including Germany (§ 50d III EStG), have 
enacted ‘denial of benefits’-provisions in their internal law which deny the advantages of a 
DTA to such mailbox companies. The scope of these provisions is similar to a denial of bene-
fits-provision under a BIT.  
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The ICSID Convention does not contain explicit substantive requirements to pre-
vent such a ‘treaty shopping’-approach, but leaves it to the agreement of the parties 
to determine who is deemed to be a ‘foreign national’. If the consent of the state is 
contained in a national law or a BIT, it is up to the contracting parties to include a 
respective “denial of benefits” provision. Several BIT’s contain “denial of benefits”- 
provisions, pursuant to which the provisions of the Treaty are not applicable to com-
panies controlled by third-state nationals (e.g. of states not party to that treaty), if 
those companies have no substantial business activity of their own. Respective ar-
guments have been advanced, inter alia, by the state parties in Generation Ukraine 
v. Ukraine and in Nova Plama A.D. v. Bulgaria, but to no avail. In both cases, the 
tribunals considered that the requirements of the denial of benetifs-provision were 
not fulfilled.  
Absent such a denial of benefits-provision, it seems that control by third-state na-
tionals would not affect ICSID jurisdiction as long as the third state is a Contracting 
State to the ICSID convention.  
It needs to be noted, however, that in several disputes the Contracting State par-
ties have raised the objection that the Claimant was a mere shell which was created 
for the sole purpose of gaining access to ICSID jurisdiction. In each of these cases, 
the tribunals did not dismiss that objection per se, but were careful to show that the 
objection was unfounded on the facts.  
In Autopista v. Venezuela, Venezuela had asserted that Icatech would be a corpo-
ration of convenience. The Tribunal analysed the context in which Icatech acquired 
shares in the claimant and considered that the assertion to be unfounded53. In Tokios 
Tokeles v. Ukraine, the tribunal did not in principle refuse to apply the doctrine of 
piercing the corporate veil, but merely considered that the requirements for doing so 
had not been fulfilled. In Aguas de Tunari v. Bolivia, Bolivia had asserted that the 
two Dutch companies were mere shells set up to obtain ICSID jurisdiction. The 
tribunal did not refuse that argument as being irrelevant per se, but concluded that 
both companies were not shells54. In its concluding observations, the tribunal also 
noted that it “does not find a sufficient basis in the present record to support an alle-
gation of abuse of corporate form or fraud”55. It did not reject the respective allega-
tion of Bolivia as irrelevant.  
The reasoning of these cases does not indicate whether they considered the “shell-
issue” to be part of the ICSID Convention or rather part of the respective bilateral 
investment treaty. Two recent non-ICSID awards, however, indicate that the shell-
issue might  be considered a part of the respective offer of the state party in a BIT to 
submit the dispute to arbitration.  
 
53  Autopista v. Venezuela, paras. 123-126. 
54  Aguas de Tunari, para. 320-323. 
55  Id., note 331. 
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In X v. Kazakhstan56, an SCC case on the basis, inter alia, of the US-Kazakhstan 
bilateral investment treaty, the Tribunal was faced with Respondent’s objection that 
the US corporate claimant was a mere shell controlled by non-U.S. nationals, possi-
bly even Kazakh citizens. The Claimant had failed to produce documentation con-
cerning its shareholders. The Tribunal noted that several provisions of the BIT re-
lated to ownership and control. It concluded that the Claimant was thus obliged to 
provide  
“the necessary information and evidence concerning the circumstances of ownership 
and control, directly or indirectly, over [Claimant-investor] at all relevant times”.57 
Since the Claimant had not provided any evidence that U.S. citizens or companies 
had any degree of control over the Claimant, the Tribunal concluded that it had not 
been established that it had jurisdiction on the basis of the Treaty. 
In Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic58, the Tribunal came to a different 
conclusion. It was faced with the objection that the Claimant was a mere shell con-
trolled by its UK parent company. The Tribunal observed that it had  
“ some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no real connection 
with a State party to a BIT, and which is in reality a mere shell company controlled 
by another company which is not constituted under the laws of that State, should not 
be entitled to invoke the provisions of that treaty.” 
However, it refused to find an implied “control”-requirement in the provisions of 
the Czech-Netherlands BIT.  
“The Tribunal cannot in effect impose upon the parties a definition of “investor” 
other than that which they themselves agreed. That agreed definition required only 
that the claimant-investor should be constituted under the laws of (in the present 
case) The Netherlands, and it is not open to the Tribunal to add other requirements 
which the parties could themselves have added but which they omitted to add”.59 
While several tribunals seem to have accepted the argument that mail-box com-
panies and shells set up for the mere purpose of obtaining access to arbitration 
should be denied that access, the jurisprudence is not yet uniform. However, none of 
the Tribunals seem to have interpreted an implied “control”-requirement into the 
ICSID-Convention. Also, both ICSID- and non-ICSID tribunals have pronounced on 
the shell-issue. That suggests that if an implied control-requirement exists, it must be 
found in the state’s offer to arbitrate contained in the respective BIT.  
 
56  Jurisdictional Award rendered in 2003 in SCC Case 122/2001, Stockholm International Arbi-
tration Review 2005:1, 123. 
57  Id., 151-152. 
58  Saluka Investment BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006 (Sir Arthur Watts 
(presiding), Fortier, Behrens).  
59  Id., paras. 240-241. 
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C. Exhaustion of Local Remedies 
I. Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law 
The exhaustion of local remedies rule is a rule of customary international law. In the 
Interhandel Case, the International Court of Justice stated that: 
“The rule that local remedies must be exhausted before international proceedings 
may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law; the rule 
has been generally observed in cases in which a State has adopted the cause of its 
national whose rights are claimed to have been disregarded in another State in viola-
tion of international law. Before resort may be had to an international court in such a 
situation, it has been considered necessary that the State where the violation oc-
curred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the frame-
work of its own domestic system.”60 
In the ELSI-case, the International Court of Justice acknowledged that the local 
remedies rule may be derogated from, qualified or varied by any binding treaty. 
However, the Court pointed out that the  
“[…] Chamber finds itself unable to accept that an important principle of customary 
international law should be held to have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence 
of any words making clear an objection to do so.” 
In this report, it shall be assumed that this rule has a procedural nature only. There 
has been a long standing debate whether the rule forms a part of procedural law or 
whether it is a substantive requirement for a breach of international law to exist. It is 
neither appropriate nor possible to give even a summary of this debate, or to com-
ment on it. Instead, reference shall be made to the summary given by John Dugard, 
Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission, in his second report on 
diplomatic protection61.  
However, both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the rule of exhaus-
tion of local remedies have been discussed in recent cases. Consequently, both shall 
be reviewed.  
II. Exhaustion of Local Remedies as a Procedural Requirement 
Art. 26 ICSID Convention reads as follows:  
“Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless otherwise 
stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any other remedy. 
A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local administrative or judicial 
remedies as a condition of its consent to arbitration under this Convention.” 
 
60  1959 ICJ Reports 27. 
61  Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, ILC 53rd session, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, pp. 
15-32. 
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Absent an explicit requirement to the contrary – in bilateral investment treaties, 
national legislation or investment agreements – access to ICSID thus will not require 
the exhaustion of local remedies. This serves to further the Centre’s purpose as a 
neutral venue for the settlement of investment disputes62, and also the exclusive 
character already provided for in the first sentence. 
In Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the Respondent thus fruitlessly argued that the 
Claimant first had to exhaust local remedies before resorting to ICSID Arbitration. 
The dispute arose on the basis of the US-Ukrainian bilateral investment treaty (the 
“BIT”), which did not contain a respective requirement of exhaustion of local reme-
dies. Since Ukraine had given its consent to ICSID arbitration already in the BIT, 
which was matched by the investor’s consent (given by filing the notice of arbitra-
tion), the Tribunal considered the reliance on Article 26 ICSID convention to be 
unfounded63. 
The duty to exhaust local remedies refers only to legal remedies. It is considered 
that this includes judicial remedies before ordinary and extraordinary courts as well 
as available remedies before administrative bodies. However, the individual is not 
obliged to exhaust “extra-legal remedies or remedies as of grace” or remedies which 
are of a discretionary nature64. 
It is considered that local remedies need not be exhausted where they provide no 
reasonable possibility of an effective remedy65. In The Loewen Group, Inc. and 
Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America66, the Tribunal put it as follows 
(para. 168 et seq.):  
“It is an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective and adequate and are 
reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances in which he is situated. 
169. Availability is not a standard to be determined or applied in the abstract. It 
means reasonably available to the complainant in the light of its situation, including 
its financial and economic circumstances as a foreign investor, as they are affected 
by any conditions relating to the exercise of any local remedy.  
170. If a State attaches conditions to a right of appeal which render exercise of the 
right impractical, the exercise of the right is neither available nor effective nor ade-
quate. Likewise, if a State burdens the exercise of the right directly or indirectly so 
as to expose the complainant to severe financial consequences, it may well be that 
the State has by its own actions disabled the complainant from affording the State 
the opportunity of redressing the matter of complaint. The scope of the need to ex-
haust local remedies must be considered in the light of these considerations.”  
 
62  Cf. Schreuer, Preamble Mn. 16-21. 
63  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003 
(Salpius, Voss, Paulsson (presiding)), paras. 13.1 – 13.6. 
64  Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 8; Brownlie, Princi-
ples of Public International Law, 5th ed., p. 499. 
65  Dugard, Third report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/523, p. 17 
66  Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond R. Loewen v. United States of America. Case No. ARB 
/AF)/98/3, Award of 26 June 2003 (Mason, Mikva, Mustill), para. 169. 
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It must be mentioned, however, that the decision then rendered by the Loewen 
Tribunal is not free from criticism67. The Tribunal considered that the claimants had 
not exhausted all available remedies (but settled instead), although an appeal vas 
virtually impossible and chances for further remedies (such as a Supreme Court 
review), were considered by experts as exceedingly remote. 
Several BIT’s contain requirements that the investor must first turn to the local 
courts and can only after a certain time of pending proceedings initiate arbitration. 
The purpose of such a rule seems to be similar to the purpose of the rule of exhaus-
tion of local remedies: to give the Respondent state the possibility to redress the 
wrong done by its own legal system68. However, such a rule is, technically speaking, 
not a requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. Thus, in Maffezini v. Spain, in 
Siemens v. Argentina and in Gas Natural v. Argentina, the tribunals considered such 
a rule not to require the exhaustion of local remedies69.  
III. Exhaustion of Local Remedies as a Substantive Requirement for a Breach  
As discussed above, the substantive aspect of the exhaustion of local remedies rule 
is not a procedural requirement, but pertains to the question whether there has been a 
breach of international law at all. Reviewing recent awards, three different aspects 
can be differentiated.  
1. Denial of Justice 
It is generally accepted that a denial of justice requires that the individual has ex-
hausted all reasonable local remedies70. The landmark case in this regard is Loewen 
v. United States. The claimants had lost a jury trial in Mississippi and were faced 
with a judgement over US-$ 500 million. While the tribunal concluded that the court 
failed to “afford Loewen the process that was due”, it also considered “that a court 
 
67  Cf. Paulsson, Denial of Justice p. 122-125; Rubins, Loewen v. United States: The Burial of an 
Investor-State Arbitration Claim, Arbitration International 21 (2005), p. 1 et seq. 
68  Cf. Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 2. 
69  Emilio Agustín Meffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the Tri-
bunal on Objections to Jurisdiction (Orrego Vicuna (presiding), Burgenthal, Wolf), para. 28; 
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 
August 2004 (Rigo Sureda (presiding), Brower, Bello Janeiro), para. 104; Gas Natural SDG, 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/03/10; Decision of the Tribunal of 17 June 
2005 on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (Lowenfeld (presiding), Lavarez, Nikken), para. 
30. 
70  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 108. 
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decision which can be challenged through the judicial process does not amount to a 
denial of justice at the international level”71. It noted that the  
“purpose of the requirement that a decision of a lower court be challenged 
through the judicial process before the State is responsible for a breach of interna-
tional law constituted by judicial decision is to afford the State the opportunity of 
redressing through its legal system the inchoate breach of international law occa-
sioned by the lower court decision. The requirement has application to breaches of 
Articles 1102 and 1110 as well as Article 1105.”  
It is noteworthy that this purpose is the same which is thought to be the purpose 
of the procedural rule of exhaustion of local remedies72.  
2. No Breach of International Law by a Decision of a Lower Court? 
The Loewen-award suggests that the acts of a court of first instance do not normally 
give rise to the level of an international wrong73. For the Loewen-Tribunal consi-
dered that the requirement of exhaustion of remedies against the decision of the 
lower court applied not only in cases of denial of justice, but also to alleged breaches 
of Article 1105 NAFTA (fair and equitable treatment) and Article 1110 NAFTA 
(expropriation). 
It needs to be recalled that each and every court, and not the court system in itself, 
is an ‘organ’ of the state, the acts of which can be attributed to the state74. A state is 
responsible for actions of its courts which are in breach of international law75. Se-
cond, irrespective of the attribution of an act to the state, state responsibility further 
requires that the act is in breach of international law. Whether a judgement of a 
lower court, against which an appeal is possible, constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation, can only be determined with respect to that particular obligation. 
With regard to a denial of justice, the conduct of a court of first instance does not 
constitute a breach since, as Paulsson describes it, “[t]he obligation is to establish 
and maintain a system which does not deny justice; the system is the whole pyra-
mid.”76  
 
71  Loewen, para. 153. 
72  Cf. Dugard, Second report on diplomatic protection, UN Doc. A/CN.4/514, p. 2 (citing Bor-
chard and Jiménez de Aréchaga). 
73  Rubins, Arbitration International 21 (2005), p. 16. 
74  Cf. draft Article 4 (1) of the ILC draft Articles on State Responsibility (underlining by author): 
“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international 
law, whether that organ exercises legislative, executive judicial or any other functions, what-
ever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of 
the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.” 
75  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 84-87. 
76  Paulsson, Denial of Justice, p. 109. 
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The Loewen-holding seems to extend the reach of the ‘substantive exhaustion of 
local remedies’ from denial of justice to expropriation and fair and equitable treat-
ment. Whether that holding accurately reflects the state of the law under NAFTA, or 
general customary international law, deserves further analysis. 
3. No Breach of International Law if Local Remedies are Available? 
Several awards indicate that certain forms of state conduct might not constitute a 
breach of an obligation under a BIT as long as local remedies are available to the 
investor.  
In Feldman v. Mexico77, the arbitral tribunal found that although “the Claimant, 
through the Respondent’s actions, is no longer able to engage in his business” as a 
result of the elimination of a tax rebate on export resales of cigarettes”78, and al-
though “it is undeniable that the Claimant has experienced great difficulties in deal-
ing with [Ministry] officials, and in some respects has been treated in a less than 
reasonable manner”,79 the Mexican Government’s regulatory actions were, on ba-
lance, not equivalent to an expropriation. In declining to find that the claimant’s 
allegations of unlawful administrative actions constituted expropriation, the tribunal 
took account of the availability of court review of those administrative actions80. 
In Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine81, the claimant alleged that through a series of 
actions and omissions, the Ukrainian authorities had expropriated his investment in 
an office building. The tribunal found that due to the lack of seeking local remedies, 
no expropriation took place: 
“20.30 The fact that an investment has become worthless obviously does not mean 
that there was an act of expropriation; investment always entails risk. Nor is it suffi-
cient for the disappointed investor to point to some governmental initiative, or inac-
tion, which might have contributed to his ill fortune. Yet again, it is not enough for 
an investor to seize upon an act of maladministration, no matter how low the level of 
the relevant governmental authority; to abandon his investment without any effort at 
overturning the administrative fault; and thus to claim an international delict on the 
theory that there had been an uncompensated virtual expropriation. In such in-
stances, an international tribunal may deem that the failure to seek redress from 
national authorities disqualifies the international claim, not because there is a re-
quirement of exhaustion of local remedies but because the very reality of conduct 
 
77  Marvin Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award of 16 December 2002 
(Kerameus (presiding), Bravo, Gantz).  
78  Id., para. 109. 
79  Id., para. 113. 
80  Id., para. 140. 
81  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/00/9, Award of 16 September 2003 
(Salpius, Voss, Paulsson (presiding)). 
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tantamount to expropriation is doubtful in the absence of a reasonable - not neces-
sarily exhaustive - effort by the investor to obtain correction.” 
In Waste Management v. Mexico (II)82, the tribunal concluded that the alleged 
breach of a contractual obligation by a state did not constitute a breach NAFTA 
Article 1105 (fair and equitable treatment)  
“116. […] It is true that in a general sense the exhaustion of local remedies is a pro-
cedural prerequisite for the bringing of an international claim, one which is dis-
pensed with by NAFTA Chapter 11. But the availability of local remedies to an 
investor faced with contractual breaches is nonetheless relevant to the question 
whether a standard such as Article 1105(1) have been complied with by the State. 
Were it not so, Chapter 11 would become a mechanism of equal resort for debt col-
lection and analogous purposes in respect of all public (including municipal) con-
tracts, which does not seem to be its purpose.”  
or Article 1110 (expropriation): 
“175. The Tribunal concludes that it is one thing to expropriate a right under a con-
tract and another to fail to comply with the contract. Non-compliance by a govern-
ment with contractual obligations is not the same thing as, or equivalent or tanta-
mount to, an expropriation. In the present case the Claimant did not lose its contrac-
tual rights, which it was free to pursue before the contractually chosen forum. The 
law of breach of contract is not secreted in the interstices of Article 1110 of 
NAFTA. Rather it is necessary to show an effective repudiation of the right, unre-
dressed by any remedies available to the Claimant, which has the effect of preven-
ting its exercise entirely or to a substantial extent.”  
Other tribunals have reached similar conclusions with regard to contract 
breaches83. 
The latest decision in this regard is the (non-ICSID) award in EnCana v. Ecuador, 
in which the refusal of a governmental agency to grant tax refunds was at issue. The 
claimant alleged that the state had expropriated its right to the refunds. The tribunal, 
relying on the Waste Management – award, held that  
“In terms of the BIT the executive is entitled to take a position in relation to claims 
put forward by individuals, even if that position may turn out to be wrong in law, 
provided it does so in good faith and stands ready to defend its position before the 
courts. Like private parties, governments do not repudiate obligations merely by 
contesting their existence. An executive agency does not expropriate the value rep-
resented by a statutory obligation to make a payment or refund by mere refusal to 
pay, provided at least that (a) the refusal is not merely wilful, (b) the courts are open 
 
82  Waste Management, Inc v. United Mexican States, Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3, Award of 30 
April 2004 (Crawford, Civiletti, Gómez), paras. 161-174. 
83  SGS v. Philippines, Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 (El-
Kosheri, Crawford, Crivellaro), para. 163; Consortium RFCC v. Royaume du Maroc, Case No. 
ARB/00/6, Award of 22 December 2003 (Briner, Cremades, Fadlallah), Abs. 65: “Pour qu’il y 
ait droit à compensation if faut que la personne de l’exproprié prouve qu’il a été l’objet de me-
sures prises par l’Etat agissant non comme cocontractant mais comme autorité publique“.   
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to the aggrieved private party, (c) the courts’ decisions are not themselves overrid-
den or repudiated by the State.”84  
D. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Parties are free to include into their arbitration agreements provisions on nationality. 
In treaty-based investment arbitration, the agreement of the parties is constituted by 
the dispute settlement offer of the BIT, which is accepted by the investor. State par-
ties have the possibility to include denial of benefits-clauses into the BIT and, by 
this, to exclude certain groups of investors from the scope of their offer to arbitrate.  
The reviewed cases suggests that in determining the nationality of corporations, 
ICSID Tribunals give deference to any existing agreements of the parties. As long as 
a tribunal considers an agreement not be incompatible with explicit provisions or 
with the object and purpose of the ICSID Convention, it will uphold that agreement.  
In those cases where nationality was disputed (e.g. Tokios Tokeles), the problems 
arose from the lack of such provisions. Since the ICSID Convention sets only the 
outer limits for such agreements, it should not be burdened with issues which the 
parties could and should have regulated for themselves (such as excluding investors 
which are controlled by host-state nationals). Irrespective of that, several awards 
indicate that tribunals will not accept mere shells as Claimants. While their reaso-
ning is not entirely consistent, it seems that tribunals interpret into the dispute set-
 
84 EnCana Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN3481, Award of 3 Feb-
ruary 2006 (Crawford (presiding), Grigera Naon, Thomas), para. 194. The award was rendered 
by a majority only. Arbitrator Horacio Grigera-Naon dissented sharply: “To require such 
“substantive” exhaustion of local remedies, consisting of a prior and final determination by the 
local courts of the host State under its own national law of disputes concerning the entitlement 
of rights (or denial of such rights) of a foreign investor covered by the Treaty, suggests the   
existence of a public international law had-and-fast rule, binding on international arbitral tribu-
nals, according to which such rights are localized in the host State, exclusively governed by its 
own laws and, for that reason, that disputes involving such rights must be previously adjudi-
cated by the courts of the host state under its own laws, before related claims under interna-
tional law are ripe for decision on the merits at the international level.” 
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tlement offer of a bilateral investment treaty a respective implied prohibition of shell 
companies as claimants.  
The rule of exhaustion of local remedies has little practical relevance as a proce-
dural rule in treaty-based investment arbitration. However, Tribunals have declined 
to find a breach of BIT-provisions where the investor alleged the non-fulfilment of 
rights existing under the law of the host state, but failed to seek recourse with (not 
necessarily exhaust) available local remedies. Investors wishing to submit such a 
dispute to treaty-based arbitration should thus carefully review whether the respec-
tive dispute settlement clause allows for such disputes, or is limited to disputes rela-
ting to a breach of the BIT.  
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and the “Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies” in Recent ICSID Jurisprudence     
                               
Comment by Michael Kerling∗ 
A. Introduction 
I have been asked to comment on the report “The foreign nationality requirement 
and the exhaustion of local remedies in recent ICSID Jurisprudence” by Dr. Richard 
Happ. As an in-house counsel of a major German construction contractor my com-
ments will be focused on the rather practical aspects of ICSID and I will mainly 
concentrate on the experiences of our company within the last four years.  
As far as I am informed, our company is still the only German construction com-
pany that has ever been involved in ICSID proceedings even though it seems to have 
been established by recent ICSID Jurisprudence that as a matter of principle a con-
struction project in a foreign state might be considered an investment in the sense of 
bi- or multilateral investment treaties. 
Even though we have considered international arbitration on the basis of bilateral 
investment treaties in the context of quite a few projects, only two cases have “really 
made it to Washington” so far. One of these cases is the quite well known case “Im-
pregilo vs. Pakistan” – our company has been one of the partners of the respective 
joint venture. The other case “Ed. Züblin AG vs. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” is for 
sure less known, mainly because it has been finished through amicable settlement in 
a very early stage. 
B. The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirement and “Treaty Shopping” in Practice:     
Impregilo vs. Pakistan 
The case “Impregilo vs. Pakistan” seems at least in parts to be suitable for some 
further thoughts about the “foreign nationality requirement” already discussed in 
more detail by my colleague Dr. Happ.  
As I mentioned earlier, our company has been one of the members of an unincor-
porated joint venture under Swiss law lead by the Italian contractor Impregilo, con-
sisting of Impregilo, German Ed. Züblin AG and two Pakistani contractors. The 
dispute arose out of two contracts relating to the construction of hydro-electric 
power facilities located on the Indus river immediately downstream of the Tarbela 
 
∗  Michael Kerling, Corporate Counsel Ed. Züblin AG, Stuttgart. 
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Dam in Northern Pakistan, that when completed, would increase power generation 
in Pakistan by 15%.  
The joint venture had suffered immense damages through continuous frustration 
of the contractual dispute resolution instruments (Dispute Adjudication Boards in 
the sense of the FIDIC Red Book). The frustration went far beyond what might have 
to be expected in such environment. The Employer, the Pakistan Water and Power 
Development Authority, not only continuously refused any cooperation with regard 
to obviously outstanding claims but also acted to the detriment of the joint venture 
by nominating obviously biased adjudicators and by continuously questioning the 
credibility of the adjudicators nominated by the joint venture. Thus, a fruitful and 
reasonable handling of the claims became impossible. On the top of that the situa-
tion for a foreign contractor became increasingly difficult due to the consequences 
of the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001.  
All this lead us to the decision to search for a solution on the international level. 
Unfortunately, we had to notice that there was no BIT providing for an ICSID clause 
between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Federal Republic of Germany (the 
old BIT between Germany and Pakistan, which was signed in 1959, does not contain 
such a clause and has never been amended accordingly). However, a BIT with an 
ICSID clause was signed between Italy and Pakistan on 19th July 1997. The joint 
venture decided to start proceedings on this basis. Of course the joint venture was 
aware of the jurisdictional problems that this might cause but due to the lack of 
alternative there was no choice but trying it.  
As expected, the jurisdiction “ratione personae” was one of the main points chal-
lenged by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (“the Respondent”). The Respondent 
argued that the Italian Contractor could not pursue claims on behalf of the joint 
venture because the joint venture lacked legal personality and therefore could not be 
considered as an entity of foreign nationality in the sense of the ICSID Convention. 
All partners to the joint venture would rather have to appear on their own behalves. 
The main counter arguments of the joint venture was the following: 
The Italian contractor had to have a possibility to assert the claims on behalf of 
the joint venture as leader and majority stakeholder in the joint venture for the fol-
lowing reasons: Under the joint venture agreement, the Italian contractor was obli-
gated to distribute any monetary judgement awarded to it in an arbitral proceeding to 
its joint venture partners according to the respective stakes of the partners in the 
joint venture. Thus, the only way for the Italian Contractor to obtain its full share in 
the joint venture would have been for the Tribunal to permit the Italian Contractor to 
proceed on behalf of the joint venture. Otherwise, the aim of the BIT, which always 
must be the full protection of the foreign investor, could not be reached. 
Unfortunately in its decision on jurisdiction, the Tribunal did not follow this view 
and considered that the Italian Contractor was not able to pursue claims on behalf of 
the joint venture. It mainly referred to Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention, which 
defines as we have heard before, that the investor, who may be either an individual 
or a juridical person, must not have the nationality of the Contracting State which is 
a party to the dispute. Referring to the drafting history of the Convention the Tribu-
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nal then concludes that an association of individuals or juridical persons does not 
qualify as a foreign juridical person for the purposes of the Convention. This lead to 
the conclusion of the Tribunal that the joint venture as a whole was not covered by 
the BIT.  
In the Tribunals view, the Italian Contractor was not able to claim compensation 
amounting to 100% of the damages suffered by the joint venture: In its view, of the 
three other joint venture partners 1.) none was a protected investor in the terms of 
the BIT, (2.) two were not nationals “of another Contracting State” for the purposes 
of Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. It pointed out that in concluding the BIT 
with Italy, the Respondent had conferred certain rights exclusively to Italian natio-
nals but not to any other nationals; not to mention Pakistani investors themselves. 
The fact that the Italian investor was forced by the joint venture agreement to dis-
tribute any awarded sums to the other partners to the joint venture was considered a 
mere internal contractual problem of the Italian Contractor. It has to be mentioned 
that the Tribunal declined this argument in only a few words, which we considered 
as neither convincing let alone satisfying. However, the view of the Tribunal seems 
to be in line with former ICSID jurisprudence. 
Nevertheless, the case, containing some further interesting questions, could be 
settled shortly after the decision on jurisdiction had been released. At least a part of 
the damages suffered was compensated, which would most probably not have been 
the case if the joint venture had not decided to bring the case to international arbitra-
tion. 
From the point of view of “Treaty Shopping”, which was also raised by my col-
league Dr. Happ, our company drew the conclusion that it might be wise not only to 
clarify whether a BIT containing an ICSID clause exists before negotiating contracts 
with public entities abroad but also to choose foreign partners against the back-
ground of a possibly existing BIT. Even though it has been established in the above 
mentioned decision that in a joint venture only partners being nationals of one of the 
contracting states can claim jurisdiction, it still is a means of pressure to have at least 
one partner in a joint venture who is able to refer the dispute to ICSID arbitration if 
any other instrument of reasonable dispute resolution has failed. 
C. The “Exhaustion of Local Remedies”: Ed. Züblin AG vs. Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia 
As I mentioned earlier, this case has been settled in such an early stage that probably 
none of you has even heard of it. I am not sure if I really fully hit the mark of the 
topic but when drafting our request for arbitration we came at least across some very 
interesting questions concerning local remedies. 
The dispute arose out of the long delay in the rendering of a judgement by the 
courts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as well as the persistent failure by the Go-
vernment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to honour a final and binding judgment in 
favour of our company.  
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A few words concerning the project and the dispute: On 8th April 1978, King 
Saud University (“the University”) and our company entered into a contract to con-
struct a new academic campus for the University. This contract was substantially 
completed in May 1986. Continuous failures to comply with its obligations under 
the contract by the University caused the Contractor to suffer significant damages. 
Any claims always submitted in accordance with the contract were rejected by the 
University. The Contractor therefore was compelled to submit these claims to the 
“Board of Grievances”, which was according to the contract to resolve any disputes 
between the parties. The lawsuit was initiated in 1984. On 12th March 2001, a judg-
ment awarding the contractor more or less what was claimed 17 years before. Our 
lawyers in Saudi Arabia considered this judgment “most probably final”. What had 
happened during this period of 17 years? In the following a short overview from the 
time of submitting the points of claim until the issuance of a “final judgment”: 
• 24th March 1986: first hearing 
• no communication and no explanation in the following 6 years 
• 3rd March 1992: re-opening of the case due to appointment of new judges 
• “final hearings” on 2nd May and 19th October 1992 
• no action in the following three years 
• re-opening of the case on 14th February 1995 
• 19th December 1995: first judgment 
• appeal of the University, relegation to Board of Grievances 
• 29th September 1997: appointment of a Technical Expert 
• 25th January 1999: submission of the report, confirming first judgment 
• accusation of the Technical Expert of bribery and forgery by the University 
• 5th July 2000: rejection of the accusations by the Investigation Bureau 
• 8th October 2000: new judgment ordering the University to pay the claimed 
amount 
• appeal by the University 
• 12th March 2001: confirmation of judgment of 8th October. 
 
After the last confirmation of the judgment nobody could really assure us that it 
was really final. Our company made multiple attempts to obtain the sums awarded 
but all such attempts failed: All governmental bodies involved had been informed, 
the request was sent from one authority to the other, but none of the officials in-
volved wanted to make any statement. Our company even referred the dispute to the 
Royal Court (but this obviously is not a further instance in Saudi judicial system) 
and to the Saudi General Investment Authority, which was founded in the year 2000 
in connection with the new Foreign Investment Law in order to improve the “in-
vestment climate” in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, the German Em-
bassy officially but unsuccessfully raised the issue several times with the Govern-
ment of Saudi Arabia. Yet, because none of these attempts led to any success and 
due to the lack of enforcement rules against public entities in the Saudi legal system, 
we started thinking about ICSID and decided to initiate respective proceedings 
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against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the basis of the BIT signed between Ger-
many and Saudi Arabia on 29th October 1996. 
In the light of such history, the term of “exhaustion of local remedies” became 
quite of essence for us. It is difficult to establish such exhaustion if it is completely 
unclear how the local remedies work. For that reason, we had to do some in-depth 
research on the Saudi judicial system when drafting our request for arbitration and 
we learnt that the Saudi legal system belonged to the legal systems where it might 
even be impossible to establish the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies.  
There are only very few publications on the Saudi legal system so that we had to 
rely mostly on information of our local counsels. The Board of Grievances, before 
which our case was handled, is a very traditional institution dating from the early 
years of Islam. It was revived by the Saudis in the fifties and today has amongst 
others exclusive jurisdiction over “cases regarding disputes relative to contracts to 
which the Government or public juridical person is a party”. Judgments usually are 
not published and the stages of appeal are extremely complicated and thus confu-
sing. Especially in the procedure for disputes between private companies and public 
entities, there are different stages of “automatic appeal” and endless relegations, 
which are quite difficult to follow. By all means, in the end, we just had to assume 
that the local remedies had been exhausted in this case and submitted our request for 
arbitration on this basis. 
Fortunately for us but unfortunately for those dedicated to ICISD jurisprudence a 
very profitable settlement offer came shortly after the Tribunal had been constituted. 
This way, many interesting questions have never been dealt with. Another question 
in this case would also have been the one of the foreign joint venture partner be-
cause our company had been the leader of a joint venture with two Swiss partners.  
D. Conclusion 
Both of our cases show that ICSID arbitration has proven as a successful instrument 
of pressure for companies involved in multinational projects, when conventional 
mechanisms of dispute resolution or enforcement of judgements fail. Therefore, 
from the point of view of an international contractor, it definitely makes sense to 
verify whether a Bilateral Investment Treaty containing an ICSID clause exists be-
fore entering into a contract with a foreign public entity.  
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The “Foreign Nationality”-Requirements in ICSID Arbitration 
                              
Comment by Anthony C. Sinclair* 
This commentary to Dr Happ’s paper1 focuses on the first of his two topics and 
deals with three essential themes.  First, this commentary acknowledges the rela-
tionship between the element of consent called for pursuant to Article 25 of the 1965 
„Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of other States” (the “Convention”2) and the nationality requirements of any appli-
cable investment protection treaty.  Secondly, it emphasises the mandatory require-
ments of the Convention as to nationality for the „International Centre for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes” (“ICSID” or “the Centre”) to have jurisdiction and 
highlights their interplay with requirements to qualify for investment treaty protec-
tion.  And finally, the commentary conducts a brief and admittedly selective survey 
of the diversity of approaches to nationality and qualification for protection found in 
investment treaties, and how these approaches can interact with the objective outer 
limits of ICSID jurisdiction. 
Possession of the nationality of a Contracting State to the Convention is a door 
through which an investor must pass in order to be able to bring a claim within  
ICSID’s jurisdiction.  Article 25(1) of the Convention provides that the jurisdiction 
of the Centre: 
“shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a 
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State 
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.  When the 
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally” 
(emphasis added). 
 
*  Anthony C. Sinclair, Associate International Arbitration Group, Allen & Overy LLP, London. 
This paper is a revised version of a presentation given by the author at the inaugural confe-
rence on ICSID arbitration to be held in Germany: The International Convention for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes: Taking Stock after 40 Years co-hosted by Frankfurt am Main 
University and the Wilhelm Merton Center, held in Frankfurt, 26 to 28 April 2006.  The views 
expressed herein are personal and do not necessarily reflect those of Allen & Overy or its     
clients. 
1 Happ, “The Foreign Nationality Requirement and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Recent 
ICSID Jurisprudence”, The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes: Taking Stock after 40 Years, Frankfurt, 26 to 28 April 2006. 
2  World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Natio-
nals of Other States, Washington D.C. 1965 signed 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966, 
575 U.N.T.S. 159 reprinted in (1965) 4 I.L.M. 532 and available online at 
www.worldbank.org/icsid. 
 130
Dr Happ rightly acknowledges that in practice it is the scope of “consent” that is 
the key for claimants’ standing.  For in the vast majority of ICSID cases today, arbi-
tration proceedings stem from a standing generic offer on the part of the host State 
to arbitrate disputes with qualified foreign investors set out in an investment promo-
tion and protection treaty.  Having the nationality of an investor to whom such an 
offer is made is therefore an essential element in order for the parties’ consent to 
arbitrate disputes to crystallise.  Matters of ICSID case law necessarily merge here 
with questions of qualification arising under investment protection treaties, notwith-
standing that strictly speaking it is only the former that is the topic of this confe-
rence.  It is for this reason, however, that reference may be made to questions of 
nationality arising both under investment treaties as well as under the Convention.  
Indeed, many of the most interesting nationality cases of recent years concern na-
tionality for the purpose of ascertaining consent under the applicable BIT, not sim-
ply nationality for the purposes of Article 25 of the Convention. 
These instruments – the Convention and any applicable investment treaty – pre-
sent dual requirements for the Centre to have jurisdiction to decide a dispute.  A 
claimant must establish both that it meets the nationality conditions in any treaty, as 
well as the objective requirements of the Convention.  The relationship between 
these is governed by Article 25, which sets the “outer limits” of ICSID’s jurisdic-
tion.3  The majority in Tokios Tokel÷s v. Ukraine therefore may well have incor-
rectly marginalised the requirements of the Convention - express or implied - when 
it essentially deemed its jurisdiction to be established merely by satisfaction of the 
criteria for standing under the applicable Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.4 There is principle 
behind the majority’s approach which many will favour: generally, “an agreement to 
submit to ICSID’s jurisdiction should be upheld unless it would lead to a use of the 
Convention for purposes for which it was clearly not intended”.5  It is precisely that 
cautionary proviso, however, that motivated the chairman of the Tribunal to disagree 
with the majority.  Weil’s frequently cited dissent – perhaps even more so than the 
majority decision itself – takes the view that satisfaction of the nationality conditions 
for jurisdiction to exist under the Convention must be “the first leg of the reaso-
ning”.6  Weil opined that although the Contracting Parties to an investment treaty 
“are free to confer to the ICSID tribunal a jurisdiction narrower than that provided 
for by the Convention, it is not for them to extend the jurisdiction of the ICSID tri-
bunal beyond its determination in the Convention”.7 
The divergence between the arbitrators in Tokios turned on the recurring – and yet 
to be convincingly resolved – question whether ICSID jurisdiction can extend to a 
 
3 Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of other States, (1972-II) 136 Recueil des Cours 331, 361 (hereafter “Broches”). 
4  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 29 April 2004. 
5 Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), Article 25, para. 464 (hereafter 
“Schreuer”). 
6  Dissenting Opinion dated 29 April 2004, para. 15. 
7 Tokios, Dissenting Opinion of Prosper Weil, para. 13. 
 131
juridical entity incorporated in another Contracting State to the Convention that is 
owned or controlled by nationals of the host State.  As Dr Happ has described, the 
majority in Tokios saw no impediment to their jurisdiction in these circumstances 
once the criteria in the investment treaty were found to be satisfied.  Notably, during 
the drafting of the Convention, a proposal was raised to define standing by reference 
to the foreign origin of the investment, consistent with the Convention’s goal to 
encourage the international flow of capital.  The idea was not pursued8 and, indeed, 
in many ICSID cases the fact that funds have been sourced locally has not proved an 
impediment to ICSID jurisdiction.9  Although the national origin of capital per se 
may therefore not be relevant to ICSID jurisdiction, the national origin of the con-
trollers of the investment may well be. Weil would have declined jurisdiction in the 
light of the general principle in international law that a national is not permitted to 
sue its own State in an international forum10 and the fact that the Convention is con-
cerned with “the need for international cooperation for economic development and 
the role of private investment therein”, not the resolution of essentially domestic 
disputes.11  Foreshadowing this issue in his Commentary, Schreuer admitted to fin-
ding the possibility that a national of a host State may seize ICSID of jurisdiction via 
a corporate vehicle incorporated in another Contracting State “troubling”.12  He 
believed that “realism” ought to “militate against jurisdiction” where the claimant 
company is controlled by nationals of the host State: 
“[o]n balance, the better approach would appear to be a realistic look at the true 
controllers thereby blocking access to the Centre for juridical persons that are con-
trolled directly or indirectly by nationals of non-Contracting States or nationals of 
the host State”.13 
The majority decision in Tokios turned on the presumed intention of the Contrac-
ting Parties to the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT.  The majority’s reasoning is relatively 
less concerned with the objective requirements for jurisdiction to exist under the 
ICSID Convention.  Like Tokios, it is also conspicuous that the jurisdictional deci-
sion in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia contains no explicit discussion 
as to whether the objective requirements of the ICSID Convention were met in that 
case, although there is again extensive reference to the requirements of the applica-
ble investment treaty.14  The Tribunal’s decision contains a lengthy treatment of the 
requirements for an entity to qualify for protection under the Bolivia-Netherlands 
BIT but no reference to ICSID Article 25(2)(b) even though the claimant was Bo-
 
8 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 427. 
9 E.g., Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Award dated 29 April 1999, para. 109. 
10 Ibid., paras. 5, 10; also Schreuer, Article 25, para. 496:  “The Convention is designed to facili-
tate the settlement of investment disputes between States and nationals of other States.  It is not 
meant for disputes between States and their own nationals.  The latter type of dispute is to be 
settled by domestic procedures, notably before domestic courts”. 
11 Convention, Preamble, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
12 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 562. 
13 Ibid., para. 563. 
14  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2005. 
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livian.15  Charitably perhaps, the Tribunal was content to infer the exi-stence of an 
agreement between the parties to treat the Bolivian company, Aguas del Tunari, as a 
national of a foreign Contracting State because of foreign control once it had estab-
lished that it fell within the definition of a Dutch “investor” as set out in the BIT.  
Admittedly, the Convention requires no special form for such an agreement.16  
Schreuer observes, in fact, that “[t]he practice of ICSID tribunals shows an in-
creasing readiness to accept an implicit agreement to treat a juridical person as a 
foreign national because of foreign control”.17  From that practice, Schreuer deduces 
that “[i]f the investor takes up the offer contained in the … treaty, the provisions on 
access of locally established but foreign controlled companies become part of the 
agreement between the parties”.18  This approach is consistent with the universally-
accepted construction of an agreement to arbitrate arising from the offer on the part 
of host States found in modern investment treaties, and the acceptance of that offer 
by investors at the time they submit a request for arbitration.19  It also appears to be 
the approach adopted by the Tribunal in Aguas del Tunari.  The case is a relatively 
rare modern example of a question of ICSID jurisdiction potentially turning on the 
application of Article 25(2)(b).  As investment protection treaties are repeatedly 
confirmed to confer upon the foreign shareholders in local companies both substan-
tive protection and a direct right to submit claims to arbitration for harm suffered to 
their subsidiaries,20 recourse to ICSID’s jurisdiction for a locally-incorporated entity 
ceases to depend on the existence of an agreement to treat it as a foreign national.21  
It is therefore unfortunate, for those seeking further clarification of ICSID law, at 
 
15  With respect to legal persons, a national of a Contracting State is defined in Article 25(2) as: 
       “(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State 
party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to con-
ciliation or arbitration and any juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting 
State party to the dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of this 
Convention”. 
16 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 504. 
17 Ibid., para. 510. 
18 In this manner, an express agreement is formed:  ibid., para. 505, also 536 but cf. para. 519 
where Schreuer doubts whether an implied agreement on nationality can arise where consent to 
jurisdiction is based on the host State’s legislation or on a treaty:  “If the investor simply ac-
cepts a standing offer by the host State to submit to jurisdiction, no agreement to treat that par-
ticular investor as a foreign national can be imputed to the host State”. 
19 E.g., El Paso Energy International Company v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdic-
tion dated 27 April 2006, para. 35:  “It is now established beyond doubt that a general refe-
rence to ICSID arbitration in a BIT can be considered as being the written consent of the State, 
required by Article 25 to give jurisdiction to the Centre, and that the filing of a request by the 
investor is considered to be the latter’s consent” (emphasis added). 
20 E.g., Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 3 August 2004, 
para. 142:  “As regards ICSID law dealing with the issue of the rights of shareholders to bring 
a claim before an arbitral tribunal, the decisions of arbitral tribunals have been consistent in fa-
vor of such right of shareholders”. 
21 This development is foreshadowed by Schreuer, Article 25, para. 520. 
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least,22 that the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal did not engage in any explicit analysis of 
the locally-incorporated claimant’s de facto foreign status for the purposes of Article 
25(2)(b).23 
Aside from the exception in Article 25(2)(b), the Convention provides relatively 
little elucidation itself on many of the contemporary problems arising from nationa-
lity requirements raised in Dr Happ’s report.  One further exceptional instance of a 
clear rule in the Convention concerns the standing of a dual national having both the 
nationality of another Contracting State, as well as the nationality of the host State.  
In Champion Trading et. al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt,24 nationals of the United 
States who were also found to be Egyptian nationals were denied the right to submit 
their claims to ICSID on account of the “clear and specific rule” found in Article 
25(2)(a).25  This provision, which had been adopted unanimously by the Conven-
tion’s drafters, ex-cludes absolutely from ICSID’s jurisdiction claims by physical 
persons who are dual nationals having both the nationality of the host State and 
nationality of another Contracting State.  Schreuer explains that “persons who pos-
sess the nationality of another Contracting State are excluded if they possess the host 
State’s nationality concurrently”.26  The rule cannot be bypassed even with the par-
ties’ consent and applies irrespective of arguments as to which nationality is the 
more effective.27  The Convention is clear in this respect. 
The larger question whether the doctrine of dominant and effective nationality, as 
elucidated by the International Court Nottebohm28 and, for example, applied by the 
 
22 Ibid., para. 537. 
23 The pre-2000 jurisprudence, based largely on contractual submissions to ICSID’s jurisdiction, 
is discussed in Schreuer, ibid., paras. 496-607. 
24  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 2003.  See also Shihata/Parra, “The Experience of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes” (1999) 14 ICSID Rev.-
F.I.L.J. 299, 308. 
25  With respect to physical persons, Article 25(2) defines “National of another Contracting State” 
to mean:  
       “(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party 
to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to conciliation 
or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered pursuant to paragraph 
(3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either 
date also had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute” (emphasis added).  
On the drafting history to this provision, see Schreuer, Article 25, para. 442. 
       Interestingly, the plain wording of Article 25(2)(a) would suggest that physical persons who 
are stateless will not have standing before the Centre: Nathan, ICSID Convention: The Law of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (2000) 84; also Schreuer, 
Article 25, para. 437. 
26 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 440. 
27 Ibid., para. 444. 
28 Nottebohm Case (Lichtenstein v. Guatemala), Second Phase, Judgment dated 6 April 1955 
(1955) ICJ Rep. 4, 22. On the principle of effective nationality see also Salem Claim (1932) II 
R.I.A.A. 1184, 1188; Mergé Claim (1955) 22 I.L.R. 443, 456; Flegenheimer Claim (1958-I) 25 
I.L.R. 91, 149; and Stankovic Claim (1963) 40 I.L.R. 153, 155. 
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Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Case No. A/18,29 is generally applicable to ICSID’s 
requirements remains at large, notwithstanding Dr Happ’s view that it “seems … to 
have been accepted with regard to investment disputes”.  The question whether the 
principle of effective nationality has any place in investment treaty arbitration was 
extensively argued in Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, but not 
decided.30  It is also adverted to in the Champion Trading decision, but again not 
decided.31  The drafting history to the Convention suggests that possession of the 
nationality of a non-Contracting State in addition to that of a Contracting State is not 
in itself a bar to ICSID jurisdiction over dual nationals.32  Broches himself suggested 
in his 1972 Hague lectures that the drafters were not concerned to legislate against 
such jurisdiction.33  The question is therefore still undecided, and will no doubt be 
raised again in future cases,34 but with the International Law Commission moving 
away from the Nottebohm position,35 it is by no means clear that the doctrine of 
dominant and effective nationality will be adopted into ICSID law.  
To conclude on the standing of physical reasons to submit claims to ICSID,   
writing on the scope of investment treaty arbitration in 1962, Elihu Lauterpacht (as 
he then was) considered that “where natural persons are concerned, few difficulties 
are likely to arise”.36  Claims have been submitted to ICSID by natural persons in at 
least a dozen cases37 and, for the most part, Lauterpacht’s forecast has been fair.  
 
29 Decision No. Dec 32-A18-FT dated 6 April 1984, reprinted in (1984) 5 Iran-US C.T.R. 251, 
263. 
30 Hussein Nuaman Soufraki v. The United Arab Emirates, Award dated 7 July 2004, para. 42.  
Noting the Award, see Sinclair, Nationality of Individual Investors in ICSID Arbitration 
(2004) 7 Intl. Arb. L. Rev. 191 (hereafter “Sinclair (2004)”).  Allen & Overy LLP represented 
the United Arab Emirates in this dispute and continues to do so in an annulment proceeding, 
which is still pending at the time of writing. 
31  Champion Trading et al. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 21 October 
2003, at p. 16. 
32 ICSID, Documents Concerning the Origin and Formulation of the Convention on the Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Vol. I (Washington 
D.C.: ICSID, 1968) 122 (hereafter “History of the ICSID Convention”); ibid., Vol. II, 170, 
447. 
33 Broches, op cit. 
34 There is also passing reference to the concept in Feldman Karpa (Marvin Roy) v. United 
Mexican States, Decision on Jurisdiction dated 6 December 2000, para. 32; and Olguín (Eu-
doro A.) v. Republic of Paraguay, Award dated 26 July 2001, para. 18. 
35 International Law Commission (Dugard, Rapporteur), First Report on Diplomatic Protection, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/506 (2000) 35; International Law Commission, Draft Convention on Diplo-
matic Protection (2002), Article 5(1) reprinted in International Law Commission, Report to the 
General Assembly, UN Doc. A/57/10 (2002) 166, 182; and also Orrego Vicuña, Interim Re-
port to the International Law Association on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, in 
International Law Associate Committee on Diplomatic Protection of Persons and Property, 
First Report (2000) at 32-33, 35 (available online at www.ila-hq.org). 
36 Lauterpacht, The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investment (1962), ICLQ Suppl. 
No. 3, 18. 
37 See the references cited in Sinclair (2004), op cit. 
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However, exceptional cases such as Soufraki and Champion Trading demonstrate 
that the nationality issues that can arise are not always straightforward. 
Just as, given the current state of the law, it cannot be said that the Convention 
imposes a legal test of “dominant and effective” nationality for physical persons, 
likewise the Convention contains no express requirement that a juridical person 
should have any particular connection with the Contracting State in which it is in-
corporated beyond the fact of incorporation.  There is no general doctrine in ICSID 
law or investment treaty arbitration generally mitigating against jurisdiction where 
the claimant is a mere “shell”, absent a specific limitation to that effect in the appli-
cable treaty.  Although it is a UNCITRAL case, remarks in Saluka Investments B.V. 
v. Czech Republic38 are highly relevant and, on this point, had Saluka been an ICSID 
case it is very likely that the Tribunal’s conclusions would have been no different.  
The Czech Republic had argued that Saluka was not a “real Dutch investor” but a 
mere conduit for an investment by Nomura, a UK entity.  Although Article 1 of the 
Czech Republic-Netherlands BIT clearly extended to Saluka, since it was an entity 
organised in accordance with the laws of the Netherlands, the Czech Republic ar-
gued strongly against that being the end of the story and requested that the Tribunal 
look at the reality of the situation.  The Tribunal denied the objection: 
“The Tribunal has some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no 
real connection with a State party to a BIT, and which is in reality a mere shell com-
pany controlled by another company which is not constituted under the laws of that 
State, should not be entitled to invoke the provisions of that treaty.  Such a possibil-
ity lends itself to abuses of the arbitral procedure and to practices of ‘treaty shop-
ping’, which can share many of the disadvantages of the widely criticised practice of 
‘forum shopping’. 
However that may be, the predominant factor which must guide the Tribunal’s 
exercise of its functions is the terms in which the parties to the Treaty now in ques-
tion have agreed to establish the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  ...The parties had complete 
freedom of choice in the matter, and they chose to limit entitled ‘investors’ to those 
satisfying the definition set out in Article 1 of the Treaty”.39 
Equally, the Convention’s drafters chose deliberately not to import any rule that 
would deny jurisdiction to a juridical person that is a so-called shell, not having any 
substantial business activities in the territory of the Contracting State in which it is 
incorporated.  To the extent that States may wish to exclude protection for such 
entities, such jurisdictional choices are, again, matters of consent that may or may 
not be addressed in any applicable relevant investment treaty. 
Accordingly, reviewing the range of approaches in investment treaties to deter-
mine whether an investor has the nationality of a Contracting Party one can find a 
great deal of variation, and rightly so, since different States legitimately may take 
different approaches to qualification for treaty protection.  There is no single appro-
 
38  Partial Award dated 17 March 2006. 
39  Ibid., paras. 240-241. 
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priate link between an entity asserting a right to protection under an investment 
treaty, and the State under whose treaty the investor is seeking to benefit.40  Many 
States bestow their treaty protection liberally, believing, one may surmise, that the 
reciprocal promotion of investment flows is best achieved by a very flexible and 
open definition of nationality based on mere formalities alone.  On the other hand, a 
significant minority of States appear to take the view that the economic and deve-
lopmental goals underpinning their investment treaties are best satisfied by confer-
ring protection only upon entities with a tangible economic link to their country, 
such as “substantial economic activities”, or their “effective management” or “main 
headquarters”.41  Whichever approach is the more appropriate for a particular State 
is a question best to be debated by economists and politicians. 
Insofar as treaties contain a reference to ICSID jurisdiction, the Convention itself 
notoriously does not specify any particular test for nationality.  The Convention thus 
accommodates the freedom of States to legislate who may be their nationals and to 
agree upon these criteria, subject to the objective outer limits of the Convention.   
In time, other criteria for standing to submit claims to international fora may be 
developed, especially as the role of individuals as subjects of international law be-
comes more widely accepted.42  For the time being, the necessary qualification to 
access ICSID is to have the nationality of a Contracting State although it is said that 
nationality for these purposes is not identical to the concept of nationality in the 
traditional sense of the link conferring upon a State the right in international law to 
espouse a claim by way of diplomatic protection.43  Nationality, for the purposes of 
ICSID, merely “serves as a means of bringing the private party within the jurisdic-
tional pale of the Centre”.44 
At one time, international investment protection had been fortuitous, but given 
the breadth of the network of investment protection available today, international 
law firms routinely advise investors on the strategic structuring of their investments.  
In doing so, close adherence to the diversity of treaty language is required in order to 
ensure that an investment benefits from the protection of an effective investment 
 
40 For a detailed study of the tests of corporate nationality, see Acconci, Determining the Interna-
tionally Relevant Link between State and Corporate Investor (2004) 5 Journal of World In-
vestment & Trade 139. 
41  For a survey of the approaches, see Sinclair, The Substance of Nationality Requirements in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration (2005) 20 ICSID Rev.-F.I.L.J. 357 (hereafter “Sinclair (2005)”). 
42 Schreuer, Article 25, para. 431. 
43 Broches, Chairman’s Report on the Preliminary Draft of the Convention, 9 July 1964, Doc 
Z11, History of the ICSID Convention, Vol. II, 557, 579 and Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction of 
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (1979) 19 Indian J. Intl. L. 
166, 198, 203 (hereafter “Amerasinghe”). 
44 Amerasinghe, 198. 
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treaty and access to ICSID should a dispute arise.45  Absent any special treaty limita-
tion, it is not uncommon and apparently not contrary to ICSID jurisdiction to locate 
a new operation in a jurisdiction perceived to provide a beneficial regulatory and 
legal environment, including the availability of an investment treaty.46  Frequently, 
such structuring takes place in the months, or even weeks, before the crystallisation 
of a cause of action.  This does not mean, however, that an investor of a State that is 
not an ICSID Contracting State may assign a ripe treaty claim to an entity having 
the nationality of a Contracting State in order to attract ICSID jurisdiction.47  The 
Tribunal in Mihaly International Corp. v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka stated that a treaty claim “under the ICSID Convention with its carefully 
structured system is not a readily assignable chose in action as shares in the stock-
exchange market or other types of negotiable instruments, such as promissory notes 
or letters of credit”.48  To allow such an assignment to operate in favour of ICSID 
jurisdiction would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention, as well as the 
sanctity of the privity of international agreements not intended to create rights and 
obligations for non-Convention States or their nationals.49 
 
45 For example, the notion of “juridical person” in the definition of “national of a Contracting 
State” is not defined in the Convention but has been held to exclude unincorporated groupings:  
Schreuer, Article 25, para. 458 and see Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Deci-
sion on Jurisdiction dated 22 April 2005, paras. 131-139; Consorzio Groupement LESI-
DIPENTA v. Republic of Algeria, Award dated 10 January 2005, para. 40. 
46 Aguas del Tunari, para. 330. 
47  The ICSID Convention requires claimants to establish that they had the nationality of a Con-
tracting State on the date at which the parties consented to ICSID’s jurisdiction (and, in the 
case of natural persons only, also on the date the Request for Arbitration is registered) but does 
not itself require continuity of nationality, for instance, through to the date of an award:  
Schreuer, Article 25, paras. 452 (natural persons) and 493 (juridical persons).  One can there-
fore agree with Dr Happ that, to the extent that a continuous nationality rule may apply at all, it 
is to be derived not from the ICSID Convention but from any applicable investment protection 
treaty; e.g., Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, Award 
dated 26 June 2003, para. 220 determining that under NAFTA Chapter 11, the claimant must 
demonstrate its continuous nationality through to the date of any award.  Amongst the com-
mentary on this controversial finding, see e.g., Paulsson, Note – Loewen v. United States,   
ICSID Additional Facility Case No. ARB/AF/98/3 - Continuous Nationality in Loewen (2004) 
20 Arb. Intl. 213; Duchesne, The Continuous-Nationality-of-Claims Principle: Its Historical 
Development and Current Relevance to Investor-State Investment Disputes (2004) 36 Geo. 
Wash. Intl. L. Rev. 783; Mendelsohn, Runaway Train: The Continuous Nationality Rule from 
the Panavezys-Saldutiskis Railway case to Loewen in Weiler (ed.) International Investment 
Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and Customary International Law (2005) chapter 4; Rubins, The Burial of an Investor-State 
Arbitration Claim (2005) 21 Arb. Intl. 1. 
48  Award dated 15 March 2002. 
49  Where an investor changes his nationality after already enjoying the protection of a BIT on the 
basis of its former nationality, “it is doubtful that he would continue to be deemed a national of 
his former country for the purposes of the BIT”:  Dolzer and Stevens, Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (1995) 34. 
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However, just as investors may structure their activities to benefit from invest-
ment treaty protection, so too may different States take steps to limit or avoid claims 
from entities to which they did not intend to extend the protection of a particular 
treaty.  In addition to defining criteria to qualify for treaty protection, some States 
insert a so-called “denial of benefits” clause in their treaties that appears to be in-
tended to confer upon host States an absolute right to exclude claims brought by 
shell or “mailbox” companies.  The rationale for the provision may be that such 
companies are understood not to contribute economically or socially to the fabric of 
the State in which they are incorporated.  Again, whether that actually is the case is a 
matter for analysis going beyond the scope of this paper. 
Plama Consortium Ltd v. Republic of Bulgaria50 is one of the few published cases 
to date to have addressed the application of such clauses.  Plama was a company 
incorporated in Cyprus, which is a Contracting Party to the 1994 Energy Charter 
Treaty (the “ECT”).  Plama indirectly owned a formerly state-owned oil refinery in 
Bulgaria through a locally-incorporated company, Nova Plama.  When a dispute 
arose, Plama submitted claims against the Republic of Bulgaria to ICSID, alleging 
violations of both the ECT and the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT.  Bulgaria sent a letter to 
ICSID purporting to invoke the denial of benefits provision in Article 17(1) of the 
ECT and deny to the claimant the substantive protection of the ECT on the basis 
that:  (1) Plama was owned or controlled by nationals of a State that was not a Con-
tracting Party to the ECT; and (2) Plama conducted no substantial business activities 
in Cyprus.  The Tribunal assumed, for the purposes of its analysis, that both re-
quirements of Article 17(1) were met and turned to the question of how Article 
17(1) was intended to operate in the context of the ECT as a whole and, specifically, 
in relation to the generic offer to submit investment disputes to international arbitra-
tion set out in Article 26.51  The Tribunal stated that by operation of Article 26(3)(a) 
of the ECT and Article 25 of the Convention, the parties had given their uncondi-
tional written consent to the arbitration of the dispute.  Such consent, once given, 
may not be unilaterally withdrawn.52  As such, Article 17(1) of the ECT was con-
genitally incapable of constituting a bar to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to hear the 
claims brought under the ECT.  As the Tribunal stated, Article 17(1) is not a condi-
tion precedent to the offer to submit disputes to investor-state arbitration; it created 
only a right to deny the protection of the ECT. 
 
50  Decision on Jurisdiction dated 8 February 2005. A denial of benefits clause was also consid-
ered in Generation Ukraine Inc. v. Ukraine, Award dated 16 September 2003. 
51 For more extensive discussion, see Sinclair, Investment Protection for Mailbox Companies 
under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty 5(2) TDM (November, 2005); Sinclair (2005) op cit.; 
and Jagusch/Sinclair, The Limits of Protection for Investments and Investors under the Energy 
Charter Treaty in Ribeiro (ed.) Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty (2006) 
73, 93-103. 
52 Article 25(1) of the Convention provides:  “When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally”. 
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The Tribunal went on to consider the question whether Article 17(1) could sup-
port an objection to the admissibility of Plama’s claims on the merits.53  In the Tri-
bunal’s opinion, while Article 17(1) conferred on Bulgaria a right to deny the ECT’s 
protection to mailbox company investors, for that denial to be effective the right had 
to be exercised:  “the existence of a right is distinct from the exercise of that right”.54  
More importantly, the Tribunal held that once exercised, any denial of benefits could 
only apply prospectively.  It concluded that it would run contrary to the legitimate 
expectations of existing investors and undermine any certainty for those planning 
new investments if, once invoked, the right to deny benefits provision could exclude 
treaty protection for existing investments.55 
The Plama Tribunal’s interpretation of the denial of benefits clause presents a 
number of practical and philosophical difficulties, which have already been de-
scribed elsewhere, leading some to question its correctness.56  If correct, however, 
the effect the Plama Tribunal gives to the denial of benefits clause has a number of 
practical consequences.  First, it appears to have left very little scope for host States 
to invoke denial of benefits clauses, since by the time it becomes aware that a dis-
pute has arisen with a mailbox company investor, it would already be too late.  The 
denial of benefits provision can offer a good defence to claims brought by mailbox 
companies but a State must exercise its right prior to or at the time of the invest-
ment.  Conversely, for investors deciding whether to commence arbitration procee-
dings or for those advising investors on structuring new investments, it is possible to 
take comfort that if the denial of benefits provision has not already been invoked, it 
may not be raised subsequently. 
By way of a final remark, it is hoped that in conjunction with Dr Happ’s report, 
the foregoing analysis of nationality requirements in ICSID – and investment treaty 
arbitration – encourages one to share the more uncontroversial view of the Plama 
Tribunal, when it said that: 
 
53 On the distinction between jurisdiction and the admissibility of claims, see Paulsson, Jurisdic-
tion and Admissibility in Aksen, Böckstiegel, Mustill, Patocchi and Whitesell (eds.) Global Re-
flections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution, Liber Amicorum in Hon-
our of Robert Briner (2005). 
54 Plama, para. 155. 
55 Ibid., para. 163. 
56 See the references cited at footnote 51, above. 
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“issues as to citizenship, nationality, ownership, control and the scope and loca-
tion of business activities can raise wide-ranging, complex and highly controversial 
disputes”.57  
 
57  Plama, para. 149. 
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State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties         
                    
Alexander Szodruch∗ 
A. Introduction  
With more than 40 pending investor claims challenging Argentina’s 2001/2002 
pesification measures, it cannot be denied that the topic of this study, though cur-
rently being en vogue, is somewhat displaced in a “stocktaking” exercise. It is no 
doubt true that ICSID could very well exist in the absence of proceedings stemming 
from state insolvency. But it is worth pondering the opposite question: Will ICSID 
survive in the presence of such investor claims? Or, putting it less drastically, does 
the phenomenon of state insolvency have the potential to change the nature of In-
vestment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID itself? Argentina’s fierce opposition to 
current proceedings and to (possible) enforcement attempts illustrates that Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration could in fact reach an important turning point when faced 
with claims resulting from situations of state insolvency.1  
It is interesting to see that although much has been written about the legal impli-
cations of the Argentina crisis, there has been a separation between traditional Fo-
reign Direct Investment (FDI) by multinational corporations on the one hand and 
issues arising from portfolio investment in Argentine public debt (i.e. sovereign 
bonds issued by Argentina in the 1990s) on the other.2 The former debate on FDI 
has largely focussed on questions of ICSID jurisdiction, the interpretation of treat-
ment obligations under BITs and Argentina’s plea of State of Necessity, while the 
discussion on Argentina’s record-breaking debt default has centred on how to cope 
with collective action problems traditionally surfacing in the corporate insolvency 
setting, the most ambitious plan being the IMF’s suggestion for an institutionalized 
 
∗  Alexander Szodruch, LL.M. (Indiana) is Ph.D Candidate at the Walther-Schücking Institute, 
University of Kiel. 
1  In particular, states could attempt to terminate Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) if they 
perceive that ICSID Arbitration prevents them from adopting emergency measures designed to 
escape an economic crisis. 
2  For exceptions see Tietje, Die Argentinien-Krise aus Rechtlicher Sicht: Staatsanleihen und 
Staateninsolvenz, Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht, Vol. 37, Feb. 2005, 13-16; 
Wälde, The Serbian Loans Case: A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection of Foreign 
Debt, in Weiler (ed.), Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Custo-
mary International Law, 2005, 383, 401-423. 
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Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).3 This separation reflects the 
general distinction between the Law of International Investment and the Law of 
International Finance, the Law of International Trade being the third leg in the trian-
gle called International Economic Law.4 However, given that Italian holders of de-
faulted Argentine bonds recently announced to initiate an ICSID claim to recover 
their losses from the Argentine default,5 the implications of Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration for sovereign debt restructuring, one of the traditional disciplines of Interna-
tional Financial Law, must no longer be neglected. In fact, as the IMF’s SDRM 
proposal is shelved for the time being due to U.S. opposition,6 it is legitimate to ask 
whether Investment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID can serve as an adequate inter-
national forum to solve disputes between distressed sovereign borrowers and their 
private lenders.7 If ICSID Tribunals turn out to be willing and legally able to hear 
and decide cases brought by a distressed sovereign’s creditors, the nature of Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration could significantly depart from the original ICSID/BIT 
drafters’ intentions. 
As a starting point, I will briefly sketch the recent discussion on state insolvency 
and highlight the important (and partly unresolved) legal issues outside of Invest-
ment Treaty law (II.). Part III., the core of the study, will analyze the substantive 
ICSID/BIT implications and obligations with respect to the phenomenon of state 
insolvency. Part IV. will address, from an ICSID perspective, two important proce-
dural issues that have frequently arisen in domestic sovereign debt litigation, i.e. the 
possibility of a temporary stay of proceedings and the prospects of enforcing credi-
tor claims. The concluding Part V. analyzes how Investment Treaty Arbitration can 
alter the common sovereign debt restructuring process and, turning that very ques-
tion upside down, how state insolvency claims can change the nature of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration. The conclusion also contains an assessment whether or not the 
current BIT/ICSID framework could perform functions of an SDRM and whether 
 
3  Anne Kruger (then IMF First Deputy Managing Director), A Financial Architecture for 2002: 
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Address given at the National Economists’ 
Club Annual Members’ Dinner, 26 Nov. 2001, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 
2001/112601.htm. The initiative was further elaborated on in the following years, see IMF, 
Proposed Features of a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, 12 Feb. 2003, http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/021203.pdf. 
4  Dolzer, Generalklauseln in Investitionsschutzverträgen, in Frowein et al. (eds.), Negotiating 
for Peace: Liber Amicorum Tono Eitel, 2003, 291 (293). 
5  Assoziazione per la Tutela Degli Investitori in Titoli Argentini, Tfa, pronto ricorso a Icsid, 2 
March 2006, http://www.tfargentina.it/download/ComunicatoStampaTFA-02_03_2006.pdf. 
Holders of defaulted Russian debt initiated ICSID proceedings in 1998. The case was report-
edly settled, see Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, The Argentine Crisis – Foreign Investors’ 
Rights, Jan. 2002, 3; Wälde, supra note 2, 402 (Fn. 44). 
6  Snow (then Secretary of the Treasury), Statement at the Meeting of the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee, 12 April 2003, http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/ 
stte/eng /usa.htm. (“it is neither necessary nor feasible to continue working on SDRM”). 
7  Debt restructurings with official lenders (states and multilateral institutions) are not covered by 
ICSID/BITs.  
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Investment Treaty Arbitration could be reconciled with the overriding principles of 
state insolvency identified by the IMF. 
This study does not contain a current affairs discussion on the Argentina procee-
dings, tempting as that may be. Still, the Argentina case will quite inevitably be used 
to illustrate what the legal issues of state insolvency are and how currently pending 
ICSID proceedings could set important precedents8 for future cases. 
B. Legal Issues of State Insolvency in the Post Brady Age 
Much has been written about the legal problems relating to state insolvency in the 
last years, which is why I will only provide a very brief overview of the core points 
of the subject matter. The notion of state insolvency hereinafter will refer to the case 
where a state does not meet (or threatens not to meet) its contractual payment obli-
gations towards foreign nationals located abroad, regardless of whether the state is 
unable or only unwilling to pay.9 In the vast majority of cases, these payment diffi-
culties arise regarding payment obligations denominated in a foreign currency (a 
currency other than the state’s own), as the debtor state always has the option to 
inflate itself out of a domestic currency payment crisis.10 State insolvency covers all 
kinds of contractual payment obligations such as debt owed to suppliers and service 
providers. However, most prominent in the state insolvency context is the debt that 
states accumulate when tapping international financial markets to finance their ex-
penditures. This is due to the fact that states are more likely to default on classic 
debt instruments, since the immediate welfare losses are much less significant com-
pared to defaulting on trade credit.11 Although the ensuing analysis will take heed of 
this factual practice, it should be kept in mind that state insolvency affects more 
claims than just those stemming from long term debt securities. 
 
8  Arbitration under ICSID does not follow a stare decisis rule, and hence the term “precedent” 
could be misleading. It will nonetheless be used in an informal sense because ICSID Tribunals 
are frequently invoking prior ICSID awards as authority for their own decisions.  
9  Borchard, State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, Vol. I. 1951, 115. Admittedly, this is 
economically inaccurate as the term insolvency only covers the situation where the debtor does 
not have sufficient funds to pay. However, already drawing a distinction between inability and 
unwillingness to pay at this definitional stage would confuse the definitional question with the 
question of whether or not the state actually has the right to refuse payments, see Ohler, Der 
Staatsbankrott, JZ 2005, 590, 593. 
10  The Russian default on ruble denominated Russian Law debt obligations (GKOs) in 1998 
illustrates that local currency debt is not immune from default either, see Gelpern/Setser, Do-
mestic and External Debt: The Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 795, 
801 (2004). 
11  Samberg, Debt Restructuring: Trade Finance Falls from Favour, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. Sept. 2002, 
21, who notes that the traditional pattern of sparing trade creditors from restructuring is chan-
ging. 
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I. Sovereign Debt in Global Financial Markets 
The most important feature that renders the problem of state insolvency so complex 
is the fact that sovereign debt is now mainly issued in the form of bonds that are 
freely traded on securities exchanges. This constitutes a remarkable departure from 
sovereign financing through syndicated bank loans in the 1970s/80s and can be 
traced back to the 1989 Brady-plan (named after then U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Nicholas Brady) that swapped bank debt for tradable debt securities.12 Moreover, 
throughout the 1990s, many emerging market countries issued new debt securities to 
a variety of receptive investors, including retail investors. This development dra-
matically changed the sovereigns’ foreign creditor base from a limited number of 
large western commercial banks to millions of investors ranging from U.S. Hedge 
Funds to Italian retirees and German dentists.13 
What is important from a legal point of view is that sovereign bonds are (undis-
putedly) private law instruments that contain express (and valid) choice of law 
clauses,14 mostly declaring the law of the place of issuance applicable, i.e. the law of 
New York or the U.K., with Japanese and German law having a much smaller 
share.15 On the other hand, we are only recently witnessing states issuing debt in-
struments under their own laws that are open for foreigners to buy. Another signifi-
cant feature of foreign law debt instruments are waiver of immunity clauses whereby 
the debtor state unequivocally submits to the jurisdiction of foreign courts and ex 
ante waives any immunity defences.16 These contractual provisions already high-
light a fundamental difference to traditional FDI where the investment contracts are 
often governed by the law of the host state and contain choice of forum clauses in 
favour of the local courts of the host state. Presumably, this reflects both a difference 
in bargaining power on the part of the foreign investors as well as the more territo-
rial nature of the FDI contracts. Debt securities are not as easily associated with a 
domestic legal order as, say, the construction of a factory on foreign soil.  
 
12  Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading from 1989 to 
1993, 21 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1802, 1804-1818 (1998). 
13  Fisch/Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 
53 Emory L. J. 1053, 1070 ff. (2004). 
14  Siebel, Rechtsfragen Internationaler Anleihen, 1997, 191. 
15  In September 2005, 63% of the outstanding emerging market debt (USD 264 bn.) was go-
verned by New York law, 29% (USD 120 bn.) by English law, 5% (USD 20 bn.) by German 
law and 3% (USD 12 bn.) by Japanese law, IMF, Progress Report on Crisis Resolution, 21 
Sept. 2005, 15. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/092105.pdf. 
16  This is in line with most legal systems that adhere to the restricted theory of state immunity 
and consider debt instruments acts iure gestionis, Reinisch, Anm. zu LG Frankfurt Judgment of 
14 March 2003, JZ 2003, 1013, 1014 with further references. 
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II. The Current Restructuring Process  
Despite a long history of ideas to form an institutionalized sovereign debt mecha-
nism, such a mechanism is still lacking. Debtors and creditors have so far looked for 
alternative avenues to find acceptable solutions for state insolvencies. It is interes-
ting for our later analysis to observe that debtor states have employed different re-
structuring techniques depending on whether the debt instruments were governed by 
foreign law or by the law of the debtor state.  
In cases of foreign law debt, restructuring has largely meant that – in some cases 
after negotiating with a creditor committee – the debtor makes an offer to its credi-
tors to swap its old debt claims for new ones that contain more favourable terms for 
the debtor (such as extended maturity, reduced interest or in some cases also debt 
relief in the form of decreased principal payments). Some of these restructurings 
have been pre-emptive, i.e. before a cessation of payments (an event of default) 
occurred, while others such as Ecuador (2000) and Argentina (2005) have been post-
default restructurings.17 Much ink has been spent on whether collective action prob-
lems could be mitigated by allowing a majority of creditors (say 75%) to bind a 
minority that is unwilling to accept a swap offer (the holdout creditors) and how 
corresponding contractual clauses could be drafted. At the time of writing this paper, 
drafting practice in New York embraces such a contractual approach and incorpo-
rates Collective Action Clauses (CACs), already a common feature in English and 
Japanese law bonds, into sovereign bonds.18 Although recent experience with the 
Uruguayan restructuring 2003 is positive,19 it remains to be seen whether or not 
CACs will actually be an effective tool for more orderly debt restructurings. Regard-
less of recent developments in drafting practice, there is still a large stock of foreign 
law debt outstanding that does not allow for majority restructuring, meaning that 
only those bondholders who accept a debt swap offer will be bound by the restruc-
turing terms.20 
Contrary to the debt swap methods employed to restructure foreign law debt, 
states have occasionally made use of their law making powers to restructure domes-
tic law debt. They adopted laws amending the terms of the debt or the modes of debt 
servicing, irrespective of whether these debt instruments were held by domestic or 
 
17  See Fisch/Gentile, supra note 13, 1069 f. 
18  For a coherent analysis of recent market practice see Drage/Hovaguimian, Collective Action 
Clauses: An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, Financial Sta-
bility Review by the Bank of England, Nov. 2004, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/public 
tions/fsr/2004/fsr17art9.pdf. German law bonds still do not contain CACs as counsel to the is-
suers and underwriting banks fear that such clauses could be struck down on consumer protec-
tion grounds, see Schneider, Die Änderung der Anleihebedingungen durch Beschluss der 
Gläubiger, in Baums/Cahn (eds.), Die Reform des Schuldverschreibungsrechts, 2004, 69, 87.  
19  Steneri, Uruguay Debt Reprofiling: Lessons from Experience, 35 Geo. J. Int’l L. 731, 748 (Fn. 
31) (2004). 
20  In June 2005, 47% of outstanding emerging market foreign law debt did not include CACs, 
IMF, supra note 15, 3. 
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foreign creditors. Russia in 1998 serviced the GKOs held by foreigners into blocked 
accounts, the proceeds being convertible into dollars only on a very restricted basis. 
Argentina took a more drastic step in 2002 when it unilaterally converted domestic 
law dollar bonds into peso debt.21 It strikes the eye that these coercive restructurings 
could give rise to Investment Treaty claims. 
III. Sovereign Debt Litigation  
As the creditor group in the post-Brady age is much more heterogeneous than in the 
1980s, the recent debates highlighted the (perceived) threat that creditors would no 
longer behave as a group acting in the common interest but would rush to the courts 
and recover as much from their debt holdings as possible, thereby obstructing an 
orderly debt restructuring process. The case of Argentina where creditors took to the 
courts in multiple jurisdictions such as Italy, Germany and the U.S. (where a court 
certified the first class action suit against a sovereign state)22 could serve as proof 
that the “rush to the courthouse”-threat is real. However, other debt restructurings, 
even highly controversial ones such as Ecuador in 2000,23 have not seen creditor 
litigation, let alone an asset-grabbing race. 
The success of holdout creditor litigation in domestic courts has largely depended 
on where they brought suit. New York courts (the most prominent forum given the 
choice of forum clauses in most debt instruments) have generally ruled in favour of 
the creditors, rejecting sovereign defences such as the Act of State Doctrine or the 
famous Art. VIII (2) (b) of the IMF Agreement.24 In Germany, there is still a case 
pending before the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) on 
whether Argentina can invoke a public international law State of Necessity de-
fence,25 and in April 2005 the Italian Corte di Cassazione held that Italian courts 
lacked jurisdiction to hear bondholder claims against Argentina on the principle of 
 
21  See Gelpern/Setser, supra note 10, 802-803, 806. 
22  Debevoise/Orta, The Class Action Threat to Sovereign Workouts, Int’l Fin. L. Rev July 2003, 
41-44. 
23  Ecuador made use of a coercive restructuring technique borrowed from U.S. corporate restruc-
turing known as exit consents, see Buchheit/Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Ex-
changes, 48 UCLA L. Rev., 59-84 (2000). The technique was only recently validated, Grey-
lock v. Mendoza, No. 04 Civ. 7643 (HB), 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1742 (S.D.N.Y. 7 Feb. 2005), 
aff’d Greylock v. Mendoza, No. 05-1414-CV, 2006 U.S. App. 1501 (2nd Cir. 18 Jan. 2006). 
24  Allied Bank International et. al. v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520-522 
(2nd Cir. 1985). For an Argentina case see Lightwater Corp. et. al. v. Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 
3804, 3808, 5932 (TPG), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6156 (S.D.N.Y. 14 April 2003), 11. Libra 
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F.2d 870, 900 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
25  See inter alia the request for a preliminary ruling (Vorlagebeschluss) by OLG Frankfurt/M. 
NJW 2003, 2688. 
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par in parem non habet jurisdictionem, holding that the Argentine default was an act 
iure imperii that Italian courts could not sit in judgment over.26 
Even where creditors obtained a judgment in their favour, they have largely been 
unable to actually collect on it.27 This is due to the traditional international law con-
cept of immunity from enforcement which prevents creditors from attaching assets 
used for iure imperii purposes.28 As states are eager not to park commercial assets 
abroad,29 payment awards are little useful at the end of the day. In 2000, the noto-
rious decision of the Brussels Court of Appeals in Elliott v. Peru30 suggested that 
holdout creditors had ultimately overcome the classic enforcement dilemma as it 
enabled them to stop the debt swaps with those creditors willing to tender their old 
bonds. However, recent U.S. court judgments31 and a subsequent ruling of that very 
Brussels Court32 indicate that the Elliott-jurisprudence was very short lived and that 
the old obstacles to enforcement remain. Enforcing debt claims in the debtor state 
itself seems unlikely at best. Local enforcement authorities are not obliged to en-
force foreign court judgments in the absence of a Treaty obligation. Even where a 
Treaty on the recognition and enforcement of judgments exists, it is subject to a 
public policy review by local authorities.33  
Where foreign investors have sued on their domestic law bonds in the debtor 
state’s courts, they have largely been unsuccessful as the courts applied the domestic 
emergency laws over the principle of pacta sunt servanda.34 
 
26  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sezioni Uniti Civili, 21 April 2005, Docket No. 11225/05 (on 
file with author). For an English brief see Cleary Gottlieb Steen Hamilton, Argentina in Italian 
Supreme Court Win in Bond Payment Suspension Suit, News Bulletin 27 May 2005, 
http://www.cgsh.com/english/news/NewsDetail.aspx?id=2523. 
27  Gelpern, What Bond Markets Can Learn from Argentina, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. April 2005, 19, 21. 
28  Whether or not the far reaching immunity waiver clauses also waive immunity from attaching 
iure imperii assets is a question in the pending German BVerfG proceedings, see Pfeif-
fer/Kopp, Der Imunitätsverzicht in Staatsanleihen und seine Reichweite, 102 ZVglRWiss 563-
573 (2003).  
29  One of the popular cases was Argentina’s president Kirchner cancelling a visit to Germany, 
fearing attachment of his presidential aircraft, see Handelsblatt, Tango-König verzichtet auf 
Tango, 13 Oct. 2003 (No. 196), 21. 
30  Het Hoef van Beroep de Brussel (8ste Kamer), 26 Sept. 2000, Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (on file 
with author). 
31  EM Ltd. et al. v. Argentina, No. 05-1525-cv, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8599 (2nd Cir. 13 May 
2005). 
32  See Latin Finance, Nicaragua Beats the Vultures, June 2004, 38. 
33  As to the possibility of enforcing German judgments in Argentina see Baars/Böckel, Argenti-
nische Auslandsanleihen vor Deutschen und Ausländischen Gerichten, ZBB 2004, 445, 463. 
34  For litigation as a result of the 1998 Russian default see Nadmitov, Russian Debt Restructuring 
– International Finance Seminar, 27, http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/pifs/pdfs/Alexande 
r_nadmitov.pdf. As to the proceedings in Argentine courts on the pesification of domestic law 
debt see Baars/Böckel, supra note 33, 462. 
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C. Bilateral Investment Treaty Obligations and ICSID 
The above analysis of recent state insolvency cases shows that in the restructuring 
process, the debtor state is in a much stronger position than the creditors, especially 
since the prospects for enforcement remain slim. This difference in bargaining 
power necessarily affects the outcome of restructuring negotiations, as the creditors 
do not have much leverage against the debtor, the times of gun-boat diplomacy to 
enforce private party claims (luckily) being long gone. We will now assess whether 
Investment Treaty Arbitration under ICSID has the potential to shift power to the 
creditors and provide them with more leverage in debt restructurings.  
I. Applicability of BITs to Sovereign Debt 
It is noteworthy that debt instruments traditionally lack arbitration clauses and in-
stead refer disputes between the parties exclusively to domestic courts.35 Hence, the 
only way for ICSID to come into play lies in the respective BIT clauses. This raises 
the question whether the specific treatment obligations are applicable to sovereign 
debt in the first place. 
1. Ratione Materiae 
There is reliable authority for the assumption that the traditionally broad investment 
definition of Art. 25 ICSID encompasses loans and bonds, whether issued by private 
or public entities.36 Interestingly, no state has thus far made use of Art. 25 (4) ICSID 
to exempt sovereign debt disputes from ICSID Arbitration. 
The more precarious question is whether the debt instruments are investments in 
the meaning of BITs. So far, we have not seen a coherent practice on this question. 
Some investment protection instruments such as the E.U.-ACP Investment Princi-
ples37 or the Italy–Argentina BIT38 expressly include public debt held by nationals of 
 
35  Ebenroth/Dillon, Arbitration Clauses in International Financial Agreements, 10 J. Int’l Arb. 5, 
22 (1993). Recent commentators have promoted the inclusion of ICSID arbitration clauses in 
sovereign bonds, Griffin/Farren, How ICSID Can Protect Sovereign Bondholders, Int’l Fin. L. 
Rev. Sept. 2005, 21-24. 
36  Fedax v. Venezuela (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 
1384 (1998), para. 29. Delaume, ICSID and the Transnational Financial Community, 1 ICSID 
Rev. – F.I.L.J., 237 (1986), 242, referring to the drafting history of the Convention. 
37  Council of the European Communities: „Community Position on Investment Protection Princi-
ples in the ACP-States”, ACP-CEE 2172/, 3 Nov 1992, 5. 
38  http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/italy_argentina_it.pdf, Art. 1 lit. c. 
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the other state party. Also, the recent U.S.-Uruguay BIT39 indicates that the U.S. 
government regards public debt as a covered investment. On the other hand, the 
Canadian Model BIT40 expressly excludes public debt instruments. Other treaty 
clauses are rather ambiguous and open to interpretation. The Tribunal in Fedax in 
1997 decided that promissory notes issued by a state were covered by the notion of 
“Titles to Money” in the Netherlands-Venezuela-BIT.41 The Tribunal drew an ex-
press analogy to the issuance of long term debt instruments such as bonds and loans 
which it implicitly assumed would no doubt qualify as “Titles to Money” as they 
would serve to finance the country’s needs.42 Taking Fedax as precedent and com-
bining this with a number of BITs that expressly cover public debt, we cannot but 
conclude that sovereign debt will qualify ratione materiae as investments for the 
sake of BIT Arbitration unless there is an express opposite treaty provision. 
2. Ratione Loci 
One possible objection to the application of BITs could be that financial instruments 
such as bonds or syndicated loans are not made “in the territory” of the debtor state 
as required by most BITs.43 The difficulty with applying this “territoriality criterion” 
to sovereign debt is that financial instruments, as opposed to traditional FDI, are 
intangible and that therefore the situs of the investment is difficult to determine. 
Indeed, it would not seem too far off to argue that a sovereign bond, traded on the 
NYSE, payable on a U.S. bank account, governed by New York law and purchased 
from a U.S. broker/dealer is not an investment “in the territory” of the debtor state. 
However, both recent BIT- and (even more so) ICSID jurisprudence are abundantly 
clear that such objections will not be sustained. The 2004 BIT between the U.S. and 
Uruguay, which maintains the territoriality criterion, implicitly acknowledges that 
debt instruments governed by New York law do fall within the ambit of the BIT.44 
And the Fedax Tribunal expressly states that the situs of a debt instrument (wherever 
it is) is irrelevant, as long as “the funds made available are utilized by the benefit-
ciary of the credit …so as to finance its various governmental needs”.45 The Tribu-
nal in CSOB adopts a similar approach, holding that the “in the territory”-
requirement is satisfied where the investment is designed to benefit the economic 
 
39  Treaty between the U.S.A. and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay Concerning the Encourage-
ment and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, Annex G, http://www.unctad.org/sections/ 
dite/iia/docs/bits/US_Uruguay.pdf. 
40  http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf, 4. 
41  Fedax v. Venezuela (Jurisdiction), supra note 36, paras. 30 ff. 
42  Id., at 1386.  
43  See U.S. Model BIT Nov. 2004, Preamble (“… investment in the territory of the other 
Party…”), http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/USmodelbitnov04.pdf. 
44  U.S.-Uruguay BIT, supra note 39, Annex G, 54. 
45  Fedax v. Venezuala (Jurisdiction), supra note 36, para. 40. 
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development of the receiving state, even where the investment is made in an entirely 
intangible form (such as a loan).46 This also implies that there is no distinction be-
tween domestic law debt and foreign law debt, an important difference to the SDRM 
proposal that expressly excluded domestic law debt.47 
3. Ratione Personae 
Although public debt instruments often fall within the ambit of a BIT ratione mate-
riae, the ratione personae scope of BITs, i.e. the question which investors actually 
benefit from the BIT guarantees, illustrates that BITs are primarily designed for FDI 
and not so much for portfolio investment. The typical BIT/ICSID yardstick is the 
nationality of the investor. In the area of traditional FDI, where the investment can-
not easily be transferred from one investor to the other, this might be adequate a 
standard. By contrast, the nationality criterion could prove inappropriate in globa-
lized financial markets where the investment (public debt) is traded on secondary 
markets and can freely change hands from one national to the other within se-
conds.48 Strictly applying the nationality criterion could lead to the undesirable re-
sult that the investment would be granted different legal protection depending on 
who the holder is. This could not only prejudice the fungibility of the debt instru-
ments49 but would also run counter to the fundamental principle in sovereign debt 
restructuring that requires holders of similar claims be granted similar treatment.50 
Admittedly, most favoured nation (MFN) clauses in BITs could mitigate this prob-
lem and level the playing field with regard to certain treatment obligations (i.e. if 
some BITs of the debtor state contain umbrella clauses, while others do not, even 
those nationals who would not at first glance benefit from the umbrella clause could 
 
46  Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Bank v. Slovakia (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. 
ARB/97/4, 14 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 251 (1999), para. 88. The Tribunal in SGS v. Pakistan 
(Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/01/13, 18 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 307 
(2003), para. 136, held that the “injection of funds into the territory” suffices. However, the 
context of this case was different as it related to the opening of offices in the host state. In SGS 
v. The Philippines (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/02/6, reprinted in 
Crawford/Lee/E. Lauterpacht (eds.), ICSID Reports, Vol. 8 2005, para. 110, the Tribunal no-
ticed that Fedax had adopted a “very broad definition of territoriality” (Fn. 41). Whether the 
SGS decisions support the broad Fedax notion of territoriality, Alexandrov, The “Baby Boom” 
of Treaty-based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals, 4 LPICT 19, 47 
(2005), is doubtable against this background. 
47  IMF, supra note 3, 23. 
48  The Tribunal in Fedax implicitely acknowledged this consequence, see Fedax v. Venezuela 
(Jurisdiction), supra note 36, para. 40 (“the identity of the investor will change with every en-
dorsement”). 
49  As to the fundamental value of fungibility, see Kümpel, Bank- und Kapitalmarktrecht, 3rd ed. 
2004, 1417. 
50  Clark, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: Parity of Treatment between Equivalent Creditors in 
Relation to Comparable Debts, 20 Int’l L. 857, 858 (1986).  
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invoke such a clause relying on MFN in “their” BIT).51 Nonetheless, it is much more 
debatable whether MFN clauses can remedy a situation when the ratione materiae 
scope of BITs varies, i.e. when one BIT does cover public debt (U.S.) while the 
other does not (Canada). Tribunal practice suggests that MFN clauses cannot 
broaden the scope of BIT protection because the other BITs are res inter alios acta 
in this respect.52 To the contrary, it is has been argued that MFN clauses actually do 
entitle investors to choose the most favourable investment definition from all BITs 
the opposing state party has concluded.53 In a setting where a Canadian investor 
holds debt issued by a state that has BITs with both the U.S. and Canada, an ICSID 
Tribunal would have to reach a decision on this difficult question. These problems 
arise whenever portfolio investments are covered by BITs, sovereign debt only  
being one instance where the ratione personae problem could surface. 
II. Contract Claims v. Treaty Claims and the Umbrella Clause 
Our next issue will be of fundamental importance for the outcome and in fact for the 
very nature of ICSID-state insolvency cases. The more regrettable it is that ICSID-
decisions are very difficult to predict on the topic: The relationship between contract 
and treaty claims and the meaning of umbrella clauses. While the problem already 
causes permanent controversy in the classic FDI setting, it is aggravated in the state 
insolvency context. It will be remembered that sovereign bonds, the investments of 
primary interest here, certify contractual obligations by which the debtor promises to 
pay a certain amount of money on a specific date with a fixed (or floating) interest 
rate. In contrast to the recent ICSID cases that sparked the debate on contract/treaty 
claims, the contract claim against the host state is not part of a larger operation (such 
as a concession contract for providing services): The contractual claim is the in-
vestment itself. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the exact elaboration 
on the relationship between contract and treaty claims will be the core task for any 
ICSID Tribunal in future state insolvency cases. A full-fledged analysis of this topic 
would certainly exceed the scope of this study,54 so I will restrain myself to high-
lighting the consequences of the different approaches for our subject of interest. 
 
51  The application of umbrella clauses through MFN clauses was addressed but left undecided in 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan (Decision on Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/03/3, 22 April 2005, 
para. 223, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/impreglio-decision.pdf.  
52  Maffezini v. Spain (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/97/7, 16 ICSID 
Rev. – F.I.L.J. 212 (2001), para. 45. Impreglio v. Pakistan, supra note 51, para. 223. 
53  Rubins, The Notion of Investment in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in Horn (ed.), Arbitrating 
Foreign Investment Disputes, 2004, 322-323. 
54  For recent analyses see Shany, Contract Claims v. Treaty Claims, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 835-851 
(2005). Cremades/Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of Forum in Foreign In-
vestment Disputes, in Horn (ed.), supra note 53, 325-351. Gaillard, Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – The SGS Cases Considered, in Weiler (ed.), supra 
note 2, 325-347. 
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Although each individual case depends on the wording of the applicable BIT, two 
general approaches in ICSID jurisprudence can be identified, recently described as 
integrationist and disintegrationist.55  
The “integrationist Tribunals” in Fedax,56 SGS v. Philippines and most recently 
Eureko and Noble Ventures v. Romania57 interpret BIT umbrella clauses to elevate 
any contractual investor claim against the state to treaty claim status. Consequently, 
under this approach, every breach of contract amounts to a breach of the treaty. A 
sovereign default would, subject to possible defences under domestic and interna-
tional law, amount to a treaty violation. The “integrationists” would thus do away 
with the long standing view in international law that the non-payment of public debt, 
although being a breach of contract, is not an international wrong.58 From a proce-
dural point of view, “integrationist Tribunals” would have to deal with choice of 
forum clauses in the debt instruments and assess whether they should follow the 
(2:1) decision in SGS v. Philippines and defer the determination of breach of con-
tract to domestic courts to avoid parallel proceedings.59 
“Disintegrationist Tribunals” interpret umbrella clauses in a more restrictive 
manner and draw a distinction between contract claims arising under municipal law 
and treaty claims arising under the BIT. Under this approach, which seemed to pre-
vail until Noble v. Romania, breaches of contract do not constitute treaty violations 
unless the state makes use of its governmental (iure imperii) powers to interfere with 
the contractual rights of the investor.60 It is argued that breaches of contract are the 
commercial risk, a risk that BITs do not seek to insure against. For state insolvency 
cases, this line of argumentation would have implications fundamentally different 
from the “integrationists”: ICSID Tribunals will not decide disputes where the only 
issue is that a state missed due payments under a debt instrument: The non-payment 
 
55  Shany, supra note 54, 844. 
56  Fedax v. Venezuela (Award), Case No. ARB/96/3, 37 I.L.M. 1391, 1396 (1998).  
57  SGS v. Philippines (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 116, 117, 127. Eureko B.V. v. Poland 
(Partial Award), Ad hoc Arbitration, 19 Aug. 2005, paras. 244 ff., http://ita.law.uvic 
.ca/documents/Eureko-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf. Noble Ventures v. Romania, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, 5 Oct. 2005, para. 54, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.  
58  García-Amador, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/106, I.L.C. Yb. 
1957-II, 117. Borchard, supra note 9, 118-120. That view was also widely shared during the 
negotiations for the multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), see OECD, The Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment – Commentary to the Consolidated Text, 22 April 1998, OECD 
Doc. DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV 1, 23. 
59  SGS v. Philippines (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 155 and Declaration by Arbiter 
Crivallero. 
60  CMS v. Argentina (Award), Case No. ARB/01/8, 44 I.L.M. 1205 (Sept. 2005), para. 299. 
Impreglio v, Pakistan, supra note 51, para. 260. Joy Mining v. Egypt (Award on Jurisdiction), 
Case No. ARB/03/11, 44 I.L.M. 73 (Jan. 2005), paras. 77-82. SGS v. Pakistan, supra note 46, 
paras. 165 ff. On the even more restrictive general principle of international law, see Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law, § 712 (1987).  
 153
of one’s debt is an act iure gestionis61 and constitutes the commercial risk that a 
creditor is aware of when purchasing emerging market debt (which often yields 
spectacular returns). ICSID would have to assess whether the government, in one 
way or the other, invokes its genuine iure imperii powers to justify non payment.62  
The importance of the contract claims/treaty claims question cannot be over-
stated. Depending on whether ICSID Tribunals will adjudicate over pure contractual 
disputes or constrain themselves to mere treaty claims, the nature of the proceedings 
will vary significantly. Both options bear their own problems. An “integrationist 
Tribunal” would stigmatize a mere non-payment as an international wrong and poli-
ticize sovereign debt restructurings.63 Moreover, it would (arguably) run the risk of 
being abused as an enforcement tool for domestic court decisions. The latter concern 
holds particularly true if one subscribes to the SGS v. Philippines Tribunal’s view 
that whenever a local judge rules in the investor’s favour, compliance with this 
judgment becomes a treaty obligation.64 “Disintegrationist Tribunals” would have to 
address the highly complex question of the extraterritorial effect of iure imperii acts, 
the issue we will turn to next. 
III. Extraterritorial Application of Emergency Laws  
The distinction between iure imperii and iure gestionis acts is certainly of some 
helpful guidance in the context of traditional FDI where the investor enters the host 
state’s territory and subjects its investment to the laws of that state. However, in the 
context of external public debt, where it is often the state that subjects itself to the 
laws of some other country upon the express request of the investor,65 the distinction 
of iure imperii and iure gestionis acts gives rise to the problem of the extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws (conflicts of public law norms). How can a sovereign 
debtor ever assume iure imperii powers to interfere with an investment (and thereby 
trigger a treaty claim) when the investment is exclusively governed by the laws of 
the State of New York, is to be repaid in New York on an account with a New York 
bank? 
The general question of the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is cer-
tainly one of the most disputed fields in International Economic Law, and scholars 
of private international law even deny that it is a matter of public international law at 
 
61  Mixed Tribunal of Cairo, 15 June 1925, stating that “the refusal to pay … has never been an 
act of sovereignty, or an act of public authority, because any private individual may do the 
same. The mere fact that the debtor is a state can make no difference”, quoted after Borchard, 
supra note 9, 11 (Fn. 7). 
62  Wälde, supra note 2, 408. 
63  Especially regarding the diplomatic tools in the hands of the creditors’ home governments, see 
infra. IV. 2. 
64  SGS v. Philippinies (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, paras. 127, 128, 163. 
65  See supra II. 1. 
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all.66 However, when faced with an investment dispute, ICSID cannot help but make 
a decision. 
1. Domestic Law Debt 
The situation of domestic law debt in this regard appears to be less complex than 
foreign law debt as it resembles the traditional FDI situation where the foreign in-
vestor submits to the laws of the debtor state. Let us assume arguendo that the 
choice of domestic law renders the sovereign competent to amend its laws and 
thereby affect its debt servicing obligations towards foreigners.67 If the state actually 
makes use of this competence, this exercise of classic iure imperii powers will be 
tested against the state’s obligations under international law (i.e. BITs).68 One pos-
sible argument for the debtor state could be that the creditor assumed the risk by 
voluntarily submitting to the local laws and receiving a higher risk premium as 
compensation and therefore acts in bad faith bringing an ICSID claim. It is unlikely 
that this would indeed prevent an in depth analysis of BIT investment disciplines. 
2. Foreign Law Debt 
Let me now turn to the more complicated issue on how treaty claims stemming from 
the use of iure imperii powers could possibly arise in the context of debt contracts 
governed by foreign law. We have already seen that generally, the mere non-
payment of one’s debts is not an act iure imperii, just as the conclusion of the very 
debt contract is a commercial and not a sovereign act. Every private debtor can do 
the same. The difference between corporate and state insolvency is that states tend to 
adopt debt moratoria in the form of emergency laws to declare the cessation of pay-
 
66  Sonnenberger, in Münchener Kommentar zum EGBGB, 4th ed. 2006, intro. to EGBGB, paras. 
123, 413. 
67  Unfortunately, this question is far from settled. In English law the above assumption is correct, 
Kahler v. Midland Bank, [1950] A.C. 24, 56 per Lord Radcliffe. To the contrary, German 
courts have a strictly territorial approach, refusing to give effect to foreign public law norms 
even when that is the proper law of the contract, BGH NJW 1960, 1101, 1102. The traditional 
French doctrine of contract international adopts an approach similar to the German one and 
was applied in the classic Serbian Loans Cases before the PCIJ in 1929, but purely as a matter 
of French law, Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, PCIJ 
Ser. A Nos. 20/21, 46-47. The ICJ case had ample opportunity to rule on the issue but refused 
to hear the case on the merits, ICJ, Case of Certain Norwegian Loans, ICJ Rep. 1957, 9, 27, 
diss. op. by Judge Read, 85. 
68  On this general principle of international law see Sir H. Lauterpacht, Case of Certain Norwe-
gian Loans, sep. op., supra note 67, 37.  
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ments on their external debts.69 By intention, these laws have an extraterritorial 
reach. Prior to any examination on whether the emergency laws comply with sub-
stantive BIT obligations, an ICSID Tribunal has to assess whether it gives effect to a 
debt moratorium despite its extraterritorial reach. Although, as far as the author is 
aware, ICSID Tribunals have not had to deal with this issue, two alternative solu-
tions can be identified. Arguably, the outcome of ICSID proceedings on the issue 
will depend on whether the arbiters have a public international law or private inter-
national law background.  
The private international law approach: Arbiters regarding the question of extra-
territorial application of public law norms primarily as a question of conflicts of 
laws would presumably rely on jurisprudence in the forum of the proper law, espe-
cially when there are judgments on the very same issue of state insolvency. Where a 
local court has already declined to give effect to the debtor state’s emergency laws 
because of their extraterritorial reach (as is the case in U.S. 2nd Circuit law),70 a 
“disintegrationist” Tribunal could defer to such a ruling and consequently refuse to 
analyze the specific BIT disciplines. This would be advantageous since, firstly, it 
would avoid diverging decisions between ICSID and domestic courts on the same 
case and, secondly, it would also mitigate the “abuse-threat” (i.e. judgment creditors 
taking to ICSID who have been unsuccessful in collecting on their domestic law 
judgments). Yet, the major disadvantage lies in the fact that domestic fora them-
selves are inconsistent on whether to recognize extraterritorially reaching emergency 
laws. A look at the recent Argentine insolvency highlights the dilemma of the pri-
vate international law approach: The Italian Corte di Cassazione is diametrically 
opposed to 2nd Circuit jurisprudence as it expressly acknowledges that the emer-
gency laws on the cessation of payments constitute non-justiceable iure imperii acts, 
thus implicitly giving them the sought extraterritorial effect without even elaborating 
on the extraterritoriality problem.71 In an Italian Bondholder v. Argentina case be-
fore a “disintegrationist” Tribunal, Argentina would probably be estopped from 
raising a “contract-claim-defence” as it (successfully) invoked its sovereign powers 
in Italian courts in the very same case.72 Thus, under a private international law 
approach, the inconsistencies of national jurisprudence could cause another line of 
inconsistent ICSID decisions. Ironically, at the end of the day, the Italian investor 
might be better off than his U.S. counterpart because ICSID awards can be better 
enforced than U.S. judgments. 
The public international law approach: As an alternative solution, ICSID could 
engage in an autonomous assessment on whether a debt moratorium can, despite its 
extraterritorial reach, affect foreign law debt contracts. Although this approach has 
 
69  See the Argentine Emergency Law No. 25. 561 dated 6 Jan. 2002 and the debt moratorium 
under this Emergency Law No. 256/2002, dated 6 Feb. 2002. 
70  See supra II. 3. 
71  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, supra note 26, 5. 
72  In SGS v. Pakistan (Jurisdiction), supra note 46, para. 139, an ICSID Tribunal held Pakistan to 
its pleadings in foreign (Swiss) courts that certain acts were non-justiceable iure imperii acts.  
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the advantage of allowing a coherent ICSID jurisprudence to develop, it would soon 
face the problem that practice-proof international law rules on the extraterritorial 
application of domestic law are very difficult to detect.73 One possible yardstick 
would be the requirement of a bona fide connection between the subject matter and 
the respective state laws,74 a test that would presumably be satisfied where a state 
enacts laws specifically designed to affect its own contracts. This is of course not to 
say that the emergency measures are BIT-legal, quite the contrary is true: The (ap-
plicable) measures would in a later step have to be tested against the BIT obligations 
of the state. The fundamental problem with an autonomous assessment is that the 
outcome will necessarily conflict with some national court judgment, which is most 
drastic when domestic courts and ICSID decide over the very same emergency 
measures (as could be the case with U.S. courts, Italian courts and ICSID deciding 
on the Argentine emergency measures). For the sake of coherent ICSID jurispru-
dence, the public international law approach would have to choose between either 
denying justice to Italian bondholders or (arguably) being abused by American 
creditors.75 
The analysis shows that both possible approaches have material disadvantages, 
and there does not seem to be a way to escape this dilemma. Nonetheless, the issue 
would have to be solved in one way or the other by a “disintegrationist” Tribunal 
that only looks at cases where the state has made use of its iure imperii powers. 
IV. Treatment Obligations under BITs 
We now head back to the more known territory of Investment Law, the individual 
BIT treatment obligations. Whether or not a Tribunal actually reaches this stage will 
largely depend on its stance on the two prior issues. This study does not provide a 
full-fledged analysis on every individual investment discipline, given that much is 
still in flux and that some topics are also addressed separately at this conference. In 
 
73  Dolzer, Extraterritoriale Anwendung von nationalem Recht aus der Sicht des Völkerrechts, 
Bitburger Gespräche, Jahrbuch 2003, 71, 79. 
74  Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. 2003, 309, with further references. 
The WTO Appellate Body employs a “sufficient nexus”-test, Report of the WTO Appellate 
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 Oct. 1998, para. 133. 
75  The deni de justice claim from Italian bondholders would sound like this: While Italian Courts 
are not hearing our case because the measures complained of are considered non-justiceable 
iure imperii acts, the “disintegrationist” ICSID Tribunal considers them ineffective and thus 
refuses to hear our pure iure gestionis contract claims. The abuse claim against U.S. creditors 
would be that U.S. creditors already had the emergency laws declared ineffective in U.S. 
courts. Bringing the claim to ICSID alleging that Argentina made use of its iure imperii pow-
ers to tamper with their contractual rights seems abusive since investors would be allowed to 
exploit enforcement possibilities not enjoyed in domestic lawsuits. 
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addition, any ex ante analysis must remain vague since every Tribunal will have to 
decide on the case specific measures.  
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that while ICSID Tribunals will not 
judge on the monetary policy of the insolvent state (such as an abandonment of a 
currency peg), they will not be willing to accept a “general measures of economic 
policy” objection in order to sustain debt moratoria: Tribunals have “jurisdiction to 
examine whether specific measures affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures 
of general economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have been 
adopted in violation of legally binding commitments made to the investor …”76  
One overriding question that will determine any analysis of specific treatment ob-
ligations will be whether account shall be taken of the circumstances under which a 
state adopted the challenged measures, as constantly raised by Argentine in the cur-
rent ICSID proceedings.77 In the alternative, the Tribunal would disregard the state’s 
motivation and merely assess the effects of the emergency measures on investments, 
regarding the circumstances only on the “defences“ stage. 
1. Expropriation  
The “circumstances-question” is currently debated in the context of expropriation 
and has given rise to diverging ICSID decisions.78 An outright repudiation of sove-
reign debt would certainly be a clear case of direct expropriation which, in the ab-
sence of prompt, effective and adequate compensation, is a BIT violation.79 The 
more intricate question is whether emergency measures could constitute a creeping 
or indirect expropriation The NAFTA-Metalclad decision suggested that a depriva-
tion of reasonable to be expected economic benefit constitutes an indirect expropria-
tion.80 Presumably, the Tribunal, both in and outside the state insolvency context, 
would require a certain degree of interference with this reasonable-to-be-expected 
benefit.81 A legislative fiat that stretches the maturity date of certain debt instrument 
to a limited extent could be acceptable while changing maturity for a significant 
 
76  CMS v. Argentina (Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/01/8, 42 I.L.M. 799 
(2003), para. 33 (emphasis added). 
77  CMS v. Argentina (Application for Annulment), 8 Sept. 2005, paras. 19-23, http://ita.law.uvic 
.ca/documents/cmsannulmentapplication.pdf. 
78  Kunoy, Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transnational Arbitration, 
6 J. World Investment & Trade, 467, 469-472 (2005). 
79  Wälde, supra note 2, 409. Argentine bondholders state that the recent Argentine law adopted in 
the aftermath of the June-2005 restructuring actually constitutes such repudiation, see White & 
Case, Recent Argentine Legislation and Bondholder Remedies, Memorandum to the Global 
Committee of Argentine Bondholders, 3. http://www.gcab.org/images/GCAB_ICSID_Postion 
_Paper_2-15-05.pdf. 
80  Metalclad v. Mexico(Award), Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 40 I.L.M. 35 (2001), para. 103. 
81  There are diverging decisions on whether the degree of interference matters, Kunoy, supra note 
78, 485-487. 
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time (i.e. from 5 to 30 years) could be viewed differently. It is to be noted that the 
CMS decision of May 2005 is of little avail in our context as it has to be seen in the 
specific minority-shareholder setting.82 
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment  
Although the discussion on what fair and equitable treatment means is still contro-
versial, recent ICSID jurisprudence strongly relies on the legitimate expectations of 
the investor at the time of the investment decision.83 In CMS, the Tribunal held that 
the conversion of dollar based claims to a local currency “entirely transform[ed] and 
alter[ed]” the business environment of the investment and thus violated the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.84 A Tribunal would thus have to determine which 
investor expectations are actually so material to be covered by this “entirely alter 
and transform the legal and business environment-test”. This could be tricky an 
exercise because on international securities markets, the legal features of debt in-
struments minutiously affect the price investors are willing to pay. One could make 
the argument that all characteristics of a debt security have an influence on the in-
vestment decision and are therefore material. A more narrow interpretation could 
regard as material only some key financial terms of a debt instrument, such as cur-
rency, maturity or, as the case may be, collateral features.85  
3. Transfer Rights  
Other treatment obligations of interest are provisions whereby states grant investors 
the right to freely transfer any received payment into a freely convertible, stable 
currency.86 These guarantees, which trump the states’ rights to adopt capital export 
control laws under Art. VI (3) of the IMF Agreement,87 could be raised in a case like 
the Russian restructuring where ruble-payments were made into blocked accounts 
 
82  Schill, From Calvo to CMS: Burying an International Law Legacy, SchiedsVZ 2005, 285, 289-
290. 
83  Dolzer, Fair and Equitable Treatment: A Key Standard in Investment Terms, 39 Int’l L. 87 
(2005). 
84  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 275. 
85  I.e. when a state undertakes to use certain revenues exclusively for debt servicing purposes and 
later removes this collateral feature by unilateral legislative action. 
86  Inter alia see U.S. Model BIT Nov. 2004, supra note 43, Art. 7. 
87  Reinisch, State Responsibility for Debts, 1995, 101. In Hood Corp. v. The Islamic Republic of 
Iran et. al., the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal had the chance to rule on the relationship between 
the IMF Articles of Agreement, 22 July 1944, 2 U.N.T.S. 124, as amended through 28 June 
1990, and the Iran-U.S. Treaty of Amity which contained a transfer guarantee similar to the 
BIT provisions. The Tribunal held the Treaty of Amity inapplicable on other grounds, see     
Aldrich, The Jurisprudence of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1996, 393. 
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that did not allow the investors to withdraw the funds and exchange them into dol-
lars.  
4. Umbrella Clauses 
Even if umbrella clauses are not interpreted to elevate every contractual claim to a 
treaty claim,88 they can still have a significant impact on a state’s ability to adopt 
measures in situations of financial distress. In fact, a respective BIT clause could be 
interpreted to prohibit a state to adopt any iure imperi measures that would affect 
debt contracts held by foreigners. Umbrella clauses could thereby have the effect of 
a stabilization clause, a curious result as debt contracts hardly ever contain stabiliza-
tion clauses.89 Such an interpretation would render false the long standing perception 
that with respect to domestic law debt, the debtor state is free to change the law to 
adapt it to its public policy needs. It would be interesting to see markets reaction if 
an ICSID Tribunal in fact gives umbrella clauses so broad a meaning, because ge-
nerally, the debtor state’s (perceived) law making powers make domestic law debt 
much more risky, yielding much higher risk returns.90 A more narrow interpretation 
would subject the umbrella clause to a public policy exemption to the benefit of the 
debtor state. 
5. Non Discrimination, National Treatment and MFN 
Last but certainly not least, the treatment obligations of national treatment, MFN and 
non-discrimination could play a major role in state insolvency cases under BITs. 
Inter-creditor equity has always been the fundamental concern for creditors.91 At the 
outset it has to be noted that these provisions can become relevant for both “intergra-
tionist” and “disintegrationist” Tribunals.  
Generally speaking, the major task for Tribunals would be to assess whether or 
not an alleged unequal treatment occurred among similarly situated investors, a 
concept known to investment law92 and state insolvency “law”93 as well. This would 
 
88  See supra III. 2. 
89  Siebel, supra note 14, 190. 
90  Argentina recently called off a domestic law bond launch because investors demanded too high 
a risk premium, see Bloomberg News, Argentina Cancels Bond Sale, Won't Pay 8.8% Yield, 
21 Sept. 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=email_us&refer=news_index&sid 
=ak3QHaN1eXLk. 
91  Historically, discrimination based on the nationality of creditors has been a cause for diplo-
matic intervention by the investors’ home governments, Borchard, supra note 9, 260-266. 
92  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 293. Wälde, supra note 2, 411-414, stressing 
the parallel to the “like-products” problems in WTO law. 
93  Clark, supra note 50. 
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surely require the state to treat holders of identical debt instruments identically. A 
highly political issue in this regard is whether a state is entitled to grant domestic 
creditors, such as domestic banks, better restructuring terms (or even entirely save 
them restructuring) compared to foreign creditors holding the same debt instru-
ments. While de jure this looks like a clear-cut violation of national treatment com-
mitments,94 at least an economic case can be made for treating local creditors on a 
preferential basis.95 Besides the national treatment question, BIT-MFN-obligations 
outlaw playing favourites among foreign creditors for political reasons. Where 
creditors are not holding identical debt instruments, the Tribunal would have to 
develop its own criteria to assess which groups of creditors are similarly situated and 
thus have to receive equal treatment. While developing these criteria could some-
times be burdensome (such as the question of whether or not a state is justified in 
paying multilateral institutions ahead of private foreign lenders),96 at least some 
situations seem straightforward. Inter alia, trade creditors and bondholders are not 
similarly situated, a fact acknowledged by major creditor organizations.97 Through a 
sophisticated classification of creditors, ICSID could help the state regain a stable 
current account and maintain basic services provided by foreigners (by allowing the 
state to pay inter alia foreign providers of airport security services).  
Again, much of the outcome will depend on whether the circumstances of the cri-
sis and public policy considerations will be considered for an examination of the 
treatment obligation assessment or only for possible defences. 
V. Sovereign Defences  
1. Acceptance of Majority Restructurings 
As it is most likely that potential ICSID claimants would be holdout creditors (who 
are not participating in a voluntary debt swap), it is worth examining whether a 
sovereign could raise a defence that ICSID should not interfere with majority re-
structurings, i.e. where a (qualified) majority of creditors has accepted a restructur-
ing plan. Such an objection, which would presumably be more prominent with “in-
 
94  In the Russian restructuring in 1998, local banks received significant secret side payments not 
made to foreign creditors, see Sturzenegger, Default Episodes in the 90s: Factbook, Toolkit 
and Preliminary Lessons, June 2003, 23, http://www.utdt.edu/~fsturzen/pinto2.pdf.  
95  Roubini, Why Should Foreign Creditors of Argentina Take a Greater Hit/Haircut than the 
Domestic Ones?, 14 Dec. 2001 (First Draft), 4, http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~nroubini/papers 
/discriminationforeigndebt.doc.  
96  See Martha, Preferred Creditor Status under International Law: The case of the International 
Monetary Fund, 39 ICLQ 801-826 (1990). 
97  Institute for International Finance, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restruc-
turings in Emerging Markets, 31 March 2005, 14, www.iif.com/data/public/principles_final 
_0305.pdf. 
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tegrationist Tribunals”, was envisaged by financial experts during the negotiations 
for the MAI.98 But while there is no question that ICSID should give effect to a 
majority restructuring under CACs,99 it is doubtable whether ICSID Tribunals can 
do the same in the absence of CACs, i.e. where the holdouts hold on to their old, 
unchanged debt claims. Annex G of the 2004 U.S.-Uruguay BIT actually has this 
effect, barring investor claims where creditors representing 75% of outstanding debt 
have accepted a restructuring offer, regardless of whether the original debt instru-
ments allow for a majority restructuring or not.100 The same approach was envisaged 
by the SDRM.101 This might be a desirable result to enable more orderly debt re-
structurings and prevent a “rush to ICSID”. However, there is no legal foundation 
for ICSID to uphold such a defence absent a clear treaty provision to that effect. The 
U.S.-Uruguay BIT and the IMF’s SDRM proposal can certainly not be seen as evi-
dence of a new customary international law rule that can limit BIT obligations.  
2. State of Necessity and Debt Sustainability 
A question common to those familiar with the current Argentina proceedings is 
whether a state in a situation of financial distress can invoke a State of Necessity, 
based on both BIT- and customary international law, to excuse BIT violations.102  
A preliminary objection to such a defence was that BITs are intended to bite in 
times of economic difficulty and that the BITs’ object and purpose exclude a State 
of Necessity defence (Notstandsfestigkeit). The CMS Tribunal seems to embrace 
such an objection, stating that only in a situation of total collapse could a State of 
Necessity defence be raised The Argentine crisis, although being severe, would not 
qualify as a situation of total collapse.103 Nonetheless, the Tribunal engaged in a 
(sometimes poorly argued)104 substantive discussion of both Art. 25 of the 2001 
I.L.C. Draft on State Responsibility105 and the emergency clause Art. XI of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT. I will briefly reproduce this discussion, highlighting some state in-
solvency specific questions that have not yet arisen in the pending proceedings. 
The first prong a Tribunal has to assess when faced with a creditor claim against 
an insolvent state is whether a state is facing a grave and imminent peril for an es-
 
98  OECD, supra note 58, 23. 
99  See supra II. 2. After a CAC restructuring, a creditor is only entitled to receive the restructured 
amounts. These restructurings thereby automatically affect claims under umbrella clauses. 
100  Supra note 39, 54. 
101  IMF, supra note 3, 26. 
102  As to other possible public international law defences see Leyendecker, Auslandsverschuldung 
und Völkerrecht, 1988, 150-240. 
103  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, para. 354-356. 
104  Schill, supra note 82, 291. 
105  As adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12 Dec. 2001, Official Records 
of the General Assembly, 56th Sess., Suppl. No. 10 (A/56/10). 
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sential interest when paying the claimant. Any definitive answer to this question 
would presumably require an assessment of the country’s debt sustainability, the 
notion developed by the IMF that (in the IMF’s view) justifies a sovereign debt 
restructuring.106 The major problem here lies in the fact that states, invoking their 
fiscal and monetary sovereignty, fiercely oppose a legally binding determination of 
their debt sustainability by an international body. Consequently, the SDRM would 
have lacked the power to assess the debt sustainability of a country.107 By contrast, 
in international law, as applied by the CMS-Tribunal, Necessity is not a self-judging 
concept.108 Accordingly, an ICSID Tribunal has to make its own assessment of the 
Necessity/debt sustainability situation in a two step analysis: What are the foreign 
exchange reserves of the state? And what exactly are the recognizable essential 
interests (the beneficium competentiae) of a state that are protected by the State of 
Necessity notion? Arguably, ICSID Tribunals lack the resources to engage in such 
an analysis, so using more capable authority would be appropriate. Unfortunately, at 
least in the Argentina case, the IMF constantly refused to state whether, in its opi-
nion, Argentina is unable or only unwilling to pay.109 A related problem would be 
how to treat a creditor that only sues for a small amount, the payment of which can-
not be said to cause a grave and imminent peril.110 
Another crucial element of the State of Necessity test is whether the contested 
measure is the only way for the state to remedy the situation of necessity, Art. 
25 (1) (a) I.L.C. Draft. The CMS-Tribunal is very (too?) restrictive on that point, 
leaving the state practically no discretion on how to react in an emergency situa-
tion.111 It goes without saying that every individual state insolvency situation would 
warrant a case-specific analysis.  
Lastly, the delicate question of contribution (a state cannot invoke Necessity 
where it has itself contributed to the situation of Necessity, Art. 25 (2) (b) I.L.C. 
Draft) could eliminate any State of Necessity defence in the state insolvency con-
text. Of course the state has contributed to its debt burden when it voluntarily tapped 
capital markets. The CMS-Tribunal indicates that this could in fact be the end of the 
story, basically restricting the State of Necessity to cases of purely external in-
 
106  IMF, supra note 3, 22. 
107  IMF, supra note 3, 28. In general see Gianviti, The Prevention and Resolution of International 
Financial Crisis: A Perspective from the International Monetary Fund, in Giovanoli (ed.), In-
ternational Monetary Law – Issues for the New Millennium, 2000, 97, 108. 
108  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, paras. 373-374. ICJ, Case Concerning the Gabcí-
kovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ Rep. 1997, 7, 40 with references to the work of the I.L.C.  
109  Gelpern, After Argentina, Policy Briefs in International Economics, IIE Paper No. PB05-2, 
Sept. 2005, 5, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb05-2.pdf. 
110  See Pfeiffer, Zahlungskrisen ausländischer Staaten im deutschen und internationalen Rechts-
verkehr, 102 ZVglRWiss 141, 163-164 (2003), promoting an examination of the overall debt 
situation (Gesamtbetrachtung). 
111  CMS v. Argentina (Award), supra note 60, paras. 323-324. As to the criticism see Schill, supra 
note 82, 291; CMS v. Argentina (Annulment Application), supra note 77, paras. 81-82. 
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fluences.112 Whether or not this restrictive interpretation will stand remains for the 
Annulment Committee to decide.113 
D. Procedural Questions  
After this analysis of the substantive treaty obligations, let me now turn to two pro-
cedural aspects that will be relevant in proceedings against an insolvent sovereign. 
I. Stay of Proceedings During Restructuring Negotiations 
In the discussions on the SDRM, the IMF insisted on a stay of court (enforcement) 
proceedings during ongoing restructuring negotiations in order to prevent obstruc-
tive creditor behaviour.114 While U.S. courts have occasionally granted temporary 
stays,115 Tribunals do not have the authority to stay proceedings until the end of 
restructuring negotiations, once the waiting period usually stipulated in BITs has 
lapsed.116 Under current ICSID Rules, stays from enforcement are only permissible 
pending Interpretation, Revision and Annulment Proceedings, Art. 50-52 ICSID 
Convention.117 To allow for a stay of proceedings pending restructuring negotia-
tions, the Administrative Council would have to amend the Arbitration Rules under 
Art. 6 (1) (c) of the Convention.  
II. Enforcing Creditor Claims and Diplomatic Protection 
We have already come across the possibility of enforcement of ICSID awards on 
some occasions. Enforcement issues have so far rarely arisen because states gene-
 
112  CMS v. Argentine (Award), supra note 60, para. 329. Schill, supra note 82, 291. This deprives 
Art. 25 of any relevance. Cases “beyond the control of the state” are governed by Art. 23 
(Force Majeure) I.L.C. Draft.  
113  See CMS v. Argentina (Annulment Application), supra note 77, paras. 83-84. 
114  IMF, supra note 3, 25 (subjecting a stay to the approval of a 75% creditor majority). 
115  Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru and the Republic of Peru, 1994 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2003, 23-33 (S.D.N.Y. 24 Feb. 1994). Lightwater Corp. v. Argentina, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16868 (S.D.N.Y. 29 Aug. 2003, stay of execution). Allied Bank International et. al. v. 
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago et. al. 733 F2d 23, 27 (2nd Cir. 1984). Skeel, Why Con-
tracts are Saving Sovereign Bankruptcy, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. March 2006, 23, sums up the efforts 
as “mixed results”. 
116  Even these requirements could be rendered obsolete by virtue of MFN Clauses, see Siemens v. 
Argentina (Decision on Jurisdiction), Case No. ARB/02/8, 44 I.L.M. 137 (Jan. 2005), paras. 
79-109. 
117  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 18 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (hereinafter the Convention). 
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rally pay their ICSID awards.118 However, the Argentine case suggests that this 
perception is invalid in state insolvency cases,119 even though states clearly are un-
der an international law obligation to comply with ICSID awards, Art. 53 (1) ICSID 
Convention. Hence, execution becomes a material concern for creditors, debtors and 
the entire ICSID system alike.  
Enforcement is governed by Art. 54, 55 ICSID-Convention. Any contracting state 
is under an obligation to enforce an ICSID award as if it were a final judgment in 
that state, Art. 54 (1). The enforcement procedure is subject to the laws concerning 
execution of judgments in the state where enforcement is sought, without prejudice 
to local laws on immunity from enforcement, Art. 54 (3), 55. By virtue of this latter 
limitation, the traditional obstacles to execution outside of the debtor state’s territory 
will also play out in the ICSID context. The restrictive immunity from enforcement 
theory (as predominantly applied among ICSID member states), as well as interna-
tional law on diplomatic immunities, will prevent creditors from attaching assets of 
the diplomatic mission and other assets used for iure imperii purposes.120 Although 
this causes inconveniences for the debtor state by impeding its commercial activities 
abroad, commercial assets will in most cases not be available for the creditor outside 
the debtor’s territory.  
One (perceived) advantage of Investment Treaty Arbitration from an investor’s 
point of view is that, compared to domestic court judgments, ICSID awards can be 
enforced easier in the debtor state itself, at least in theory.121 ICSID awards have the 
status of a final judgment of the debtor state’s courts and must not be subjected to a 
public policy review by local enforcement authorities, clearly constituting an im-
provement compared to the enforcement of foreign court judgments and arbitral 
awards.122. A local court is by international law obliged to enforce an ICSID award 
without testing it against local emergency laws. Although the reference to local 
enforcement laws in Art. 54 (3) cannot introduce a public policy review through the 
backdoor,123 it mitigates the advantages of ICSID proceedings. The debtor state is 
 
118  Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 Cornell 
L. Rev. 959, 1028 (2000). 
119  Alfaro/Lorenti, The Growing Opposition if Argentina to ICSID Arbitral Tribunals, 6 J. World 
Investment & Trade, 417-430.  
120  See supra II. 3. As to the immunity from attachment of diplomatic assets, see Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961, 550 U.N.T.S. 95, Art. 22 (3). 
121  Griffin/Farren, How ICSID can protect sovereign bondholders, Int’l Fin. L. Rev. Sept. 2005, 
21, 23. 
122  See The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 10 June 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, Art. V. For exquatur proceedings, see Baars/Böckel, 
supra note 33, 463. 
123  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention – A Commentary, 2001, Art. 54 para. 104. Argentine at-
tempts to that effect, see Alfaro/Lorenti, Argentina: The Enforcement Process of the ICSID 
Awards, Mondaq Business Briefing, 1 June 2005, www.mondaq.com, gravely err on that point 
of law. 
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free to invoke its own laws on immunity from enforcement to evade execution, and 
these local enforcement laws themselves are not subject to ICSID review.124  
A more real enforcement prospect brings us to the more traditional sphere of in-
ternational law, that of diplomatic protection. Failure of the debtor state to comply 
with an award (or a local judge striking down an award on local public policy 
grounds) triggers the state’s international responsibility and can give rise to diplo-
matic protection of the creditors’ home states, Art. 27 Convention, including taking 
the case to the ICJ, see also Art. 64 Convention.125 Even more effective sanctions to 
compel the debtor state to pay could be exerted by ICSID’s parent institution, the 
World Bank, as well as the latter’s Bretton Woods twin, the IMF. U.S. lawyers have 
already pointed at the Helms Amendment under which the U.S. government is by 
law prohibited from making financial contributions to a country that repudiates or 
nullifies contracts with a U.S. person. This prohibition, which would presumably 
cover a default on ICSID awards, includes contributions through the IMF and the 
World Bank.126 Given U.S. voting power in the Bretton Woods institutions, the 
Helms Amendment could be a very powerful tool in the creditors’ hands. 
Tribunals should have these political and diplomatic consequences in mind when 
deciding on the substantive issues outlined above, especially when creditors already 
have obtained judgments in local courts and have recourse to ICSID merely for the 
better enforcement prospects.  
E. Conclusion 
I. How Could State Insolvency Change Investment Treaty Arbitration? 
In our analysis, we have seen some key challenges ICSID Tribunals will face when 
confronted with the phenomenon of state insolvency. The first challenge, both in 
procedural and substantive terms, is that the potential number of claimants (who are 
 
124  Schreuer, supra note 123, Art. 55 para. 99, emphasizes that ICSID drafters contemplated 
withdrawing immunity under the laws of the host state but abandoned that idea. Many states 
have immunized their domestic assets from enforcement, Wood, Project Finance, Subordinated 
Debt and State Loans, 1995, 154. 
125  A case before the ICJ under Art. 64 ICSID seems straightforward where the state does not pay 
the award. The debtor state could claim that it is simply unable to honour its obligation under 
Art. 53 (1) ICSID because it lacks sufficient funds, see Lowe, Some Comments on Procedural 
Weaknesses in International Law, 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 37, 39 (2004) on Argentina’s 
situation. The ICJ might engage in an analysis under Art. 61, 62 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, thus further fragmenting international law. 
126  22 U.S.C.S. § 2370a. See Maiden, Argentina Ruling Calls Halt to Holdout Litigation, Int’l Fin. 
L. Rev. June 2005, 6, 7. The Helms Amendment was already employed by an American inves-
tor to stop payments by the Inter-American-Development Bank to Costa Rica as long as Costa 
Rica did not accept ICSID Arbitration, Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Costa 
Rica (Final Award), Case No. ARB/96/1, 15 ICSID Rev. – F.I.L.J. 169, paras. 24 ff. (2000). 
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everything but a homogenous group) largely exceeds that known from prior ICSID 
proceedings. Moreover, state insolvency raises some known substantive investment 
treaty questions in a new context, such as the State of Necessity/debt sustainability 
problem. Other issues such as the extraterritoriality issue are entirely new and reflect 
the structural differences between classic FDI and sovereign debt. 
Undoubtedly, the sticking point to predict the outcome and the very nature of 
state insolvency proceedings in Investment Treaty Arbitration lies in the distinction 
between contract claims and treaty claims. Tribunal consistency on this issue is of 
fundamental importance for states and creditors. If the integrationist view prevails, 
and every sovereign default constitutes a BIT violation, ICSID could become very 
prominent a forum for an insolvent sovereign’s creditors.  
II. How Could ICISD Change the “Law” of  State Insolvency 
How then does Investment Treaty Arbitration have the potential to change the “law” 
of state insolvency? One instance where BITs and ICSID can have a significant 
impact is domestic law debt. If the monetary and exchange control laws of the 
debtor state are tested against the state’s BIT obligations, investors’ risk awareness 
towards domestic law debt could wane, especially if umbrella clauses are given the 
effect of stabilization clauses (see supra III. 4. d.). More importantly, Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, if enforced through the Helms Amendment, could significantly 
change multilateral emergency lending. If ICSID Tribunals rule in favour of holdout 
creditors, and if the Helms Amendment applies, the IMF and the World Bank would 
be barred from issuing emergency packages beyond its current policies that allow 
for lending into arrears under certain circumstances.127 This could mean a significant 
shift in bargaining power during sovereign debt restructuring negotiations. 
The future of sovereign debt workouts seems to lie in CACs that can mitigate the 
collective action problems. Investment Treaty Arbitration is not likely to tamper 
with CAC restructurings.128  
 
127  Salmon, Sovereign Finally Closes Debt Restructuring, Euromoney July 2005, 42, 43. For the 
IMF, see IMF, Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears – Further Considerations on the Good 
Faith Criterion, 30 July 2002, 5. 
128  We have so far overlooked majority enforcement clauses often used in trust indentures under 
U.K. law and becoming more prominent in New York law debt. Under these clauses, the initia-
tion of lawsuits in domestic courts requires approval by 25% of the represented outstanding 
principal, see Drage/Hovaguimian, supra note 18, 5. How, under these circumstances, an “in-
tegrationist” Tribunal will react if a minority bondholder sues individually invoking an um-
brella clause would be interesting to observe. 
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III. Would ICSID Make a Good SDRM? 
In light of the preceding analysis, how can Investment Treaty Arbitration under 
ICSID (a World Bank institution after all) be reconciled with the ambitious IMF 
proposal for an SDRM? Could ICSID perform functions of such a body where sup-
port for an institutionalized SDRM is lacking? Or would ICSID Arbitration actually 
run counter to the general SDRM principles identified by the IMF? It is obvious that 
Investment Treaty Arbitration cannot function as a full-fledged SDRM The IMF 
heavily borrowed from national insolvency proceedings when designing its SDRM. 
ICSID Tribunals are not – without amendment of the Convention – intended to per-
form administrative functions of a national insolvency court. ICSID Tribunals are 
certainly not a forum where a distressed sovereign could file for bankruptcy (i.e. 
initiate a debt restructuring). As outlined above, ICSID would not even have the 
procedural competence to suspend holdout proceedings to await restructuring nego-
tiations (supra IV. 1.), let alone certify a restructuring plan like a national insolvency 
judge would.  
However, the IMF proposal also introduced a Dispute Resolution Forum (DRF) 
for creditor/debtor disputes that in fact relied on ICSID as a role model, though 
primarily for procedural matters.129 Whether or not ICSID could perform functions 
of the (rejected) DRF will heavily depend on ICSID’s self perception, especially 
with regard to the contract /treaty claims distinction. The DRF was designed as a 
“contract” forum that could inter alia rule on the validity of individual creditor 
claims. “Integrationist” Tribunals will face many of the substantive issues discussed 
in the SDRM context. The above analysis has shown that ICSID Arbitration and the 
SDRM principles are not always congruent. This firstly goes for the scope of ICSID 
Arbitration, which would include domestic law debt but would exclude nationals of 
the debtor state, contrary to the proposed DRF.130 More significantly, under ICSID, 
a majority restructuring would not bind holdout creditors, a key feature of the 
SDRM. The same goes for a stay on creditor enforcement actions. Lastly, if the 
CMS decision stands, ICSID would have to make an autonomous assessment of the 
state’s debt sustainability, which the DRF was expressly prohibited from doing.131 A 
thorough interpretation of the BIT principles of national treatment, MFN and non 
 
129  IMF, The Design of the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism – Further Considerations, 
27 Nov. 2002, 63, 69, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2002/112702.pdf. See 
Schwarcz, supra note 118, 1024-1030. 
130  IMF, supra note 3, 23. 
131  Id., 28 
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discrimination could, however, contribute to enhanced inter-creditor equity (supra 
III. 4. e.).  
 169
State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties         
                     
Comment by Peter Gnam∗ 
A. 
From time to time there are situations also on the economic as well as political plat-
form where “it takes two to tango”. Facing insolvency and making efforts to get 
along with it could very well be such a “tango situation“. The debtor makes short 
and long strides in all directions, but not getting away that much from those eager to 
dance with him, cheek to cheek, so as to get as much feeling as possible for the 
debtor´s movements and for what is left of the body to represent an asset which is 
worth dancing for it. Well, tango is popular in a way, but not everybody likes to 
dance it, in particular if the dancing part of the debtor is acted by a state, and if there 
are too many creditors bound to dance this kind of tango on a too small dancing 
floor. 
B. 
Mr. Szodruch has already thoroughly dealt with issues arising from portfolio in-
vestment under a sovereign debt default scenario. So I would like to focus my com-
ments on the more traditional Foreign Direct Investment and its potential risk expo-
sure in case of a state insolvency.     
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) are designed to support national companies 
(or even individuals) of one state who want to invest in the other contracting state by 
safeguarding as much as possible a predictable and reliable legal framework for such 
investment; this way an investor should be encouraged but also promoted to make 
direct investments into countries which are in need of them but lack the financial 
and/or technical capabilities to do it on their own. The purpose of any such Treaty is 
expressed in its respective Title and Preamble and is “to protect” and “to promote” 
investments.  
BITs are not specifically designed to protect and promote sovereign bondholders, 
be it individuals or classes of them. We have learned from the paper presented by 
Mr. Szodruch whether and under which criteria they can qualify for being treated as 
“investors”, and that it needs a little bit of doing to get the sovereign bondholders 
 
∗  Peter Gnam, Attorney and former Deputy General Counsel Siemens, Munich.  
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into and under the protection scheme of a BIT and onto the Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration road. 
As opposed to Foreign Investors, sovereign bondholders - under the respective 
terms and conditions for the emission of the bonds -  a priori have a direct financial 
claim on repayment of the bond and interest; when they want to make use of a BIT 
and its possible arbitration clause, they do it to get an enforceable award on such 
repayment and thus to improve their chances for its execution. A Foreign Investor 
does not necessarily have financial claims against a state from the outset; but he has 
a claim that the state complies with all and any non-financial and legal commitments 
it has undertaken so as to make the investment feasible and its implementation safe-
guarded. Only in case the state does not meet any such commitment, the BIT ap-
pears on the scene so as to verify whether there is a breach of the BIT, and whether 
this breach has lead to a damage to the investor which then may or may not consti-
tute a claim for money (compensation of damages) against the state in default under 
the BIT. However, such claim, when raised under a BIT, does not per se qualify to 
be added to the “debt pool“ of a state insolvency and to give the claiming investor 
the position of a creditor in such insolvency. There is still a long way to go, if the 
state does not acknowledge such claim from the outset, which he normally does not. 
Before we have a look into the practice of Foreign Direct Investment, a last ob-
servation in this context: it appears that the purpose of a BIT as outlined before and 
the purpose of whatever structure or procedure used for solving a state insolvency, 
do not match; they even seem to be contra-rotating. As there cannot be a liquidation 
of the state and its public assets, all concepts for solving a state insolvency are in the 
end directed to protect the state against its creditors (as opposed to the protection of 
an investor under a BIT); the creditors – so as to have a workable balance towards 
the needs of the state and the welfare of its citizens – are required to contribute to a 
solution of the “crisis” by e.g. writing off substantial parts of their financial claims. 
As for the foreign  investors, the “encourage and protect investment–doctrine” of a 
BIT is turned upside down, and there is not much legal aid left to avoid the partial or 
total sacrifice of the investment. 
Foreign Direct Investment mainly comprises large scale projects. In most cases, 
the investment is invited by a state to build up or strengthen its public service sector 
in the fields of energy or water supply network, oil and gas production, transport 
systems, telecommunication and IT infrastructure, but also to provide medical cen-
ters, hotel and resort complexes and the like. The investment required for such pro-
jects is mostly of substantial magnitude – and the state doesn´t have the money to 
spend on it, although being very often badly in need of accomplishing such projects. 
In the last 2 or 3 decades, there very seldom have been, if at all, investment pro-
jects for which the state had to directly pay money to an investor. Foreign Direct 
Investment does in principle not create a creditor–debtor relation between the inves-
tor and the state per se or require it – at least as far as debt of money is concerned. 
These projects are either financed in the classic way through institutional or private 
lending – the state hereby becoming a financial debtor to the lenders, not to the in-
vestor – or through one of the tools of private project financing ranging from sup-
 171
plier´s credit to BOT models or business outsourcing; in the latter cases, the investor 
assumes the advance obligation to have the project (or his participation in a priva-
tized company) financed by his own resources or financing instruments, and he gets 
his “Return of and on Investment” from his participation in whole or in part in the 
proceeds of the project as a going concern. 
Under a Foreign Direct Investment scenario, the role of the state is therefore not 
based on assuming payment obligations but is to establish and uphold stable, reliable 
and predictable investment conditions for the investment it is calling in, particularly 
in the administrative and legal environment. So the obligation of the state towards an 
investor is more an immaterial one, without a genuine financial debt exposure. The 
state by granting (non financial) guarantees, authorizations or licenses, or by creat-
ing specific administrative or legal infrastructures, safeguards an environment in 
which the project as a going concern shall be protected and can so pay back the 
investment by itself – and by e.g. paying taxes can even positively contribute to the 
state´s  liquid assets. 
One certainly can say that a state insolvency situation as such does not affect any 
such non financial commitments undertaken by the state. So it should not come as a 
surprise when I tell you, that the factor insolvency of a state – as a potential or given 
situation – is not and, as far as I know, never has been a relevant factor in any risk 
assessment an investor makes, before engaging in a cross border investment;     
honestly spoken: the management in charge of any such project und its legal advi-
sors don´t even think about it. 
It is the BIT which an investor becomes aware of and wants to call in, if and 
when there is a non fulfillment of a state´s commitments towards an investment or 
otherwise a violation of Treaty standards. And it is a default of the state in this re-
spect which can substantially change the investor´s role towards the state: the inves-
tor, having so long been a “beneficiary” of the state under the investment protection 
scheme, mutates into a “creditor” of the same state, provided he suffers a damage 
and has the ius standi to present a financial claim under the Investment Treaty Arbi-
tration scheme; and in case, after 3 to 5 years of arbitration proceeding,  there is an 
enforceable award,  favorable to the investor, the foreign investor from this moment 
on, and not earlier, can join the bandwagon of all the other financial creditors to the 
state and enjoy facing the realities of the actual debt situation of the state, an insol-
vency being imminent, already pending or not. 
From a practical point of view, for the investor there is not much timing or even 
strategy available when and how to structure an Investment Treaty Arbitration along 
a state insolvency. Apart from the fact that one can not predict whether the insol-
vency of a state is of long term or rather short term nature, whether it occurs at the 
beginning of an arbitration proceeding, in the middle of it or thereafter, there is not 
much control on orientating the enforceability of an award to a certain stage of a 
state´s financial indebtedness. On the other hand, the investor needs an enforceable 
award anyway and this as soon as possible, so as to rank properly among other fi-
nancial creditors, if need be. 
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In this context, I do not see much value in a discussion whether to establish rules 
on a “stay” for Investment Treaty Arbitration proceedings as long as an insolvency 
of the defendant state is pending or in a critical stage. An investor is somewhat lost 
in an insolvency as long as his claim is neither acknowledged by the state nor yet 
awarded by a tribunal and enforceable. The mere fact that there might still come up 
the one or other potential enforceable claim against a state in the distant future can-
not have any impact on the need to solve an existing insolvency situation in the 
interest of the state itself and the well-being of its nationals but also in the interest of 
the  financial creditors. A different aspect could be the question of having an “auto-
matic stay” of enforcement of awards once there actually is a state insolvency. But 
this is neither a question under a BIT nor under the ICSID Rules, as an automatic 
stay had to apply to all creditors and would therefore require a statutory regulation 
under the insolvency procedure itself.  
Argentina´s insolvency is over, for the time being; it was a fairly short one, if it 
has been one at all. One should not forget, however, that there still is an avalanche 
of 30 or more Investment Treaty claims pending at ICSID against this state with a 
claim exposure probably exceeding 20 billions of USD. I leave it open whether this 
can lead to another dangerous indebtedness potential of this state, in case all these 
claims succeed and become enforceable awards. I leave it open because Argentina is 
going to develop a strategy to bar such claims from becoming a real threat to the 
state. Argentina intends to run all ICSID awards, when rendered against it, through 
the annulment procedure. A “catch all” annulment scenario as defense against a new 
indebtedness potential - that is something new, apart from having the effect of 
blocking ICSID arbitration to some extent. But what is worse, from a legal point of 
view, is the strong political and legal opposition to ICSID arbitration as such (invok-
ing inter alia the Calvo doctrine again) and the motion of certain members of the 
Government, to prevent enforcement of ICSID awards; it is alleged that both the 
BITs and the system of ICSID arbitration itself could violate the Argentine constitu-
tion and that therefore any award rendered thereunder could be declared null and 
void by a domestic court. Should the Government really dare to invoke such nullity 
in the future, it would block investors, for many years to come, to have a valid and 
enforceable financial claim and become a “creditor” to the state. This might also 
give the politicians of BIT states some headache as it can have consequences on 
future BIT negotiations or prolongations and the value of Investment Treaty Arbitra-
tion.  
C.  
So much for the reality of consequences and obligations under Investment Treaties 
in practice. The problem for a foreign investor is not the insolvency as such; the 
problem seems to be rather the bumpy road an investor has to go to acquire the legal 
qualification to present his financial claim in a state insolvency, whenever this might 
happen. Just to close the circle: the foreign investor has a bad dancing card and the 
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state is a lousy dancer when it is about to take the dancing floor to dance the “tango 
bancarotta”.  
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State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under               
Investment Treaties        
            
Comment by August Reinisch* 
After the fascination and comprehensive tour de horizon on State insolvency is-
sues and ICSID we have just heard by Mr. Szodruch I would like to focus on one 
particular aspect and that is the question whether ICSID, this highly attractive forum 
for a particular type of international economic disputes, i.e. investment disputes, 
would also make a good sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM). In fact, 
mainly in the sovereign debt debate, ICSID has been mentioned time and again as a 
potential insolvency forum.1 Whether this may have been motivated by its affiliation 
with the World Bank or because of a general feeling of its over-all success is not 
always clear. It is interesting, however, that the ICSID community, if I may thus call 
arbitrators, counsel and academics working in and writing on that field of invest-
ment law, has largely ignored, if not outright rejected, this potential role. ICSID 
tribunals like the one in the CMS case2 have expressly rejected a general competence 
to adjudicate on general economic policy measures such as debt moratoria. Ac-
cording to the CMS Tribunal, they do “not have jurisdiction over measures of gen-
eral economic policy adopted by [States] and cannot pass judgment on whether they 
are right or wrong.” Instead, its jurisdiction was narrowly construed “to examine 
whether specific measures affecting the Claimant’s investment or measures of ge-
neral economic policy having a direct bearing on such investment have been adopted 
in violation of legally binding commitments made to the investor in treaties, legisla-
tion or contracts.”3 
This is all the more surprising, given the ever increasing scope of ICSID jurisdic-
tion and thus its potential also for creditor claims against sovereign debtors.  
Mr Szodruch has skillfully outlined the possibilities of ICSID in this regard and I 
agree with almost everything he says there. Still, as a commentator I feel a certain 
need, not necessarily to disagree or criticize, but at least to emphasize that there 
might be some considerable jurisdictional obstacles both de lege lata and de lege 
ferenda left.  
 
*  August Reinisch is Professor of International Law and European Law at the University of 
Vienna and Professorial Lecturer at the Bologna Center of SAIS/Johns Hopkins University. 
1  See S. L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 
85 Cornell L.R. 101 (2000). 
2  CMS v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003, Case No. ARB/01/8, 42 ILM 799 
(2003). 
3  CMS v. Argentina, supra note 2, para. 33. 
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Let me first turn to the question of ratione materiae jurisdiction of ICSID panels 
over loan and other debt claims. It is said in the paper that the “traditionally broad 
investment definition of Art. 25 ICSID encompasses loans and bonds, whether is-
sued by private or public entities”4, while it might be more questionable whether 
sovereign debt would always be covered by BIT definitions of investment.5 Indeed, 
some BITs contain rather restrictive language with regard to the definition of in-
vestment which implies that the usual forms of sovereign debt would not be pro-
tected.  
However, I would submit that it is still also a genuine ICSID issue whether sove-
reign debt always falls under the ratione materiae jurisdiction of Article 25 of the 
ICSID Convention. It is true that, in particular, Fedax6 is a strong precedent and 
supports the proposition that all sovereign debt should qualify as investment under 
the Convention. Nevertheless, if we follow the, by now well-established, practice of 
ICSID tribunals to require, in addition to qualifying under the investment definition 
of the applicable BIT, fulfillment of the Article 25 ICSID Convention criteria of 
“investment”, as they have been elaborated in legal doctrine7 and by the case-law of 
the tribunals,8 I am not so sure whether duration, risk sharing, substantial commit-
ment, etc. are all fulfilled in all cases involving sovereign debt. There are many 
short-term debt instruments with fixed interest rates which may escape the invest-
ment notion under the ICSID Convention.  
Szodruch has rightly reminded us that also the issue of ratione perso-
nae jurisdiction may provide some problems for the use of ICSID as a forum to 
settle sovereign debt disputes. The requirement that the private creditor has to have 
the nationality of a State party to the ICSID Convention and, since ICSID clauses 
are practically non-existent in bond or loan agreements, also of a BIT-partner of the 
debtor State may lead to rather fortuitous results. This is only exacerbated by the 
fact that most modern debt instruments are constantly publicly traded on the interna-
tional financial markets which will make the precise holders of debt claims at a 
specific point in time sometimes hard to ascertain. The suggestion that MFN clauses 
could mitigate the problem that debt claims might have to be treated differently, 
always according to the applicable BIT between the sovereign debtor and the (na-
tional) groups of creditors,9 would not solve the fundamental problem that some 
creditors may not have any access to investment arbitration at all because there is no 
 
4  Szodruch, p. 148.  
5  Idid., p. 149. 
6  Fedax v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, ICSID Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 July 
1997, 37 ILM 1378 (1998). 
7  According to Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), 140, the typical fea-
tures an investment would normally exhibit are a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit 
and return, an element of risk for both sides, a substantial commitment and a significance for 
the host State’s development. 
8  See Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2004, 44 ILM 73 (2005), para. 53. 
9  Szodruch, p. 151.  
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BIT in force. In addition, apart from a State’s private creditors, an entire group, i.e. 
its public creditors, is necessarily left outside the venue of ICSID, whose ratione 
personae jurisdiction can only extend over “a Contracting State [...] and a national 
of another Contracting State”10. This contrasts with today’s practice of debt relief in 
the form of restructuring and rescheduling of a State’s (public and private) external 
debt, mainly achieved in the so-called Paris and London Clubs. ICSID could cover 
only private debt in this terminology, i.e. debts vis-à-vis private creditors who must 
be regarded as investors in order to qualify as potential users of the ICSID system. 
Admittedly, during the last 20 years public debt has become less important in rela-
tive terms compared to the recent surge of public financing through bond emissions. 
Still, the problem remains that ICSID could not “adjudicate” the claims of public 
creditors. This necessarily narrow jurisdictional scope of ICSID must be regarded as 
an inherent disadvantage for its potential use as an insolvency mechanism which is 
true not only de lege lata, but also de lege ferenda.   
Let me thus now turn to the core policy issue relating to the question whether it 
would be feasible for ICSID to perform functions of a SDRM, i.e. restructuring the 
(private and public) external debt of sovereign States, and what kind of changes 
would be required for that purpose. The main task of a SDRM is the effective re-
structuring of a sovereign’s debt enabling it to continue to operate and guaranteeing 
equal treatment to creditors. This requires compulsory jurisdiction over all creditors. 
ICSID, however, has just “random” jurisdiction over some creditors who seek to 
enforce their individual claims. There is no jurisdictional mechanism of forcing 
potential claimants to institute ICSID proceedings if they prefer not to sue or to sue 
elsewhere, as they are regularly entitled to under the dispute settlement clauses typi-
cally included in BITs. But even if all creditors chose to institute ICSID proceedings 
there is no compulsory consolidation mechanism which would guarantee a consis-
tent outcome. Instead, parallel proceedings would result, with all the concomitant 
risks of conflicting or inconsistent outcomes, etc. To transform ICSID into a genuine 
SDRM with compulsory jurisdiction over all creditors of sovereign debtors by 
amending the ICSID Convention would be theoretically possible. There is, however, 
not only no indication of any political will to do so, it would also fundamentally 
change ICSID which has just started to establish a reputation as a well-functioning 
dispute settlement system for investment claims.   
Instead of changing ICSID, one could consider other functions possibly per-
formed by the Centre. Conceivably, the role of ICSID in situations of sovereign 
insolvency could be one of validating the existence of claims in first line. An effec-
tive SDRM would additionally require a forum competent to reduce the creditors’ 
valid claims to a certain equal proportion and at the same time to achieve a debt 
discharge for the debtor State. Whether this central SDRM task could be performed 
 
10  Article 25(1) ICSID Convention.  
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by the IMF or by a new international judicial or quasi-judicial body will be seen, but 
most likely it will not be ICSID. 
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Third-Party Participation (NGO’s and Private Persons) and Transparency 
in ICSID Proceedings        
                    
Carl-Sebastian Zoellner∗ 
A. Introduction 
“Taking Stock After 40 Years,” the title and purpose of the present conference, 
already suggests that at least de facto, there has to be a certain degree of transpa-
rency as regards the object of our scholarly attention – otherwise any stocktaking 
attempt would have to remain purely speculative and prove to be virtually impos-
sible for all but those participants, among them my commentators, who have perso-
nally contributed to the emerging body of international investment law by sitting as 
arbitrators or by representing parties. Yet the question remains, to what extent, and 
on what basis, third-party participation and transparency have been incorporated in 
ICSID proceedings – and what the future perspectives of those concepts are. 
When the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
was created by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (the Convention),1 some of its most important 
features represented clear and significant new developments in the realm of interna-
tional law.2 Third-party participation and transparency, however, do not fall squarely 
into this category: As far as procedure and organization are concerned, international 
investment dispute settlement in general has borrowed its main elements from the 
system of (private) commercial arbitration,3 with ICSID being no exception to this 
rule. Compared to judicial proceedings before courts of law, commercial arbitration 
is generally characterized by significantly higher degrees of confidentiality and 
 
∗  Carl Sebastian Zoellner is Ph.D Candidate (Martin-Luther-University, Halle); LL.M. (Michi-
gan); Dipl.-Jurist (Christian-Albrechts-University, Kiel). This paper has been slightly updated 
after the conference to reflect the official publication of newly adopted changes to the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules. I am grateful to Dr. Christian Tams, LL.M. (Cambridge) and Alexander 
Szodruch, LL.M. (Indiana) for their helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  575 U.N.T.S. 159. The Convention was opened for signature in 1965 and came into force on 
14 October, 1966. 
2  Cf. Lauterpacht, Foreword, in: Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, xi (2001), 
who inter alia mentions the right of non-State entities to sue States directly, restrictions to State 
immunity, and the exclusion of the local remedies rule. 
3  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 2, available at: http://www.oecd. 
org/investment. 
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privacy, by closed doors and often unpublished awards.4 Accordingly, allowing 
parties to keep private the details of their dispute is routinely being viewed as one of 
the factors that give arbitration an advantage over court procedures.5 This opacity 
not only appeals to private enterprises which fear exposure of business secrets, but 
scholars have also identified it as key reason why governments accept mixed arbitra-
tion in the first place.6 
With regard to purely commercial arbitration agreed on between privates, deci-
ding a case in camera without registration of the dispute or publication of the final 
award indeed does not offend fundamental principles of justice,7 nor does it as such 
involve questions of democratic legitimacy.8 Given the public policy implications of 
investor-state arbitration, where the proverbial “non-accountable three private indi-
viduals” scrutinize regulatory measures taken by legitimate governments, however, 
this might be very different for the kind of disputes ICSID has successfully adminis-
tered in the last 40 years.9 Therefore, in the context of international investment dis-
putes, knowledge – implying the use of specialized amicus curiae expertise – and 
the accountability provided by publicity become key issues complementing confi-
 
4  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169 (Weiler ed., 2005); Leahy/Bianchi, The Changing Face of International Arbi-
tration, 17(4) J. Int’l Arb. 19, 51 (2000); Prütting, Vertraulichkeit in der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit 
und in der Mediation, in: Law of International Business and Dispute Settlement in the 21st 
Century – Liber Amicorum Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, 629 (R. Briner et al. eds., 2002); Lew, The 
case for publication of arbitration awards, in: The Art of Arbitration – Liber Amicorum Pieter 
Sanders, 223, 224 et seq. (Schultsz ed., 1982). Privacy is concerned with limiting the rights of 
third parties (i.e. persons other than the arbitrators, the parties and possibly witnesses) to attend 
meetings, hearings and to generally know about or participate in the arbitration, while confi-
dentiality refers to the obligation of arbitrators and the parties not to divulge information relat-
ing to the contents of the proceedings, relevant documents or the award itself. See Lew, Expert 
Report of Dr. Julian D.M. Lew in Esso/BHP v. Plowman, 11(3) Arb. Int’l 285 (1995).  
5  Cf. Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 
14 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 121, 138 (2003); Merkin, Arbitration Law 1 (1991). 
6  See, for instance, as regards states’s acceptance of arbitration before the International Chamber 
of Commerce in Paris, Böckstiegel, Arbitration of Disputes between States and Private Enter-
prises, 59 Am. J. Int’l L. 579, 584 (1965).  
7  Cf. Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Paper delivered at ASA Swiss 
Arbitration Association Conference on Investment Treaties and Arbitration in Zurich (25 Janu-
ary 2002), reprinted in 1 Transnat’l Dispute Management (2004), available at: 
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/. 
8  But see Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbi-
tration, 14 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 121, 135 (2003). 
9  It should be noted, however, that of more than 120 cases submitted to ICSID, the vast majority 
were only submitted in the past few years – a trend indicating further dramatic increases in the 
future, see Flores, Energy and International Law: Development, Litigation, and Regulation, 36 
Tex. Int’l L. J. 1, 8-9 (2001); Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 
1521, 1538 et seq. (2005) with further references.   
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dentiality and privacy.10 To properly reconcile and balance these at times conflicting 
principles is the task an effective and legitimate institutional framework for invest-
ment dispute settlement needs to achieve. How does ICSID fare in this respect? 
In order to answer this question, I will first of all introduce the various dimen-
sions of transparency and briefly outline its history in international economic law 
(B.). Having set the analytical framework, I will turn to the development and current 
state of third-party participation and transparency in investment disputes adminis-
tered under ICSID rules, comparing it to other investment dispute settlement mecha-
nisms where appropriate (C.). Building up on recent changes ignited by the ICSID 
Secretariat Draft Proposal, I will then discuss benefits and potential costs of trans-
parency in investor-state arbitration and evaluate the present developments against 
this background (D.). 
B. Transparency in International Economic Law 
I. The Notion of Transparency 
In a recent article, transparency has been described as “egregiously overused and 
poorly understood buzzword.”11 Indeed, when looking at international law at large, 
it becomes apparent that not many terms refer to situations as different from each 
other as “transparency” does. First of all, transparency has gained considerable im-
portance in the study of international relations. Given the fundamental structural 
changes in the international legal order, i.e., with a view to the notable shift from 
Westphalian sovereignty to an international law of cooperation and integration, 
states today face more and more obligations stemming from a rapidly growing num-
ber of international law instruments.12 Transparency has been identified as key con-
cept to ensure compliance with these obligations.13 Because this paradigmatic shift 
arguably entails the partial transfer of sovereignty and previously national compe-
tences to international regimes, transparency also increasingly becomes subject of 
 
10  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 170 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
11  Hale/Slaughter, Transparency: Possibilities and Limits, 30 Fletcher F. World Aff. 153, 163 
(2006). 
12  Delbrück, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order: International 
Law in the Era of Globalization, 11 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Eu-
ropäisches Recht 1 (2001), passim. 
13  See Chayes/Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty 135-53 (1995); Hansen, Transparency, 
Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 
Va. J. Int’l L. 1017, 1060 (1999). 
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debates circulating around the democratic legitimacy of this phenomenon.14 Fur-
thermore, on the international, regional and national level alike, additional aspects of 
transparency currently enjoy high attention and are constantly gaining importance in 
the respective legal regimes.15 Thus, generally speaking, the current discussion of 
transparency in international law can be grouped along three different contexts: (1) 
as a concept underlying obligations international law places on states’ internal legal 
regimes and procedures;16 (2) as a concept governing the relations between institu-
tions and regimes of international law and (their) member states;17 and (3) as a con-
cept denoting the openness of institutions and procedures of international law, espe-
cially vis-à-vis international civil society.18  
As far as the narrower field of international economic law is concerned, however, 
the notion of transparency is predominantly used in the last sense, i.e., to express 
criticism regarding the way agreements are negotiated, institutions are governed or 
dispute settlement operates – it is the very absence, the proverbial “lack of transpa-
rency” and the allegedly resulting legitimacy or democratic deficit which dominate 
 
14  Petersmann, Time for a United Nations ‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into 
the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 
621, 646 (2002); Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational De-
mocracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 29, 42 
(2003). 
15  On the international level, for instance, transparency is currently at the center of the debate 
regarding the problem of corruption,. Ouzounov, Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Cap-
ture and the Role of Multinational Business, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1181, 1198 (2004); Klich, 
Bribery in Economics in Transition: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 Stan. J. Int’l L. 121 
(1996). On the regional and national level, the transparency principle is increasingly reflected 
in a right for citizens to access information, cf. Riemann, Die Transparenz der Europäischen 
Union: das neue Recht auf Zugang zu Dokumenten von Parlament, Rat und Kommission, pas-
sim (2004). But see Bradley Pack, FOIA Frustation: Access to Government Documents under 
the Bush Administration, 46 Ariz. L. Rev. 815 (2004). 
16  Zoellner, Transparency. An Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle of International 
Economic Law, 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 579, 582 et seq. (2006); cf. also United Nations, Confe-
rence on Trade and Development, Transparency, Series on Issues in International Investment 
Agreements, UNCTAD/ITE/IIE/2003/4, 16 et seq. (2004), available at: 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20034_en.pdf; Hilf, Power, Rules and Principles - Which 
Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 111, 119 (2001). 
17  Mitchell, Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 Int'l 
Stud. Q. 109, 110 et seq. (1998); Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Schol-
arship, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 227, 250-51 (1997); see also Abbott, "Trust But Verify": 
The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, 
26 Cornell Int'l L. J. 1, 40-45 (1993). 
18  Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l. L. 873, 876 et seq. (2003); 
Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int’l. L. 489, 
493 (2001); cf. also Long, „Democratizing“ Globalization: Practicing the Policies of Cultural 
Inclusion, 10 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 217, 259 et seq. (2002). 
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the discourse over transparency in this field of law.19 Focusing in further on invest-
ment dispute settlement, these concerns have not only aggravated civil society 
groups,20 but they have also been voiced by officials working for the US State De-
partment: “Conducting arbitrations implicating the public interest in conditions of 
secrecy is unacceptable.”21 Yet until the beginning of 1981, information relating to 
ICSID proceedings was not available to the public at all.22 Thus, it becomes evident 
that the awareness of transparency and its role in state-investor arbitration has only 
evolved slowly. 
II. Historic Development of Transparency in International Economic Law 
While there is no historical study on the emergence of international norms on trans-
parency and citizen participation, Immanuel Kant’s coining of the phrase “capacity 
for publicity” in his essay Perpetual Peace certainly comes to mind as a key mo-
ment.23 According to Kant, the “transcendental formula of public right [requires 
that] all actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not 
consistent with publicity.”24 A first intergovernmental step to provide for some 
transparency on the international level was Art. 18 of the Treaty of Versailles,25 
following President Wilson’s famous call for “open covenants of peace, openly ar-
rived at” instead of secret diplomacy.26 From the current perspective, this develop-
 
19  Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary 
Fund, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 521 (2004); Lacarte, Transparency, Public Debate, and Participation 
by NGOs in the WTO: A WTO Perspective, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 683, 686 (2004); Waincymer, 
Transparency of Dispute Settlement within the World Trade Organization, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 
797 (2000); Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice 
and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817 (1998). 
20  Atik, Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11 Process, in: 
NAFTA – Investment Law and Arbitration 135, 149-150 with further references (Weiler ed., 
2004); cf. also Hober, Arbitration Involving States 139, 151, in: Leading Arbitrator’s Guide to 
International Arbitration (Newman/Hill eds., 2003). 
21  Barton Legum (then Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department), cited in: The American 
Lawyer, Feature, 1 March 2002. 
22  Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1(2) J. Int’l Arb. 101 (1984). 
23  Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 927, 928 (2004). 
24  Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, in: Werke, Bd. 6, 326 (Toman ed., 1995) (1789). 
25  Art. 18 required that all treaties be registered and then published by the Secretariat of the 
League of Nations, and stipulated that no such treaty or agreement would be binding until re-
gistered. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 28 
June 1919, in: The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 1.  
26  The citation is from the first of Wilson’s fourteen points, Stavasage, Open-Door or Closed-
Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 International Organizazion 
667, 668 (2004) with an account of transparency’s increasing role in international negotiations 
following World War I. 
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ment may have provided the necessary intellectual stimulus for the emergence of 
transparency as an issue in international economic law.27 
As regards substantive provisions in international economic law, however, the 
first fundamental norm dealing with transparency did not concern the publicity of 
dispute settlement but another dimension of transparency: The Convention Relating 
to the Simplification of Customs Formalities (Customs Convention) subjected mem-
ber states to transparency disciplines by mandating the prompt publication of all 
customs regulations and “clear and most definite” public notice of the conditions for 
export and import licenses.28 The Customs Convention was also remarkably modern 
insofar as it explicitly expanded the group of beneficiaries to “persons concerned,” 
which did not only include state parties but also domestic persons as well as aliens,29 
and provided for dispute settlement.30 Furthermore, and probably most noteworthy, 
private parties played a significant role in the negotiating and drafting process.31 The 
International Chamber of Commerce, for instance, exerted considerable influence on 
the formation of policy on the subjects of publicity and redress.32 
More specifically with regard to investment dispute settlement, however, trans-
parency’s role remained limited for a long time. Even today many Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral instruments like the Energy Charter Treaty do 
not require investors to publicly manifest their intention to launch a dispute, nor do 
they provide for the publication of awards or openness of proceedings – public dis-
closure thus often depends on the arbitral rules chosen by the parties or, in the ab-
sence of any regulation, on the will of the parties.33 In this respect, the default rule 
stemming from investor-state arbitration’s origins in commercial arbitration seems 
to be that unless neither party objects to it, no publication takes place and the pro-
 
27  Charnovitz, Transparency and Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 927, 929 (2004). 
28  International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities, 3 November 
1923, 19 Am. J. Int’l L. Supp. 146 (1925), at art. 3(a) and art. 4. 
29  Id., at art. 4 para. 1. 
30  Id., at art. 7 and art. 22. 
31  This at least holds true for organizations representing the business community, Ridgeway, 
Merchants of Peace 204, 207-08, 211 et seq., 216, 232 (1938); Charnovitz, Transparency and 
Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927, 929 (2004).  
32  Ridgeway, Merchants of Peace 213 (1938). 
33  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
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ceedings remain closed.34 Notable exceptions to this confidentiality rule are the most 
recent versions of the US and Canadian Model BITs.35 In a similar vein, most in-
vestment treaties regularly do not contain rules piercing the privacy of the procee-
dings, i.e., governing the admissibility of amicus curiae submissions.36 Again, the 
current versions of the US and Canadian Model BITs are  prominent deviations from 
a general phenomenon.37 Given this wide-spread lacuna, however, arbitral rules and 
framework norms such as those contained in the Convention gain crucial importance 
as far as third party participation and transparency of proceedings are concerned: In 
the absence of transparency provisions in the applicable substantive law, the proce-
dural norms of the arbitration facility determine the degree of openness in the re-
spective proceedings.38 
 
34  Collins, Privacy and Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 121, 122 
(1995); Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment 
Law and Arbitration 169, 172 (Weiler ed., 2005). Whether there really is a presumption of ab-
solute confidentiality, however, is subject to debate and influenced by the legal traditions at the 
place of arbitration.  See Bagner, Confidentiality - A Fundamental Principle in International 
Commercial Arbitration? 18(3) J. Int’l Arb. 243 (2001); Leahy/Bianchi, The Changing Face of 
International Arbitration, 17(4) J. Int’l Arb. 19, 36 (2000); Gruner, Accounting for the Public 
Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923, 959 (2003);. Buys, The 
Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration, 14 Am. Rev. 
Int’l Arb. 121, 125 et seq. (2003). Cf. also Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All 
ER136 with Esso Australia Resources Ltd and Others v. Plowman (Minister for Energy and 
Minerals) and Others, 128 ALR 391 (1995). 
35  See US Model BIT 2004, at art. 29, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Sectors 
/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf; Canadian Model Agreement for Pro-
motion and Protection of Investments (2004), art. 38, available at: http://www.naftaclaims. 
com/files/Canada_Model_BIT.pdf. At least with regard to the United States, this development 
was inter alia prompted by the domestic Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), cf. Loewen 
Group, Inc. and Raymond Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3 (Award), 26 June 2003, available at: http://www.investmentclaims.com. In any 
event, the US and Canada were also the first to undertake opening up NAFTA arbitration pro-
ceedings they are involved in, with Mexico joining later. See NAFTA Free Trade Commission 
Joint Statement on the Decade of achievement (San Antonio, 16 July 2004)), reprinted in: 
Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 17, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/investment. 
36  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 183 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
37  See US Model BIT 2004, at art. 28 para. 2, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade 
_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_6897.pdf; Canadian Model Agreement 
for Promotion and Protection of Investments (2004), at art. 39, available at: http://www.      
naftaclaims.com/files/Canada_Model_BIT.pdf. 
38  Generally, the level of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings will be determined both by the 
applicable arbitration rules as well as the arbitration law at the place of arbitration. In addition, 
Art. 44 of the Convention emphasizes that it remains at the discretion of the parties to deviate 
from the default frame provided by the ICSID arbitral rules. 
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C. Development and Current State of the Game 
I will thus now turn to the law governing the administration of investment dispute 
settlement proceedings by ICSID as it has developed and currently stands. With a 
view to the very recent changes brought about by amendments to the Arbitration 
Rules the Administrative Council adopted pursuant to Art. 6 of the Convention on 
10 April 2006 ((ICSID Arbitration Rules),39 this section will first sketch the norma-
tive framework effective before the amendments, then elaborate on the changes 
originally suggested by the ICSID Secretariat as well as on the actual amendments.  
I. Third-Party Rights and Transparency at Relevant Stages of ICSID Proceedings  
Before the Recent Amendments 
First of all, factors implicating transparency and third-party rights at various stages 
of the proceedings will be analyzed, i.e., norms pertaining to the registration of dis-
putes, access to hearings, right to submit documents, and access to awards and other 
relevant documents. Relevant provisions can be found in the Convention itself as 
well as in Administrative Regulations and in the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003. 
Corresponding norms in the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003 shall also be 
included in the survey.40 
1. Registration of Disputes 
When ICSID is chosen as a arbitration facility, the ICSID secretariat routinely ap-
plies a policy of registering all cases and publishes the register on its website.41 
According to the pertinent regulation, this register includes the names of the in-
volved parties, the date of registration and a short summary of the dispute.42 Admi-
nistrative Regulation 23 (2) further clarifies that the register is open for inspection 
 
39  See ICSID’s website, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm, for regulations 
and rules currently in force. Furthermore, references to the corresponding norms and rules per-
taining to conciliation proceedings administered by ICSID will be provided in the footnotes. 
The rules effective before the recent amendments (hereinafter: ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003) 
are still available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm.  
40  The ICSID Additional Facility Rules have been amended effective 10 April 2006 as well, 
however, the rules effective prior to these changes (hereinafter: ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules 2003)  are still available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm.  
41  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
42  See ICSID Administrative Regulation 22 (1), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basicdoc.htm. 
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by any person.43 Such a detailed public register guarantees at least a minimum de-
gree of transparency concerning current investment disputes; in this regard, the po-
licy applied by ICSID is a noteworthy contrast to that of other institutions, such as 
for instance the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC), which both do not publish precise information about registra-
tion, number or content of administered investor-state arbitration cases.44 Further-
more, as regards non-institutional ad hoc arbitration, the most commonly used UN-
CITRAL rules do not feature a registration requirement, either.45 
2. Access to Proceedings 
Under this heading, two facets of transparency can be discussed: (1) “passive” ac-
cess to the hearings, for instance by means of broadcast or physical attendance, and 
(2) “active” access, i.e., the right of third parties to participate in the proceedings by 
submitting amicus curiae briefs. 
a) Privacy v. Open Proceedings 
Neither the Convention nor the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 contained norms 
providing for open hearings or access to submissions and other relevant documents 
absent party consensus. To the contrary, Rule 32 (2) ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 
explicitly stipulated that it was only with the consent of the parties that the Tribunal 
could allow third parties, i.e., “other persons besides the parties, their agents, coun-
sel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and officers of the 
 
43  Id., at Regulation 23 (2). 
44  Consequently, there is only “anecdotal evidence” about the exact number of investment arbi-
tration cases administered by these facilities, and “no one” likely knows the precise number of 
UNCITRAL cases, see Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Pri-
vatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 
1541 n.75, n. 77 (2005). The ICC does, however, publish general statistics about the number of 
requests for arbitration in the ICC Arbitration Bulletin and indicates the percentage of procee-
dings in which at least one party has been a “state, parastatal or public entity.”  See also 
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/right_topics/stat_2005.asp. 
45  UNCITRAL has a secretariat, however, the latter has no mandate to register cases or keep data 
of the use of its rules by investors. Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation 
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 3, avail-
able at: http://www.oecd.org/investment. It should also be noted that ICSID is increasingly of-
fering administrative support in ad hoc arbitrations based on the UNICTRAL rules, see for in-
stance recently the UPS case, United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, available 
at:http://www.investmentclaims.com. 
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Tribunal” to attend the hearings.46 A similar rule had been included in the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules 2003.47 Given this univocal directive contained in the 
applicable rules, it was also clear that a Tribunal could not exercise its powers with 
respect to arbitral procedure to allow attendance by third parties against the will of 
the parties – they effectively enjoyed a veto right.48 Finally, arbitrators had to sign a 
declaration that they “shall keep confidential all information coming to [their] 
knowledge as a result of [their] participation in the proceeding” before the respective 
tribunal can be constituted.49  
Bearing in mind that the Convention explicitly leaves it up to the parties to decide 
on rules applicable in the proceedings,50 however, it would have been nevertheless 
perfectly possible for the parties to agree on completely open proceedings both in 
conciliation as well as in arbitration cases brought before ICSID. Empirically, how-
ever, the necessary party consensus to open up ICSID proceedings or even publicly 
broadcast them has been missing – a stark contrast to a number of cases stemming 
from the investment Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)51 which were decided under UNCITRAL rules.52 
 
46  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 32(2), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid 
/basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm. As to conciliation, the identical standard is laid down in Rule 27 
(2) ICSID Conciliation Rules 2003. In addition, the rule’s preceding paragraph holds that  
hearings shall take place in private and remain, unless the parties otherwise agree, secret.  
47  See ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Schedule B Art. 34 (1) and (2) (Conciliation), 
Schedule C Art. 39 (2) (Arbitration), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/ fa-
cility-2003.htm.  As to factfinding, Schedule A Art. 9 (4) lays down that sessions of the Com-
mission “shall not be public.”  
48  For a recent confirmation of this state of affairs, see Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe S.A., 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Order in Response to a Pe-
tition for Participation as Amicus Curiae (17 March 2006), para. 7, available at: http://www. 
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/ARB0317-AC-en.pdf (hereinafter: Aguas Provinciales); Aguas Ar-
gentinas, S.A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi Universal, 
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19,  Order in Response to a Petition 
for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae (19 May 2005), para. 6, available at: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com (hereinafter: Aguas Argentinas).    
49  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 6 (2); ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Schedule C 
Art. 13 (2); cf. also ICSID Conciliation Rules 2003, Rule 6 (2); ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules 2003, Schedule B Art. 13 (2), available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/ 
basicdoc-2003.htm and http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm respectively. 
50  See supra, note 39. 
51  North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M. 289.. 
52  The pertinent NAFTA cases are UPS, supra note 46; Methanex Corporation v. United States of 
America, and Canfor Corporation v. United States of America, both available at http://www. 
investmentclaims.com. 
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b) Amicus Curiae Submissions 
aa) Normative Framework 
As far as the “active” access to proceedings is concerned, the general exclusion of 
third parties from the hearings was complemented by the fact that both the Conven-
tion and the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 did not arrange for submission of amicus 
curiae documents to tribunals; the relevant evidence rules were silent on this issue.53 
And again, until recently ICSID proceedings had not produced precedents compa-
rable to NAFTA cases under UNCITRAL rules which confirmed that tribunals had 
broad authority to accept and consider submissions from third parties.54 Because 
ICSID is one of the dispute settlement facilities investors may turn to in disputes 
arising under NAFTA,55 however, this very well could have been different. In its 
2003 interpretative note, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (FTC) clarified that 
“no provision of [NAFTA] limits a Tribunal’s discretion to accept written submis-
sions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”56 Furthermore, Art. 44 of 
the Convention stipulates that “if any question of procedure arises which is not co-
vered by this Section or the Arbitration Rules or any rules agreed by the parties, the 
Tribunal shall decide the question.” Thus, if the admission of amicus curiae submis-
sions were such a question of procedure, an ICSID tribunal would have been able to 
admit them even on the basis of the old rules, if it deemed the briefs to be helpful in 
justly deciding the dispute.  
bb) Recent Jurisprudence: Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales 
Such a reasoning has recently indeed been employed by the Tribunals in two on-
going arbitrations, Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales. In both cases, the state 
party agreed to allow amicus curiae submissions, whereas the claimant opposed such 
an opening up of the proceedings.57 Acknowledging that neither the Convention nor 
the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 specifically authorized or prohibited the submis-
 
53  See ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rules 33-37, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basicdoc-2003.htm; ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Schedule C Rules 40-44, avail-
able at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm. 
54  Amicus Curiae submissions have been allowed in UPS and Methanex, cf. Methanex Corpora-
tion v. United States of America, supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from 
Third Persons to Intervene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001. 
55  NAFTA, supra note 52, at Art. 1120 Nr. 1 a). 
56  Free Trade Commission, Statement on non-disputing party participation (October 2003), 
reprinted in: Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 15, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/investment. 
57  See Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 8, Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 9. 
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sion by non-parties of amicus curiae briefs while noting the absence of any prece-
dent under ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 granting this right, the Tribunals examined 
two questions: (1) Did they have the power to accept amicus curiae submissions? 
and (2), if they had, what were the conditions under which this right could be exer-
cised?58 Even though at least in Aguas Argentinas the claimant specifically argued 
that allowing amicus curiae submissions would effectively introduce additional 
parties to the dispute and thus yield substantive consequences,59 the Tribunals in 
both cases held that given the traditional concept of acting as “friend of the court” 
and its application in other forums, the question of amicus curiae submissions 
merely concerned an offer of assistance to the court regarding expertise and perspec-
tives the parties themselves could not provide.60 Furthermore, the Tribunals found 
support for their conclusion that the permissibility of amicus curiae briefs was a 
procedural question by comparing Art. 44 of the Convention with Art. 15 (1) of the 
UNCITRAL rules, which had been the legal foundation for amicus curiae participa-
tion in Methanex, and by looking at the practice of other international arbitral pro-
ceedings in the practice of NAFTA, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the 
World Trade Organization.61 In sum, because the Tribunals were also convinced 
they could exercise their discretion to accept third party briefs without putting an 
increased burden on only one of the parties, they held that Art. 44 of the Convention 
indeed granted Tribunals the power to accept amicus curiae submissions from suit-
able nonparties in appropriate cases.62 
Having decided that as a general matter they had the power to accept such sub-
missions, the Tribunals had to answer the second question and develop conditions 
under which they may exercise this right. Accordingly, in order to balance the inte-
rest of third parties to be heard with substantive and procedural rights of the disput-
ing parties, they established three basic criteria: (1) the appropriateness of the sub-
ject matter of the case; (2) the suitability of the given nonparty in the specific case; 
and (3) the procedure by which the amicus curiae submission is made and consid-
ered.63 The first criterion refers to the public interest of a dispute, understood as 
cases in which the decision have the potential to directly or indirectly affect persons 
other than the disputing parties,64 whereas the suitability of a given nonparty prima-
 
58  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 9; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 10. 
59  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 12. 
60  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 13; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 13. 
61  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, paras. 14-15; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, paras. 14-
15. 
62  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 16; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 16. 
63  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 17; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 17. 
64  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 19; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 18. In this 
context, the Tribunal also noted that increasing transparency in proceedings implicating the 
public interest also increased the legitimacy of international arbitral processes in general and 
ICSID in particular, see Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 22; Aguas Provinciales, supra 
note 49, para. 21.  
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rily depends on its expertise, experience, and independence.65 When deciding on an 
application for leave as amicus curiae, the Tribunals would consider the opinion of 
the parties, the additional burden on parties, Tribunal, and proceedings as well as the 
degree to which the proposed amicus curiae brief was likely to aid the Tribunal in 
arriving at its ultimate decision.66 
3. Access to Awards 
In contrast to the issue of amicus curiae briefs and its original drafts, the Convention 
and the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 are perfectly clear as far as the publication of 
awards is concerned: Most fundamentally, Art. 48 (5) of the Convention mandates 
that ICSID may not publish awards without the consent of the parties; Administra-
tive Regulation 22 (2) reiterates this principle.67 Rule 48 (4) ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003 slightly but importantly refined this prohibition by adding that excerpts of legal 
rules applied by the respective Tribunal may be published by the Centre.68 This 
modification was included in the 1984 revision of the ICSID Arbitration Rules and 
can be interpreted as a reaction to parties selectively disclosing information about 
past proceedings.69 ICSID actively seeks and, statistically, obtains the consent of the 
parties to publish the full award in the ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law 
Journal or, more recently, though its website in about fifty per cent of the cases.70 
Because Art. 48 (5) of the Convention is addressed to ICSID only, however, the 
parties remain free to make awards available to the public unless they have agreed 
otherwise.71 Consequently, even if one party does not consent to ICSID publishing 
 
65  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49¸para. 24; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 23. 
66  Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 27; Aguas Provinciales, supra note 49, para. 26. 
67  ICSID Administrative Regulations, Regulation 22(2). While first drafts leading up to the 
Convention were silent on the question of publication, a later suggestion to authorize the     
ICSID to publish the award “except as the parties otherwise agree” was changed into the pro-
hibition currently in force. See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 mn. 
95 (2001) with further references. 
68  ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003, Rule 48(4), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/ 
basicdoc-2003.htm; see also ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, Rule 53 (3), available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility-2003.htm which in addition allows the regis-
tration of awards if this is required by the arbitration law of the country where the award is 
made. In conciliation proceedings, ICSID has no authority to publish the report, cf.  Art. 33 
ICSID Conciliation Rules. 
69  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 MN 96 (2001); implicitly recogni-
zing the challenge to provide a “balanced” account when information about proceedings is dis-
closed by parties or their counsel Lalive, The First ‘World Bank’ Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. 
Morocco)-Some Legal Problems, 51 Brit. YB of Int’l L. 123, 132 n.1 (1980). 
70  Yannaca-Small, Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settle-
ment Procedures, OECD Working Paper No. 2005/1, 4, available at: http://www. 
oecd.org/investment. 
71  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 MN 100 (2001). 
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the award, the other party frequently releases it for publication in the International 
Legal Materials or other avenues.72 Taken together with ICSID’s competence to 
publish excerpts of the legal rules applied, at least the key holdings of all ICSID 
awards nowadays are available to the public.73 
4. Access to other Documents (Decisions, Memorials, Minutes) 
Even though Art. 48 (5) of the Convention literally refers to awards only, ICSID has 
always handled other (interim) decisions a tribunal may take, such as preliminary 
decisions on jurisdiction (Art. 41), procedural orders or recommendations of provi-
sional measures, congruently, and will thus not publish them without the consent of 
the parties.74 As far as their pleadings and other information about pending proceed-
ings are concerned, publication remains at the individual discretion of the parties, 
i.e., absent an agreement to refrain from disclosure, they may unilaterally do so.75 
Given that the rules are silent on this issue, the unilateral release of such information 
had been subject of a request for provisional measures, however, the Tribunal re-
fused to recommend provisional measures barring the public discussion of the pen-
ding case by the investor.76 Very recently, however, for the first time in ICSID his-
tory, both parties of a case consented to the publication of their pleadings by the 
ICSID Secretariat.77 Finally, as to the keeping of minutes of all hearings, the current 
version of the Administrative Regulations clarifies that the Secretary-General may 
only arrange for publication if both parties consent.78 
5. Conclusion 
Notwithstanding some policies supporting transparency, notably in terms of registra-
tion of disputes and publication of at least legal excerpts of awards, confidentiality 
and privacy notions stemming from its conceptual origins in commercial arbitration 
have dominated state-investor dispute settlement administered by ICSID. This holds 
 
72  See, for instance, AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award, 27 June 1990, 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991); AMT v. 
Zaire, Award, 21 February 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1531 (1997); Fedax v. Venezuela, Decision on Ju-
risdiction, 11 July 1997, Award, 9 March 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1378, 1391 (1998). 
73  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 182 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
74  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, Art. 48 mn. 105 (2001). 
75  Id., MN 107-111. 
76  C. Amco v. Indonesia, Decision on Preliminary Measures, 9 December 1983, 1 ICSID Reports 
410. 
77  See ICSID, Documentation Regarding ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, Malaysian Historical 
Salvors v. Malaysia, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/caseARB-05-10.htm. 
78  ICSID Administrative Regulations, supra note 40, Regulation 22 (2) c). 
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particularly true as regards third party participation, which had not been envisioned 
by the normative ICSID framework at all. Considering the public policy implica-
tions of cases before mixed tribunals, this was a questionable state of affairs. Fur-
thermore, it was also out of line with some of the more recent NAFTA cases brought 
under UNCITRAL rules and the underlying policy choices by the respective 
NAFTA member states which put an emphasis on transparency and third party par-
ticipation.79 Against this background, the fact that recently the Tribunals in Aguas 
Provinciales and Aguas Argentinas ruled they were competent to accept amicus 
curiae briefs even though one party opposed this step is all the more remarkable. As 
each award is only binding inter partes and cannot function as binding precedent on 
future Tribunals, however, Aguas Provinciales and Aguas Argentinas did not miti-
gate the general need for discussing potential reforms of the normative framework as 
such. 
II. The ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposals 
1. Discussion Paper 
This need for discussion has also been recognized by the ICSID Secretariat: Reflect-
ing on the practice of ICSID and responding to proposals made and concerns voiced 
by different parties, the ICSID Secretariat in 2004 issued a discussion paper on 
“Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration.”80 In addition to 
topics such as interim relief, an increased role for mediation and the possible crea-
tion of an appeals facility, transparency and third party access to ICSID arbitral 
proceedings were raised as potential areas of improvement.81 The ICSID Secretariat 
recognized that even though at least the key legal holdings of awards were eventu-
ally published under the then existing framework, requiring party consent for publi-
cation of the full award raises the issue of timeliness – oftentimes, several months 
pass before the Secretariat obtains consent of both parties.82 Thus, speedy publica-
tion of the legal excerpts is all the more important. It therefore proposed to make 
timely publication of excerpts by the Secretariat mandatory.83 Contrasting previous 
ICSID practice with the NAFTA cases mentioned above, the Secretariat moreover 
suggested amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 to clarify that – and 
under what conditions – panels have the authority to accept third party submissions 
 
79  See NAFTA Free Trade Commission Joint Statement on the Decade of achievement, supra 
note 36. 
80  ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discus-
sion Paper, 22 October 2004, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/ Discus-
sionPaper.pdf. 
81  Cf. id., at para. 6.  
82  Id., at para. 12. 
83  Id. 
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from, for instance, civil society organization, business groups, or other States parties 
to investment treaties concerned.84  
2. Working Paper 
Having received feedback from the members of the Administrative Council as well 
as from business and civil society groups, arbitration experts and institutions, the 
Secretariat finally in May 2005 presented a working paper including detailed sug-
gestions how to amend the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 and Administrative Regu-
lations.85 Amending the rules and regulations only requires a majority of two-thirds 
of the members of the Administrative Council.86 Although the proposals regarding 
access of third parties to the proceedings in particular elicited some disagreement, 
reactions to the preceding discussion paper had been generally positive.87 Hence, it 
seemed most of the amendments suggested had a realistic chance to be realized. 
a) Publication of Legal Excerpts 
As far as transparency-related amendments are concerned, the ICSID Secretariat 
first of all suggested clarifying the wording of Rule 48 (4) ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003 to read: “The Centre shall, however, promptly include in its publications ex-
cerpts of the legal conclusions of the Tribunal.”88 Hence, this change aimed at intro-
ducing the qualifier “promptly” in the rule and making publication mandatory, 
thereby guaranteeing early release of such excerpts. A similar rule regarding the 
publication of full awards, however, is barred by Art. 48 (5) of the Convention and 
would thus require the unanimous decision of all contracting parties to amend the 
Convention.89 This seems rather unlikely – in its discussion paper, the ICSID Secre-
tariat itself noted that obtaining “unanimous ratification for an amendment by the 
140 Contracting States would at best be a very long process.”90 Because it is applic-
able to arbitrations not governed by the Convention, however, a different situation 
 
84  Id., at para. 13. 
85  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf. 
86  See Art. 6 (1) of the Convention. 
87  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf, 
para. 6. 
88  Id., 9. The corresponding art. 53 (3) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was to be changed 
accordingly. 
89  See Art. 66 (1) of the Convention. 
90  ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discus-
sion Paper, 22 October 2004, para. 3, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/ high-
lights/DiscussionPaper.pdf. 
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arises with respect to Rule 53 (3) ICSID Additional Facility Rules 2003, which 
could very well be amended to indicate that, in cases of investment arbitration, 
awards shall be published by ICSID unless the parties agree otherwise.91 
b) Access to Proceedings 
In contrast to those pertaining to the publication of excerpts by the ICSID Secre-
tariat, the proposed changes with regard to third party access to proceedings were 
more fundamental and the most controversial, for they would have drastically im-
pacted the traditionally prominent role of party consensus in questions of proce-
dure.92 According to suggested amendments of Rule 32 ICSID Arbitration Rules 
2003, allowing third parties to attend or observe parts or all of the hearings would 
have become a discretionary competence of the Tribunal.93 While it would have had 
to consult “as far as possible” with the Secretary and the parties before exercising 
this competence, the final decision would have been vested with the Tribunal, which 
also would have had to establish appropriate procedures.94 Moreover, the proposal 
undertook to fill the lacunae described above regarding amicus curiae submissions 
by amending Rule 37 ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003.95 Analogous to the suggested 
competence as regards passive access, a new paragraph explicitly empowered the 
Tribunal to allow, “after consulting both parties as far as possible,” third parties to 
file written submission with the tribunal. In accordance with the legal reasoning 
sketched above, the Secretariat described these latter amendments as clarification 
rather than as an expansion of the Tribunal’s competences.96 The proposed amend-
ment obligated the Tribunal to consider, among other things, the extent to which (1) 
a potential third party’s new insight, perspective or particular knowledge would aid 
the Tribunal in the determination of factual or legal issues; (2) the third party would 
address a matter within the scope of the dispute; and (3) the third party has a “sig-
nificant interest in the proceedings.”97 Finally, the Tribunal would have to ensure 
 
91  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev., 1521, 1602 (2005). 
92  It is thus not entirely surprising that this part of the proposal has been “watered down” to 
safeguard a de facto veto of either party. See infra, part III.; cf. also Vis-Dunbar/Peterson,    
ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitration process, IISD Invest-
ment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/I 
tn_mar29_ 2006.pdf. 
93  ICSID Secretariat, Suggested Changes to the ICSID Rules and Regulations, Working Paper, 12 
May 2005, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/052405-sgmanual.pdf, 10. 
The corresponding Art. 39 (2) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules was to be changed ac-
cordingly.  
94  Id. 
95  Id., 11. Similar changes were suggested for ICSID Additional Facility Rules Art. 41. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
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that the submission would neither disrupt the proceedings nor unduly burden either 
party.98 
III. The New ICSID Arbitration Rules 
On 5 April 2006, ICSID issued a press release informing the public that voting by 
the members of the Administrative Council on “the amendments recently proposed 
by the Secretariat” had been concluded and that changes were expected to come into 
effect on 10 April 2006.99 It is worth mentioning, however, that the final proposal 
actually voted upon differed in some key aspects from the previous versions of sug-
gested reforms which had been tendered for public comment and that have been 
summarized above.100 As a matter of fact, while voting on the amended proposals 
took place in late 2005 and early 2006, the text being voted upon was not released to 
the public at that time and has only recently been leaked – a few days before the 
official release of the adopted amendments.101 In the context of changes intended to 
create a more transparent framework for improving the legitimacy and acceptance of 
the investor-state arbitration process, this may strike one as rather ironic. 
Be that as it may, as far as substantive changes to the original ICSID Secretariat 
Draft Proposal are concerned, most notably the possibility for Tribunals to open up 
proceedings at their own discretion has been watered down significantly: Instead of 
leaving the decision after consulting “with the parties as far as possible” with the 
Tribunal, ICSID Arbitration Rule 32 (2) now features an introductory “Unless either 
party objects”-qualifier.102 Therefore, parties still enjoy a de facto veto right, and 
accordingly, some commentators have already stated that this change between the 
old rules and the newly adopted ones was “hardly a big difference.”103 Indeed, the 
only difference seems to be that while before open hearings could only be instituted 
in case of an explicit consensus of the parties, it is now the absence of a veto that 
suffices, i.e., one could view the new system as one of an implicit “tacit consent” 
presumption. Nevertheless, effective party control of the privacy of hearings has 
been preserved by the member governments. 
 
98  Id. 
99  See ICSID News Release, Amendments to the ICSID Rules and Regulations (5 April 2006), 
available at: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/03-04-06.htm. 
100  See Vis-Dunbar/Peterson, ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process, IISD Investment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: http://www 
.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mar29_2006.pdf. 
101  Id. 
102  ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rule 32 (2), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/basic 
en.htm. 
103  See Vis-Dunbar/Peterson, ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process, IISD Investment Treaty Breaking News, 29 March 2006, available at: 
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_mar29_2006.pdf, quoting Schreuer. 
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With the exception of the nixed competence of the Tribunal to grant passive ac-
cess even in case of party opposition, however, the other changes with transparency 
implications originally proposed the ICSID secretariat have been adopted. That is to 
say, the modification regarding the mandatory and prompt publication of legal ex-
cerpts by the ICSID Secretariat as well as the clarification that Tribunals may accept 
amicus curiae submission where deemed appropriate have been approved and came 
into effect on 10 April 2006.104 
IV. Conclusion 
In sum, the adopted amendments corroborate the reasoning employed by the Aguas 
Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales Tribunals as far as amicus curiae submissions 
are concerned. The additional changes originally proposed by the ICSID Secretariat 
would have further parlayed the role of transparency by leaving the new possibility 
to open up hearings, even in the face of opposition by the parties, at the discretion of 
the Tribunal. This being said, it should not be forgotten that with a view to Art. 44 of 
the Convention, the parties always remain free to agree on different rules which 
should govern the arbitration. In other words, if both parties would have agreed 
beforehand to exclude third parties from the hearings as well as from submitting 
briefs, a Tribunal could not have referred to the proposed amendments in the ICSID 
Arbitration Rules and decide otherwise. This caveat notwithstanding, the suggested 
changes nevertheless would have had a significant impact, for unlike under the old 
as well as under the newly adopted rules, consensus of both parties would have been 
necessary to have closed hearings – a polar opposite to the hitherto existing situation 
and quite likely the reason why member governments (for now) declined to actually 
adopt this change and instead opted to preserve an effective veto right. 
D. Perspectives and Limits of Transparency 
When looking at the most recent versions of prominent national model BITs, disclo-
sure policies applied by NAFTA countries, and recent practice of investor-state 
arbitration Tribunals as summarized above, one could conclude that there currently 
is a general trend towards transparency in international investment arbitration.105 
The amendments originally suggested by ICSID Secretariat and, at least partially, 
the changes actually adopted pick up on this trend. Some interested parties, how-
ever, oppose these developments for a number of reasons, inter alia because they are 
 
104  Cf. ICSID Arbitration Rules, Rules 48 (4) and 37 (2), available at: http://worldbank.org/icsid/ 
basicdoc/basic-en.htm. 
105  Legum, Trends and Challenges in Investor-State Arbitration, 19 Arbitration International 143, 
144 (2003). 
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perceived as unduly interfering with the principle that party consensus forms the 
basis of arbitration proceedings.106 In the following, I will thus weigh potential bene-
fits and problems of increasing transparency and third party participation in inves-
tor-state arbitration and assess in how far the proposed and adopted ICSID Arbitra-
tion Rules respectively represent a good compromise between the competing inte-
rests. 
I. Benefits of Transparency and Third Party Participation 
1. Knowledge, Expertise and Coherence 
Dating back as a concept to Roman times,107 the classical reason for allowing non-
disputant parties to file amicus curiae briefs is to inform the court about additional 
aspects of a case which are important, but have not been reflected in the parties’ own 
submissions – be it because they lacked the necessary expertise,108 be it because as a 
party, their individual interest in the outcome of the case did not accommodate rami-
fications of a claim that concern “the public interest,”109 be it because they delibe-
rately chose to.110 Therefore, third party participation is primarily deemed to in-
crease the information available to a tribunal, thereby leading to a better informed 
and thus ideally better quality decision.111 Against this background, common law 
systems embracing the concept of amicus curiae have traditionally restricted third 
 
106  See South Centre, Developments on Discussions for the Improvement of the Framework of for 
ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries, South Centre Analytical 
Note, para. 41, available at: http://www.southcentre.org/tadp_webpage/research_papers/invest 
ment_project/icsid_discpaper_feb05.doc.   
107  See Angell, The Amicus Curiae Brief: American Development of English Institutions, 16 Int’l 
Comp. L.Q. 1017 (1967). 
108  Due to the increasing complexity of scientific risk assessment, the tension between risk regula-
tion and investment treaty disciplines might be an area in which governments could indeed 
lack the degree of expertise highly specialized NGOs or individual experts can provide. In a 
similar vein, disputes in the realm of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have been heavily 
influenced by party submissions which included studies provided by NGOs and academics, 
Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Sug-
gestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817, 836 (1998). 
109 Gruner, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l 
L. 923, 956 (2003). 
110  For instance, in the context of investor-state arbitration, general political considerations or the 
fear to create unfavorable precedent undermining the government’s position in another pending 
case might keep parties from including certain aspects of a case in their pleadings, cf. in the 
context of amicus curiae participation in the WTO, Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel 
and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Suggestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 
817, 836-837 (1998). 
111  Cf. regarding the WTO, Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organisations in the 
World Trade Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 331, 351 (1996). 
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party submissions to a strictly informative, as opposed to a more advocating role – a 
“friend” is not a party.112  
Transparency has another important “knowledge” dimension: It is only with 
awards being published that the knowledge of legal interpretations of clauses typi-
cally contained in investment treaties leaves the confines of a secretive “network of 
law firms” involved in these proceedings.113 General access to awards thus levels the 
playing field and provides every potential party and their legal counsel with a wider 
array of jurisprudence to litigate with.114 Furthermore, a closely related positive 
effect of transparency provided by published awards lays in its contribution to a 
more coherent formulation of international investment law: Even though commenta-
tors have cautioned to limit expectations about outcome predictability and empha-
sized the peculiar nature of state-investor arbitration, which features highly fact 
dependent doctrines and can thus produce different results in seemingly similar 
cases,115 it can hardly be denied that insofar it is possible, both parties and tribunals 
regularly refer to the legal reasoning employed by prior tribunals. Thus, notwith-
standing the fact that arbitration awards strictly speaking cannot create binding 
precedent,116 publishing the legal reasoning and application of relevant doctrines in 
awards nevertheless fosters at least a certain degree of predictability and coherence 
as far as the interpretation of similar obligations contained in investment protection 
instruments is concerned.117 
This is a very welcome development, not only because it aids tribunals them-
selves to consider more fully the legal issues at hand and to, as the case may be, 
issue a rational distinction based on reasoned opinions.118 Just as importantly, the 
resulting predictability is vital for the effective functioning of the respective invest-
ment treaties, which are geared towards “increasing substantially investment oppor-
 
112  Regarding this distinction and the different schools of thought in US jurisprudence, see gene-
rally Ford, What are „Friends“ for ? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting Amici would 
help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade 
Am. 207, 236-240 (2005).  
113  Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Paper delivered at ASA Swiss 
Arbitration Association Conference on Investment Treaties and Arbitration in Zurich (25 Janu-
ary 2002), reprinted in 1 Transnat’l Dispute Management (2004), available at: http://www. 
transnational-dispute-management.com/. 
114  Id. 
115 Coe, Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes -- A Preliminary 
Sketch, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 7, 21-22 (2005). 
116  An award is binding only on the parties to the dispute and does not give rise to stare decisis 
precedent regarding the interpretation of a given clause or rule. This principle has also been 
stressed by the tribunal interpreting Art. 15 (1) UNCITRAL Rules in Methanex, see Methanex, 
supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici 
Curiae,” 15 January 2001, para. 51. 
117 Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521, 1524, 1616-1617 
(2005). 
118  Id., 1616. 
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tunities in the territories of the parties” by “ensuring a predictable commercial 
framework for business planning and investment.”119 
2. Legitimacy and Good Governance 
While informing tribunals, counsels, parties and scholars as demonstrated is an im-
portant facet of transparency and third party participation, their public and scholarly 
discussion alike mostly center around the more prominent notions of democratic 
legitimacy, the “public interest” and good governance.120 In fact, transparency has 
even been labeled “the most basic of good governance principles.”121 Why is this – 
and what does it mean for investment dispute settlement within the ICSID frame-
work? 
It is almost a truism by now that investor-state arbitration has the potential to sig-
nificantly affect the “public interest.”122 This is not merely the case because one of 
the parties is a state,123 however, it is due to the fact that the subject matter of many 
investment disputes impacts on the provision and costs of “public” services such as 
water, waste management, electricity or gas124 or touches on the legality of domestic 
regulatory actions in sensitive fields such as environmental protection125 and emer-
 
119  The quotes are taken from NAFTA’s art. 102 para. 1 and preamble respectively, the underlying 
telos, however, is representative of any investment protection agreement. As to the economic 
investment incentives created by transparency, see generally Zoellner, Transparency. An 
Analysis of an Evolving Fundamental Principle of International Economic Law, part II.B.1, 27 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 579, 587 (2006). 
120  In this respect, see the often cited article by DePalma, NAFTA’s Powerful Little Secret: Ob-
scure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. Times, 11 March 2001, Sec-
tion 3, 1; cf. also Ford, What are „Friends“ for ? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting 
Amici would help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. 
J. L. & Trade Am. 207, 209-211 (2005); Soloway, NAFTA's Chapter 11 - The Challenge of 
Private Party Participation, 16 J. Int'l Arb. 8, 10 (1999); Gurudevan, An Evaluation of Current 
Legitimacy-based Objections to NAFTA's Chapter 11 Investment Dispute Resolution Process, 
6 San Diego Int'l L.J. 399, 425-427 (2005) with further references. 
121 Mann/Cosbey et al., Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
8, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_response .pdf. 
122  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 220 (2001). 
123  Methanex Corp. v. U.S., Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene 
as “Amici Curiae,” para. 49 (Jan. 15, 2001), available at: www.investmentclaims.com. 
124  Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 197 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
125 Hodges, Where the Grass is Always Greener: Foreign Investor Actions Against Environmental 
Regulations Under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, 14 Geo. Int’l L. Rev. 367, 385 (2001); cf. also 
Wälde/Dow, Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment, 34(2) J. World Trade 
1, 17 (2000), generally discussing criticisms regarding binding international arbitration under-
mining domestic political processes and regulatory autonomy. 
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gency measures in times of severe economic plight.126 Accordingly, these public 
interest implications create the need for public knowledge and, assuming that there 
was a general duty of confidentiality in arbitration, arguably for a public interest 
exception in investment dispute settlement cases.127 By opening up proceedings to 
the public, publishing awards and allowing civil society’s input by means of amicus 
curiae submissions, stakeholders will be more comfortable that their interests are 
being judged fairly and effectively.128 Consequently, legitimacy and acceptance of 
binding investment arbitration processes, which offer claimants a uniquely strong 
“sword” compared to other international law instruments, will benefit.129 
In terms of legitimacy and good governance, however, we should not focus too 
narrowly on the facilities and institutions of investor-state arbitration. To the con-
trary, from a good governance perspective, the legitimacy of involved governments 
depends at least as much on increased transparency in state-investor arbitrations as 
can be said with regard to the public acceptance of dispute settlement proceedings 
and Tribunals: As a prerequisite for accountability, transparency enables citizens to 
control the actions of their governments.130 In the context of state-investor arbitra-
tion, this is significant for a number of reasons. For one, and most importantly, the 
public policy ramifications sketched above require from a democratic point of view 
that the position taken and the legal arguments made by governments in these pro-
 
126  Regarding the most notorious example of Argentina’s pesification measures and resulting 
implications for ICSID arbitration and international investment law, see the contribution in this 
volume by Szodruch, State Insolvency – Consequences and Obligations under Investment 
Treaties; Tietje, Die Argentinien-Krise aus rechtlicher Sicht: Staatsanleihen und Staateninsol-
venz, 37 Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht 13-16 (2005). 
127  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 221 (2001). 
128 Clark, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 32 
Int’l Law. 851, 852 (1998). 
129  Regarding the connection between transparency and acceptance of investment arbitration, see 
Methanex, supra note 53, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Inter-
vene as “amici curiae”, 15 January 2001, para. 49. Concerning the perception that investment 
treaties and awards have moved from providing a “protective shield” against government over-
reaching to granting investors a “sword” to cut into domestic public protection laws, see  
Jones, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Arbitration Dispute Resolution: A Shield to Be 
Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared? 2002 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 527, 528 (2002).   
130  As to the relation between information provided by transparency and accountability, see gene-
rally Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration: Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Ar-
bitration, 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 279, 289 (2004); Delbrück, Diskussionsbeitrag zum Ref-
erat Hilf, 40 Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht 386, 387 (2003); Bluemel, 
Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance, 31 Brooklyn J. Int'l 
L. 139, 144 (2005); Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in: Democracy, Ac-
countability, and Representation 329, 335 (Przeworski et al. eds., 1999). 
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ceedings be available to the electorate.131 Thereby, a control mechanism as regards 
the negotiation, conclusion, administration and concrete effects of investment trea-
ties is established; ideally, the populace can respond to unwelcome developments at 
the voting booth. The vast potential effects investment disputes can have on the 
public purse bolster the need for accountability in this respect.132 
More specifically, transparency in arbitration proceedings can prevent capture 
and successful rent-seeking by special interests and functions to reveal a govern-
ment’s responsiveness to genuine domestic preferences and democratic majorities.133 
As a matter of fact, the “filter function” governments traditionally assumed in inter-
national economic law,134 i.e., the denial of amicus curiae submissions and direct 
third party participation in favor of “indirect” representation via government sub-
missions necessarily mandates that domestic interest groups have the possibility to 
check whether their concerns are adequately reflected in government submissions. 
II. Costs and Potential Problems of Increased Transparency and Third Party Partici-
pation 
Having seen the benefits transparency and third party participation have to offer, I 
will now turn to costs and potential problems associated with increasing the open-
ness of investment dispute settlement proceedings. 
First of all, it should be noted that the very concept of transparency is one that is 
nowadays common to many western countries, but not necessarily rooted in other 
societies.135 In a similar vein, the concept of amicus curiae is generally well-known 
 
131  Keohane, quoted after Bluemel, supra note 131, 144: “Accountability refers to relationships in 
which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their pro-
posed or past behavior, to discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event 
that they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.” 
132  Fracassi, NAFTA Chapter 11: Confidentiality and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 Chi. J. 
Int'l L. 213, 220 (2001). 
133  For a lucid discussion of the interconnectedness of transparency, accountability and the prob-
lem of capture using cost-benefit analysis, see Hahn/Tetlock, Using Information Markets to 
Improve Public Decision Making, 29 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 213, 264 (2005). 
134  Debevoise, Access to Documents and Panel and Appellate Body Sessions: Practice and Sug-
gestions for Greater Transparency, 32 Int’l L. 817, 836 (1998); Ullrich, No Need for Secrecy?, 
34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55, 59-60 (2000). 
135  Morrisson, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 
32 Int’l Law. 851, 860 (1998). For a critical account of the WTO transparency disciplines and 
their impact on developing states’ systems of governance, see also Wolfe, Regulatory Trans-
parency, Developing Countries, and the Fate of the WTO (March 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/wolfe.pdf. 
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to common law systems, but rarely found in the civil law legal tradition.136 There-
fore, increased transparency and amicus curiae briefs could have disparate impacts 
on parties with different legal backgrounds and, accordingly, different levels of 
experience in dealing with such briefs – a possibility that has caused some fear of 
unduly overburdening one party and thus interfering with a neutral and fair pro-
cess.137 
Worries about an undue burden are usually accompanied by the expectation that 
opening up the proceedings would likewise open up “floodgates” and cause uncon-
trollable numbers of submissions.138 Given the limited financial resources particu-
larly developing countries have at their disposal, there is some concern about their 
capacity to respond properly to a high number of amicus curiae submissions.139 
According to some commentators, this potential inequality is further aggravated by 
the difference in funding and experience as far as civil society and business groups 
in the industrialized world on the one hand, in developing countries on the other are 
concerned.140 
In any event, to effectively manage potentially high numbers of amicus curiae 
submissions, conditions as to which third parties may file under what circumstances 
need to be established. While the traditionally informative role of amici curiae and 
their legitimizing function in arbitration proceedings implicating the public interest 
have been elaborated upon above, however, now a number of questions about their 
own legitimacy arise:  If the traditional filter function of an elected government is 
abandoned in favor of direct submissions by interested groups, what does this mean 
in terms of democratic representation of the majority’s will in a given country? How 
are such groups, many of which are not exactly characterized by internal transpa-
rency or democratic structures themselves, legitimized, given that they are not ac-
countable to a constituency?  Therefore, it could be argued that increasing transpa-
rency and allowing amicus curiae submissions opens the door for well-organized, 
vested interests to bypass the domestic decision making and lobbying process, ma-
king capture actually more instead of less likely.141 Distinguishing between groups 
 
136  With respect to amicus curiae submissions in the context of NAFTA, Mexico opposed al-
lowing submissions because this would import a concept known to U.S. and Canadian parties, 
whereas Mexico, as a civil law state, had no experience in this regard. See Methanex, supra 
note 53, para. 9. 
137  To counter such fears, tribunals ruling on their powers to accept amicus curiae submissions 
have emphasized the need to establish procedures safeguarding parties’ equal rights. See for 
instance Aguas Argentinas, supra note 49, para. 29; Methanex, supra note 53, paras. 35 et seq.  
138  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 37, refers to the recent case Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3), in which over 300 interested parties petitioned for the right to in-
tervene, attend hearings, and receive full public disclosure of all evidence and pleadings. Cf. 
also Carmody, Beyond the Proposals: Public Participation in International Economic Law, 15 
Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1321, 1346 (2000), arguing that “evidence does not suggest that the 
floodgates have opened to date.”  
139  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 37. 
140  Id. 
141  Ullrich, No Need for Secrecy?, 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 55, 77 (2000). 
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which may legitimately file in a given case and those which may not, however, 
could prove rather difficult, burdensome and expensive.142 In addition, one might 
point out that in private law disputes in many legal systems, amicus curiae briefs 
submitted by government agencies or organs are considered to give a voice to the 
public and deemed to address ramifications of a claim that go beyond the effects on 
the individual parties – that is to say, the very involvement of the government as 
such represents the “public interest.”143 From this angle, allowing third parties to 
address public interest issues in state-investor arbitration, where the government is 
necessarily already involved, might seem superfluous. 
Finally, increasing transparency and allowing third party submissions represent a 
significant step in the process of judicilization of investment arbitration proceedings, 
i.e., moving it closer to “ordinary” litigation.144 This development robs arbitration of 
two of its perceived core strengths, confidentiality and privacy, and might give rise 
to concerns about reputation among both private claimants and states involved.145 
Moreover, from a game theoretic point of view, it may cause problems in terms of 
posture and efficiency losses.146 Accordingly, some commentators have already 
opined that due to this development, conciliation might be the preferable route to go 
in future investment disputes.147 
 
142  This were only different if instead of including a set of criteria in the ICSID Arbitration Rules 
or leaving it generally up to the respective Tribunal, a working system of self-regulation and 
pre-selection among civil society actors could be established. See thereto generally Re-
basti/Vierucci, A Legal Status for NGOs in Contemporary International Law?,7, available at: 
http://www.esil-sedi.org/english/pdf/VierucciRebasti.PDF. 
143  See, for instance, the U.S.  Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29 (a); cf. also Gruner, Ac-
counting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration, 41 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 923, 
956 (2003).   
144  Regarding this trend, see generally Leahy/Bianchi, supra note 5, 51-52. 
145  In the case of states, the potential loss of prestige could further be accompanied by political 
repercussions, see Böckstiegel, supra note 7, 584. It is here submitted, however, that this is but 
one consequence of democratic accountability and thus as such no valid reason to uphold con-
fidentiality in state-investor arbitration.  
146  Transparency provided by open proceedings may particularly affect the negotiation of com-
promises or „amicable settlements“ in the pre-hearing phase (see ICSID Arbitration Rule 21; 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, Schedule C Art. 29 (2)), for under public scrutiny, no party 
can afford to give in on their initial stand. Generally as regards game theoretic costs of trans-
parency associated with the “posture” problem, see Stavasage, Open-Door or Closed-Door? 
Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 International Organization 667, 
668 and passim (2004).  
147 Coe, Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary 
Sketch, 12 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 7, 23, 26-27 (2005). 
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III. Evaluation of the Proposal and the Adopted Changes – The Perspectives of  
Increased Transparency 
With a view to the possible costs and benefits of transparency and third party par-
ticipation, how should the latest developments in the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas 
Provinciales arbitrations, the ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and the actual 
amendments be evaluated? 
First of all, it is safe to assume that when the Contracting States signed the Con-
vention, thereby consenting to investor-state arbitration, they certainly did not fore-
see possible future amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules creating a prior 
consensus requirement regarding closed proceedings or Tribunals exercising discre-
tion as to whether admit amicus curiae submissions in spite of party opposition. As a 
matter of fact, even in the NAFTA context, where the US and Canada recently have 
been very active in promoting transparency, the third party to the treaty,  Mexico, 
has only recently and rather hesitatingly joined some of the newly adopted poli-
cies.148 In a similar vein, the ICSID Secretariat has been severely criticized for its 
initiative, for it were too political and bypassed the mandatory legal process for 
amending the Convention, a power which “rests with the political (sovereign) power 
of the Contracting States.”149 In this light, the developments represented by the  
ICSID Draft Proposal, by the adopted changes and by the Aguas Argentinas and 
Aguas Provinciales orders might indeed signal a possible changing of the tide as 
regards confidentiality and the consensus principle in investment dispute arbitration. 
This shift not only affects states, but it also concerns investors fearing loss of busi-
ness secrets and, more importantly, a negative impact on their reputation – it should 
be remembered that in Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales, it was the private 
claimant who opposed third party participation. In any event, against this back-
ground, the fact that the Secretariat considered some of its suggestions merely 
“clarifications” and Tribunals have based their powers to allow third party submis-
sions on interpretations of existing rules does not justify sweeping claims that this 
was a “phenomenon that has emerged with the consent of states, not in spite of 
them.”150 In my opinion, increasing transparency and opening up proceedings is a 
general trend which should not – and ultimately cannot – be stopped, even though 
member governments for now have refused to fully adopt all changes that were 
originally proposed.151 What is nevertheless worth remembering in this context, 
however, is that the whole system of investor-state arbitration, notwithstanding more 
and more elaborate rules, at the end of the day depends on  the good-faith applica-
tion of rules and on the willingness of states to actually enforce awards. It is only in 
 
148  See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Joint Statement on the Decade of Achievement (San 
Antonio, 16 July 2004), supra note 36.   
149  South Centre, supra note 107, paras. 16, 23-28.  
150 Hollis, Private Actors in Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Reten-
tion of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 235, 243 (2002). 
151  See supra, note 93. 
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this regard that a state’s “general and perpetual consent” to the system, its current 
evolution and potential future developments indeed remains vital.  
That being said, the reforms suggested were rather moderate and well-balanced, 
their only partial adoption is thus somewhat disappointing. Mandatory publication of 
excerpts containing the legal conclusions of a case obligates the Secretariat and will 
have positive effects on coherence and predictability without infringing on parties’ 
rights. The clarification that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae briefs is in line 
with the interpretation of the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales Tribunals 
and seems dogmatically accurate. Conceptually, it is not a radical proposal, but a 
challenging proposal: In order to safeguard efficient, fair and balanced proceedings, 
Tribunals will have to carefully evaluate which third party submissions to accept and 
whether to consider the information contained therein. Moreover, Tribunals need to 
be aware of resource and timing issues and find a balance between public interest 
and traditional party control.152 The indicated criteria are in my view adequate to 
ensure that neither parties nor the Tribunal are excessively burdened by the briefs 
and by and large conform with current practice of NAFTA tribunals operating under 
UNCITRAL rules, assigning a “quasi-expert” status to amici.153 By doing so, Tribu-
nals have acted very responsibly and limited third parties to an informative, “clas-
sic” amicus curiae role. This avoids some of the potential costs feared by opponents 
to third party participation, while preserving its benefits in cases with public interest 
implications. In contrast, a further-reaching “right” to have amicus curiae briefs 
considered or to even actively participate in pleadings, as sought and suggested by 
some commentators,154 should even de lege ferenda not be granted. A friend is a 
friend is a friend – and not a party. Nor is it plausible to assume that amici could not 
make their points effectively through written submissions.155 
As to the originally proposed right of the Tribunal to allow third parties to attend 
all or parts of the hearings, it may be argued that this would have been a more fun-
damental departure from traditional state-investor arbitration than the question of 
amicus curiae briefs. The fact that member government for the time being were not 
prepared to adopt such a measure would further support such a stand. Given the 
absolutely vital impact of such transparency on the legitimacy of the arbitration 
process and, in my eyes even more importantly, on the accountability of the go-
vernments involved, however, this development is – at least in the long run – un-
stoppable. In this respect, some of the arguments advanced against such openness, 
 
152  Cf. with regard to dispute settlement in the WTO Morrisson, Comment, in: Clark/Morrisson, 
Key Procedural Issue: Transparency, Comments, 32 Int’l Law. 851, 860 (1998). 
153 Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, in: International Investment Law and 
Arbitration 169, 198 (Weiler ed., 2005). 
154  See Ford, What are „Friends“ for? In NAFTA Chapter 11 Disputes, Accepting Amici would 
help lift the Curtain of Secrecy Surrounding Investor-State Arbitrations, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade 
Am. 207, 253 (2005). 
155  Howse, Kantor-Howse Exchange Regarding Restrictions on Public Access to ICSID Arbitra-
tions, available at: http://gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/article_57.htm. 
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such as possible detrimental effects on foreign investment if the defense brought 
forward by states was exposed to public scrutiny,156 are quite telling and by them-
selves evidence enough that more openness is called for. As a matter of fact, it is 
debatable whether instead of opening the proceedings to additional groups of people, 
there should be a general presumption of open hearings.157 In a similar vein, amend-
ing the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and, albeit an unlikely scenario, the Con-
vention and ICSID Arbitration Rules to provide for the mandatory publication of 
complete awards would be a welcome development.  
Taking everything into account, most, if not all, potential costs of increased trans-
parency can be avoided if Tribunals carefully exercise their discretion in the fields of 
transparency and third party participation. And, because the parties choose their 
arbitrators and trust them to rule on the substantive issues, there is no convincing 
reason why tribunals should be unfit to properly manage these procedural compe-
tence as well. 
E. Conclusion 
We have seen that third party participation and transparency are important notions in 
the field of state-investor arbitration, yet in practice have traditionally been limited. 
The recent amendments following the ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and the 
orders in the Aguas Argentinas and Aguas Provinciales arbitrations, however, indi-
cate an important change, which is in line a general development in investment dis-
pute settlement arbitration. To conclude our discussion of transparency and third 
party participation in ICSID proceedings, the following theses sum up the issues 
covered: 
Largely modeled after private commercial arbitration, rules governing state-
investor arbitration have traditionally provided very little mandatory transparency 
and virtually no opportunities for third party participation. Consequently, increasing 
transparency and allowing third party input has been at the discretion of the parties, 
often requiring consensus. Insofar, the rules established by the Convention and the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules 2003 are more or less typical examples. 
While it is debatable whether there really is a general and absolute confidentiality 
principle in commercial arbitration, keeping these proceedings and their outcome 
private does generally not encounter serious concerns with regard to public interest 
implications or democratic legitimacy. As far as state-investor arbitration is con-
cerned, however, the often highly sensitive subject matter covered and possible 
 
156  South Centre, supra note 107, para. 43.  
157  Mann/Cosbey et al., Comments on ICSID Discussion Paper “Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 
10-11, available at: http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_icsid_ response.pdf. 
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wide-reaching ramifications of a case that go beyond the effects on the respective 
parties draw a different picture. 
As a prerequisite for accountability, transparency is vital in ensuring the accep-
tance and democratic legitimacy of investment arbitration and the governments 
involved. Furthermore, it also fosters coherence in the emerging body of interna-
tional investment law and functions as predictability-enhancing incentive for foreign 
direct investment. Amicus curiae briefs can offer unique perspectives, provide tribu-
nals with additional expertise, and mirror civil society’s take on issues bearing on 
the public interest. 
Given both the public pressure for reform and the sketched benefits of transpa-
rency, the NAFTA parties have attempted to radically overhaul existing confidenti-
ality rules and provide for more openness, thereby “judicializing” the arbitration 
process. This trend has been reflected in recent awards rendered under UNCITRAL 
rules. The ICSID Secretariat Draft Proposal and, to a slightly lesser extent, the 
changes actually adopted, pick up on this trend. 
The reforms are rather moderate, well-balanced and should be applauded. Manda-
tory publication of excerpts containing the legal conclusions of a case as well as the 
clarification that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae briefs if suitable are not radical 
proposals and do as such not unduly infringe parties’ rights. The originally proposed 
right of Tribunals to open proceedings, however, would have been more fundamen-
tal and would have constituted a necessary, highly important and welcomed step 
towards more accountability of governments involved. Therefore, even though the 
Administrative Council for now shied away from adopting this amendment, the 
necessary changes will only be postponed, not abolished.   
Most, if not all, potential costs of increased transparency can be avoided. In order 
to safeguard efficient, fair and balanced proceedings, tribunals will have to carefully 
evaluate which third party submissions to accept and whether to consider the infor-
mation contained therein. There is no reason not to trust their ability to do so. By 
contrast, a “right” to have amicus curiae briefs considered or to even actively par-
ticipate in pleadings should not be granted. 
In addition to the necessity of introducing open hearings, amending the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules and, albeit an unlikely scenario, the Convention and   
ICSID Arbitration Rules to provide for the mandatory publication of complete 
awards would be a welcome development. 
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Transparency and Third-Party Participation in Investment Arbitration
                   
Comment by Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel∗ 
First of all, it should be noted that this Frankfurt Conference, so well organized by 
my colleague Rainer Hofmann, in spite of the many meetings now held worldwide 
on investment and particularly ICSID arbitration, by its program and also by the 
involvement of young brilliant researchers in addition to the “usual suspects”, con-
tributes efficiently to the many questions that still need comprehensive examination 
both academically and in practice. 
And further, it should be noted that the paper presented by Carl-Sebastian Zoell-
ner at this conference gives an insight and overview on information and discussion 
on the topic of transparency which has not been available so far and, therefore, will 
be very useful. This is so, irrespective of the fact that some in the field, including 
myself, may not agree with every conclusion he submits. 
I am afraid my own comments, given more or less spontaneously at the Confe-
rence on the basis of my own experience as an arbitrator in investment cases, will 
have to be short, because the task of putting them on paper for this publication falls 
into a time in which other commitments accepted long before, many due to my in-
vestment arbitration cases, leave little time. 
First of all, one has to recall that it is not by accident that arbitration, including in-
ternational arbitration, has traditionally been in camera. The rise of international 
arbitration to the present situation where it is at least internationally the by far most 
frequently accepted method of dispute settlement in international trade and invest-
ment has been and is only possible by agreement of prospective parties to contracts 
or treaties submitting to arbitration. One of the main reasons usually mentioned for 
this submission is the confidentiality of the proceedings. This is particularly so for 
commercial arbitration between private enterprises, but also for arbitration between 
states and private enterprises.  
In this context of course, one has to accept that states or state institutions or state 
enterprises may have additional political and/or legal responsibilities to give account 
of their contracts and disputes to the general public at large or at least to certain 
 
∗  Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel is Professor em. of International Business Law at University of Co-
logne; Chairman of the Board of the German Institution of Arbitration (DIS); recent President 
of the International Law Association (ILA); Hon. Vice-Pres. and former President of the 
LCIA; former President of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal, The Hague; former Panel 
Chairman of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC); member of the ICC Ar-
bitration Commission; arbitrator and  president of arbitration tribunal in many national and in-
ternational arbitrations of the ICC, ICSID, NAFTA, UNCITRAL, AAA, and others. 
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public administrative or legislative institutions. But, on the other hand, in most states 
such reporting duties are limited by law and practice, because one is aware that 
concluding and performing international contracts efficiently requires a certain de-
gree of trust and cooperation between the parties which is not fit to every step and 
decision being the object of public discussion and justification in what easily may 
become a political debate. Similar considerations prevail for arbitration, where the 
efficient representation of a party’s interests may be hindered by public and particu-
larly political discussions and where due process and the administration of justice 
call for a de-politicized process in the view of both the states and the private enter-
prises involved. 
There is no need to reiterate here the present status and the main considerations 
regarding transparency in international economic law and the development of the 
practice of ICSID and the recent discussion regarding ICSID proceedings well 
summarized by Zoellner. Indeed, in response to a respective invitation, I participated 
in that discussion on the future of ICSID by correspondence and in meetings in Lon-
don and Washington DC. For good reason, proposals for more transparency of IC-
SID proceedings were put forward and have been taken into account by ICSID Tri-
bunals and in the recent process of adopting amendments of various ICSID provi-
sions that came into effect on 10 April 2006. As Zoellner rightly indicates in the 
updated version of his paper, the changes are limited:  
• The new Rule 37(2) provides that Tribunals may accept amicus curiae submis-
sion.  
• The new Rule 32(2) authorizes the Tribunal to allow third persons into the hear-
ing “unless either party objects”, whereby the parties still enjoy a de facto veto 
right.  
• And finally, the new Rule 48(4) provides the mandatory and prompt publication 
of legal excerpts of awards by ICSID while the full publication of awards still 
remains subject to approval of the parties. 
 
But in the context of this rather limited opening in comparison to the former ver-
sion of the ICSID Rules, it should also be noticed that, in responding to much fur-
ther going options presented by the ICSID Secretariat, the replies from the member 
states showed considerable hesitation to go “all the way” into full transparency of 
ICSID proceedings and admitting third parties and particularly national and interna-
tional non-governmental organizations and interest groups to participate in case 
proceedings. 
My own personal experiences as an arbitrator in investment arbitrations are li-
mited in this regard and are obviously under the old version of the Rules. Over many 
years, there were no suggestions or attempts for more transparency or admission of 
third parties to proceedings in which I participated. 
When I chaired the first NAFTA investment arbitration in the Ethyl Case, which 
was between a US investor and the Government of Canada, Mexico made use of the 
opportunity expressly provided for in NAFTA Chapter 11 and did submit additional 
briefs which our Tribunal took into account. 
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In one of my ICSID cases some years ago, though ICSID, according to its usual 
practice, asked the Parties for approval to publish our award and did not receive it 
from both parties, counsel of one of the parties put our award on the website of its 
law firm and, since the award was now public knowledge, no further action or sanc-
tion was taken. 
In one of my other ICSID cases, since the case seemed to raise considerable pub-
lic and political attention in the host state being the respondent in the proceedings, a 
national television station in that country asked for permission to bring live coverage 
of our hearing in Washington DC to the public in the host country. Making use of 
the Tribunal’s discretion under (the old) ICSID Arbitration Rule 32, we decided that 
that provision seemed to imply an only limited attendance of hearings and that such 
a live coverage might change the character of pleadings and was not in the interest 
of an efficient procedure. Permit me to add that I also had difficulties imagining that 
a considerable television audience in a far away country would be interested to fol-
low the technicalities of pleadings, procedural discussion and cross examination in a 
foreign language, English, in Washington DC. 
In the same case, after the hearing in camera was concluded and the transcript of 
the hearing had been distributed to the Parties and the Tribunal, counsel of one of 
the parties put that transcript on the website of its law firm. When the other party 
objected, the Tribunal recommended to withdraw the publication from the website, 
and counsel complied with that recommendation. 
Turning to NAFTA, after considerable discussion on transparency, particularly in 
the United States, NAFTA Chapter 11 investment arbitrations have become more 
transparent in a number of ways. The best illustrations are perhaps the wide scope of 
respective publication made available on all NAFTA cases involving claims against 
the United States on the website of the US Department of State which discloses 
comprehensive information including full texts of procedural documents,as well as 
the website NAFTAClaims.com operated by Prof. Todd Grierson Weiler. 
On the other hand, one has to realize that, for decades, investment disputes have 
been and still are submitted to and decided under the rules of the well known institu-
tions for international commercial arbitration such as the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) and some-
times as well the rules of national arbitral institutions such as those of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC). In fact, of the hundreds of new international arbitra-
tion cases started every year at the ICC, regularly more than 10 % involve states as 
parties. In all of these, the traditional confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings is 
maintained and – as I know from the many of such cases in which I have served as 
an arbitrator – the Parties insist on that confidentiality. 
Zoellner repeats the distinction sometimes made that, in commercial arbitration, 
keeping the arbitral proceedings and their outcome private does generally not en-
counter serious concerns with regard to public interest implications or democratic 
legitimacy, while in state-investor arbitration, the often highly sensitive subject 
matter covered and possible wide-reaching ramifications of a case go beyond the 
effects on the respective parties. With all respect, from my experience, that distinc-
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tion often is not valid. There are ICSID cases which deal with investments of rela-
tively small importance for the respondent host state and small amounts in dispute, 
and commercial arbitration cases under the ICC and UNCITRAL Rules on major 
infrastructure construction, oil, nuclear and geothermal energy, telecommunication 
and similar investments of fundamental importance and high political attention in 
the host state for periods of up to 30 years and for amounts of several billion US-
Dollars in dispute. It is hard to say that transparency is important for the former and 
not for the latter.  
Thus, in conclusion, I submit that, on one hand, there are good reasons for more 
transparency in investment arbitration and more transparency has indeed been real-
ized in recent amendment of relevant provisions and practice. But on the other hand, 
one has to realize that many parties including state parties consider confidentiality of 
the arbitral proceedings as important to them and may decide not to submit to arbi-
tration rules that do not maintain that confidentiality. If we neglect such preferences 
of the parties, we may end up with transparent procedures satisfying understandable 
concerns, but not chosen by parties. 
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Opening the Investment Arbitration Process: At What Cost, for What 
Benefit?        
                    
Comment by Noah Rubins* 
A. Introduction 
I first became aware of the issue of “transparency” in investment arbitration in Feb-
ruary 2002, not long after the conclusion of hearings in Loewen v. United States, 
when renowned American journalist Bill Moyers broadcast a television documentary 
called “Trading Democracy.”1  In the program, Moyers attacked the very idea of 
investment arbitration as an “end run around democracy,” where “secret NAFTA 
Tribunals can force taxpayers to pay billions of dollars in lawsuits filed by corpora-
tions against the United States.”  The documentary focused in particular on the 
Loewen case, and expressed shock that “boutique” law firms (a group that expressly 
included the multinational firm of more than 2,000 lawyers to which I then be-
longed) were quietly challenging legitimate regulation and “local traditions” in the 
United States on the basis of “obscure” treaty provisions. 
Continued pressure from various quarters, particularly within the NGO commu-
nity, has given rise to a prolific discussion of the openness of investor-State arbitra-
tion proceedings.2  Practical developments, both at the institutional level and on the 
part of individual treaty-based tribunals, have led to a level of publicity unprece-
dented in the annals of international arbitration, including consistently published 
awards, hearings accessible to the public, and the submission of amicus curiae briefs 
from non-parties.  Despite the rapid change in this area, it appears that insufficient 
consideration has been given to the full scope of interests at stake in bringing so 
much light to the formerly somber recesses of extra-judicial dispute resolution, with 
a number of important issues simply taken for granted in the rush to protect the 
investment arbitration “system” from cries of foul from certain political forces and 
special interest groups. 
 
*  Noah Rubins, Attorney Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Paris. 
1  For a transcript of the program, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB65/transcript. 
html. 
2  See, e.g., Atik, Legitimacy,Ttransparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 11 
Process, NAFTA Investment Law and Arbitration 135 (Weiler, ed. 2004); Mistelis, Confiden-
tiality and third Party Participation: UPS v. Canada and Methanex Corp v. United States, In-
ternational Investment Law and Arbitration 169 (Weiler 2005); Teitelbaum, Privacy, Confiden-
tiality and Third Party Participation: Recent Developments in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitra-
tion, 2  The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 249 (2003). 
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Many of the proponents of increased public access and openness have relied ex-
tensively on the concept of “transparency.”  This is an understandable rhetorical 
approach: there is growing consensus among prestigious international institutions, 
and in particular the World Bank and OECD, that transparency is an essential ele-
ment of good governance, for corporations and States alike.  Transparency in the 
awarding of State contracts, for example, is understood to increase predictability and 
efficiency, reduce the incidence of corruption, and bring important benefits to the 
populations of developing States.  So cloaking arguments related to investment arbi-
tration procedure in the mantle of “transparency” promises a certain level of public 
support by analogy. But the adoption of “good governance” terminology cannot 
convert questions of dispute resolution procedure into questions of good gover-
nance.  The issues and interests at stake are very different, and therefore it is impor-
tant to use concepts appropriate to the task of objectively evaluating the need and 
modalities for additional openness in arbitral proceedings.   
There are three very distinct types of so-called arbitral “transparency,” each with 
its own characteristics, costs and benefits.  The first involves pre-award disclosure, 
allowing the public access to oral and written arbitration proceedings.  Pre-award 
disclosure has a number of aspects, from the publication of basic information about 
a dispute (already carried out systematically by ICSID with regard to the cases it 
administers), to circulation of pleadings and hearing transcripts (practiced until re-
cently only in NAFTA cases),3 to the ultimate pre-award openness, the right of the 
public to attend or observe oral hearings.  The second form of arbitral openness is 
post award disclosure, i.e. the publication of awards and other information about a 
dispute once the proceedings have drawn to a close.  The final type of “transpa-
rency,” the most extreme and controversial, involves privacy rather than disclosure.  
By privacy, I mean to refer to the word “privity,” the state of being a full-fledged 
participant in the dispute.  In practice, the issue of privacy has been expressed 
through the debate as to whether non-party entities might be permitted to make 
amicus curiae submissions to an investment arbitration tribunal.4 
Whether each of these three aspects of “transparency” (or “opacity,” as the case 
may be) presents a problem to be addressed on a systemic basis (to the extent one 
can presume that we are dealing with a unified “system” – more on that later) is a 
question that should be answered only after a serious cost/benefit analysis.  While 
the categories of cost and benefit are similar for each type of transparency, the mag-
nitude of cost and benefit appears to differ for each.  It is also important not to take 
for granted the different costs and benefits that accrue to the variety of different 
 
3  For a recent example of this form of pre-award disclosure in the ICSID context, see Malaysian 
Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10, http://www.     
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/caseARB-05-10.htm. 
4  Amicus curiae submissions have become a limited but integral part of litigation before the 
WTOs Appellate Body.  United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, WTO Appellate Body Report of 6 November 1998, paras. 105-
108. 
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stakeholders in and around the investment arbitration “system.”  It should be uncon-
troversial that costs and benefits inure differently to investor-claimants, respondent 
States, national constituencies within the host state, arbitral institutions, non-
governmental environmental protection organizations, etc. 
B. The Perceived Advantages to Openness 
The literature has identified three primary advantages to increased “transparency.”  
These perceived benefits should not be taken for granted, but should rather be 
viewed with a critical eye. 
I. Closing the Democracy Gap 
Closing the “democracy gap” is the benefit most discussed, and was the one empha-
sized in Bill Moyers’ television program, mentioned at the beginning of this paper.  
Investment treaty arbitration has adopted the structure and procedure of “private” 
commercial arbitration systems, with adjudication behind closed doors.  This may be 
appropriate in the private context, where business conflicts have little impact on 
third parties, and where the public disclosure of sensitive commercial information or 
trade secrets may unnecessarily harm the parties.  But in investor-State disputes, 
such secrecy is “un-democratic” (so goes the argument), because it can subject to 
critique the laws and regulations enacted by the duly-elected legislators or execu-
tives of the host State.  But this discussion raises the question as to how broad this 
democracy gap really is.  Is there not a range of activities related to democratic go-
vernance that are outside the public purview?  And perhaps more importantly, how 
is the challenge of a regulation in treaty arbitration different in terms of public inte-
rest and impact on third-party interests from the challenge in commercial arbitration 
of the State’s performance under a contract to buy public goods or services?5  If the 
transparency of arbitration is to depend simply on “public interest,” then separate 
rules will have to govern the process whenever a State is involved, not just in treaty 
cases. 
II. Painting the Full Picture 
A second often-cited benefit of arbitral “openness,” primarily in the context of per-
mitting amicus curiae submissions from non-parties, is that the arbitral tribunal will 
 
5  Indeed, the courts in Australia have curtailed the confidentiality of arbitration in commercial 
cases that substantially affect the “public interest.”  See Esso Australia Resources Ltd & Ors v 
Plowman (Minister for Energy) & Ors (1995) 128 ALR 321. 
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be better able fully to understand the dispute before it once it has received informa-
tion from sources other than the disputing parties.  The theory is that both the   
claimant and respondent State have strategic and political interests that limit the 
scope of information and argumentation they will provide to the arbitrators.  But 
while the parties to investment arbitration (and their counsel) are surely selective 
about the way they present their case, it stands to reason that each of them is best 
positioned to determine the optimal strategy to prevail.   
Given that amicus submissions are normally submitted in support of one of the 
parties (most frequently the respondent State), it would seem that an amicus brief 
offering information extraneous to the supported party’s submissions would threaten 
to undermine the very purpose for which it was created, interfering with the party’s 
strategy for victory.  Some observers contend that certain important information (the 
environmental impact of a measure or its absence, for example) is not at the disposal 
of the host State, or is ignored or discarded for reasons of bureaucratic capture.  But 
these problems would appear best addressed from within the host State by the aspi-
ring amicus.  NGOs often have effective avenues to present their views and data to 
governments where they operate, and to ensure that this information is included in 
submissions. 
It also stands to reason that the effectiveness of non-party submissions in pro-
viding a full picture of the dispute is largely a function of the wholesale opening of 
proceedings to public access.  It is difficult to imagine an amicus brief that effec-
tively fills the gaps in the parties’ submissions, unless the submitting party has had 
the opportunity to scrutinize the case record.  Therefore, in the absence of complete 
“transparency,” with all of the incumbent difficulties and costs to the parties, it is 
questionable whether amicus submissions will advance the tribunal’s analysis at all.6 
III. Harmonization of Jurisprudence 
The third primary benefit of transparency is the increased consistency of investment 
treaty jurisprudence.  The threat of inconsistent decisions came to prominence in the 
wake of the CME and Lauder awards,7 and has since found further impetus in other 
 
6  See Weiler, Restrictions on Submissions of Amicus Briefs to NAFTA investment Arbitral 
Tribunals, TDM, February 2004. 
7  CME Czech Republic, B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Partial Award of 13 September 
2003 (finding Czech Republic liable for damages under Netherlands-Czech BIT); Lauder v. 
Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Award of 3 September 2001 (finding Czech Republic not liable 
under U.S.-Czech BIT). On the conflicting decisions, see Bagner, How to Avoid Conflicting 
Awards: the Lauder and CME Cases, 5 J. World Inv. & Trade 31 (2004). 
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pairs of cases where seemingly similar facts led to different outcomes.8  Setting 
aside for the moment whether inconsistent decisions in investor-State arbitration 
pose a significant problem at all, it is questionable whether additional public access 
to arbitral documentation would in fact harmonize arbitration awards.  For the time 
being, all arbitrators are instructed to decide only the case before them, with due 
regard to the absence of any rule of stare decisis in relation to awards rendered in 
other disputes involving other parties.9  Until this fundamental rule changes, the 
increase of information about other tribunals and the basis on which they ruled 
should have little effect on the way tribunals adjudicate disputes.  Moreover, arbitra-
tors already have access to an unprecedented volume of prior decisions.  Nearly 
every ICSID decision is available to the public within weeks or even days after it is 
issued.  In the absence of binding precedent, is it really necessary or useful to ensure 
access to the voluminous submissions of the parties in prior disputes?10 
C. The Costs of Openness 
In addition to the limitations on the presumed benefits of arbitral openness described 
above, there are also potential costs that are insufficiently explored.     
I. Politicizing Investment Disputes 
Perhaps most important of these is the re-politicization of investment disputes.  
Investment treaties with direct recourse to arbitration were created precisely to 
eliminate the political element of economic disputes, which made outcomes unpre-
dictable and unprincipled. In the words of Horatio Grigera Naón: 
International dispute settlement mechanisms are expected to provide a le-
gal and technical - instead of a political - approach to the resolution of 
disputes regarding foreign investment.  By advancing the resolution of 
disputes through the furtherance of principles of justice rather than politi-
 
8  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 2003; SGS Société Générale de Surveillance 
S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 
January 2004. 
9  See, e.g., Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10, Decision 
on Jurisdiction of 17 June 2005, para. 36 (“The Tribunal wishes to emphasize that it has ren-
dered its decision independently, without considering itself bound by any other judgments or 
arbitral awards”). 
10  It is a separate and valid question whether investment arbitration jurisprudence is, on the 
whole, less consistent than other legal systems, and whether lingering conflicts between indi-
vidual case decisions are cause for serious concern.  For the affirmative answer on both points, 
see Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Inter-
national Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1521 (2005). 
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cal accommodation (which may, of course, be pursued in parallel by other 
means) private international dispute resolution devices provide a better 
technical and appropriately depoliticized framework for the development 
of substantive law and principles regarding foreign investment protection 
likely to enjoy wide international consensus.11 
The father of the ICSID Convention, Aron Broches, envisaged the investor-State 
dispute resolution system as way to create a more predictable and stable investment 
environment, and one in which disputes would be less likely to arise.12  Whereas 
prior dispute resolution practices, such as diplomatic espousal, economic sanctions, 
and even gunboat diplomacy gave the advantage to economically and militarily 
powerful States, the new system was intended to place all States on equal footing, 
and to allow dispute resolution to occur on the basis of principle.  Unfortunately, the 
litigation of disputes in conditions of complete publicity does not lend itself to such 
principled outcomes.  Where parties are free to present their case to the “court” of 
public opinion, the risk of abuse and re-politicization is great.  Of special concern is 
the possibility that claimant investors will relate an extreme and one-sided view of 
the facts underlying an investment dispute, imposing upon the respondent State the 
burden of criticism on a diplomatic level, immediate negative effects on external 
perceptions of its investment climate, pressure from international lenders, and other 
negative effects long before the parties’ positions are assessed by an arbitral tribu-
nal.  In the worst case, an investor-claimant may initiate arbitration precisely with 
these effects in mind, hoping to obtain “nuisance value” compensation through ex-
tensive publicity, without regard to the actual merits (or absence thereof) of its 
claim. 
A related and far from salubrious effect of re-politicization is the reduction of set-
tlement opportunities.  Since the foundation of ICSID, a large proportion of invest-
ment disputes have been resolved through amicable settlement before an award on 
the merits was rendered.  Such an outcome is clearly in the interests of all the pri-
mary stakeholders, both in terms of arbitration cost savings, the possibility of pre-
serving investment activities, and the elimination of any need to engage in enforce-
ment of an arbitral award.  But the early publication of extensive information about 
the merits of an investment dispute can result in the hardening of positions, particu-
larly that of the respondent State.  Government officials, particularly the mid-level 
bureaucrats who are typically charged with managing disputes with foreign inves-
tors, are subject to rather abstract pressures that can discourage settlement even in 
the most propitious circumstances. In a litigation proceeding, a result less than a 
total victory can be blamed on the arbitrator or judge, while the government official 
 
11   Grigera Naón, The Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Private Parties: An 
Overview from the Perspective of the ICC, 1 J. World Inv. 59-60 (2000). 
12  Broches, The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 
International Investment Disputes: Avoidance and Settlement 75, 77 (Rubin & Nelson, eds. 
1985). See also Shihata, Towards a greater Depoliticiztion of Investment Disuputes: The Roles 
of ICSID and MIGA, 30-32 (1993). 
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himself will have to take responsibility for any concessions included in a settlement 
agreement. This pressure is increased where public opinion has turned against the 
foreign investor, and therefore any compromise viewed as a betrayal of national 
interests.  Likewise, where the investor levels allegations of mismanagement, cor-
ruption, or arbitrary conduct against the State and its officials, settlement may be 
tantamount to political suicide, perceived as (at least partial) admission of the facts 
alleged.  It would seem that increased publicity (particularly one-sided and argumen-
tative) can only intensify these forces, which form a significant barrier to amicable 
settlement in investor-State disputes.  
II. Increased Time and Cost 
Increased openness of arbitral proceedings is bound to have some effect on the 
speed and cost-effectiveness of the dispute resolution process.  For less invasive 
types of “transparency,” such as post-award disclosure of awards and pleadings, the 
added cost is minimal, and delay non-existent by definition.  Other forms of public 
participation, in particular the submission and review of amicus curiae briefs, are of 
greater concern in this regard.  The review of amicus submissions requires arbitra-
tors first to determine whether a brief will be accepted at all, then a review of the 
submission once made, and finally an analysis of whether the contents of the sub-
mission should affect the tribunal’s decision.  Perhaps more significant still are the 
costs and time involved in the parties’ review and response to non-party submis-
sions.  The resulting costs and delays are multiplied if a third party is given the op-
portunity to reply to critiques of its opinion raised by the parties.   
Given the voluminous pleadings and massive legal costs already common in in-
vestment arbitration proceedings, and the burdens placed upon developing State 
respondents and small- to mid-sized corporate (or individual) claimants, even a 
modest increase in expense should be accepted only after careful consideration.  
Likewise, while speedy adjudication is hardly taken for granted in most investment 
arbitration cases, the delay caused by an additional round of briefing in response to 
amicus briefs could be significant. 
III. De-Harmonization of the Procedural “System” 
A final negative consequence of increased “transparency” that has received almost 
no attention is the introduction of additional heterogeneity into a procedural “sys-
tem” that has already drawn criticism for its lack of internal harmonization.  Manda-
tory public access to pleadings, awards, hearings, and the adjudicative process itself 
is generally accepted to require some adjustment to the treaty texts or procedural 
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rules governing investment arbitration.13  Whether this will mean fundamental 
change to the Washington Convention, the ICSID Rules, or widespread alteration of 
individual consent documents such as model BITs, remains to be seen.  Already 
certain modifications have been made to the ICSID Rules and, more drastically, to 
the U.S. Model BIT of 2004.   
As these changes are implemented, the variations in procedural rules will widen 
between, for example, arbitration under the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules, or pur-
suant to the BITs of the United States and the Netherlands.  As a result, claimants 
will gain an additional (and unintended) advantage from their unilateral power to 
select the dispute resolution method of their choice.  The risk of strategic behavior is 
particularly acute in light of recent jurisprudence granting “mailbox companies” 
access to BIT protections in certain circumstances.14  A claimant who stands to 
benefit from broad publicity (a U.S. company investing in a less-developed country 
dependent upon U.S. foreign aid, for example) might seek arbitration at ICSID un-
der the U.S. BIT, while a company preferring confidentiality (whether due to sensi-
tive business information or skeletons in the closet) might choose UNCITRAL arbi-
tration under a more traditional BIT through a corporate subsidiary of the appropri-
ate nationality. 
The result of this new facet of the “treaty shopping” problem is less predictability 
of both process and outcome.  To the extent that investment arbitration is meant to 
stabilize the investment climate and provide both investors and States a view of how 
disputes are likely to be resolved, such a development would appear negative. 
D. What Cost for Which Stakeholder? 
With these (and other) costs and benefits in mind, does the balance tip towards in-
creased openness, or the continued limitation of public access to investment arbitra-
tion?  The answer to this question is likely to differ for each stakeholder in the arbi-
tral process, and with respect to each of the three types of “transparency.”  This 
short presentation is not the place for a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of 
each permutation of stakeholders and publicity, and below I suggest only a few 
relevant thoughts for consideration in this regard. 
 
13  Naturally, the parties to a dispute are free to set the level of publicity for the adjudication of 
their dispute as they see fit.  Moreover, tribunals have ruled that the applicable procedural rules 
(UNCITRAL and ICSID) provide them the authority to take certain steps in the interest of 
“transparency,” should they deem such measures to be necessary and desirable.  Most obser-
vers supporting increased openness, however, appear to favor a more systematic and manda-
tory approach to the issue, with a default rule implemented supporting public disclosure and 
the review of amicus submissions. 
14  See, e.g., Plama v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 Febru-
ary 2005, para. 128 (under ECT, it is “irrelevant who owns or controls the Claimant at any ma-
terial time”). 
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The benefit of most concern to the public at large is clearly the closing of the 
much-touted “democracy gap.”  This defect is largely solved by post-award publica-
tion of decisions.  It is for this reason that the general population in the only host 
State to experience “real time” opening of hearings – the United States – has reacted 
with disinterest to more extensive access.  In the first investment arbitration with 
public hearings, for example, only four people attended.  At the same time, the pub-
lic bears very little of the direct cost associated with additional openness, except to 
the extent that pressure from publicity results in a disadvantageous settlement by 
their government.  Naturally, such an outcome leads (in theory, at least) to an alloca-
tion of tax receipts that could otherwise be used to provide public services.   
Non-governmental organizations, by contrast, glean only scant benefit from post-
award transparency, since they focus upon influencing the outcome of particular 
arbitral disputes in accordance with the particular interests that they represent.  
Moreover, the “democracy gap” is of little concern to many NGOs, which are pre-
cisely created to overcome the under-representation of certain interest groups within 
the structure of democratic decision-making.  NGOs do gain a significant benefit 
from pre-award publicity and the participation of non-parties in the arbitration pro-
cess, since it is they who most often submit amicus filings. 
For obvious reasons, investor-claimants gain only limited benefit from post-
award publicity, since their efforts are centered on victory in the case at hand.  
Moreover, investors do not stand to derive significant advantage from the accep-
tance of amicus submissions.  Most such filings are made on behalf of respondent 
States by non-governmental organizations, rather than by business groups.  As ex-
plained above, however, the possibility of broad publicity before an award is ren-
dered benefits claimants, in that the threat of disclosure can compel early settlement.  
The claimant bears little of the costs incurred as a result of this kind of transparency 
– most of which are carried by the respondent State.  Of course, the claimant will 
have to pay part of the price for transparency, to the extent it results in increased 
legal expenses or delay in the rendering of an award. 
Respondent States bear the brunt of the cost of increased pre-award publicity in 
investment arbitration.  As noted above, the publication of factual allegations can 
increase pressure on respondent States in a number of ways.  While accusations may 
run both ways, counterclaims are exceedingly rare in investment treaty arbitration.  
Therefore, it is primarily the respondent who will fear pre-award openness.  In this 
regard, the increased risk of procedural abuse through the imposition and publicity 
of frivolous or exaggerated claims is an important cost.  The respondent stands to 
benefit from the intervention of non-party actors, who tend to support the host-State 
position in their amicus submissions.  But it is not always clear that such filings are 
wholly welcome, as they may be seen to distract from the more central aspects of the 
respondent government’s defense. 
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E. Conclusion 
The concern with pre-award transparency (and amicus submissions, which is 
founded upon the former kind of public access) is that investment treaties were de-
vised to de-politicize investment disputes.  Both claimant and respondent can at-
tempt to use openness as a weapon contrary to this fundamental principle.  Politi-
cized disputes are less predictable in outcome than legal disputes, and therefore 
hinder FDI flows by making them more expensive.  Moreover, the exposure during 
a dispute, and the resulting “parallel proceedings” in the court of public opinion 
hardens positions, exacerbates disputes, and makes amicable settlement less likely. 
This is all above and beyond the relatively minor, but not insignificant cost of 
added time spent arranging for the reviewing third party submissions.  In this regard, 
it seems logical that a system be devised for such intervenors to contribute to arbitra-
tion costs in exchange for the benefit they receive from amicus participation.  Per-
haps this is just part of the practical and logistical details that need to be worked out 
now that - supposedly - we are in consensus about the need for transparency.  But 
such issues are likely to prove more difficult than has generally been recognized.  
Investment arbitration is not limited to adjudication within the ICSID system, and so 
amending the ICSID Rules is not enough.  An inconsistency in confidential and 
privacy provisions between ICSID and UNCITRAL, for example, will only serve to 
deepen the heterogeneity of arbitration procedure of which the proponents of trans-
parency already complain.  Moreover, this variety of provisions can only benefit 
claimant investors, since it is their right in investment treaties to select from a menu 
of arbitration rules in accordance with their strategy in a given case. 
All of this is not to say that awards - and perhaps pleadings – should never be 
made available to the public, after the close of arbitral proceedings.  It would appear 
that the cost of such publication is minimal, and the potential benefit relatively great.  
The analysis for pre-award openness and de-privatization of the arbitration process 
is much more ambiguous.  It appears that claimants stand to benefit most from such 
developments, and States who stand to bear the highest cost.  This may be accep-
table to the architects of the system, because: (1) States are meant to bear such a 
burden, because in return they receive a competitive advantage in FDI placement; 
(2) the third-party (i.e. public) benefit outweighs the cost; or (3) public pressure, not 
matter how irrational, is enough to bring the system crumbling down – a result that 
will adversely affect all stakeholders in the investment arbitration process.  All this 
may be the proper result once the cost-benefit analysis has been undertaken.  But the 
process has yet to begin, as most commentators have skipped to the end, presuming 
an answer that “feels right.” 
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Is There A Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure?    
                   
Christian J. Tams∗ 
A. Introduction 
In October 2004, the ICSID Secretariat issued a Discussion Paper entitled "Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration".1 This paper came at a time 
when ICSID dispute settlement, judging from the number of pending cases, flouri-
shed. Yet the increasing number of proceedings not only signalled a general accep-
tance of the system, but also brought with it new problems – which the Secretariat 
apparently sought to tackle from a position of strength, by leading the debate about a 
number of reforms. The various measures suggested in the Discussion Paper were an 
interesting blend of purely technical issues and drastic measures of a far-reaching 
nature. Among the latter were proposals set out in Chapter VI and the Paper's An-
nex, in which the Secretariat showed itself prepared to "pursue the creation of […] 
an ICSID Appeals Facility",2 and put forward rather concrete proposals for that 
option.3 As commentators did not fail to observe, these proposals went to the heart 
of the ICSID system of dispute settlement and raised many issues of a fundamental 
nature.4 In retrospect, it is curious how lightly they were raised. In fairness, it must 
be admitted that when suggesting the establishment of an appeals facility, the Secre-
tariat responded to calls, by a number of ICSID member States (and notably the 
United States), for a reform of the existing dispute settlement system. Yet, the clear 
majority of ICSID participants voiced concerns during informal debates in late 2005 
and early 2006, or even came out openly hostile against the idea. As a result, ICSID 
officials seem to have discarded any immediate plans for the creation of an appeals 
 
∗  Christian Tams, LL.M. (Cantab. 2000), Ph.D. (Cantab. 2004) is Senior Research Assistant at 
the Walter – Schücking Institute for International Law, University of Kiel, Germany. 
1  'Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration' (22 October 2004), available 
on the internet: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-arb.htm. 
2  Ibid., para. 23. 
3  Ibid. 
4  See e.g. South Centre Analytical Note, 'Developments on Discussion for the Improvements of 
the Framework for ICSID Arbitration and the Participation of Developing Countries' 
(SC/TADP/AN/INV/1), available at http://www.southcentre.org. 
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facility, accepting that the earlier proposals had been considered by many as 'prema-
ture'.5  
The present paper proceeds on the assumption that while temporarily off the 
agenda, the debate about an ICSID appellate system is not over. In fact, it may only 
be just beginning – but this time without the time-pressure that the Secretariat's 
reform proposal inevitably introduced. It is submitted that indeed, much more time 
is needed properly to evaluate the pros and cons of an appellate structure. The pre-
sent paper seeks to contribute to that debate. It explores various arguments that 
might possibly militate in favour of a two-tiered system of dispute settlement (infra, 
section C.) but also assesses obstacles to such a reform (section B.), as well as alter-
natives to an appeals structure (section D.).  
B. Obstacles  
Before examining arguments that might support an overhaul of the present system, it 
seems necessary to discuss obstacles to reform. The present section addresses three 
rather different problems that any reform proposal must face. In very brief terms, 
these obstacles can be formulated in the following propositions:  
• The ICSID dispute settlement system at present already allows for a review of 
awards in exceptional circumstances.  
• The ICSID dispute settlement system deliberately restricted review to these 
exceptional circumstances, while otherwise stressing the need for finality. 
• A reform of the ICSID dispute settlement system depends on stringent majority 
requirements and therefore requires broad political backing.  
All three obstacles will be addressed in turn.  
I. The Present System Permits a Review of Awards in Exceptional Circumstances 
The first point to make is that even at present, there is some scope for a review of 
ICSID awards. When assessing that scope, it is necessary to distinguish between 
awards governed by the ICSID Convention proper, and those rendered under the 
Additional Facility Rules.  
 
5  Investment Treaty News: 'ICSID Member-Governments OK watered-down changes to arbitra-
tion process' (29 March 2006), available on the internet: <http://www.iisd.org/ invest-
ment/itn/news.asp>. Cf. already the ICSID Working Paper 'Suggested Changes to the ICSID 
Rules and Regulations' (12 May 2005), available on the internet: <http://www.worldbank.org 
/icsid/highlights/sug-changes.htm>, para. 4. 
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1. ICSID Convention Awards 
Awards rendered under the ICSID Convention can only be attacked by the proce-
dures provided by the Convention itself. In particular, Article 54 of the Washington 
Convention obliges States to treat pecuniary6 awards as if they were final judgments 
of the State's own courts. For the purposes of recognition and enforcement,7 the 
ICSID Convention thus excludes any outside re-assessment of awards, or possibility 
of vacatur, by national courts. However, Article 54 is only part of the picture. It is 
one feature of a careful compromise struck during drafting. The other main feature is 
equally relevant and equally remarkable: internally, i.e. by mechanisms set out in the 
Washington Convention itself, ICSID awards can at present be reviewed. Unlike 
most other international dispute settlement mechanisms, the ICSID Convention not 
only recognises narrowly described forms of rectification, revision and interpretation 
of awards. In addition, Article 52 of the Washington Convention permits for a sys-
temic review of awards in the form of an annulment procedure by ad hoc annulment 
committees. The scope of that annulment review has always been much discussed.8 
As the wording of Article 52 clarifies, there are five grounds of annulment: (1) the 
arbitral tribunal was not properly constituted; (2) it manifestly exceeded its powers; 
(3) a tribunal member was corrupt; (4) there was a serious departure from a funda-
mental rule of procedure, or (5) the award did not state the reasons upon which it 
was based. 
At least at first glance, this list (which includes some rather vague notions such as 
"manifest excess of powers") may seem impressive. But Article 52 is important both 
for what it says and for what it does not say. While allowing for an unusual review 
procedure on five specific grounds, it implicitly excludes other forms of review.9 In 
fact, clear evidence suggests that the drafters intended annulment to be an excep-
tional remedy and that the five grounds were to be narrowly construed.10 More im-
portantly, they were adamant that Article 52 should not be used as a form of sub-
stantive appellate review. In terms of the applicable standards governing systemic 
 
6  The express reference to pecuniary obligations implies that non-pecuniary injunctions are not 
covered by ICSID's enhanced enforcement regime: see Toope, Mixed International Arbitration 
(1990), 245-246. 
7  The Convention regime is less ambitious with respect to State immunity from execution: As 
Article 55 clarifies, Article 54 does not oblige States to enforce judgments which could not be 
enforced because of immunity from execution. For an explanation cf. the Report of the Execu-
tive Directors, 1 ICSID Reports, 32. 
8  For the most detailed assessment see the commentary on Article 52, in: Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention, and the various contributions in Gaillard/Banifatemi (eds.), Annulment of ICSID 
Awards (Huntington, 2004). 
9  Arnoldt, Praxis des Weltbankübereinkommens (1997), 184; Amadio, Le contentieux interna-
tional de l'investissement privé et la convention de la banque mondiale du 18 Mars 1965 
(1967), 240. 
10  For details see Arnoldt, Praxis des Weltbankübereinkommens, 184 et seq. 
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review, this means that Article 52 is only concerned with the procedural propriety of 
an award rather with its correctness as a matter of substance.11 
Unfortunately, ICSID annulment committees have not always followed the text 
and spirit of Article 52. It is well known that at least some of them have taken a 
rather expansive view of their powers and have effectively used the concepts of 
‘manifest excess of power’12 and ‘failure to state reasons’13 as stepping stones for a 
substantive review of the initial award.14 While subsequent annulment decisions 
have adopted more restrictive approaches, it seems fair to say that the scope of Arti-
cle 52 remains controversial.15 It may simply be that Article 52, by requiring com-
mittee members to turn a blind eye on a potentially wrong decision, asks too much 
of highly qualified lawyers. But at least at the conceptual level, the limited nature of 
annulment under Article 52 is of crucial importance, and the distinction between 
annulment and forms of substantive review needs to be maintained. While not pro-
viding for a comprehensive appeals system, the Washington Convention thus regu-
lates questions of review in a very differentiated manner, striking a careful balance 
between the need for finality on the one hand, and the possibility of review on the 
other. 
2. Additional Facility Awards  
ICSID Additional Facility awards are governed by a rather different regime. Since 
there is no equivalent to Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, Additional Facility 
awards are not subject to any internal review procedure comparable to annulment. 
However, they can be attacked externally, before national courts, where recognition 
and enforcement must be sought.16 At the seat of the arbitration, national courts can 
be asked to set aside awards in vacatur applications. During enforcement proper, 
 
11  Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public Interna-
tional Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, Fordham Law Review 73 (2005), 1547; van den 
Houtte, Article 52 of the Washington Convention – A Brief Introduction, in: Gail-
lard/Banifatemi (footnote 8), 12; Schreuer, ICSID Convention (footnote 8), Art. 52 mn. 11. 
12  Article 52(1)(b) ICSID Convention. 
13  Article 52(1)(e) ICSID Convention. 
14  For a detailed assessment of annulment jurisprudence see Schreuer, Three Generations of 
ICSID Annulment Proceedings, in: Gaillard/Banifatemi, (footnote 8), 17; Schwartz, Finality at 
What Cost?, ibid., 43. For highly critical reactions to the Klöckner and Amco annulment deci-
sions see e.g. Redfern, ICSID – Losing Its Appeal?, 3 Arbitration International (1989), 98; 
Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 Duke Law 
Journal 739. 
15  The debate between contributors to the volume edited by Gaillard and Banifatemi (footnote 8) 
testifies to this. Contrast e.g. Schreuer's positive assessment of the Wena and Vivendi decisions 
(e.g. at 18: "[T]he ICSID annulment process has found its proper balance.") with the highly 
critical pieces by Schwartz (43-86) and Cremades (87-95). 
16  'Enforcement' is used here to include the recognition of the award; for a similar use of termino-
logy see e.g. Collier/Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law (1999), 265. 
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respondents can ask national courts to refuse recognition – typically under the condi-
tions set out in Article V of the 1958 New York Convention.17 The rules governing 
these two forms of review are manifold.18 But very simplistically, it can be said that 
awards can be reviewed for procedural defects broadly similar to the grounds of 
annulment set out in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention.19 In addition, Article 
V(2)(b) as well as many national rules governing vacatur applications allow an 
award to be attacked if it and/or its enforcement is contrary to public policy.20 This 
means that the scope for review is somewhat broader than under Article 52 ICSID 
Convention which deliberately opted against a public policy exception. Both under 
national laws governing vacatur applications and at the stage of enforcement proper, 
some courts have relied on public policy exceptions to perform a substantive review 
of awards. But these attempts are few and far between, and are difficult to bring in 
line with the overall aim of the New York Convention, which intends to enhance the 
prospects for enforcement.21 Although applications of the public policy exception 
will often require national courts to look into the substance of an award, this means 
that enforcement should only be refused in highly exceptional circumstances. Again, 
this was a deliberate choice, aimed at preserving the integrity of arbitral awards, and 
at securing their enforceability. 
II. The ICSID System Deliberately Opted Against Broader Options of Review 
The previous considerations suggest that ICSID, already having some sort of review, 
may be an unlikely candidate for an appeals debate. But there is a second obstacle to 
reform, and that is the fact that the ICSID system deliberately opted against broader 
options of review. To some extent, this argument has been dealt with already, when 
discussing the scope of Article 52 of the Convention. Yet, rather than stressing the 
narrow scope of annulment (or of national court review, for that matter), one might 
equally underline the reasons leading ICSID drafters to restrict the options for re-
view. Three such positive reasons can be distinguished:  
 
17  330 U.N.T.S. 38. Similar provisions are included in the Inter-American [Panama] Convention 
on International Commercial Arbitration, OAS Treaty Series, No. 42. 
18  For a more detailed assessment of the points made in the following see Franck (footnote 11), 
Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1548-1557. 
19  See Collier/Lowe (footnote 16), 267-270, for further details. 
20  For comment cf. Toope (footnote 6), 129-138. 
21  In its Report, the New York Convention drafting committee noted that public policy excepti-
ons could only come into play if enforcement would be "distinctly contrary to the basic prin-
ciples of the legal system of the country where the award is invoked" (Report of the Committee 
on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 28 March 1955, UN Doc. E/2704 and 
E/AC.42/4/Rev.1.). For a detailed treatment of national courts' approaches see the ILA Study 
into the application of public policy by enforcement courts, eventually leading to a Resolution 
adopted at the ILA's 2002 New Delhi Session, both reproduced in International Law Associati-
on (ed.), Report of the Seventieth Conference (London, 2002). 
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• For a start, drafters were keen to establish a system that would solve disputes 
within a reasonable period of time22 – hence their insistence on time-limits, and 
provisions preventing parties from frustrating proceedings.23 The reason for this 
is not difficult to understand. Proceedings, whether judicial or arbitral, leave le-
gal positions in abeyance and produce uncertainty. As a general matter, dispute 
settlement systems striving for efficiency should therefore seek to minimise the 
time spent on resolving legal and factual questions. In the case of investment ar-
bitration, this rationale would seem to be particularly relevant.24 Often, disputes 
concern important investment projects binding a relevant portion of a com-
pany’s budget. By definition, investments prompting ICSID disputes also occur 
abroad, i.e. in a country in which the investor is not registered. Finally, as the 
sets of Argentine or SGS cases illustrate, parties (whether investors or States) 
may have entered into different contracts of a similar type, which means that 
one decision is likely to affect a variety of legal relations. Given these factors, 
the drafters were certainly correct in stressing the need for a reasonably quick 
resolution of disputes. Whether investment arbitration presently meets that goal 
is of course a matter for discussion. In contrast, it seems evident that whatever 
its design, an appeals structure would not reduce, but increase the amount of 
time lapsing before a definite decision on the merits. While much depends on 
time frames, it seems beyond doubt that introducing an appeals facility would 
complicate the task of resolving disputes quickly. 
• The second point is related. It is based on a simple calculation: the longer the 
proceedings, the higher the costs. Again, much depends on the specific features 
of the appeals structure, but it seems clear that litigation in a two-tiered system 
is more expansive than with only one round of proceedings. This in itself is a 
potential drawback of a reform.25 However, higher costs may have further im-
plications: a more expansive litigation might deter smaller participants (whether 
smaller companies or poor States) from pursuing their rights.26 It might there-
 
22  Cf. South Centre Analytical Note (footnote 4), para. 59. 
23  Cf. e.g. Articles 45, 37(2)(b) and 38 of the ICSID Convention. 
24  See Tawil, An International Appellate System: Progress or Pitfall?, Transnational Dispute 
Management 2/2005, 69 (70): "[I]nvestors require quick decisions as trust is a necessary requi-
rement to be complied for investments to be done." 
25  Cf. South Centre Analytical Note (footnote 4), para. 68: "A particular challenge, for develo-
ping countries, of the appeal facility is the cost of such a proceeding", noting that unlike in in-
vestment arbitration, "[t]he expense of the Appellate Body of WTO is born by the organisation 
itself" (ibid.). 
26  Cf. Wälde, Alternatives for Obtaining Greater Consistency in Investment Arbitration: An 
Appellate Institution after the WTO, Authoritative Treaty Arbitration or Mandatory Consolida-
tion?, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 71 (74): "For a well-resourced government 
facing an under-resourced opponent (typically a smaller, entrepreneurial company with shal-
low pockets), an important strategy is simply to drain away the claimant’s litigation war-chest 
until it is compelled to give up. Adding an appeal will reinforce the strength of such a litigati-
on-resource based strategy." 
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fore act as an external factor harming the bargaining position of some ICSID 
participants. 
• Lastly, ICSID drafters were prepared to place a considerable measure of trust in 
ICSID panels of arbitrators. They were convinced that an award, by these arbi-
trators, should be preserved at nearly all costs – hence the decision against any 
national court review and the narrow scope of annulment proceedings under Ar-
ticle 52.27 This is not to suggest that their approach was the only acceptable one. 
However, it is a decision that was taken in 1965, and one that can certainly be 
described as fundamental to the ICSID dispute settlement system. Reversing it 
would not only mean a departure from the drafters' original intent. More impor-
tantly, the decision in favour of a second level of dispute settlement would also 
risk undermining the authority of the first level decision – i.e. the regular ICSID 
panels of arbitrators. If first-level decisions were regularly appealed, they might 
very well end up de-valued. In fact, experience with the WTO system of dispute 
settlement suggests that this is a risk that needs to be taken seriously.28 In any 
event, that decision would show a considerable degree of distrust in the one 
level of dispute settlement in whose decision the Convention drafters delibera-
tely placed great trust. 
III. A Meaningful Reform Requires Broad Political Support  
The preceding considerations suggest that both ICSID Convention and Additional 
Facility awards can be reviewed in exceptional cases, but are deliberately not subject 
to an appellate procedure. The proposed reform is therefore hard to reconcile with an 
essential feature of the present system. But there is a further, more practical obstacle: 
Meaningful reform proposals depend on stringent majority requirements. The degree 
of support required primarily depends on the type of appeals facility envisaged. 
• The most ambitious proposal would be to introduce a single and comprehensive 
appeals facility competent to re-assess all awards rendered by ICSID tribunals. 
For that to be the case, the proposed appeals structure would have to be estab-
lished by the very ICSID constitutional rules (whether ICSID Convention or 
Additional Facility rules). Unsurprisingly, this ambitious proposal faces the 
most serious problems of implementation. In the case of ICSID Convention 
awards, it would conflict with Article 53 of the Convention, which stipulates in 
no unclear terms that awards "shall not be subject to any appeal".29 The most 
straightforward way of addressing this conflict would be to amend the Conven-
 
27  Supra, section B.I.1. 
28  A statistical analysis shows that between 1995 and 2000, 77% of WTO Panel Reports were 
appealed: see Park, Statistical Analysis of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2000), 
in: Petersmann/Ortino, The WTO Dispute Settlement System (2004), 531 (541). 
29  As Sands/Mackenzie/Shany observe (Manual of International Courts and Tribunals, 1999, at 
90): "the exclusion of appeal is absolute". 
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tion. Pursuant to its Article 66, amendments require the ratification (or other 
form of approval) of each of the 143 member States. That far-reaching proposals 
should meet with a unanimous consensus however hardly seems realistic, at 
least in the short term. In the case of Additional Facility awards, matters would 
be less complicated, as there is no equivalent to Article 53. Still, Article 52(4) of 
the Additional Facility Rules (Schedule C)30 declares awards to be "final and 
binding on the parties", which shows that the Additional Facility Rules envisage 
a one-level system of arbitration. To allow for a comprehensive system of ap-
peals, they would thus have to be amended. While this would not require the 
support of all member States, it could only be done through a majority decision 
of the ICSID Administrative Council.31 
• Given these majority requirements, it comes as no surprise that ICSID partici-
pants have begun to look for more feasible ways of allowing at least some par-
ties to appeal some awards rendered by ICSID tribunals. These more realistic 
proposals would give up the goal of establishing a comprehensive appeals facili-
ty, and would open an appeals option for parties that jointly decide to avail 
themselves of it. The easiest way to do so would be to provide for an appeals 
option within the instruments establishing ICSID jurisdiction (typically bilateral 
or multilateral investment treaties). Alternatively, States could agree on a Proto-
col to the ICSID Convention specifically providing for appeals.32 Legally spea-
king, nothing could prevent States and/or investors from so doing. As far as IC-
SID Additional Facility arbitration is concerned, parties of course are free to de-
fine the scope of ICSID arbitration, and could do so by establishing a second 
level of arbitration. With respect to ICSID Convention awards, these proposals 
would clearly circumvent Article 53, but would be justified as a valid inter-se 
modification.33 Yet, while legally possible and politically more feasible, a sys-
tem of appeals established under specific treaties might not be able to fulfil the 
hopes of those arguing for a reform of the ICSID system. This is a matter to be 
assessed more fully in subsequent sections of this paper,34 but the main problem 
may be briefly referred to at this point already. If the appeals option depended 
on the provisions of investment treaties or a Protocol to the Convention, ICSID 
would offer a ‘piecemeal appeal’, open in some, but not in all disputes. If ap-
 
30  Available on the internet: http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm. 
31  Cf. Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention, which also served as the basis for the very estab-
lishment of the Additional Facility Rules. For comment see Schreuer, The ICSID Convention 
(footnote 8), Art. 6, mn. 23-26. 
32  Cf. Bishop, The Case for an Appellate Panel and Its Scope of Review, Transnational Dispute 
Management 2/2005, 10. 
33  Cf. Article 41 VCLT, pursuant to which an inter-se modification is permitted if it is not "(b) … 
prohibited by the treaty and: (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their 
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations; (ii) does not relate to a provi-
sion, derogation from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object and pur-
pose of the treaty as a whole." 
34  Infra, section D.I.3. 
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peals structures were to be established by different investment treaties, there 
might eventually even be not one single, but different appeals facilities, possibly 
functioning according to different rules and standards. 
C. Arguments for Introducing an Appeals Facility 
The preceding section has sought to underline the difficulties to which the estab-
lishment of an investment appellate structure would give rise. The present section 
addresses arguments suggesting that notwithstanding these difficulties, the reform 
should be pursued. More specifically, it breaks down the different calls for reform 
into four (inter-related) arguments, and addresses each of them in turn. 
I. An Appellate System Would Foster Consistency 
The main argument supporting the establishment of an ICSID appeals facility is that 
such a facility could improve the consistency of international investment law. This 
argument is widely taken up by commentators. For example, in its discussion paper 
of late 2004, right at the start at the section considering an appellate structure, the 
ICSID Secretariat recognised that "the appeal mechanism would be intended to 
foster coherence and consistency in the case law"35 (while also claiming that 
"[s]ignificant inconsistencies have not to date been a general feature of the jurispru-
dence of ICSID"36). Similarly, many commentators stress the need for an investment 
court of appeals uniting a seemingly fragmented body of law.37 The propositions 
underlying this 'consistency argument' are that ICSID awards at present lack consis-
tency, that this is a problem, and that an appellate body could solve it. All three 
issues will be addressed in turn. 
 
35  ICSID Discussion Paper (footnote 5), para. 21. 
36  Ibid. 
37  See e.g. Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1617 et seq.; Bishop (footnote 
32), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 10; Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment 
Court, The American Lawyer, Summer 2004 issue, available on the internet: http://www.       
americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourt04.html. For earlier proposals see already 
Holtzmann, A Task for the 21st Century: Creating a New International Court for Resolving 
Disputes on the Enforceability of Arbitral Awards, in: Hunter et al. (eds.) The Internationalisa-
tion of International Arbitration: The LCIA Centenary Conference (1995), 111; Schwebel, The 
Creation and Operation of an International Court of Arbitral Awards, ibid., 115. 
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1. Are Investment Awards Inconsistent?  
Disaggregating the issues, it is first necessary to assess whether there are at present 
inconsistent investment awards. The answer to this question is in the affirmative. At 
least in some instances, tribunals have rendered diametrically opposed or conflicting 
decisions, and have also openly criticised the reasoning of previous awards. As the 
cases are well-known, it may be sufficient to deal with them en passant, and to focus 
on the different types of inconsistency that they stand for.38 
The Lauder cases39 provide a spectacular example of opposite decisions by dif-
ferent tribunals, concerning the same set of facts, almost identical parties, and nearly 
identical legal norms. In fairness, it must be admitted that they were decided by 
UNCITRAL tribunals. Yet, their treatment may be justified here, as the decisions 
concerned substantive aspects of investment law not depending on a particular arbi-
tral framework, and as they epitomise the problem of inconsistency. In essence, the 
two arbitral tribunals differed on the extent to which the Czech Republic had 
breached its obligations vis-à-vis a US American investor, Mr. Lauder, and a Dutch 
company (CME) controlled by him. A Stockholm arbitral tribunal found that the 
Czech Republic had committed an expropriation in the sense of Art. 5 of the Dutch-
Czech BIT40 when depriving CME of exclusive rights in the television business, 
holding that the relevant conduct (by the Czech Media Council) "smacks of dis-
crimination against the foreign investor."41 Faced with essentially the same expro-
priation standard in the US-Czech BIT,42 the London tribunal held that the measures 
in question did not amount to an expropriation, as there had been no direct interfe-
rence by Czech authorities, as Mr. Lauder's property rights had been maintained, 
and as the measure did not benefit the Czech Republic.43 Based on their respective 
 
38  For a more detailed treatment of the relevant awards see e.g. Franck (footnote 11), Fordham 
Law Journal 73 (2005), 1558 et seq. 
39  CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 13 September 2001 and Final 
Award of 14 March 2003 (the 'Stockholm Award'); Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award of 
3 September 2001 (the 'London Award'). All awards are available on the internet: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. See also the subsequent decision by the Swedish 
Svea Court of Appeals, which decided not to vacate the Stockholm award: Judgment of 15 
May 2003, available on the internet: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
40  Article 5 of the Netherlands-Czech Republic BIT provides that neither country "shall take any 
measures depriving, directly or indirectly, investors of […] their investments unless the follo-
wing conditions are complied with: (a) the measures are taken in the public interest and under 
due process of law; (b) the measures are not discriminatory; (c) the measures are accompanied 
by just compensation." 
41  Stockholm Award (footnote 39), para. 612. 
42  Article III(1) of the US-Czech Republic BIT provides that: "Investments shall not be expropri-
ated or nationalized either directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation 
or nationalization (expropriation) except: for a public purpose; in a nondiscriminatory manner; 
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due 
process of law and the general principles or treatment provided for in Article II(2)." 
43  London Award (footnote 39), para. 201. 
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reasoning, the Stockholm tribunal in its final award ordered the defendant to pay 
$355 million to CME, while the London tribunal refused to award Mr. Lauder any 
damages. Whatever the correct result, it is beyond doubt (and is widely accepted 
among commentators), that the contradictory result of the two Lauder cases has 
primarily had one effect: as was aptly put by one observer, it "brings the law into 
disrepute, it brings arbitration into disrepute - the whole thing is highly regret-
able."44 
Instances like the different SGS cases45 concern the conflicting interpretation, 
given by different ICSID tribunals, of a similar legal rule enshrined in different 
treaties, and applicable in similar cases between different parties.46 The legal rules in 
question were versions of the much-discussed ‘umbrella clauses’,47 contained in the 
BIT between Switzerland and Pakistan, and Switzerland and the Philippines. In 
different cases, ICSID tribunals had to assess whether this clause would transmute 
breaches of contract into treaty violations coming within the scope of the relevant 
BITs. In SGS-Pakistan, the tribunal adopted a narrow reading of the umbrella 
clause, which provided that host States "shall constantly guarantee the observance of 
the commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the Inves-
tors". Worried that each and every contract breach might be actionable before ICSID 
tribunals, it held there would have to be "clear and convincing evidence" that the 
State parties to the BIT intended to transform contract breaches into treaty claims.48 
In contrast, the tribunal in SGS-Philippines stressed the broad wording of the um-
brella clause, by virtue of which a host State "shall observe any obligation it has 
assumed with regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the 
other". While it sought to distinguish the formulations of the two umbrella clauses, 
presumably to avoid being chided for departing from earlier awards, the SGS-
Philippines tribunal expressly criticised the award in the Pakistan case for inventing 
a presumption in favour of restrictive readings of umbrella clauses.49 This suggests 
that the conflict between the two decisions cannot really be explained by the wor-
 
44  Rushton, Clifford Chance Entangled in Bitter Lauder Arbitrations, Legal Bus., Oct. 2001, 108 
(cited in Franck, [footnote 11], Fordham Law Journal 73 [2005], at 1559). For similarly 
outspoken criticism see Goldhaber (footnote 37): "Czech taxpayers must think poorly of what 
passes for the world system of investment arbitration. […] The Lauder cases dramatize the te-
nuous legitimacy of investment dispute resolution." 
45  SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 August 
2003 ('SGS-Pakistan'); SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 29 January 2004 ('SGS-Philippines'), both available on the internet: http://www. 
investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
46  For a brief summary see Gill, Inconsistent Decisions: An Issue to be Addressed or a Fact of 
Life?, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 12 (12-13). 
47  On these see e.g. Wälde, The "Umbrella" Clause on Investment Arbitration – A Comment on 
Original Intentions and Recent Case, 6 Journal of World Investment &Trade (2005), 184-236; 
Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protecti-
on, Arbitration International 2004, Vol. 20 (4), 411-434. 
48  SGS-Pakistan (footnote 45), para. 167. 
49  SGS-Philippines (footnote 45), paras. 119-127. 
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ding of the respective treaties. In essence, the two tribunals adopted different inter-
pretations of umbrella clauses. Taken together, the SGS decisions thus leave States 
and investors with a feeling of considerable uncertainty with respect to the meaning 
of such clauses.50 Since the umbrella clauses were contained in different treaties, the 
tribunal’s contradictory approaches, on a conceptual level, are not as problematic as 
the two Lauder cases.51 But given the number of umbrella clauses within modern 
BITs, the practical consequences of the decisions are considerable.  
Finally, a number of NAFTA cases shows that even when applying the same 
treaty norm, as opposed to identically-worded provisions of different treaties, arbi-
tral tribunals do reach different conclusions. The different decisions in the cases of 
S.D. Myers v. Canada,52 Metalclad v. Mexico53 and Pope & Talbot v. Canada54 are 
based on remarkably different interpretations of NAFTA's "fair and equitable treat-
ment" clause, namely Article 1105. The Metalclad and Pope & Talbot tribunals 
seemed to consider Article 1105 to provide companies with a positive right existing 
independent, and going beyond, minimum standards of customary international 
law.55 In contrast, in S.D. Myers, the tribunal took a different approach; it held Arti-
cle 1105 to be violated when "an investor has been treated in such an unjust or arbi-
trary manner that the treatment rises to the level that is unacceptable from the inter-
national perspective", thereby making Article 1105 dependent on general interna-
tional law.56 Again, for present purposes, it is not relevant to assess which of the 
tribunals took the correct approach. Rather, the three awards show that even within 
one and the same treaty system, different arbitral awards can create a level of uncer-
tainty that is inimical to predictable and reliable dispute settlement.57 
Of course, as always, there is a risk that by presenting three prominent examples, 
one might be taken to imply that these are the rule. It should therefore be underlined 
that in most cases, ICSID tribunals reach consistent decisions. Yet, even if they are 
exceptional, the instances of inconsistent decisions are noteworthy. They would 
seem to be more than occasional aberrations occurring within any system of law. 
Given the popularity of ICSID proceedings, their number is unlikely to decrease in 
 
50  For subsequent decisions on the scope of umbrella clauses see the (non-ICSID) award, in: 
Eureko v. Poland, Partial Award on Liability of 19 August 2005; and the ICSID decision in 
Noble Ventures v. Romania, Final Award of 12 October 2005, both available on the internet: 
http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
51  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 25. 
52  Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award of 13 December 2000 (UNCITRAL), available on 
the internet: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
53  Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico, Award of 30 August 2000 (ICSID), available on the inter-
net: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
54  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award of 10 April 2001 (UNCITRAL), available on the inter-
net: http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa1.html. 
55  See Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1578-1581 for references. 
56  Myers (foonote 52), para. 263. 
57  For an attempt to influence the matter see the interpretative note issued by the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission: 'Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions' (31 July 2001), 
available on the internet: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp. 
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the future. What is more, inconsistent decisions are clearly visible in a system now 
increasingly moving towards transparency and greater public scrutiny.58 Since they 
will usually concern similar provisions found in different but similarly-phrased trea-
ties, the contradiction between decisions will also be particularly evident. It remains 
to be seen whether the problem is a fact of life with which investors and States have 
to put up, or whether it could be remedied by the establishment of an appeals faci-
lity.  
2. Is Inconsistency a Problem?  
Inconsistent decisions need not necessarily be considered a problem. At least three 
arguments might suggest that it is not.  
•  First, one might take what might be called an "individual approach" to invest-
ment dispute resolution, and argue that the first task of a tribunal really is to 
solve the case rather than to worry about implications. This approach draws at-
tention to one of the specific features of arbitration as opposed to institutiona-
lised adjudication. Indeed, the dispute settlement system established under the 
ICSID Convention (or the Additional Facility Rules, for that matter), is there for 
the parties, and not for interested observers keen on systemic consistency. Yet, 
notwithstanding its correct starting-point, the individual approach is simplistic. 
It neglects that arbitration within the ICSID system is not purely ad hoc, but 
functions according to institutional rules laid down in the ICSID Convention 
and Rules. Perhaps more importantly, it ignores that – at least in practice – the 
ICSID dispute settlement has developed into a system characterised by personal 
continuity between different panels, frequent references to earlier awards (both 
in pleadings and awards), and intense peer discussion requiring arbitrators to 
justify deviations from previous decisions.59 The day-to-day functioning of the 
ICSID system therefore defies the premises of the individual approach. Lastly, 
that approach also ignores that consistency also benefits the parties (and may be 
expected by them), as it reduces the uncertainty inherent in arbitral proceedings.  
• Second, one might argue that with the large number of pending investment 
cases, some degree of inconsistency is normal.60 Just like the first, this second 
argument proceeds from a correct starting-point, but is ultimately unconvincing. 
Of course, one could hardly expect arbitral tribunals to function like robots pro-
ducing identical results in different cases – especially in a system of decentre-
lised dispute settlement rejecting the concept of binding precedent and based on 
 
58  A point stressed by Gill (footnote 46), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 13. 
59  Cf. also Wälde (footnote 26), 77.  
60   Gill, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 12 et seq. 
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tribunals on an ad hoc basis.61 More generally, one might say that ICSID dispute 
settlement lacks 'hard' mechanisms for forcing tribunals to arrive at consistent 
decisions. But again, this does not mean that inconsistency in ICSID dispute set-
tlement was unproblematic. Very simply, it is submitted that while some degree 
of inconsistency has to be accepted as normal litigation risk, the present degree 
of inconsistency is no longer a normal fact of life. Of course, there are few ob-
jective criteria measuring "normal" degrees of inconsistency. Yet, it may be 
helpful to compare ICSID experience to that of other dispute settlement institu-
tions. True, those other bodies have also had to cope with inconsistent decisions. 
In public international law, for example, the ICTY's Tadic decision62 caused an 
outrage, because it deviated from the ICJ’s standard of attribution established in 
the Nicaragua case.63 But despite the number of international tribunals, and the 
host of issues addressed by them, Tadic/Nicaragua has really been the one and 
only high-profile inconsistency.64 In contrast, even on the basis of the few ex-
amples referred to, we can say that investment tribunals openly disagree; they 
do so frequently, and they do so on a variety of issues. The level of inconsis-
tency reached in investment arbitration seems to be more than a fact of life.  
• But there may be yet another reason explaining this high degree of inconsis-
tency. It has to do with the fragmentation of substantive international investment 
law, and the dominance of specific investment treaties in particular. When ap-
plying treaty rules and arriving at different results, so the explanation runs,     
ICSID tribunals might simply give effect to the differing treaty standards – one 
might say that, fragmented as it is, investment law simply cannot be interpreted 
consistently. To take an example, while nearly all BITs prohibit expropriation, 
they need not all define expropriation in an identical way. If this were the case, 
inconsistent decisions would not be problematic, but rather to be welcomed. 
Once more, this argument highlights one of the specific features of investment 
law. It also enables us to distinguish between different types of inconsistencies. 
Clearly, it is more problematic for tribunals to interpret one and the same norm 
inconsistently, as happened with Art. 1105 NAFTA, or to give contrasting deci-
sion in one case (Lauder) than to interpret two similar, but different provisions 
(such as two umbrella clauses) differently.65 However, this does not explain 
away the problem either. For once, notwithstanding the fragmentation of sub-
stantive investment law, there are concepts of general application. A tribunal 
 
61  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Managemant 2/2005, 8 ; Bishop (footnote 32), 
Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 9.  
62 ICTY, Case IT-94-1, Prosecutor v. Tadic, ILM, vol. 38 (1999), 1518 (paras. 116-145).  
63  ICJ Reports 1986, 14, 62-65 (especially paras. 109 and 115). 
64  For a detailed treatment of the problem of fragmentation see e.g. Buergenthal, Proliferation of 
International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad? Leiden Journal of International Law 14 
(2001), 267; Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts, Max Planck UNYB 5  
(2001), 67 et seq. 
65  Crawford, Comment, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 25. 
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asked to interpret an umbrella clause will of course be guided by that clause’s 
wording. But it will also proceed on the basis of its understandings of general 
conflict principles (such as the lex specialis rule), or of presumptions in favour 
of or against a specific interpretation. Even where the norm in question is treaty-
specific, a tribunal interpreting it thus will operate on the basis of general con-
cepts. It appears that inconsistent decisions such as the SGS or Lauder cases 
simply did not turn on the specific wording of a given treaty, but were decided 
because tribunals approached these general questions differently.66 To sum up 
on this point, despite the various arguments advanced by commentators, there is 
indeed a problem of inconsistency. This leads to the final question: Could an 
appellate body solve it? 
3. Could an Appellate Body Solve the Problem?  
At first sight, the answer plainly to this question is in the affirmative. Within many 
national legal systems, authoritative pronouncements by highest courts often put an 
end to long-term disputes, between district or regional courts. Similarly, the WTO 
Appellate Body is widely credited for having rendered dispute settlement in world 
trade law coherent and predictable. Why, then, to give but one example, should an 
appellate investment court not authoritatively, determine the proper interpretation of 
regularly-worded umbrella clauses? While that prospect is indeed appealing, one 
major problem remains: It must also be stressed that not all appellate systems are 
likely to render investment law more consistent. Instead, the consistency argument 
presupposes that the future appeals facility would be established in a particular way. 
Three specific features can be distinguished. 
• First, as a minimum requirement, there would have to be one single appeals 
facility.67 As has been noted above, it would be relatively easy for States to 
agree on a right to appeal under specific treaties. It has also been shown that 
these treaty-specific appeals could either be handled by one single appellate 
structure, or by different appellate structures established under the different trea-
ties. If States agreed on various appellate structures for different treaties (such as 
BITs or multilateral investment treaties), these could admittedly exercise a sane 
influence on investment law under that treaty. With respect to some, widely ap-
plicable treaties, this might already be some advantage – for example, a NAFTA 
appellate investment facility might consolidate the inconsistent case-law on 
NAFTA standards of protection. But from an ICSID perspective, this would be 
rather counter-productive, as other appellate structures (for example, an appel-
late body established under the Energy Charter Treaty) could reach different re-
 
66  Franck (footnote 11), Fordham Law Journal 73 (2005), 1563 et seq. and 1569 et seq. 
67  Cf. also Bishop (footnote 32), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 8 (10). 
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sults.68 This would add, rather than reduce, uncertainty, and would further frag-
ment dispute settlement under the ICSID system.69 
• Second, the consistency argument depends on the comprehensiveness of the 
would-be appellate system. It would not be sufficient for different investment 
treaties to envisage recourse to one and the same single appellate institution. 
Rather, that appellate institution would be best suited to bring about consistency 
if it was competent to hear appeals in all investment disputes. The reason for 
this is that, given the decentralised character of dispute settlement, appellate de-
cisions would first and foremost have to influence subsequent arbitral awards. 
On that assumption, an appellate decision determining the meaning of an um-
brella clause would have good chances of being followed by subsequent tribu-
nals if these tribunals’ awards were also subject to appellate review (by the same 
appellate institution that had rendered the first appeals decision). The situation 
might be different if the subsequent first-level arbitral tribunal called upon to in-
terpret and apply the umbrella clause would not be part of the ICSID appeals 
system. Of course, the first-level tribunal could still be persuaded to follow the 
previous appellate decision – just as presently, ICSID tribunals can of course opt 
to follow previous arbitral decisions. However, it seems that only the possibility 
of appeal would really increase the likelihood of consistent decisions. In short, 
in order to bring about consistency, and to modify the present situation (in 
which tribunals can opt for consistency, but at times do not seem to do so), the 
future appellate structure would have to be comprehensive, or at least competent 
to hear appeals in a large majority of cases. In contrast, systems of piecemeal 
appeal would probably produce no more than piecemeal consistency. 
• Third, the consistency argument also favours a specific organisational set-up of 
the future appeals facility. Even if there was a single and comprehensive appel-
late structure, the appellate institution would probably have to be organised as 
standing permanent body, or at least composed of members drawn from a rela-
 
68  The point was made very clearly by Sheppard and Warner (Editorial Note, Transnational 
Dispute Management 2/2005, 3 [4]): "If appellate bodies are established on a particular rather 
than universal basis, this runs the risk of undermining the reasons for establishing such a sys-
tem in the first place." See also Bishop (footnote 32), Transnational Dispute Management 
2/2005, 8 (10): " I would suggest that if we wind up with multiple appellate bodies, as opposed 
to a single appellate body, that much of the reason underlying the need for an appellate body is 
going to be undermined." 
69  See also the ICSID Discussion Paper (footnote 1), para. 23: "If, however, multiple appeal 
mechanisms are to be established, ICSID might best abstain from pursuing the creation of an 
Appeals Facility as it might otherwise only add to the number of appeal mechanisms." 
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tively small roster of permanent members.70 Once more, the matter admittedly 
involves a certain degree of speculation. Yet, experience with the present ICSID 
dispute settlement system suggests that consistency requires a certain degree of 
personal and institutional continuity. The point may be illustrated by reference 
to annulment applications under Article 52 ICSID Convention. At present, an-
nulment is – in the terminology used here – based on a single and comprehen-
sive system, as all annulment applications are handled by ICSID annulment 
committees governed by Article 52, and as all awards are in principle subject to 
annulment.71 Still, a quick glance at cases such as Klöckner, Vivendi or MINE 
shows how differently annulment committees have interpreted their task.72 
Much suggests that this difference is largely due to the lack of personal conti-
nuity. Had there been, under Article 52, a standing annulment institution, it 
seems safe to predict that there would not have been such vast differences be-
tween the different generations of annulment decisions. Conversely, the relative 
consistency of WTO Appellate Body jurisprudence (or of ICJ or ITLOS juris-
prudence, to take examples of judicial institutions typically acting as first-level 
courts) is in large measure due to the personal and institutional continuity of the 
respective bodies. The lesson to be drawn from this experience is that if indeed, 
ICSID appellate jurisprudence should bring about consistency, it should best be 
conferred upon a permanent, standing institution composed of a small number 
of arbitrators.73 
4. Interim Assessment 
The preceding considerations significantly affect the force of the consistency argu-
ment. Following the line of argument set out above, one might say that a plurality of 
appellate facilities would probably do more harm than good. A piecemeal appellate 
institution with non-comprehensive competence would probably do little harm, but 
not much good either. (Although of course much may be a question of degree: 90% 
appealibility would be non-comprehensive in theory, but would go quite some way 
in fostering consistency, while 20% would not.) Lastly, in order to bring about con-
 
70  Not surprisingly, such an approach (which clearly follows Article 17:3 of the WTO DSU) is 
indeed suggested in the ICSID Discussion Paper (note 1): see Annex, para 5: "Such a set of 
ICSID Appeals Facility Rules could provide for the establishment of an Appeals Panel compo-
sed of 15 persons elected by the Administrative Council of ICSID on the nomination of the 
Secretary-General of the Centre. The terms of the Panel members would be staggered. Eight of 
the first 15 would serve for three years; all others would be elected for six-year terms. Each 
member would be from a different country. They would all have to be persons of recognized 
authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, international investment and investment trea-
ties." 
71  See supra, section B.I. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Legum, Visualizing an Appellate System, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 64 (66). 
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sistency, the appeals facility would probably have to have very few members, and 
function on a permanent basis. These considerations are not aimed at discarding the 
consistency argument altogether. As a matter of principle, it remains valid, and 
strongly militates in favour of reforming the present system. However, it has also 
been shown that in order to foster consistency, the ICSID system would have to opt 
for a quite particular form of appeals structure, and one that is not likely to be easily 
agreed on. Lastly, the fragmentation of substantive investment law means that even 
an appeals institution fulfilling these requirements would not solve the problem of 
inconsistency altogether. In short, the consistency argument is much qualified by 
both practical considerations and the specific features of investment law. 
II. An Appellate System Would Be More Likely to Produce Correct Decisions 
The hope for consistency is one argument in favour of reforming the present ICSID 
system. But there is a more basic promise of introducing a second level of dispute 
settlement. Having two levels of dispute settlement could enhance the prospects of 
correct decisions – one might call this the ‘accuracy' or 'correctness argument'. Its 
idea is that an investment appeals court is more likely to 'get it right' than ICSID 
panels of arbitrators at present. This in turn might be more important to investors or 
States than the time and cost spent during litigation – as V.V. Veeder's observation 
suggests:  
"Of course, for the investor or the state, the final successful arbitration award is 
always an undisguised blessing. […] But, for the unsuccessful investor, an adverse 
final award is obviously adversely final and the result or reasoning of the award can 
act as a defect of precedent for other investors facing the same issues. Thus finality 
may be less desirable for the investor and investment arbitration than getting the 
answer right."74 
It is difficult to take issue with the proposition that arbitral tribunals should render 
correct decisions, and therefore proposals aiming at correct decisions should be 
welcomed. But would an appellate system really increase that possibility? At a ge-
neral level, the answer is probably yes. The investment appellate body could focus 
on the issues that divide the parties, and it would have the benefit of having before it 
one fully-reasoned decision. On the other hand, there is of course no guarantee. But 
maybe more important than these general considerations is whether the ICSID sys-
tem needs an appellate level to have bad decisions corrected. This question of course 
can hardly be answered comprehensively – since a comprehensive answer would 
presuppose an exhaustive assessment of ICSID jurisprudence. Yet, it may be helpful 
to approach it from the perspective of ICSID's clients. Does their conduct provide 
evidence for a general dissatisfaction with the present system based on one level of 
dispute settlement? It is submitted that the answer to this question is "no". Of course, 
 
74  Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 6. 
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the decision of some States to draft investment treaties envisaging an appellate struc-
ture is an important factor. However, it is a factor that has to be put into perspective. 
From a more general angle, this State practice is probably less impressive than it 
seems (or than the ICSID Secretariat suggested in its Discussion Paper). It has to be 
contrasted to a number of other factors which are clear evidence of trust placed in 
the ICSID system in its present form. These other factors include  
• the still increasing number of States ratifying the Convention and concluding 
investment treaties with ICSID jurisdictional clauses;  
• the willingness of investors to bring ICSID claims; 
• the readiness of States to comply with ICSID awards; 
 
These factors are not intended to suggest that everything was perfect. However, 
they suggest that in the view of most parties, the present system with one level of 
dispute settlement can still be trusted. As has been shown,75 it is a system that was 
designed after careful deliberation, a system that had to strike a balance between the 
need for correct decisions, and the interests of finality, i.e. time, cost and trust in 
panellists. On balance, the preceding considerations do not show any sustained and 
wide-spread desire among ICSID participants to move away from that system, to-
wards an appellate structure. Proposals for a reform thus rest on abstract proposi-
tions about the relative advantages of appeals structures generally, which cannot be 
simply applied to the ICSID system. With respect to investment law, it seems that 
the drafters' decision to place trust in a single level of arbitration, and to emphasise 
the need for a speedy resolution of disputes, still holds true today. As a consequence, 
the 'accuracy argument' is not really convincing.  
III. An Appellate System Would Increase the Authority of ICSID Awards 
Even if it is not strictly called for in order to bring about consistency, or to eliminate 
errors, setting up an appeals facility may have other positive effects. According to 
some, it might increase the authority of investment awards. For example, Audley 
Sheppard and Hugo Warner, noting the limited legitimacy of investment arbitration, 
argued that "the presence of an appellate mechanism" – which they held "should be 
as authoritative as possible" – "may partially solve this problem".76 Few of course 
would dispute that investment awards lacking authority are problematic. In this 
respect, the basic rationale underlying the 'authority argument' seems appealing. 
Still, it is another question whether the introduction of an appeals facility would 
truly enhance the authority of investment awards. In this respect, it is necessary to 
distinguish between ICSID Convention awards on the one hand, and Additional 
Facility awards on the other. 
 
75  Supra, section II. 
76  Sheppard/Warner (footnote 68), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 4. 
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1. ICSID Convention Awards 
ICSID Convention awards could gain in authority because an appellate body rende-
ring them might enjoy a higher degree of eminence than first-level tribunals. This 
would not necessarily be the case, but would not be unlikely if the appellate body 
was set up as a permanent institution composed of highly-respected lawyers, and if 
its jurisprudence over time earned the respect of the investment community. Expe-
rience with WTO law but also with national legal systems indeed suggests that 
standing higher-level judicial bodies over time can acquire a certain status as institu-
tions, which in turn increases the authority of their pronouncements.77 The same 
would not be unlikely to happen in investment arbitration, if one particular form of 
appellate institution (namely a standing body) was created. This standing appellate 
body could over time gain an institutional respect that ad hoc panels of arbitrators 
could not acquire. Seen from this perspective, the creation of an appeals facility 
might have a positive effect on the authority of investment awards, including awards 
rendered under the ICSID Convention. Just as with respect to the accuracy argu-
ment, the real question however is whether this potential would justify a major over-
haul of the presently decentralised system. The answer to this question does not only 
depend on the reform’s potential effects, but on whether it is necessary. It must 
therefore be asked whether at present, without an appeals facility, investment awards 
rendered under the ICSID Convention lack the required authority. This in turn de-
pends on legal provisions determining the status of awards, as well as on compliance 
in practice. 
As far as legal provisions are concerned, awards leave little to be desired. Article 
53 of the Convention declares them to be binding, while Article 54 equates them to 
decisions of highest national courts. As has been noted already, the Convention 
deliberately rules out any possibility of national court review; instead it provides an 
exceptionally strong enforcement mechanism.78 When looking at the letter of the 
law, ICSID Convention awards thus could hardly be more authoritative than they 
already are at present. 
Ultimately, however, an award’s authority depends on whether it is complied with 
in practice. In this respect, investment awards also perform rather well. Of course, 
States have often expressed dismay when required to pay large sums of damages; 
some have also voiced concern of a more general nature, and have threatened to 
leave the system of investment law altogether.79 These warnings should not be ig-
nored. But they also have to be put in perspective. From a broader angle, it seems 
that States' criticism of the system has remained exceptional, and has not been fol-
 
77  See already supra, section D.I.4. 
78  Supra, section B.I. 
79  See notably Argentina's threats to re-admit a review of ICSID awards by national courts, and to 
re-introduce the Calvo and Drago clauses: cf. Alfaro, ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged 
by the Argentine Government and its Supreme Court, Oil Gas and Energy Law (OGEL) Vol. 
2, Issue 4, 2004, available on the internet: http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel. 
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lowed up by concrete actions. Certainly when compared to other forms of interna-
tional dispute settlement, compliance with investment awards remains largely un-
problematic, despite the high stakes involved. Paraphrasing a famous dictum about 
compliance with international law generally, it seems fair to say that 'almost all 
States comply with almost all investment awards almost all the time'.80 In fact, not-
withstanding a few problematic cases of enforcement,81 all ICSID Convention award 
have so far been complied with; there is thus no investment law equivalent to fa-
mous inter-State instances of non-compliance such as the ICJ Nicaragua decision.82 
Also, investment awards have usually83 been complied with promptly. Again, com-
pared to other international bodies’ track record, there is no equivalent to the de-
cades it took Albania to accept the ICJ’s Corfu Channel decision,84 or Turkey’s 
year-long refusal to pay Mrs. Loizidou.85 
The preceding paragraph should not be taken as a plea for complacency. Of 
course, even systems with good compliance records can break down, and lose their 
authority. What is important to note is that despite repeated warnings, and notwith-
standing the high stakes involved, the ICSID system is a system with a good com-
pliance record. Legally, the Washington Convention imbues awards with a high 
degree of authority. In practice, States have complied with awards. On that basis, it 
does not seem necessary to introduce an appeals system in order to increase the 
authority of ICSID Convention awards. 
2. Additional Facility Awards 
As far as Additional Facility awards are concerned, the different considerations set 
out in the last section equally apply. In particular, it is worth pointing out that de-
spite the possibility of national court review, Additional Facility awards also have a 
good compliance record so far. Still, the aftermath of the Metalclad award86 shows 
the potential for conflict. Figuratively speaking, the British Columbia Supreme 
Court decision87 may have been a shot over the bow, signalling national courts’ 
 
80  Cf. Henkin, How Nations Behave (2nd edn., New York, 1979), 47: "Almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time." 
81  Namely the Benvenuti, SOABI, and LETCO cases. On compliance in the former two see the 
information provided in Schreuer, The ICSID Convention (footnote 8), Article 54, MN 50-60. 
82  ICJ Reports 1986, 14. 
83  For exceptions, see notably the cases referred to in footnote 81. 
84  ICJ Reports 1949, 4. 
85  The various awards in the case are available on the internet: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
view.asp?item=3&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=loizidou&sessionid=6636633&skin=
hudoc-en.  
86  Supra, footnote 54. 
87  Decision of 2 May 2001, [2001] SCBC 664, available on the internet: http://www.investment 
claims.com/oa1.html. 
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unwillingness simply to accept investment awards at face value. Of course, Metal-
clad itself was controversial, and it is worth pointing out that the shot went over the 
bow rather than hitting the ship. However, the proceedings show that investment 
awards rendered outside the ICSID Convention are vulnerable, and do not enjoy the 
protection, or authority, which Arts. 53-54 confer upon Convention awards. 
According to some, the establishment of an appeals mechanism might provide an 
opportunity to remedy this problem. In the words of Daniel Price, "if we are going 
to have an appellate mechanism then it […] has to displace completely the role of 
national courts presently exercised under the New York convention".88 In other 
words, Additional Facility appellate awards would be as immune from national court 
review as ICSID Convention awards. It is not quite clear how that proposal should 
be implemented – probably best by including a waiver clause in the relevant juris-
diction-conferring instruments. But it is clear that it would enhance the status of 
investment arbitration and remedy one of the weaknesses of Additional Facility 
awards compared to awards rendered under the ICSID Convention. In that respect, 
one might indeed be tempted to say that the creation of an appeals facility could 
increase the authority of investment awards rendered outside the ICSID Convention. 
However, it should also be pointed out that this would not be an automatic conse-
quence, but depend on the willingness of States to take the extra step of "elevating" 
Additional Facility awards, as far as their immunity from national court review is 
concerned, to the level of ICSID Convention decisions. Whether States are willing 
to take that step, and whether they would be willing to do so in each and every treaty 
envisaging an appellate investment decision, is another matter. 
3. Interim Assessment 
To sum up, the 'authority argument' provides limited support for the establishment of 
an ICSID appeals facility. A permanent investment appellate institution, possibly 
modelled along the lines of the WTO Appellate Body, might gain an institutional 
prestige increasing the authority of its decisions. With respect to Additional Facility 
awards, States might also be willing to sacrifice national court review of such appel-
late awards. Both factors are speculative though: States need not necessarily recog-
nise the higher status of appeals decisions, and institutional prestige is not gained 
lightly. In any event, investment appeals in practice do not really suffer from serious 
problems of authority, as compliance with them is very good. Also, at least with 
respect to awards rendered under the ICSID Convention, it is difficult to imagine 
how awards, as a matter of law, could be more authoritative. Lastly, one should not 
forget one potential drawback of appeals systems, which may be seen as the 'autho-
rity argument' turned on its head. As has been noted, while potentially increasing the 
 
88  Price, US Trade Promotion Legislation, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 48; simi-
larly Legum (footnote 73), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 64. 
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authority of some decisions, a move towards a two-tiered system of dispute settle-
ment risks undermining the authority of the first level decision.89 Even if a two-level 
process of dispute settlement eventually produced decisions that were more authori-
tative then the ones presently rendered, this increase in authority would have to be 
measured against a loss of authority of the first level awards. On balance, therefore, 
the 'authority argument' provides only rather ambiguous support for the creation of 
an ICSID appellate structure. 
IV. Interim Conclusions 
The preceding sections have examined a rather heterogeneous range of arguments 
put forward to support the establishment of an ICSID appeals facility. They have 
shown that a reasonably good case for introducing an appeals structure can be made. 
Primarily, this case rests on what has been labelled the 'consistency argument', i.e. 
the hope that an appeals facility would render investment law more coherent, and 
would put an end to the worrying series of inconsistent decisions by ICSID and 
other investment tribunals. In contrast, other arguments allegedly supporting the 
establishment of an appellate structure are of lesser value. In particular, it is a matter 
for speculation whether a two-tiered system of dispute settlement would produce 
better, or more authoritative decisions. In any event, judging from the conduct of 
ICSID participants, there do not really seem to be serious problems of authority or 
accuracy within the present system.  
Whether this mixed record is sufficient to overcome the various drawbacks of a 
reform may be a matter of perspective – depending on which the glass may be con-
sidered half-full or half-empty. As has been shown, the drawbacks of a reform 
(some certain, some speculative) weigh rather heavily: not so much because of ab-
stract concepts such as finality, but because the possibility of appeals would make 
investment proceedings more expensive, would prolong the period of uncertainty 
between the application and the eventual decisions and could de-value the authority 
of first-level awards. Perhaps most importantly, anyone considering the opposing 
arguments should bear in mind that in order to achieve the desired results, one 
would have to opt for a specific form of appeals facility: for the various reasons 
explored above, a meaningful reform of the system would have to seek to establish a 
single permanent institution with comprehensive competence. In contrast, treaty-
specific appeals jurisdictions, possibly even organised in multiple fora, would 
probably (at least from an ICSID institutional point of view) increase rather than 
alleviate problems. 
In the light of these considerations, the better arguments suggest that the glass is 
half-empty. The case for establishing an appeals facility is certainly not compelling. 
Given the difficulties of a reform, and the range of ensuing consequential problems 
 
89  Section C.II. 
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which the present paper has not even touched upon, one should probably not risk 
paralysing a still-functioning system by seriously engaging in a far-reaching institu-
tional reform. On balance, the benefits seem too speculative, the institutional costs 
too high, and the chances of success too slim.  
D. Alternatives  
So far, this paper has focused on the rather drastic reform proposals put forward by 
the ICISD Secretariat in its October 2004 Discussion Paper. The preceding section 
suggests that even with more time and a more methodical discussion, that drastic 
reform should not be pursued. Admittedly, the cautious approach thus advocated 
may also cause problems – experience suggests that often, postponing reforms is as 
dangerous as an over-ambitious reform gone awry. To avoid that problem, a number 
of alternatives to an appellate structure will be briefly examined in the following. 
These alternatives are all aimed at remedying the most problematic feature of ICSID 
dispute settlement, namely that of inconsistent awards.  
I. Critical Debate of Inconsistent Awards 
The most obvious of the various alternatives examined in the following is a plea for 
a critical peer review of inconsistent awards. This review should be aimed at high-
lighting the risks of inconsistent awards; it should encourage tribunals to avoid out-
right contradictions in their respective reasoning, or at least to explain contradictory 
approaches with reference to the specificities of the case before them. While ob-
vious, these proposals may indeed be helpful. Experience with inter-State dispute 
settlement suggests that a professional debate about the risks of fragmenting interna-
tional law through inconsistent decisions does exercise a moderating influence on 
tribunals. To come back to the public international law example referred to earlier, it 
bears underlining that since the beginning of the critical debate about inconsistent 
decisions (triggered by the 'Tadic-Nicaragua conflict'), there do not seem to have 
been any further instances of serious conflicts between different international tribu-
nals. Of course, the reasons for this healthy development are difficult to re-establish, 
but it does not seem to be far-fetched to suggest that the existence of a critical debate 
may have been a force for the good. Based on that experience, one might hope that 
"transparency, publication and informed and professional peer discussion"90 would 
reduce the number of inconsistent investment awards. In that respect, the on-going 
discussion, among ICSID officials, ICSID clients, arbitrators, counsel and academ-
ics, about the coherence of investment law, as well as the general trend towards a 
more rigorous scrutiny of ICSID decisions may have a sane influence on future 
 
90  Wälde (footnote 26), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 77. 
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ICSID panels.91 They might be part of an evolution of investment law, a process 
eventually leading to "the development of a common legal opinion of jurisprudence 
constante, to resolve the difficult legal questions [dividing different arbitral tribu-
nals]".92 
II. Consolidating Cases 
As noted above, inconsistent decisions may simply be a consequence of decentral-
ised, ad hoc dispute settlement by different panels of arbitrators. Not surprisingly, 
then, one way of avoiding inconsistent decisions may be to consolidate cases. Ad-
mittedly, consolidation has a number of drawbacks. The most obvious is that it only 
becomes an option if two or more proceedings concern the same subject-matter.93 
Yet, the Argentine experience suggest that this does happen. At least for some types 
of conflicts, consolidation might be a way out of the dilemma. In fact, it would seem 
to be a rather attractive option.94 It is an option already available under the present 
system, which does not prevent parties from joining proceedings and appearing as 
parties in the same interest. Alternatively, parties remain free to consolidate cases in 
an informal way, by agreeing to nominate the same arbitrators – which is what hap-
pened in some of the recent proceedings concerning the Argentine’s privatisation of 
the gas industry.95 If this is done, formal or informal consolidation would seem to 
provide very effective remedies against inconsistent decisions. As a rule, they would 
also be likely to save money and time. Of course, given its drawbacks, it will not 
solve the problem of inconsistent decisions altogether, but at least it may alleviate it 
to some extent, and thus prove a helpful alternative. 
 
91  Wälde, ibid.; similarly Gill (footnote 46), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 13. 
92  Cf. SGS-Phllipines (footnote 45), para. 97. 
93  For an interpretation of what is meant by the general requirement of "same subject-matter" see 
Crivellaro, Consolidation of Arbitral and Court Proceedings in Investment Disputes, 4 Law 
and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2005), 371 (394 et seq.). 
94  See also Blackaby, Testing the Procedural Limits of the Treaty System: The Argentinean 
Experience, Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 19, and the brief observation by Wäl-
de (footnote 26), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 76. 
95  Namely Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/01/3, and Sempra 
Energy International v. Argentine Republic, Case No. ARB/02/16. In both cases, the tribunal 
was composed of Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Marc Lalonde and Sandra Morelli Rico. The con-
current decisions on objections to jurisdiction are available on the internet: http://www.   
worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm. For brief information on other informally consolidated 
cases see Blackaby (footnote 96), Transnational Dispute Management 2/2005, 18-19. 
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III. References to the International Court of Justice 
By the same token, States might consider formulating ICSID disputes as inter-State 
disputes and submit them to the United Nations "principal judicial organ"96, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). This is an option which so far has not been pur-
sued, but which is explicitly foreseen in Article 64 of the ICSID Convention. Just as 
consolidating cases, turning to the ICJ does not offer a proper substitute for an ap-
peals system. In fact, Article 64 only establishes the Court’s jurisdiction over inter-
State disputes "concerning the interpretation or application of th[e] [ICSID] Conven-
tion". The drafting history clearly shows that the provision was not to be used to 
introduce a form of appeal to the ICJ. What is more, according to Article 34 of the 
ICJ Statute, disputes would have to be formulated as disputes between two States. It 
would thus require some creative legal argument to present disputes about specific 
investment treaties (such as the precise interpretation of BIT standards) as "ICSID 
disputes" coming within the ICJ’s jurisdiction.  
Within those limits however, it is submitted that Article 64 of the Convention 
could play a helpful role, and deserves more attention than it is usually given. There 
are good reasons to assume that ICJ judgments on matters of investment law are 
more likely to be generally accepted than decisions by three member ad hoc tribu-
nals or committees. This first of all has to do with the Court's standing: the "World 
Court" is a venerable institution composed of 15 permanent members representing 
"the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world."97 Its 
special status is reflected in the frequent references, in ICSID awards, to ICJ judg-
ments,98 but also in the broad acceptance of important ICJ decisions on issues such 
as diplomatic protection or the nationality of corporations. Contrary to ad hoc arbi-
tral bodies, the Court thus possesses a considerable institutional authority, which 
would imbue its pronouncements on investment law matters with a considerable 
authority. The solemn atmosphere and length of ICJ proceedings might add to this; 
both would mean that an eventual decision would be rendered only after detailed 
argument and would be well considered. In short, there might be some virtue in 
using the ICJ to clarify particularly important matters of investment law.  
 
96  Cf. Art. 92 UN Charter. 
97  Cf. Article 9 ICJ Statute. 
98  A particularly prominent example is the jurisdictional award in CMS, which extensively dis-
cusses the ICJ's Gabcikovo Nagymaros case, and also refers to the Nicaragua and ELSI cases: 
CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003, pa-
ras. 309, 313, 330, 339, 371, 372. 
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IV. A Reference Procedure Along the Lines of Article 234 TEC 
Finally, a reference procedure along the lines of Article 234 TEC99 might be yet 
another alternative to an appeals facility.100 Under that provision, national courts can 
refer certain matters of law to the ECJ for decision.101 When answering an Art. 234 
reference, the ECJ is not acting as an appellate court, but simply ruling on a point of 
EC law. It remains for the national court to use this information to decide the case. 
Still, experience within Europe suggests that the reference procedure is one of the 
ECJ's most powerful tools in ensuring the uniform application of EC and EU law. Of 
course, this experience cannot simply be used as a blueprint for investment arbitra-
tion. Unlike under Article 234 TEC, references would have to be made not by na-
tional courts, but by arbitral tribunals. In many respects, the institution competent to 
decide on references would face problems similar to those of an appellate institution: 
for example, one would have to agree on the scope of review, or on the types of 
questions that could be referred to it, and on its composition. In addition, one would 
have to decide which parts of its rulings should bind normal ICSID arbitral tribunals, 
whether this binding force should also extend to subsequent cases, and whether 
ICSID tribunals could be under an obligation to make reference. In short, the prob-
lems of implementation would be enormous. Still, introducing a reference procedure 
would have one decisive advantage over plans to establish an appeals system: it 
would not conflict with Art. 53 of the ICSID Convention. Even with a reference 
system, ICSID awards (following a reference decision) would not be "subject to any 
appeal". There would thus be no need for an amendment of the ICSID Convention; 
in contrast, the reference system could be established through an amendment of the 
ICSID Rules. 
 
99  In its entirety, the provision runs as follows:  "The [European] Court of Justice shall have juris-
diction to give preliminary rulings concerning:  
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;                                                                                             
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community and of  the ECB;  
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an  act of the Council, where those 
statutes so provide. 
  Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or 
tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the [European] Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where any such 
question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the 
matter before the [European] Court of Justice.'' 
100  For brief comments in that regard see e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler, Annulment of ICSID Awards in 
Contract and Treaty Arbitrations: Are there Differences?, in: Gaillard/Banifatemi (footnote 8), 
189 (221). 
101  For details on Article 234 see e.g. Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven's Door: Fragmentation, 
Efficiency and Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, Common Market Law Re-
view 40/1 (2003), 9-50; Dauses, Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren nach Artikel 177 EG-
Vertrag (2nd edn., München, 1995). 
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Compared to the other options discussed in the present section, an ICSID refe-
rence procedure is certainly the most ambitious alternative to an appeals system. 
Unlike ICJ references or the consolidation of cases, it would require an amendment 
of ICSID's institutional set-up. However, its establishment would be less cumber-
some than that of an appeals system proper. 
E. Concluding Observations 
The present paper suggests that there are no compelling reasons to move towards an 
investment appellate structure. The drafters' decision to set up ICSID as a single-
level system of dispute settlement remains plausible today. This system, based on 
decentralised dispute resolution by ad hoc tribunals, has very few instruments to 
prevent inconsistent awards, which is a serious problem. However, this problem 
should not be addressed by establishing an appellate structure. Instead, there may be 
virtue in simply highlighting the risk of inconsistent decisions, or to make use of two 
existing alternatives: consolidating cases, or seeking ICJ decisions. If this proves 
insufficient, and if a major reform of the present system becomes unavoidable, then 
it would be preferable to opt for an ICSID reference procedure along the lines of 
Article 234 TEC. 
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A Development Perspective to the Introduction of an Appellate Process 
in International Investment Arbitration    
                    
Comment by Asif H. Qureshi∗ 
I am very grateful to the organisers of the conference for having given me the oppor-
tunity to comment on Dr Tams’s paper. My sincere thanks for the warm hospitality I 
received in Frankfurt.  
I am very impressed by Dr Tam’s paper - which excels in being very informed, 
very considered but most of all very measured. Generally, I would make three ob-
servations.  
First, it seems to me that deconstructionists would have much to say about pro-
posals for reform in the international investment dispute settlement system, given 
that it is largely set against a normative framework that is bilateral, disorganised and 
non-multilateral. Is it really possible to meaningfully evaluate the arguments for and 
the obstacles in setting up an appellate facility in the investment sphere, with the 
objective of providing normative coherence, in circumstances where the multilateral 
consensus on substantive matters is not very evident. Does this institutional debate 
not partake of our concerns and preferences with respect to the normative frame-
work of investment? Indeed, is the suggestion for an appellate facility at a multila-
teral level not an attempt to force an issue on the international agenda - one which 
has not received the endorsement for being negotiated by a significant constituency 
concerned with international investment law? In recent history this lack of endorse-
ment has happened twice, first in the context of the negotiations for a Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MIA) under the auspices of the OECD, and then under the 
Doha Agenda within the WTO.  
Second, in my opinion it is not possible to engage in constructing dispute settle-
ment mechanisms - without reference to the nature of the underlying normative 
structure. The case for an appellate facility must be set against the objectives and 
purposes of the provision of dispute settlement in the international investment 
sphere. It is not possible to de-link institutional building from its substantive sphere 
and its underpinnings. The objects and purposes of the international investment 
system along with its normative framework inform the institutions that govern and 
serve it. The objectives of investment are not confined to the investors’ concerns 
alone. Thus, ‘consistency, accuracy and authority’ in dispute settlement  may be 
significant reasons for institutional reform - but there are other concerns which may 
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seek to trump these considerations - for example human rights, environment and of 
course the development objectives of the host State.  
Third, there is no doubt in my mind that there is a development perspective in the 
establishment of an appellate process in the investment sphere. This involves ensur-
ing inter alia that:  
• the review process facilitates the development objective; 
• that the review process reduces or alleviates the burdens that accompany in-
vestment liberalisation through the interpretative process; 
• that there exist independent, fair and transparent processes in the appellate struc-
ture, through for example ensuring effective participation of developing/host 
countries in the appellate process; 
• that the power of multinational corporations is not unduly strengthened through 
the abusive use of an appellate process;  
• that the national legislative ‘policy space’ developing countries need for their 
development objectives is not undermined through the introduction of an appel-
late process; 
• that the appellate system does not lead to the multilateralization of bilaterally 
negotiated agreements; and thereby compromise the flexibility afforded by a bi-
lateral system along with the collective decision of developing countries not to 
engage in a multilateral system that is not development friendly.   
More specifically with reference to some of the main points made in Dr Tam’s 
paper, the following questions are posed. First, is the justification for an appellate 
system on the basis of ‘consistency and coherence’ in judicial outcomes not really 
an argument for moulding a particular kind of ‘consistency and coherence’ into the 
disorganised international investment system - given that interpretation in an appel-
late process is a form of legislation? Is the objection to ‘inconsistency’ not really a 
call for normative uniformity? Second, should disparate investment norms necessar-
ily be interpreted identically on the basis of equality, fairness, predictably and reli-
ability?   Third, if investment involves and is about ultimately ensuring development 
- should development not be the overriding consideration in the process of interpre-
tation? Should there not be a strive consistently at better facilitating the ‘develop-
ment objective’ and better decisions all round, rather than pursuing a fetish for iden-
tity of interpretation?  Fourth, will a non-ringed fenced appellate system, set against 
a disorganised bilateral investment normative framework, not add to uncertainty and 
complexity - given that the beneficiaries of and parties to bilateral agreements will 
not be clear as to how ultimately their rights and obligations will be ‘coherently and 
consistently’ interpreted, not to mention the added complexity in interpretation aris-
ing from such a system? Finally, will an appellate system not lead to further investor 
bias, by augmenting the capacity of multilateral companies to pursue an appeal? 
In conclusion I would agree with Dr Tams’s negative assessment of the ‘consis-
tency’ basis for an appellate system but for different reasons.  I would not put it on 
such a high pedestal as other objectives - particularly the development objective. 
From a development perspective a treaty specific appeal system is favoured. A prin-
cipal concern about the efforts for introducing a non-ring fenced appellate system in 
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the investment sphere is that it seeks to add to the coherence and development of 
international investment law through a somewhat non-transparent route.  Further, the 
need to inject the development dimension in any proposed appellate system is im-
portant. A development friendly appellate system requires in particular a focus on its 
apparatus of interpretation; on participatory rights and technical assistance.   
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Inconsistent ICSID Awards – Is There a Need for         
an Appellate Structure?       
                     
Comment by Richard H. Kreindler∗ 
 
It is a great pleasure to comment briefly on the excellent presentation and conference 
paper provided by Dr. Tams, entitled "Is There a Need for an ICSID Appellate 
Structure?" Dr. Tams has sought to tackle a thorny question which is of increasing 
relevance both as a scientific inquiry and as a matter of practical relevance.  It af-
fects the everyday life of international investment-related contracts, dispute resolu-
tion provisions and subsequent arbitrations. 
My brief comments and observations use Dr. Tams' paper as a point of departure.  
They admittedly somewhat transcend the specific content of his own paper, and are 
organized into four areas of inquiry as follows:   
• First, Is there a trend in favor of an appellate mechanism in this area?   
• Second, How may this question be addressed in the ICSID Convention1 context 
versus bilateral and multilateral treaty contexts?   
• Third, What arguments exist for and against an appellate mechanism in this 
area?   
• Fourth, What may be said of Dr. Tams' specific proposal respecting "reference 
0proceedings" and could one contemplate analogous application of Article 
1131(2) of the NAFTA2?  
A. Trend in Favor of Appellate Mechanism  
The increase in number and size of investment-related and particularly ICSID Con-
vention-based arbitrations in the last ten and particularly five years – some would 
term it an onslaught – has led various observers to question whether some form of 
appellate mechanism may now be called for.  These observers include consumers of 
arbitration, professors, practitioners and arbitrators, and some wearing more than 
one of these hats simultaneously.  The very transparency of many investment-related 
arbitrations, especially those under the ICSID Convention, has given rise to dis-
 
∗  Richard H. Kreindler, Attorney Shearman & Sterling LLP, Frankfurt. The original presenta-
tion style has intentionally been substantially preserved. 
1 Available, inter alia, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf. 
2 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/NAFTA%20Text%20 
%20Excerpts.pdf. 
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crepancies or disconnects, or perceived discrepancies and disconnects.  Some have 
seen these as providing justification for some form of appellate review at a suprana-
tional level. 
Whether a true trend in this respect has been emerging is difficult to say.  Trends 
with respect to ICSID-related arbitration are sometimes measured by comments in 
doctrine, sometimes by holdings and dicta in awards, sometimes by observations at 
conferences and increasingly by web-based exchanges.  The sum total of the fore-
going does not necessarily suggest, in my mind, a trend in favor of an appellate 
mechanism.   
What it does suggest is that increasing disquiet is emerging in some circles over 
the discrepancies and disconnects, or perceived discrepancies and disconnects, that 
may have emerged from one award to the next.  These relate to such fundamental 
issues as the "fair and equitable treatment" standard and other public international 
law-based measurements which play a role in investment-related contracts, claims 
and disputes.3  On another level, it might be claimed that such a trend is in fact al-
ready emerging, even at an official or semi-official level.  One example of such a 
manifestation might be the October 2004 ICSID "Discussion Paper on Possible 
Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration" (October 22, 2004).4   
If there is such a trend, is this trend correct?  And even if it is not correct, is it ir-
reversible?  
Whether such a trend is "correct" cannot possibly be answered in a uniform man-
ner.  Indeed Dr. Tams himself does not presume to attach a blanket correctness or 
incorrectness to any such trend.  If for no other reason, it is impossible and in any 
event ill-advised to consider such a trend to be the proper path.  The reason is that 
the factors causing a perceived need for an appellate structure are diverse.  They 
affect only some ICSID matters and not others.  They are in part a sign of the times 
which may change over the next few years.   
The supposed need for and lack of uniformity and harmonization which some 
would see as the justification for an appellate structure may, even if it did exist to-
day, look quite different in five years, with the benefit of further jurisprudence and 
doctrinal development.  And also for that reason, the trend should not be considered 
irreversible.  The need seen by some for harmonization and supra-level control to-
day may be looked at with different colored glasses in the next decade.   
 
3 See, e.g., Kreindler, "Fair and Equitable Treatment – A Comparative International Law Ap-
proach," presented at the Harvard Law School Conference on "International Investment Law at 
a Crossroads," March 3, 2006, and reprinted in Transnational Dispute Management-TDM, 
Vol. 3, Issue 3, June 2006. 
4 Available, inter alia, at http://www.asil.org/ilib/2004/10/ilib041030.htm#d1. 
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B. ICSID Convention versus Other BIT/MIT Contexts  
The focus here is avowedly on ICSID arbitration (both contractual and non-
contractual), and not on ICSID Additional Facility5, NAFTA or other non-ICSID 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) or multilateral investment treaty (MIT) bases.  
Indeed in the overflow of discussion that has emerged regarding the possible need 
for an appellate structure, it is sometimes neglected that certain of the phenomena 
which are being experienced in investment-related arbitration, whether for good or 
for ill, have little or nothing to do with ICSID Convention matters per se.  Rather, 
they are rooted in specific, individually – and often idiosyncratically – drafted and 
interpreted BITs and MITs.   
At the same time, discussion in isolation or ignorance of other investment-related 
arbitration would be misleading, illusory and counterproductive, so that the ICSID 
discussion is to a great extent a global discussion.  Many, if not most, of the at least 
publicly accessible ICSID awards which have an influence on the emerging invest-
ment-related jurisprudence respecting such matters as expropriation, minimum stan-
dards and the like may also be seen as influential in non-ICSID based arbitrations 
and awards which address essentially the same issues.  And in reverse, various non-
ICSID based awards which have entered the public domain have been considered by 
ICSID Convention-based tribunals at least as having a certain precedential influence 
or weight.    
C. Arguments for and against Appellate Mechanism  
The arguments for and against an ICSID or supra-ICSID "appellate structure" are 
already well articulated, and to a great extent evenly balanced.  They include the 
following: 
I. First: Predictability   
The rationale is that if all ICSID Convention awards were subject to a largely uni-
form standard and staffing of review and appeal, then both the underlying awards 
and any appellate decisions would ensure or at least promote greater predictability as 
to how recurring issues would or should be decided.   
 
5 Available, inter alia, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm. 
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II. Second: Consistency   
At first blush, consistency might be perceived to pose the same issues as predictabi-
lity, and to be sure they are interrelated.  At the same time, predictability is not ne-
cessarily a guarantee of consistency.   
Consistency is not possible or desirable where a fact-driven analysis demands dif-
ferent results under different circumstances.  On some levels, consistency is no more 
possible in public international law issues, including many affecting investment 
arbitration, than in commercial disputes, since the result is and should often be fact-
dependent. 
III. Third: Coherence   
While arguably a subset of both predictability and consistency, coherence deserves 
its own standard and its own discussion, and is surely part of any debate about the 
need for an appellate structure.   
It might be contended that incoherent awards are not likely to foster predictability 
or consistency.  Yet the primary goal of a coherent award is that its reasoning and 
findings are understandable and defensible internally inter se, within the particular 
factual and legal framework of that dispute, its treaty or contract bases and the evi-
dence adduced.   
Thus on the one hand the coherence of an award, particularly in the transparent 
investment award context, may hinge on both the tenability of the conclusions under 
the particular factual and legal circumstances on the one hand, and on the tenability 
of the result vis à vis similarly situated prior awards.  At the same time, an internally 
coherent award may appear to be incoherent when compared with other awards 
which are perceived as treating the same subject, particularly application or interpre-
tation of the same legal principles or treaties.  
IV. Fourth: Transparency   
Transparency may be seen as affecting each of the factors already addressed above.   
The more transparent or accessible an award or ruling, the more likely it is to at-
tract the attention of judges, arbitrators, parties and counsel in simultaneously pend-
ing or future cases.  In turn, the more likely it is to precipitate agreement or dis-
agreement in subsequent awards or judgments.  This is particularly so if the prior 
ruling breaks new ground, disagrees with a prior line of precedent or otherwise in-
volves noteworthy participants and/or high stakes legally or commercially.  An ap-
pellate structure, it is argued, may serve the goal of transparency by subjecting al-
ready transparent ICSID decisions to a further transparent scrutiny process.   
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This is of course assuming that transparency is accepted as a goal of arbitration or 
at least investment arbitration – which is by no means a uniformly held view. 
V. Fifth: Accountability   
Like predictability, accountability is somehow fused with the other factors discussed 
above.  At the same time, accountability may be seen as portending greater control, 
greater circumspection and even greater mistrust of a process which, without some 
appellate review mechanism, would potentially go off on its own tangent.   
Query whether such control and circumspection are possible or desirable.  The 
same might be said of any appellate process whether in civil litigation or in arbitra-
tion generally.  But it remains that appeal per se, as opposed to challenge or annul-
ment on narrow and substantially procedural grounds, is largely considered ana-
thema to arbitration.  Annulment, on the other hand, including the ad hoc annulment 
scheme as practiced thus far in ICSID arbitration, is already seen as providing a 
certain measure of accountability.   
Those who advocate a further and more elaborate ICSID appellate structure often 
point precisely to the ad hoc annulment scheme as being a partial failure, and as 
engendering not more accountability, but actually less.  One reason for this view 
among those who hold it is that the ad hoc annulment scheme by design has been 
just that, ad hoc.  Most conceptions of an ICSID appellate scheme, by contrast, fore-
see a finite and largely unchanging group of appellate judges or reviewers who, by 
virtue of their tenure over time, might serve the goal of accountability better than in 
an ad hoc process where the judges or reviewers are different from annulment to 
annulment.   
This is all by way of presupposing that accountability in investment arbitration is 
desirable.  While arbitrators should not be "unaccountable," it is not an entirely 
unanimous view that arbitrators chosen for an individual case with a specific seat, 
specific law and specific rules actually owe any "accountability" to anyone – except 
of course to the parties, the institution if any, and the courts at the seat in the context 
of the mandatory norms of due process, equal treatment and other sources of control 
typically considered to be synonymous with the grounds for opposition to enforce-
ment found in Article V.1 and V.2 of the New York Convention.6  In the case of a 
self-enforcing award which is not deemed to be subject to the New York Conven-
tion, then accountability is a matter between the arbitrators, the parties and the insti-
tution.  Whether it extends further to issues of "creating good law" and the like is 
debatable. 
 
6 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, art. V, available, inter alia, at http://www.uncitral 
.org/-pdf/english/texts/-arbitration/NY-conv/XXII_1_e.pdf. 
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VI. Sixth: Bias   
Proponents and opponents of an appellate structure for ICSID often stray into the 
area of contending or denying that in the case of investor rights versus state rights, 
there is an inherent bias in favor of investor rights.   
Query whether the ICSID (and non-ICSID) awards which have entered the public 
domain, particularly in the last five years, buttress the argument that there is a sys-
temic, inherent or otherwise ineluctable bias in favor of investor protection.  Surely 
the answer overall is largely no.   
If that answer is correct, then a motivation for an appellate structure based on bias 
is misplaced.  On the other hand, there is the perception that this is a moving target.  
That in the next several years more and more developing states will become defen-
dants in ICSID and other investment arbitration.  That more issues of bias may arise 
and that if only for perception reasons, an appellate structure applicable to all state 
parties alike may be politically expedient. 
VII. Seventh: Challenges to Lis Pendens and Res Iudicata   
The discussion surrounding an appellate structure also relates to concerns as to 
whether conflicts or perceived conflicts in legal holdings from one ICSID award to 
another relating to such issues as fair and equitable treatment, fork-in-the-road pro-
visions, contract claims versus treaty claims, etc. are a threat to principles of lis 
pendens or res judicata known principally from the civil litigation field, and increa-
singly from international commercial arbitration.   
This concern is in turn related to the notion that "forum shopping" or "treaty 
shopping" in the ICSID context may do violence to established notions of prior 
claims pending or precedent.7  With the aid of an appellate structure, it is thought, 
disincentives to such shopping around might be created, thereby serving such other 
goals as predictability, consistency and accountability.   
Whether this holds water is debatable, since the addition of an appellate stage to 
one arbitration does not clearly assist in preventing another arbitration (or litigation) 
with overlapping parties and issues from being commenced in parallel.  Nor does an 
appellate structure for ICSID awards necessarily have any way of promoting prece-
dential value of ICSID awards for non-ICSID investment arbitrations having diffe-
rent treaty bases.      
 
7 See, e.g., Kreindler, "Arbitral Forum Shopping," in Parallel Arbitration Tribunals and Awards 
in International Arbitration, Dossiers 3 ICC Institute of World Business Law, 2005. 
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VIII. Eighth: Relative Adequacy of the Existing ICSID Annulment Mechanism    
If the ICSID ad hoc annulment process is deemed to be working satisfactorily, then 
query why an additional appellate structure or an appellate structure in lieu of an-
nulment would be called for.   
Of course, annulment and appeal are not necessarily synonymous, and a two-
tiered system would not be entirely unimaginable.  On the other hand, proponents of 
an appellate structure largely have in mind a one-tier system in lieu of ad hoc an-
nulment.  For some such proponents, the annulment system thus far is perceived to 
have been unhelpful, unwieldy, heavily biased in favor of annulment, and a dis-
guised means of obtaining two bites at the apple.  Even if this were true, which de-
fies the empirical and other experience, it is not entirely clear how an appellate 
structure would remedy or improve upon the annulment mechanism except insofar 
as it would be "staffed" on a consistent basis by a group of judges with long tenure 
who are meant to counteract the ad hoc, piecemeal approach to date.   
Whether the ad hoc, piecemeal approach to date is in need of replacement is an-
other matter altogether.  On a certain level, the ad hoc, piecemeal annulment com-
mittee in an individual ICSID matter is arguably no more or less objectionable than 
the ad hoc, piecemeal judge or panel of judges in an individual ICC, UNCITRAL or 
other challenge proceeding before the Swiss Federal Tribunal, the Paris Court of 
Appeal or the US District Court for the Southern District of New York.  While those 
state judges are civil servants with long tenure, that tenure per se does not necessa-
rily guarantee long-term expertise in matters relevant to annulment of international 
arbitration awards.  Admittedly, on the other hand, the concentration of competence 
and expertise now being aspired to in precisely these named courts does suggest a 
less ad hoc approach than that of the ICSID annulment committee mechanism. 
Ultimately, each of the grounds addressed briefly above can be seen as providing 
a reasonable basis for considering an ICSID appellate structure, as also elucidated 
by Dr. Tams, but each one can also be turned on its head.  In the final analysis, the 
most compelling obstacle to such a reform would be one of an entirely different, 
pragmatic nature: namely, the relative impracticality of seeking, let alone obtaining 
the necessary amendment to the ICSID Convention8, in fulfillment of the stringent 
requirements for amendment.   
For that reason alone, there may be little utility in taking a black-and-white posi-
tion on the issue, although this can be found in recent other commentary.  
 
8 Article 66(1) ICSID Convention provides: "(1) If the Administrative Council shall so decide 
by a majority of two-thirds of its members, the proposed amendment shall be circulated to all 
Contracting States for ratification, acceptance or approval.  Each amendment shall enter into 
force 30 days after dispatch by the depositary of this Convention of a notification to Contrac-
ting States that all Contracting States have ratified, accepted or approved the amendment."  
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D. Dr. Tams' Mention of "Reference Proceedings"  
The foregoing tour d'horizon of certain of the arguments for and against the imple-
mentation of an ICSID appellate structure or mechanism may serve, it is hoped, as a 
useful background to appreciate the interesting and creative remarks and study un-
dertaken by Dr. Tams.  In particular, they are meant to help in putting into perspec-
tive his discussion of "reference proceedings" in the context of this debate.  Refe-
rence proceedings may be an alternative to the contemplation of an appellate struc-
ture, especially in view of the practical challenge of attempting to introduce such a 
structure by Convention amendment.  
With the potential exception of intrepretative notes under NAFTA Article 1131, 
there is in fact no system of reference proceedings in ICSID or non-ICSID based 
investment arbitration.  Article 1131(2) NAFTA9 provides: "An interpretation by the 
Commission of a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal estab-
lished under this Section."  This is to be compared and contrasted with Article 64 
ICSID Convention, which provides: "Any dispute arising between Contracting 
States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not 
settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International Court of Justice by the 
application of any party to such dispute, unless the States concerned agree to another 
method of settlement." [emphasis added]  
Is possible analogous application of Article 1131(2) NAFTA a solution to the ap-
pellate structure approach, and in view of Dr. Tams' remarks?   
On one level, the answer may be No, there are too many conceptual and other dif-
ferences between NAFTA and ICSID.  These include differences inherent in the 
simple fact that NAFTA is an MIT while ICSID is a Convention respecting dispute 
resolution relating to disparate BITS, MITS and also non-treaty disputes.  Further-
more, there is a narrow tripartite focus of NAFTA versus the expansive, multilateral 
nature of ICSID.  
On another level, and particularly in view of Dr. Tams' paper, the answer might 
well be Yes: 
 First, the Article 1131(2) NAFTA concept may be seen as existing in all cases as 
a matter of general treaty law.  Thus Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties10 provides: "[When interpreting a treaty], [t]here shall be taken into 
account […]: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions."  The referral mechanism 
in NAFTA may be seen as having become a matter of general treaty law at least 
between and among the member states to the treaty.  An analogous situation might 
 
9 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/NAFTA%20Text%20 
%20-Excerpts.pdf. 
10 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Vienna%20Conventi 
on%20on%20-the%20Law%20of%20Treaties.pdf. 
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be conceivable under ICSID, although again the requirement of an amendment may 
be unavoidable.  
Second, Article 1131(2) NAFTA, at least in the narrow NAFTA context, has 
proven to be an effective, clear, time-efficient method for facilitating or even impo-
sing clarity and uniformity, at least prospectively.  The obvious example here is the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission binding interpretation in 2001 respecting "fair and 
equitable treatment" under Article 1105 NAFTA as "not requir[ing] treatment in 
addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens."  There can be little doubt that – harking 
back to the discussion above of predictability, consistency, coherence and the like – 
this interpretation promptly contributed to a certain realignment of NAFTA juris-
prudence.   
Thus prior to the FTC interpretation the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada Par-
tial Award (2001)11 had held that "fair and equitable treatment" was an independent, 
self-contained, additive treaty standard.  It gave a broad interpretation of Art. 1105 
and imposed no threshold limitation that the conduct at issue be "egregious," "outra-
geous," etc.  Acceptance of the narrower FTC interpretation followed in the Pope & 
Talbot v. Canada Final Award (2002)12.   
Then, in Methanex v. US (2005)13, the tribunal stated that the FTC interpretation 
was binding not only as a matter of NAFTA law, but also pursuant to the general 
law of treaties, and that Article 1105 required showing the existence of an explicit 
rule of customary international law as being applicable to the case in order to estab-
lish a breach of the "Minimum Standard of Treatment."   
NAFTA-based awards since the FTC binding interpretation continue to grapple 
with F&ET, but within the confines of the interpretation: Mondev v. US (2002)14, 
UPS v. Canada (2002)15, ADF v. US (2003)16, Loewen v. US (2003)17, Waste Ma-
nagement v. Mexico (2004)18, GAMI v. Mexico (2004)19, Methanex v. US (2005)20, 
and Thunderbird v. Mexico (2006)21. 
 
11 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Pope-Canada-Award-
10Apr2001.pdf. 
12 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Pope-Canada-Damages-
31May2002.pdf. 
13  Available, inter alia, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_ Fi 
nal_Award.pdf.   
14 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Mondev-US-Award-
11Oct2002.pdf. 
15 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/UPS-Canada-Jurisdiction-
22Nov-2002.pdf. 
16 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/ADF-US-Award-
9Jan2003.pdf. 
17 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Loewen-US-Award-26Ju 
n2003.pdf. 
18 Available, inter alia, at http://naftaclaims.com/-Disputes/Mexico/Waste/WasteFinalAwardMe 
rits.pdf. 
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Third, a system of binding interpretation within ICSID might be seen as doing 
violence to bilateral meetings of the minds in individually negotiated BITs and 
FTAs, including retroactively, but in fact would be fully consistent with Article 
31(3) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties22.  Such system, assuming it could 
be achieved through the necessary modalities of approval of an amendment to the 
ICSID Convention, would conceivably also prospectively contribute to harmoniza-
tion and unification of drafting of certain typical, potentially open provisions.   
These include respecting, e.g., "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection 
and security" in the context of "customary international law."  They also include 
application of the proper law under the default provision in Article 42(1) ICSID 
Convention and supplementation of interpretation of a BIT through international law 
(e.g., the issue in the Wena annulment proceedings23).  They further include the 
validity of waiver of the right of annulment under Article 52 ICSID Convention, the 
meaning or standard of interpretation of "legal dispute" arising directly out of an 
"investment" under Article 25(1) ICSID Convention (e.g., Mihaly International24), 
and the meaning or standard of interpretation of "nationality" and "foreign control" 
under Article 25(2) ICSID Convention. 
Fourth, issues such as arose in SGS v. Pakistan25 and SGS v. Philippines26 – as-
suming for the sake of argument that that discordance was an undesirable develop-
ment – could be retroactively addressed for future cases, and even for applications 
for interpretation or correction within the current ICSID Convention Article 50(1) 
interpretation and correction scheme (see, e.g., Wena v. Egypt27).  This provision 
states, "If any dispute shall arise between the parties as to the meaning or scope of 
an award, either party may request interpretation of the award by an application in 
writing addressed to the Secretary-General." 
Fifth, the initial phase of three to five years would be one of uncertainty, instabil-
ity, but perhaps no greater than what is currently occurring.  After such initial phase, 
 
19 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/GAMI-Mexico-FinalAwa 
rd15Nov-2004.pdf. 
20 Available, inter alia, at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Methanex/Methanex_Fin 
al_Award.pdf.   
21 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Thunderbird-Mexico-Aw 
ard.pdf. 
22 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Vienna%20Convention 
%20on%20the-%20Law%20of%20Treaties.pdf. 
23 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Wena-Egypt-Annulment-
5Feb2002.pdf. 
24 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Mihaly-SriLanka-Award-
15Mar2002-.pdf. 
25 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/SGS-Pakistan-Jurisdictio 
n-6Aug2003-.pdf. 
26 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/SGS-Philippines-Jurisd 
iction-29Jan-2004.pdf. 
27 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Wena-Egypt-Annulment-
5Feb2002.pdf. 
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greater stability as to such points would occur: witness the NAFTA F&ET situation.  
Inconsistencies of the Lauder28 variety would still occur, and perhaps should still 
occur, as in general commercial arbitration and litigation, but that would not be the 
focus of binding interpretation.  And insofar as ICSID awards have a persuasive 
effect on non-ICSID investment-related disputes, including NAFTA, ICSID Addi-
tional Facility, UNCITRAL Rules29 and Energy Charter Treaty30, the ICSID binding 
interpretation could have a salutary effect on the uncertainties affecting various 
investment arbitration regimes.  
Sixth, apart from the admittedly considerable obstacle of effectuating the neces-
sary Convention amendment, a system of binding interpretation would be no more 
cumbersome and problematic, and arguably far less so, than various other proposals 
for establishment of an ICSID appellate structure, or for expansion of the ICSID 
annulment mechanism.  
Ultimately, the chances of obtaining unanimous approval for an amendment of 
the ICSID Convention to institute such a mechanism may be slim, but perhaps no 
less slim than the chances of doing so to institute an "appellate structure."  And such 
appellate structure might be far riskier in the conception and implementation, and 
also less consistent with the original goals of finality and unappealability of the 
Convention's original drafters.  In any event, Dr. Tams' analysis of certain of the 
related issues in this debate is a valuable and perceptive contribution to a discussion 
which is likely to be only in its beginning stages.  
 
28 Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Lauder-Czech-FinalAwa 
rd-3Sept2001.pdf,http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-PartialAward-13 
Sept2001.-pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-PartialAward-13Sep 
t2001-Dissent.pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-Appealof Partia-
lAward-15May2003.pdf, http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAwa 
rd-14Mar2003.pdf, http://www.in-vestmentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-FinalAward-14 
Mar2003-Separate.pdf, http://www.invest-mentclaims.com/decisions/CME-Czech-AppealofFi 
nalAward2003-15May2003.pdf. 
29 Available, inter alia, at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rul 
es.pdf. 
30  Available, inter alia, at http://www.investmentclaims.com/instruments/Energy%20Charter%20 
Treaty.pdf. 
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Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO       
                             
Christina Pfaff∗ 
A. Introduction  
At the dawn of the twenty-first century foreign investment and the protection of 
foreign investor rights belong to the most innovated fields in international law. The 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)1, the specifi-
cally specialized arbitral institution for the settlement of investment disputes has 
shaped, with enormous success, both the development and interpretation of many 
legal standards and guarantees in international investment law2. This success is 
based on certain unique advantages. ICSID is attached to the World Bank, unlike 
any other international arbitral institution. Due to the status of the World Bank3 most 
countries may be more likely to observe ICSID obligations4, which can improve the 
 
∗  Christina Pfaff, LL.M. (European and International Economic Law) is Ph.D Candidate and 
Research Assistant at the Wilhelm Merton Center for European Integration and International 
Economic Order, University Frankfurt, Germany. 
1  BGBl. 1969 II, p. 1191; the convention is also available at <www.worldbank.org/icsid 
/basicdoc/basicdoc>; the implementation of the ICSID Convention was based on the attempt of 
the drafters to attain a „careful balance between the interests of investors and host states,“, see 
further Delaume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 Am. J. Int’l L., p. 784 (1983); Smutny, 
Arbitration before the International Centre fort he Settlement of Investment Disputes (2002), 
Business Law International B.L.I., p. 367; Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitra-
tion (2004), p. 38; Fahmi/Shihata, The experience of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (1999) ICISD Review, p. 299-369. 
2  The number of cases before ICSID increased considerably after the invocation of arbitration 
under the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement); see generally 
Bishop/Crawford/Reisman, Foreign Investment Disputes (2005), p. 11; it is important to note, 
however, that the ICSID Convention does not contain any comprehensive rule on the protec-
tion of foreign investment, but only the procedural framework, see Art. 42 (1) ICSID Conven-
tion. 
3  See generally Fahmi/Shihata, The dynamic evolution of international organizations: the case 
of the World Bank (1999), Journal of the History of International Law, p. 217-249; Tschofen, 
The World Bank in a changing world (1995), p. 52. 
4  Fahmi/Shihata, Avoidance and settlement of disputes - the World Bank’s approach and ex-
perience (1999) International Law Forum, p. 90-98; Görs, Internationales Investitionsrecht- 
Vom völkerrechtlichen Enteignungsschutz zum europäischen Binnenmarkt (2005), p. 74; in 
that sense also Slaughter, The future of international law is domestic – or the European way of 
law, Harvard International Law Journal (2006), p. 338. 
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protection of investment in return5. ICSID is based upon an international treaty, the 
ICSID Convention6. Any breach of any obligation under the ICSID Convention 
implies a violation of international law7. Moreover, investment liberalization has 
been carried out primarily by bilateral arrangements8, such as the Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties (BITs)9. These agreements are entered into by trading partners and 
determine a consensus on the conditions of foreign investment and investor reme-
dies between the parties10. Most of these BITs refer to ICSID for dispute resolu-
tion11. 
But after forty years of ICSID the time has come to not only to take stock of the 
work of the tribunals under the ICSID Convention, but to take potential alternative 
approaches to the field of foreign investment protection into account. While activi-
ties of the ICSID Tribunal have been in the centre of academic discussion for a long 
 
5  Semler, Schiedsverfahren im Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 97-102.  
6  Lörcher, ICSID Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 12; Semler, Schiedsverfahren im 
Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2003), 
SchiedsVZ, p. 97 (99). 
7  Lörcher, ICSID Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 11.  
8  Stoll, WTO-Handbuch (2002), Chapter C. I. 6., para 2; Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to 
ICSID Arbitration (2004), p. 38-40; Semler, Schiedsverfahren im  Rahmen von Investitions-
schutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 97. 
9  Direct foreign investment is protected by a network of over 2400 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) involving 176 countries and additionally a vast number of provisions in plurilateral and 
multilateral treaties concerning investment protection or international trade. These BITs have 
been set into function over the past 40 years and provide a legal framework for international 
investment on the bilateral level. They contain relatively similar provisions and create action-
able standards of conduct for governments regarding the treatment of foreign investment, 
though the arrangements bind only the parties involved.  
10  The establishment of ICSID led to an increase of legal certainty with regard to investment 
disputes, see Nathan, Submissions to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes in Breach of the Convention (1995) J.Int.Arb., p. 27 and Fahmi/Shihata, Towards a 
Greater Depoliticalization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, (1986), 
ICSID Review FILJ, p. 3; Schäfer, Enteignungsstandards im Völkerrecht, RIW (1998), p. 193.   
11  See <www.worldbank/icsid/about/about.>; ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the 
Framework for ICSID Arbitration, Discussion Paper 22 October 2004, para 5; Semler, 
Schiedsverfahren im Rahmen von Investitionsschutzabkommen der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land (2003), SchiedsVZ, p. 99; in addition consensus on jurisdiction of ICSID can also be de-
termined in multilateral agreements such as the NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty, see 
Reed/Paulsson/Blackaby, Guide to ICSID Arbitration (2004), p. 35; Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary (2001), Art. 25, para 257; Broches, Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States of 1965 – Explanatory 
Notes and Survey of its Application (1993), YCA, p. 627, 643, para 35; ibid., Denying         
ICSID’s jurisdiction (1996), Journal of International Arbitration, p. 21-30; Hirsch, The Arbi-
tration Mechanism of the International Centre fort he Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(1993), p. 48 (51), Lew/Kröll/Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 
(2003), Chapter 28, para 48.  
 269
period and debated extensively12, the protection of foreign investment by other 
mechanisms has been much less considered. A number of international treaties deal-
ing with the protection of (foreign) property are based upon international law13. In 
spite of the presence of property protection in both texts of international human 
rights and international trade law, the role of these instruments in the context of 
foreign investment protection remained largely irrelevant and research on this par-
ticular issue remained scarce. In addressing this gap, the present study, with due 
regard to the complexity of the issues, seeks to increase the level of understanding of 
the role of human rights and international trade mechanisms in the area of foreign 
investment protection, drawing on an analysis on the specific aspects of foreign 
investment protection in international human rights and trade law.    
The emerging code of human rights provides a set of standards that apply to every 
sector of human interaction. In the context of foreign property protection human 
rights law and institutions comply with the basic rules of aliens’ law, which is based 
on the international law principle of diplomatic protection14. The concept of diplo-
matic protection as based on  the traditional view according to which the individual 
constitutes only a mere part of the State is founded on the traditional do ut des ap-
proach15 in general international law. Understanding the instrument in such fashion 
limits the role of international human rights law with respect to foreign property 
protection. A new generation of international human rights treaties emerged and 
tackled this classical approach by granting treaty rights to all individuals16. Thus 
these treaties serve the benefit of all individuals, irrespective of their citizenship, and 
the international legal community, as its observance is monitored by all state parties 
equally. Yet, the protection of foreign investment and the protection of foreign pro-
perty in general international law are footing on different goals: Human rights17 
together with aliens’ law aim at a certain  detachment of the individual from the 
state as well as a civilized conduct among states while the law on foreign investment 
protection focuses at protecting foreign investment as such. These differences have 
 
12  See Schreuer, The ICSID Convention - A Commentary (2001), Art. 25, paras 92 –125 and the 
references cited. 
13  E. g. the European Convention on Human Rights, which talks about international law in ge-
neral in its Art. 1 of the First Additional Protocol. 
14  Diplomatic Protection is to be understood as the protection given by a subject of international 
law to individuals, i. e. legal or natural persons, against a violation of international law by an-
other subject of international law, see Geck, Diplomatic Protection, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), En-
cyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 1046. 
15  The do ut des approach is also defined as the concept of reciprocity; see further Parisi/Ghei, 
The role of reciprocity in international law, Cornell International Law Journal (1968), p. 93-
123. For a methodical approach see Kahan, The logic of reciprocity (2003) Michigan Law Re-
view, p. 71-103. 
16  E. g. the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), see Articles 24 and 44.  
17  Human rights are defined as “those claims made by men, for themselves or on behalf of other 
men, supported by some theory which concentrates on the humanity of man, on man as a hu-
man being, a member of mankind.”, Dorwick, Human Rights, Problems, Perspectives and 
Texts (1979), p. 8. 
 270
had a strong influence on the protection of (foreign) property by human rights in-
struments with regard to consistency and coherency issues in jurisprudence, and, as 
a consequence thereof, on the entire role of human rights institutions in the field of 
foreign investment. 
Trade and investment are closely linked with each other18. Both are complemen-
tary and substitute strategies for business looking for access to foreign markets, and 
the realisation of new commercial opportunities19. As establishing a commercial 
presence in a foreign country is one of the modes of delivering services investment 
goes often hand in hand with trade in services as well. From an economic perspec-
tive, foreign investment is a core part of the linkage between global markets and 
international trade20, because access to the markets through a commercial presence 
brings about foreign investment, which may lead to additional trade21. Both concepts 
appear as two sides of the same coin. This substantial overlap between trade and 
investment law leads to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their role in the 
context of foreign investment. Some WTO Agreements contain investment provi-
sions, e.g. the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), but more or less as incidental 
matters to some main theme. In addition, the panels set up under the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding (DSU) had to deal with investment issues occasionally22. Yet, 
the close linkage between trade and investment sharply contrasts with the current 
role of the WTO in the field of foreign investment protection, in particular since 
investment appears as the “missing panel” in the system and no comprehensive 
multilateral agreement on foreign investment protection under WTO auspices could 
be successfully concluded23.  
 
18  See e.g., WTO, Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, The Rela-
tionship Between Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, WT/WGTI/W/7, 18 September 1997. 
19  Sauve, Advisor of the OECD’s Trade Directorate (2003) emphasized this assumption by  
stating that „the absence of a creditable and coherent regime for international investment is 
particularly glaring at a time when investment (more than trade) has become the driving force 
of deepening integration in the world economy“, Trade Rules behind Borders, Essays on Ser-
vice, Investment and the New Trade Agenda (2004), p. 22 f.  
20  Lörcher, ICSID-Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (2005), SchiedsVZ, p. 11; Tietje, Die Beilegung inter-
nationaler Investitionsstreitigkeiten, in Streitbeilegung in den internationalen Wirtschaftsbe-
ziehungen, (Marauhn, ed.) p. 49. 
21  See Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations (1968) 10, stating that “The function of the law of 
responsibility of States for injuries to aliens … is to provide in the general world interest, ade-
quate protection for the stranger, to the end that travel, trade, and intercourse may be facili-
tated”. 
22  Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R; WT/DS59/R; Canada- Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act 
(FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984). 
23  In this context, Sauve (supra note 19, p. 24) stated that the “patchwork quilt of different bila-
teral treaties, regional arrangements, and limited pluri-lateral or multilateral instruments rela-
ting to investment stands in sharp contrast to the comprehensive system of norms and princi-
ples governing international trade.”  
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The task of this paper consists in illuminating the current state of foreign invest-
ment protection by other mechanisms than the ICSID focusing on human rights 
institutions and the WTO. It attempts to provide a survey on relevant human rights 
institutions and provisions of the WTO agreements dealing with foreign investment 
issues. The conceptual approaches to the issue of foreign investment protection in 
international human rights law and in international trade law are analyzed in order to 
draw conclusions on the advantages and disadvantages of each system from the 
investor’s perspective. In addition, a critical look is taken at relevant court decisions 
rendered in the context of foreign investment protection. The paper does not, how-
ever, aim at comparing these mechanisms and their systems but instead points at the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of each mechanism, in particular as against 
ICSID. These considerations permit an evaluation of the elements which define the 
role of the human rights systems and the WTO system with respect to foreign in-
vestment protection.   
The paper is structured as follows. As a starting point, Chapter B gives a brief 
overview of the historical development of foreign property protection in general 
international law. It focuses on the rule of diplomatic protection which as a concept 
has experienced an on-going adjustment to the development of general international 
law over the last decades. The traditional approach of diplomatic protection24 ap-
pears to have somewhat changed, as rights and entitlements are accrued to the indi-
vidual by human rights conventions. The conceptual understanding of the instrument 
has been defined and clarified by the jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Various court 
decisions, such as the Barcelona Traction Case, tackled the concept of the rule of 
diplomatic protection. The analysis of the decisions shows the continuing adjust-
ment of the rule of diplomatic protection in general international law.  
Chapter C provides an overview of the universal and regional human rights insti-
tutions playing a role in the field of foreign investment protection. In this context, 
the paper focuses on the category of treaties which accord treaty rights to all indi-
viduals and thus create a favourable legal position for foreign investors. The respec-
tive treaties as well as the pertinent jurisprudence are introduced and analyzed by 
identifying their specific features which render one instrument more or less suitable 
for foreign investment protection than another. Chapter C illustrates the principal 
characteristics of foreign property and investment protection in international human 
rights law and argues that international investment law and human rights are based 
on different grounds.  
Next, Chapter D points at clarifying the role of the WTO in the field of foreign 
investment. This topic is approached by a short survey on the development of fo-
reign investment protection within the WTO system. The core part of the Chapter 
focuses on the WTO agreements dealing with investment issues. The provisions of 
 
24  The traditional approach of diplomatic protection determined the mediatisation of the individ-
ual entirely.  
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the agreements are examined with regard to the respective jurisprudence. The paper 
argues that despite the close linkage between trade and investment the current ap-
proach of the WTO to the field of foreign investment is dominated by the attempt 
not to include comprehensive investment provisions into the existing agreements 
due to conflicts attached to the issue. This assumption creates obstacles for a poten-
tial multilateral comprehensive agreement on foreign investment. These obstacles 
are illustrated and summarized in Part III which aims at defining overlaps and diver-
gences between trade law and investment law as well as the need for a multilateral 
regime, in particular with regard to consistency and coherence in international juris-
prudence. The paper concludes with part E, which evaluates the results of the ana-
lytical framework and assesses potential as alternative approaches to foreign invest-
ment protection as compared to the ICSID Convention.   
B. The Protection of Foreign Property in General International Law 
Fundamental to the protection of foreign investment is the concept of property. The 
protection of (foreign) property25 by rules of international law has been subject to 
on-going controversial debates26 and the question of property rights of aliens has 
become rather separated from that of a general minimum standard of protection. The 
traditional protection of foreign investment was based on the rules of aliens’ law27, 
in particular the international expropriation rules28, as aliens may have claims 
against natural or legal persons and institutions in a foreign state29. Pursuant to the 
rules of international law only the home state of the foreign investor can assert 
 
25  Alien property is determined by the effective power to enforce measures against such property, 
see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Aliens, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International 
Law, vol. I (1992), p. 116. 
26  Dolzer, New Foundations of the Law of Expropriation of Alien Property , American Journal of 
International Law (1981), p. 553- 589; Verwey, The Taking of Foreign Property under Interna-
tional Law: A New Legal Perspective?, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (1984), p. 
3-96; Borchardt, The Diplomatic Protection of citizens abroad (1915), p. 8-56; Slaugh-
ter/Tulumello/Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A new Generation 
of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, American Journal of International Law 92 (1998) p. 367-397; 
von Glahn, Law among Nations; An Introduction to Public International Law (1996); Frieden, 
Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of global Finance, 
International Organizations 45 (1991) p. 425-451; Seidl-Hohenveldern (supra note 25) at 116 
with further references.  
27  Ipsen, Individualschutz im Völkerrecht, Zum völkergewohnheitsrechtlichen Mindeststandard, 
in Völkerrecht (Ipsen, ed.), § 50, para 2.  
28  Banz, Völkerrechtlicher Eigentumsschutz durch Investitionschutzabkommen, insbesondere die 
Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland seit 1959 (1988), p. 135; Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteig-
nung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 3. 
29  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 135.  
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claims on the basis of diplomatic protection30 in case of interferences with aliens’ 
property. The rule of diplomatic protection reflects the traditional view in interna-
tional law “that a State is in reality asserting its own rights- its right to ensure, in the 
person of its subjects, respect for the rule of international law.”31 Thus the link of 
nationality gives the state the right to protect its nationals against abuses by other 
states. The concept rests on the assumption that not individuals, but their home 
states are the holders of the rights granted in international law, as the individual is a 
mere part of its home state32. In addition the home state of the investor will not ac-
cept the exclusive power of the host state to judge on the legality of the taking and 
the amount of compensation due33. The exhaustion of local remedies is an obligatory 
prerequisite for the application of the rule of diplomatic protection34.  
The scope of the international law norms concerning protection of (foreign) pro-
perty comprises not only the “classical” expropriation cases but also cases where 
measures tolerated or adopted by the host state impair and defeat the effective use of 
alien property as if it were deprivation of it35. International law does not exclude 
interference with alien property entirely, but interference with it may violate interna-
tional discrimination rules, if such measures are directed exclusively against fo-
 
30  Diplomatic Protection is to be understood here as the protection given by a subject of interna-
tional law to individuals, i. e. natural or legal persons, against a violation of international law 
by another subject of international law. The legal institution of diplomatic protection has been 
shaped by some important developments in the international legal community, e. g. by the evo-
lution of human rights and by efforts to raise individuals more and more to the status of sub-
jects of international law.  
31  Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. (1924); PCIJ, Series No. 5 (1925), 
judgment p. 6 at p. 12; c. f.; also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Judgment 
ICJ reports (1970),  45; separate opinion of Judge Morelli, at p. 222 (226). 
32  This viewpoint is backed by the concept of reciprocity (traditional do ut des between states). 
33  United States –Iran Agreement on 19 January 1981 (Hostages and Financial Arrangements); 
see Aldrich, What Constitutes a Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the United 
States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 88 American Journal of International Law, (1994), p. 585 (610); 
Baker/Davis, Arbitral Proceedings under the UNCITRAL Rules - The Experience of the 
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 23 George Washington Journal of International Law & 
Economics (1989), p. 267 (347); Briner, Luncheon Talk: The United States-Iran Claims Tri-
bunal and Disputes Involving Sovereigns, 18 Arbitration International 299 (2002); Jones, The 
United States-Iran Claims Tribunal: Private Rights and State Responsibility, 24 Virginia Jour-
nal of International Law (1984), p. 259 (285); Lillich, The United States-Iran Claims Tribunal, 
1981-1983 (1985), p. 15 f.  
34  The requirement that individuals first exhaust local remedies gives states – and particularly 
their domestic courts – an incentive to reach conclusions acceptable to the international institu-
tion so that the international court need not intervene to review the case; see e. g. the Mavrom-
matis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 2 (1939), p. 6 at p. 12 of the 1924 judgment; 
Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76 (1939), p. 4 at p. 18; Electricity 
Company of Sofia Case, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 77 (1939), p. 64 at p. 78 and Interhandel Case, 
ICJ Reports 1959, p. 6 at p. 27. 
35  These measures are referred to as a „creeping nationalization“ or a so-called „constructive 
taking“. 
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reigners36. The host state has to grant minimum standard compensation37 due for the 
taking of the property to citizens and aliens alike38.  
Recently, the International Law Commission (ILC), a permanent organ for the 
codification of international law39 decided, subject to the approval of the General 
Assembly40, at its forty-seventh session (1995) to include the issue of diplomatic 
protection on its agenda41 and qualified the topic as appropriate for codification and 
progressive development in international law. At the fifty-eighth session (2006) the 
ILC adopted a text of draft articles concerning the rule of diplomatic protection and, 
thus, concluded its work on this issue42. The current draft version of the articles on 
diplomatic protection contains a chapter on general principles of diplomatic protec-
tion, such as a definition of term and scope43. The following chapters address inter 
alia the local remedies rule and the status of legal and natural persons44. The draft 
articles, however, deal only with the secondary rules45, which are the rules relating 
to the conditions that must be met for bringing a claim for diplomatic protection. In 
 
36  This problem was addressed in the Chilean Copper Nationalization Case by the Landgericht 
Hamburg, Chile-Kupfer Streit, Court Decision of 22 January 1973, Außenwirtschaftsdienst des 
Betriebsberaters (AWD), Vol. 19 (1973) p. 163-165 and Court Decision of 13 March 1974, 
AWD, Vol. 20, p. 410-413; English version available in ILM, vol. 12 (1973) p. 251-289 and 
ILM, Vol. 13 (1974), p.1115-1120; and the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Corporación 
de Cobre c. Societé Brade Copper Corporation et Societé du Groupement d’Importation des 
Metaux, 29 novembre 1972, clunet, vol. 100 (1973) p. 227-238, English version available in 
ILM, Vol. 12 (1973), p. 182-189; Behrens, Rechtsfragen im chilenischen Kupferstreit, Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (1973), p. 394 (435); Seidl-
Hohenveldern, Chilean Chopper Nationalization Cases before German Courts, American Jour-
nal of International Law , vol. 69, No. 1, (1975), p. 110-119. 
37  The minimum standard is defined as prompt, adequate and effective compensation.  
38  Garcia-Amador, Fourth Report on International Responsibility, YILC (1959 II) 1-36; ibid., 
State Responsibility: Some new Problems; Recueil des Cours, vol. 94 (1958-II) , p. 365 (491); 
Parry/Clive, Some considerations upon the protection of individuals in international law; Re-
cueil des Cours, vol. 90 (1956-II), p. 653 (726). 
39  For a general survey see Sir Vallat; International Law Commission, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. II (1995) p. 1208-1212. 
40  The General Assembly instructed the ILC in 1996 to further examine the topic and to define its 
scope and content in the light of the observations made during debates, Resolution 51/160 of 
16 December 1996; see also A/51/358 and Add. 1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
51/160, the ILC established a Working Group on the topic at its forty-nine session (1997). The 
report of the Working Group was endorsed by the ILC, Yearbook ILC, vol. II, para 171. 
41  See Yearbook ILC (1995), vol. II, para 501. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 51/160 
of 11 December 1996, the ILC included this topic on its agenda at its forty-ninth session 
(1997), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-second Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/52/10), paras 169-171. 
42  Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Chapter IV, p. 16. 
43  See Chapter I, Article 1 and 2; yet, the draft article makes no attempt to provide a complete 
and comprehensive definition of diplomatic protection. It rather defines the salient features of 
the rule in the sense in which the term is used in the present draft articles.  
44  See Chapter II, Article 4 and Chapter III, Article 9. 
45  The primary rules, which govern the treatment of the person and property of aliens, see Report 
of the International Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), Chapter IV, p 22 (23).  
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addition, certain weaknesses inherent to the instrument, such as the protection of 
stateless persons46 or the exhaustion of local remedies47 as a prerequisite for the 
application of the rules of diplomatic protection were tackled by the draft codifica-
tion. It is important to note that any rights resulting from either customary interna-
tional law or bilateral or multilateral human rights treaties remain unaffected48. Ul-
timately, draft Article 17 deals with foreign investment, stating that “[t]he present 
draft articles do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent with special rules 
of international law, such as treaty provisions for the protection of investment.” The 
article contributes to treaties, which, within their provisions concerning dispute 
resolution, exclude or depart substantially from the rules governing diplomatic pro-
tection. BITs or the multilateral ICSID Convention are the primary examples of such 
treaties49. Their provisions for dispute resolution allow direct access of the investor 
to international arbitration and dispense with the conditions for the exercise of dip-
lomatic protection. Avoiding political uncertainty as an inherent factor in the nature 
of diplomatic protection is another advantage for dispute resolution in accordance 
with these respective treaty provisions. The ILC draft articles are notably based on 
the jurisprudence rendered by international tribunals with regard to the instrument of 
diplomatic protection.  
 
46  Article 8 of the draft version.  
47  Article 14 of the draft version; Article 15 determines recognized exceptions from the local 
remedies rule. 
48  A state may protect an individual in inter-state proceedings under the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171), the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (article 11), the Conven-
tion on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (United Na-
tions, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, p. 85, art. 21), the European Convention on Human Rights (ar-
ticle 24), the American Convention on Human Rights (art. 45) and the African Charter on Hu-
man and People’s Rights ( United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1520, p. 217, arts. 47-54), see 
draft article 16.  
49  Article 27 (1) of the ICSID Convention reads: „No Contracting State shall give diplomatic 
protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals 
and another Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbi-
tration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by 
and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.“, see United Nations, Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission, Fifty-eighth Session (2006), p. 89 (90).  
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I. Historical Development of Investment Protection in International Law 
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foreign investment was largely made 
in the context of colonial ambitions50. Notions of collective ownership of property 
which were widely prevalent in the colonies were replaced by European notions of 
individual property51. The common form of foreign investment of these days was 
indirect, through loans and government bonds, and foreign direct investment, on 
which this paper is focused, started to take shape only in the late nineteenth century. 
The increase of such foreign direct investment was promoted by two independent, 
but interrelated developments, which were, on the one hand, the rapidly increasing 
rate of technological invention and, on the other hand, the growth of corporations. 
When the host governments expropriated property of investors from another state, 
the government of the investor would provide diplomatic protection52, which is 
defined as the exclusive right of the state to pursue treaty rights beneficial to its 
nationals in the international context53. The claims based on the rule of diplomatic 
protection were commonly dealt with by ad hoc tribunals or mixed claims commis-
sions to adjudicate the claims. The instrument of diplomatic protection allowing for 
the intervention of the government of the investor led to conflicts with the host go-
vernment. This development culminated in the formulation of the “Calvo-
Doctrine”54, which embodied the Latin American version of the principle of equality 
between nationals and aliens due to the abusive exercise of the right of diplomatic 
protection55. The doctrine promulgated that foreign investors were entitled to treat-
 
50  During the nineteenth century, optional treaty standards hardened into rules of international 
customary law or became considered as general principles of law recognised by civilised na-
tions. These standards require the compliance of the rule of law (in the meaning of the conti-
nental Rechtsstaat), the right to full, prompt and effective compensation and the exhaustion of 
local remedies.  
51  This protection was to ensure that colonial legal systems were changed in order to accommo-
date European notions of individual rights of property and freedom of contract.  
52  See Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad: An Elementary Principle of 
International Law Under Attack, American Journal of International Law, vol. 69, No. 2 (1975), 
p. 359-365; Gramlich, Diplomatic Protection Against Acts of Intergovernmental Organs, Ger-
man Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, (1984), p. 386 (428). 
53  At that time diplomatic protection was usually pursued through exchanges of diplomatic notes 
between the governments or espousing a formal claim on behalf of the investor as a state na-
tional on a government to government basis. 
54  The name of the doctrine refers to the Argentinean diplomat and jurist Carlos Calvo, who 
shaped the „Calvo-Doctrine“ in 1868. The doctrine states that “aliens who established them-
selves in a country are certainly entitled to the same rights of protection as nationals, but they 
cannot claim any greater measure of protection.”  
55  Some American States suspected diplomatic protection to be a potential instrument for 
stronger states in order to achieve economic intervention, intrusion into their domestic jurisdic-
tion, imperialism and neo-colonialism. 
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ment no different or better than citizens of the host state56. According to the doc-
trine, foreign investors were to have their claims heard by the courts of the countries 
where they invested, but they were not entitled to seek the diplomatic protection of 
their governments or to have claims presented to international tribunals. The doc-
trine has been embodied in some international instruments: on the Seventh Interna-
tional Conference of the American States57 the Calvo-Doctrine was explicitly incor-
porated into the Convention on Rights and Duties of States58. Nevertheless the 
Calvo-Doctrine proved to be no obstacle to legal actions based on violations of 
established international obligations referring to the treatment of aliens, as the inter-
national responsibility was drawn into question59.  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign investment disputes were 
widely brought about by land reform measures in certain countries, such as the 
transformation of the entire Czarist economy in the Soviet Union to socialism in 
1917 and the disruptions of World War I. Prior to 1917 a common understanding, 
the traditional consensus among the principal nations existed which embodied the 
obligatory rule of prompt and adequate compensation in case of a state taking an 
alien’s property60. In addition, states adhered to the rule of diplomatic protection in 
its traditional sense. This situation changed in connection with the Russian Revolu-
tion61 and World War I and led to the denial of private property in the Soviet Union 
 
56  Calvo assumed that the acknowledgment of the minimum international standard would lead to 
„an exorbitant and fatal privilege, essentially favourable to the powerful States and injurious to 
the weaker nations, establishing an unjustifiable inequality between nationals and foreigners, 
Garcia-Amador, Calvo Doctrine, Calvo Clause, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 521, 522; Shea, The Calvo Clause, A Problem of Inter-
American and International Law and Diplomacy; Modern Law Review, vol. 20, No. 4, (1957), 
p. 428-429.  
57  The First International Conference of American States was held in Washington in 1889/1890 
and the Seventh Conference in Montevideo in 1933. The formulation was officially adopted in 
the following words: “1. Foreigners are entitled to enjoy all the civil rights enjoyed by natives; 
and they shall be afforded all the benefits of said rights in all that is essential as well as in the 
form or procedure, and the legal remedies incident thereto, absolutely in like manners as said 
natives; 2. A nation has not, nor recognizes in favour of foreigners, any other obligations or re-
sponsibilities than those which in favour of the natives are established, in like cases, by the 
constitution and the laws.”, see also Scott, The International Conferences of American States, 
1889 to 1928 (1931), p. 45.  
58  The Convention states that „Nationals and foreigners are under the same protection of the law 
and the national authorities and the foreigners may not claim rights other more extensive than 
those of the nationals“ (Art. 9); the doctrine was also taken up in another inter-American in-
strument, the 1902 Convention Relative to the Rights of Aliens (Art. 2).  
59  Shea, The Calvo Clause, A Problem of Inter-American and International Law and Diplomacy, 
Modern Law Review, vol. 20, No. 4, (1957), p. 428-429. 
60  See Art. 46 II Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, which states that „private property cannot be 
confiscated“. 
61 See Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 18 
and references cited there in footnote 24.  
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between 1917 and 196262. The end of World War I witnessed the establishment of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)63. This court rendered two   
leading decisions referring to the matter of diplomatic protection and the protection 
of alien’s property in the 1920s: the Oscar Chinn Case and the Mavrommatis Con-
cessions Case.  
The end of World War II was accompanied by the imposition of socialist econo-
mies in Eastern Europe, the nationalization of certain industries in Western Europe64 
and the independence of former colonial territories. These developments caused an 
increasing number of foreign investment disputes which needed to be resolved. Thus 
the rules of international customary law were reaffirmed65. In this period of time 
property rights including the right to compensation for expropriation have been 
included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human Rights 
(1969) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981)66. These in-
struments grant, irrespective of the principle of reciprocity (do ut des), the treaty 
rights to everyone regardless of e. g. nationality, which brought about a legal eman-
cipation of the individual and led to a somewhat different understanding of the con-
cept of diplomatic protection. The Cold War period brought further conflicts67, as a 
section of the world proclaimed its adherence to the “Hull-Rule”68, while other large 
 
62  See Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, vol. I (1951), p. 98 (Decree of the Council 
of People’s commissars on the General and Legal Conditions for Concessions, 23 November 
1920); Mexico followed Russia by changing its constitution in the sense that no protection of 
property whatsoever was guaranteed.  
63  The Permanent Court of International Justice did its best to stigmatise the measures of liquida-
tion of enemy property under the Peace Treaties of 1919 as exceptions from the traditional 
rules of international law as well as to reaffirm the minimum standard of international law on 
the protection of foreign property. The court made it clear beyond doubt that once a breach of 
international standards occurred, it was irrelevant if the state concerned applied the same 
treatment to its own nationals. Non-discrimination was not to be regarded as a justification for 
a violation of the minimum standard of international law, see Roth, The Minimum Standard of 
International Law applied to Aliens (1949), p. 81. 
64  France and the United Kingdom. 
65  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 187. 
66  In addition, these rights have been included in the constitutions of many countries and private 
initiatives to address the treatment of foreign investors were set off: the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC) adopted the International Code of Fair Treatment of Foreign Investors in 
1949. 
67  See inter alia the United States Supreme Court, stating in 1962: “There are few if any issues in 
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state’s 
power to expropriate the property of aliens”, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, at p. 428 (1964). The “social function of property” and the “redistribution of wealth” 
competed with the traditional Western concepts of private property and protection of aliens. 
68  The Hull-Rule is named after the American Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Cordell Hull, calling 
for prompt, adequate and effective compensation, see 32 Am.J. Int’l L., Supp., p. 181-207 
(1938). The Hull-Rule proclaimed adequate and partial rather than full compensation and was 
therefore met by heavy criticism, see further Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investments and Inter-
national Law (1969), p. 7 (8).  
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sections of it regarded this rule and its equivalents as tailor-made for imperialist 
powers. Many socialist countries banned foreign direct investment in their territories 
altogether. Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) were nego-
tiated by a few countries in the upcoming period to regulate the treatment of foreign 
investment. Furthermore the International Court of Justice was newly formed69. In 
1962 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 180370 to express the traditional 
consensus71 determining specific conditions in case of expropriation or nationaliza-
tion of property72.  
After the pronouncement of Resolution 1803 the World Bank drafted a Conven-
tion, which was supposed to set up a proper institutional framework for the settle-
ment of investment disputes73. The result of these endeavours is the ICSID-
Convention74, which came into force in October 1966 only eighteen months after its 
drafting75. The Convention created the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes to administer arbitrations between contracting governments and 
investors of other states. The Convention does not provide a specific rule of interna-
tional law on a comprehensive basis for the future development of the protection of 
international investment, but institutional rules and administrative and financial 
 
69  In 1952 the ICJ found it lacked jurisdiction on an investment dispute between the British 
government and Iran in the case Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (United Kingdom v. Iran), Judgment of 
22 July 1952. 
70  UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty 
over Natural Resources. 
71  The traditional consensus determined that “nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning 
have to be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest. These 
have to be recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and 
foreign. In such cases the owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with 
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in ac-
cordance with international law…”, General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 
1962, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. The Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (UN G. A. Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of December 12, 1974) stipulates that 
each State has the right „ to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, 
in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such measures, 
taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State con-
siders pertinent. In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it 
shall be settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless 
[otherwise agreed]“ (Art. 2 (2) (c)).  
72  The resolution was met by heavy criticism, as it determined a trend towards further vagueness, 
which was illustrated by terms such as „appropriate compensation“ (adopted in Res. 1803) or 
the formula of „reasonable, adequate and reasonable prompt“ compensation, see further 
Friedmann, A.S.I.L. Proceedings (1963), p. 127 (128); ibid., Restatement of the Law, Second 
– Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965), p. 563; Metzger, Law of International 
Trade, vol. I (1966), p. 112 et seq.  
73  So far it can be stated that the ICSID Convention is still representing the consensus reached in 
Resolution 1803. 
74  See BGBL. 1969 II 369. 
75  Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (2001), p. 4, mn. 10.  
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regulations for the settlement of disputes76. In the 1970s the consensus found in 
Resolution 1803 and the standards for treatment of foreign investment as well as the 
content of the international law that governs it began to be drawn into question by a 
growing number of developing states regarding the issue of economic decoloniza-
tion77. As a result thereof, many industries were nationalized by Third World gov-
ernments78. In 1974 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolutions 3201 
(S-VI) and 3281 (XXIX) in order to establish a so-called “New International Eco-
nomic Order”. The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States accorded to 
reach state the right “to nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign 
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adop-
ting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of 
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic law 
of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless [otherwise agreed].”79 
Both resolutions were backed by a majority of the developing states, as they as-
serted each country’s right to a free choice of its economic system as well as the 
right to exercise sovereignty over its natural resources. But the assumptions of the 
1960s and 1970s regarding the tension between foreign investment and economic 
decolonization revealed to be erroneous80: In the 1980s it became evident that coun-
 
76  Pursuant to Article 42 of ICSID Convention “the responsible arbitration courts have to settle 
the dispute on the grounds of the law of the state involved” and to apply “such rules of interna-
tional law as may be applicable”.  
77  This relates to the issue of „permanent sovereignty of natural resources“, the matter of the 
“New Economic Order” and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of 1974 
(UNYB 1974, 402); see Dolzer, Wirtschaft und Kultur im Völkerrecht, in Völkerrecht, (Vitz-
thum, ed.), 6. Abschnitt I 3 e, para 30, 31 and 6. Abschnitt I 3 a , para 44-47; Gloria, Völker-
rechtlicher Eigentumsschutz, in Völkerrecht (Ipsen ed.), § 47, para 1; United Nations, Depart-
ment of Economic and Social Affairs, The External Financing of Economic Development 
(1968 – E.68.II D.10), Section 84, p.31; Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and Internatio-
nal Law (1969), p. 7; Dolzer, Eigentum, Enteignung und Entschädigung im geltenden Völ-
kerrecht (1985), p. 24 (25). 
78  Implementing such policies the Libyan government under the leadership of Mu’ammar Qad-
dafi nationalized in 1971 the petroleum industry, Kuwait in 1980 the petroleum interests of the 
American Independent Oil Company and Chile from 1955 to 1973 the copper mining compa-
nies, see generally Sornarajah, The Clash of Gobalisation and the International Law on Fo-
reign Investment, at a Symposium at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs on 
12 September 2002, p. 4. 
79  Art. 2 (2) (c) UN-Res. 3281; legal sovereignty in international law determines that a sovereign 
state may exercise its sovereignty only subject to compliance with all other rules of interna-
tional law, see Larson, Sovereignty within the Law (1965), p. 332. 
80  The world total investment abroad at the end of 1966 was estimated at $ 90 billion. Accumu-
lated foreign direct investment by capital exporters in less developed countries were estimated 
to have amounted to $ 30 billion at the end of 1966. Between 1964 and 1966, the annual pri-
vate capital export from members of the Development Assistance Committee (D.A.C.) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to developing countries 
averaged $ 3, 5 billion, of which $ 2 billion were private investment, OECD Background Paper 
on Private Investment in Less Developed Countries, 6 May 1968 (Press/A (68) 23, p. 2).   
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tries acting hostile to foreign investment were being left behind in the race for eco-
nomic growth and aliens’ property was considered as an asset of the host state.81 The 
law on foreign investment has witnessed an explosive growth ever since82. In the 
1990s the fall of socialism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave a significant 
impetus for an improvement of the climate for foreign investment. A remarkable 
consensus83 could be generated concerning the standards for treatment of foreign 
investment. The USA drafted a Model BIT, which served as a role model for many 
BITs coming into effect and concluded a regional Free Trade Agreement, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990s84. These BITs were fol-
lowed by the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994 which is dealing with investment issues 
in the energy sector, and the idea to bring about an international foreign investment 
regime accelerated. In 1996 the WTO implemented a “Working Group on Foreign 
Investment” with the task to negotiate such multilateral agreement which, however, 
failed to achieve this goal85. The dynamic development of foreign investment law 
found its most ambitious initiative in the unsuccessful effort taken by the OECD to 
 
81  Developing countries are becoming more important as host countries for foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) activities. Their share of global FDI flows increased from 21 % in 1991 to 36 % in 
1997. Despite the crisis in financial markets in Asia at the end of the twentieth century, FDI 
flows into developing countries in Asia remain strong and reached the mark of $ 78 billion, 
UNCTAD, Investment Report (1999). Today the 48 less-developed countries (LDCs) remain 
marginal recipients of FDI receiving only 2% of all FDI to developing countries and 0.5% of 
the global total. But among the top ten in terms of absolute increases, eight were developing 
countries, led by Mexico, China and South Africa. Conversely, among the ten countries ex-
periencing the steepest declines in FDI in flows, eight were developed countries (Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the United States and Germany reported the largest declines). 
82  From 1980 until today the world-wide investment flows increased enormously: compared with 
the world-wide trade increase the annual percentage has increased about six fold. These num-
bers fluctuate depending on the state of the world-wide economy, see 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2005overview_en.pdf>. The global FDI Stock is a meas-
ure of the investment underlying international production. In 1996, the global FDI stock valued 
$ 3.2 trillion. Its rate of growth over the past decade was more than twice that of fixed capital 
formation, indicating an increasing internationalization of production systems, see UNCTAD, 
Investment Report (1998); in 2001 the book value of the FDI valued approximately $ 6, 8 tril-
lion, International Monetary Fund Statistics Department, Foreign Investment Trends and Sta-
tistics (2003). 
83  The consensus was named the “Washington Consensus”. The term referred to the alliance 
between the US Government, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which are 
all located in Washington D. C.  
84  Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalisations and the international law on foreign investment, The 
Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy, Symposium at the Norman Paterson 
School of International Affairs on 12 September 2002, p. 3. 
85  Graham, A note why multilateral negotiations failed at the OECD, and how such negotiations 
might be crafted to succeed at the WTO, Private Investments abroad – Problems and Solutions 
in international Business (1999), p. 3-9; for a comparative study see Kurtz, A general invest-
ment agreement in the WTO – Lessons from Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the OECD Multi-
lateral Agreement on Investment, Jean Monnet Working Paper (2002), p. 73.  
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draft a comprehensive Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)86. The favour-
able climate for foreign investment was damped by a succession of economic crises, 
in particular in Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century and set the initial 
stage for a new evaluation of foreign investment law.  
II. Leading Court Decisions  
Not only scholars were involved in the process of the conceptual evolution of pro-
perty protection in international law and the interpretation of pertinent treaty law, 
which shaped the development of alien property and investment protection, but also 
certain courts and arbitral tribunals: In particular, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had to deal with 
cases raising issues of alien property and investment protection.   
1. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
The Permanent Court of International Justice was the precedessor of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice87. The idea of furthering the peaceful settlement of interna-
tional disputes was first raised in 1899 and 1907 at The Hague Peace Conference. 
The Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was adopted, 
which dealt not only with arbitration but also with other methods of peaceful settle-
ment such as good offices and mediation. The convention made provisions for the 
creation of permanent machinery for dispute resolution88 and in 1902 the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration started operating89. At the Second Conference proposals were 
made to establish a Permanent International Court which resulted in a draft for the 
 
86  The MAI resulted in the abandonment of the initiative because of anti-globalisation protests 
aiming at the implementation of restrictions for multinational corporations. As consequence, 
many countries withdrew from the initiative; see generally Muchlinski, Towards a multilateral 
agreement on investment (MAI), the OECD and WTO models and sustainable development, in 
International economic law with a human face (Weiss ed.), (1998) p. 429-451; Karl, Das Mul-
tilaterale Investitionsschutzabkommen (MAI), RIW, (1998), p. 432 (440); ibid., On the way to 
multilateral investment rules- some recent policy issues (2002), ICSID Review, p. 293-319; 
ibid., Internationaler Investitionsschutz - Quo vadis? (2000), Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft, p. 143 (169); Brewer, Investment Issues at the WTO: the Architecture of 
Rules and the Settlement of Disputes, Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 1, No. 3 
(1998), pp. 457. 
87  See <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibluebook.pdf>. 
88  The said machinery was to enable arbitral tribunals to be set up as desired and to facilitate their 
work.  
89  The convention further created a Permanent Bureau, which was and still is located at The 
Hague. The Bureau assumed functions corresponding to those of a court registry and laid down 
a set of rules of procedure to govern the conduct of arbitration. 
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initial set up of an international tribunal90. Between 1911 and 1919 several plans 
were submitted by national and international bodies and governments for the estab-
lishment of a permanent international judicial tribunal after the war91. After 35 ses-
sions the Committee of Jurists, which was convened by the Council of the League of 
Nations, adopted a draft scheme for the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice (PCIJ). These endeavours culminated in the creation of the PCIJ 
within the framework of the new international system after World War I by the 
League of Nations. The PCIJ started its operative work in 1922 and was dissolved in 
1946.  
a) The Chinn Case92 
In Congo, then a colony of Belgium, a British citizen93 established a transport busi-
ness on the sea. The business was attached to a company, Unatra, with a majority of 
its shares held by the Belgian State itself. Because of the commercial depression in 
1930/1931 the Belgian government decided to subsidize the export trade of Congo 
by decreasing tariffs for certain products up to 75 %. Unatra experienced a loss of 
profits in return and received compensation. As a result of this change of tariffs, the 
British citizen was unable to compete and closed down his business without re-
ceiving any reimbursement or compensation. Thereupon the United Kingdom, in 
consent with the Belgian government, submitted the case to the PCIJ raising the 
question whether the Belgian measures constituted a breach of international law. In 
its judgment, the court held the measures of the Belgian government to be in accor-
dance with international law. In this respect, the Convention of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye served legal basis for the judgment94. In the interpretation given the court 
stressed that the said convention would not oblige Belgium to create an atmosphere 
of equal commercial conditions95. Therefore alleging unlawful discrimination on 
behalf of its citizen by the British government could not prevail as Unatra was in a 
different position. In line with these findings the court held that the measures of the 
 
90  The draft was not adopted at the Second Conference because of differences of opinion con-
cerning issues of jurisdiction. The draft was attached to the Final Act of the 1907 Conference 
under the title „Projet d’une Cour de Justice Arbitrale“. 
91  These plans, sometimes in conjunction with plans for a world organization, were mostly based 
on initiatives of independent academic bodies, notably the British Fabians Society and the 
American Society for the Judicial Settlement of Disputes.  
92  Oscar Chinn Case, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 65-152. 
93  Oscar Chinn, PCIJ, Series C, No. 75. 
94  Dolzer, Chinn Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. I 
(1992), p. 579-580. 
95  The court assumed that Oscar Chinn had been aware of the favourable position of Unatra, see 
Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 69. 
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Belgian government in question did not result in a violation of vested rights96. The 
judgment received much attention due to its pronouncements on expropriation and 
discrimination, although the court’s understanding of these terms hardly mirrors the 
current approach to international law in this respect.   
b) The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case97 
The Permanent Court of International Justice also addressed the issue of diplomatic 
protection in the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case98. Before World War I, a 
Greek national, Mavrommatis, signed two agreements with the Ottoman Empire, on 
concessions for the construction and exploitation of works necessary for the distri-
bution of public electricity and water in Palestine. After the beginning of World War 
I the parties of the agreements postponed their execution. After the peace settlement 
process Mavrommatis addressed the government of Palestine with the question when 
to put the concessions into operation. According to the Peace Treaties signed after 
World War I, the Allied Powers should continue to enjoy the rights acquired in Pa-
lestine before the beginning of World War I. In addition, Great Britain was entrusted 
with the mandate for Palestine. For this reason the British government concluded an 
equivalent agreement with another applicant, which provided for the right of the 
applicant to require the expropriation of any concessions conflicting with his rights. 
Mavrommatis continued to submit plans for execution of the concessions to the 
British government, but when these were eventually rejected, he claimed restitution 
for violation of his rights.  
On behalf of its national, the Greek government exercised diplomatic protection 
by addressing the PCIJ with an application to institute proceedings against the Bri-
tish government. The court accepted jurisdiction after rejecting objections regarding 
the issue of jurisdiction raised by the British government99. In its judgment the court 
 
96  The court excluded the possibility of making profit from the scope of protection of vested 
rights, stating that „Favourable business conditions and good-will are transient circumstances, 
subject to inevitable changes …“, see Series A/B, No. 63 (1934), p. 88.  
97  Mavrommatis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 5 (1925); Doehring, Mavrommatis Con-
cessions Case, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), vol. III, 
(1981), p. 330 (332).  
98 See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925). 
99  See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925), Judgment of 8 August 1924 (PCIJ A 2). 
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held that diplomatic protection was an elementary principle of international law100. 
Thus, in the judgment the court found that Mavrommatis was entitled to require that 
the concessions were being readapted to the new economic conditions, but not to 
compensation payment101. After two years, the Greek government submitted another 
application alleging the breach of international obligations by the British govern-
ment as it refused to approve new plans submitted by Mavrommatis on 5 May 1926 
until December 1926. In return, the British government repeated its objections 
against jurisdiction of the PCIJ as without the express consent of both parties, the 
Court could not claim jurisdiction to decide whether one of its judgments had or had 
not been complied with. In addition, the government denied the violation of interna-
tional obligations within the meaning of the respective mandate. In its judgment102 
the court upheld the objections alleged by the British government on the question 
whether it had jurisdiction to supervise the fulfilment of terms of a previous judg-
ment. Moreover, the court emphasized the exhaustion of local remedies as a substan-
tial requirement for the application of the rules of diplomatic protection103. The 1925 
judgment contributed therefore to the development of the rule of diplomatic protec-
tion. In particular the affirmation of the concept of diplomatic protection was con-
sidered a huge step forward in the context of foreign investment protection by ge-
neral international law.  
2. The International Court of Justice 
After World War II a system for the peaceful settlement of disputes should be set up 
including an international judicial institution104. As a consequence thereof, it was 
agreed upon convening a “United Nations Conference on International Organiza-
tion”. At the Yalta Conference in 1945 the statute for an international court was 
 
100  See PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925), p. 6, para 12: “[i]t is an elementary principle of interna-
tional law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to inter-
national law committed by another State; in so doing, a state was in reality asserting its own 
rights … [For] in the eyes of [an international tribunal] the State is the only claimant”, the en-
tire judgment is also available at <http://www.icjcij.org/cijwww/cdecisions/ccpij/serie_A/A_ 
02/06_Mavrommatis_en_Palestine_Arret.pdf>. The dictum was repeated by the Permanent 
Court of International Justice in the Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), 
P.C.I.J. Reports (1939), Series A/B, No. 76, p. 16. 
101  See PCIL, Series A, No. 5, Judgment of 26 March 1925 (PCIJ A 5). 
102  Readaption of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, No. 11 (1927), judg-
ment of 10 October 1927 (PCIJ A 11). 
103  Mavrommatis Concession Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. 5 (1925), p. 6 at para 12 of the 1924 
judgment. 
104  Jessup, Do New Problems Need New Courts?, American Journal of International Law, vol. 65 
(1971), p. 261-268; for a short survey see Tornaritis, The review of the Role of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, revHellen, Vol 24 (1971), pp. 34; Lillich, The deliberative Process of 
the International Court of Justice, A Preliminary Critique and Some Possible Reforms, Ameri-
can Journal of International Law, vol. 7 (1976), p. 28.  
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drafted which was modelled on the Statute of the PCIJ, as most provisions were 
taken verbatim from the revised version. The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ)105, the “World Court”, was adopted in conjunction with the Charter of 
the United Nations on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 1945. So far, 
the ICJ has only infrequently been confronted with investment disputes: Yet, the 
court rendered two post-war106 leading decisions. As only states can appear before 
the ICJ, the claims were espoused by the states on behalf of their nationals. These 
two decisions continue to be of outstanding importance in the context of the devel-
opment of foreign property protection by international law: (1) The Barcelona Trac-
tion, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain) Judgment107 of 1970 and (2) the 
Elettronica Sipula S.p.A. (USA v. Italy) Judgment108 of 1989.  
a) The Barcelona Traction Case 
The foundations of property protection were indirectly addressed in the ICJ decision 
in Barcelona Traction in connection with matters of diplomatic protection of legal 
persons. Belgian nationals, both natural and legal persons, were shareholders of a 
Canadian holding company, the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. 
The company issued several series of bonds, partly in pesetas and sterling. In con-
text with the Spanish civil war the bonds interest payments were refused and not 
resumed. Spanish shareholders submitted a petition for a declaration on bankruptcy 
which was followed by the Spanish courts and the assets of the company were 
seized. Various legal actions against the declaration of bankruptcy remained unsuc-
cessful. In 1951 the corporate capital was sold entirely in the shape of new shares at 
 
105  According to Article 92 of the Charter of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice 
is established as the “Principal judicial organ of the United Nations.”  
106  One of the most famous Pre-War Court Decisions together with the Oscar Chinn Case and the 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case was the Case concerning Chorzow Factory, PICJ, 
Ser. B, No. 3 (1925), p. 1-36, which dealt with the issue of restitution in international law. The 
dictum affirmed the idea of restitution as a primary remedy in international law. The court 
stated in its judgment that “the essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal 
act – a principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by 
the decisions of arbitral decisions – is, that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability, 
have existed if that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear”, see PICJ 
Series A, No. 17 at 47, which resulted in a pronouncement on the responsibility of the host 
state to foreign investors. The judgment is also available at <http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij 
/eng/decisions/1927.07.26_chorzow/>. 
107  Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 42, 
42-50 (Feb 5); see also Wallace, Barcelona Traction Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, vol. I (1992), p. 346-349. 
108  Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989), p. 115-121, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/ielsi/iels.ijudgments/icsli.ijudgment19890720.pdf>.  
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public auction and purchased by a Spanish company. The Belgium shareholders did 
not receive any reimbursement or compensation for their loss.  
Belgium applied to the ICJ109 and alleged reparation for the damage caused “on 
account of acts said to be contrary to international law committed by organs of the 
Spanish State”, including “the deprivation of the enjoyment of rights”, and leading 
to the “total spoliation of the Barcelona Traction group.”110 In return, the Spanish 
government raised objectives regarding the discontinuance of the proceedings, but 
also a lack of jus standi of Belgium and the exhaustion of local remedies. The court 
acknowledged that Belgium was acting on behalf of natural and legal persons, but 
followed the last two arguments of the Spanish government111. The decisive factor in 
this context was whether the Belgian government was entitled to provide diplomatic 
protection for the Belgian shareholders though their losses resulted not from an 
injury to the “direct rights” of the nationals112. The final judgment rendered rejected 
the claims of Belgium on the grounds of lacking jus standi 113 and concluded the 
application of diplomatic protection only to be granted when exceptional circum-
 
109  ICJ Pleadings, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Ltd. (Application 1958); New 
Application 1962, vols. I-X. 
110  The application was discontinued when in 1961 Belgium attempted to negotiate an out-of-
court settlement, which was objected by the Spanish government. The case was submitted to 
the ICJ by a new application of Belgium in 1962.  
111  See para 102 of the judgment. In addition, the court denied any analogy with regard to the 
Nottebohm Case, Judgment, ICJ-Reports 1955. 
112  The court stated in this respect that “…an act directed against and infringing only the com-
panys rights does not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, even if their interests are 
affected. … The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed at the direct rights of 
the shareholder as such. It is well known that there are rights which municipal law orders con-
fers upon the latter distinct from those of the company, including the right to any declared 
dividend, the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the right to share in the residual as-
sets of the company on liquidation. Whenever one of his direct rights is infringed, the share-
holder has an independent right of action”, see Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports (1970), 
p. 36, paras. 46-47; see also p. 33, where the court held that „From its origins closely linked 
with international commerce, diplomatic protection has sustained a particular impact from the 
growth of international economic relations, and at the same time from the profound transfor-
mations which have taken place in the economic life of nations”. 
113  In this respect, the court stated “that the adoption of the theory of diplomatic protection of 
shareholders as such, by opening the door to competing diplomatic claims, could create an at-
mosphere of confusion and insecurity in international economic relations. The danger would 
be all the greater inasmuch as the shares of companies whose activity is international are 
widely scattered and frequently change hands;” Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 
4; separate opinions of Judge Jessup paras 44-57, 80 and Judge Gros, paras 22, 24. 
 288
stances occur114. Likewise, the principle of diplomatic protection of corporations 
was clarified in the sense that a corporation is to be protected by the State of natio-
nality of the corporation and not by the State or States of nationality of shareholders 
in a corporation115. The decision met heavy and well-founded criticism which was 
based mainly on the argument that “the court seems to have raised a host of complex 
issues and to have resolved almost none”116. The opportunity to clarify and develop 
legal standards in international commercial litigation and in international law in 
general had not been taken117. 
b) The Case concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI)118 
The Barcelona Traction Case set the climate for the court decision concerning Elet-
tronica Sicula S.p.A. (USA v. Italy): A company founded in Palermo/Italy, the Ray-
theon ELSI S.p.A. was owned almost entirely by an American company, the United 
 
114  “In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic protection, international 
law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an analogy with the rules governing the national-
ity of individuals. The traditional rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corpo-
rate entity to the State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has 
its registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by a long practice and by numer-
ous international instruments. This notwithstanding, further or different links are at times said 
to be required in order that a right of diplomatic protection should exist. Indeed, it has been the 
practice of some states to give a company incorporated under their law diplomatic protection 
solely when it has its seat or management or centre of control in their territory, or when a ma-
jority or a substantial proportion of the shares has been owned by nationals of the state concer-
ned. Only then, it has been held, does there exist between the corporation and the state in 
question a genuine connection of the kind familiar from other branches of international law. 
However, in the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute 
test of the genuine connection has found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied 
are of a relative nature, and sometimes links with one State have had weighed against those 
with another.” Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports (1970), p. 4 at paras 32, 33, 42 and p. 48, 
para 92, where the court stated that “it is quite true that it has been maintained that, for reasons 
of equity, a State should be able, in certain cases, to take up the protection of its nationals, sha-
reholders in a company which has been the victim of a violation of international law. Thus a 
theory has been developed to the effect that the state of the shareholders has a right of diploma-
tic protection when the state whose responsibility is invoked is the national state of the compa-
ny. Whatever the validity of this theory may be, it is certainly not applicable to the present ca-
se, since Spain is not the national State of Barcelona Traction”.  
115  See Barcelona Traction Case, ICJ Reports 1970, p. 34, paras 40 - 44. 
116  Wallace, Elettronica Sicula Case, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, vol. I (1992), p. 348; in addition it was mentioned that the court in Barcelona Traction 
was guided by a number of policy considerations, see ibid. p. 48-49, paras 94-96, p. 48, paras 
94, 95, p. 38, para 53, p. 50, para 98. 
117  This suggestion is in accordance with the evaluation of Judge Fitzmaurice who stated that 
„general international law obligations in the sphere of the treatment of foreigners“ have not 
been clarified, see separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice, ICJ-Report 1064, p. 65.  
118  Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989), p. 15-121. 
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States Corporation Raytheon Company and its subsidiary The Machlett Laborato-
ries. Due to a continuing financial crisis of ELSI, the government of Italy was asked 
to provide subsidies or other governmental support to the company in order to avoid 
liquidation. After a refusal of the Italian authorities, representatives of Raytheon 
provided support for an orderly liquidation. The liquidation was prevented by an 
order released by the Mayor of Palermo which determined the requisitioning of 
ELSI’s assets119. In response, ELSI submitted a petition for bankruptcy. ELSI was 
purchased by a state-controlled subsidiary substantially below its book value. In 
1974 the United States of America declared to exercise diplomatic protection on 
behalf of Raytheon and Machlett. The U.S. government alleged violations of a bilat-
eral treaty between the United States of America and Italy120. Pursuant to Article 
XXVI of this treaty, the ICJ had jurisdiction and thereupon the case was submitted 
to the court in February 1987. Italy argued that local remedies had not been ex-
hausted, as the actions before the Italian courts had not been based on provisions of 
the bilateral treaty. In this respect, the court addressed the rule of customary law 
requiring the exhaustion of local remedies and found that the rule is “an important 
principle of customary international law”121. The ICJ acknowledged jurisdiction but 
then rejected the case122 while discussing the scope of certain standards provided by 
the treaty123. The decision remained, in this respect, to be based mainly on a debat-
able evaluation of the facts124. Nevertheless, the ELSI decision had remarkable im-
pacts on the development and interpretation of BITs, but, as before, the ICJ deprived 
itself of the opportunity to shape and construe international customary law. 
 
119  The representatives of ELSI raised an appeal against the order immediately. The Prefect of 
Palermo declared the actions of the Mayor to have exceeded his power, but the decision was 
issued more than a year later.  
120  The respective treaty is the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, concluded on 2 
February 1948. 
121  ELSI case, I.C.J. reports 1989, p. 15 at p. 42, para. 50. In this respect the Court also stated that 
“the local remedies rule does not, indeed cannot, require that a claim be presented to the mu-
nicipal courts in a form, and with arguments, suited to an international tribunal, applying dif-
ferent law to different parties: for an international claim to be admissible, it is sufficient if the 
essence of the claim has been brought before the competent tribunals and pursued as far as 
permitted by local law and procedures, and without success.” 
122  The Court stated that “in the present state of the law, the protection of shareholders requires 
that recourse be had to treaty stipulations or special agreements directly concluded between the 
private investor and the State in which the investment was placed. States even more frequently 
provide for protection, (…), either by means of special instruments or within the framework of 
wider economic agreements. (…) No such instrument is in force between the Parties to the pre-
sent case.” 
123  The Court discussed primarily Art. III and Art. V of the bilateral treaty, but dismissed the 
claims put forward by the United States in context with these articles.  
124  See Wengler, Die Entscheidung des IGH im „ELSI“-Fall, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, vol. 
43, (1990), p. 619 (620). 
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3. Summary 
The court decisions rendered by international tribunals in the area of foreign invest-
ment protection and presented in the section above mirror the developments carried 
out by international jurisprudence. Principles such as the exhaustion of local reme-
dies125 and the rule of diplomatic protection126 were affirmed and cleared by dictums 
of the courts in the context of cases concerning foreign property protection. Never-
theless, most applicants before the international courts aimed at an award of restitu-
tion or the payment of compensation, but in particular the award of restitution has 
always been considerably rare in the jurisprudence of the World Court127, which 
represents the main reason for the insignificance of the jurisprudence of the World 
Court in the area of foreign investment protection. 
C. The Role of Human Rights Institutions 
As foreign investment protection is fundamentally based on the idea of property, the 
protection of alien property forms an integral part of foreign investment protection 
in international law. In the past the protection of foreign property by human rights 
institutions was carried out by the instrument of classical diplomatic protection. In 
the early years of international law the individual had no own rights in the interna-
tional legal order. As a consequence thereof, the protection of a national abroad was 
to be done only by means of the fiction underlying the instrument of diplomatic 
protection: that the home state was asserting its own rights128. A large number of 
treaties concluded by human rights institutions reflected the traditional approach to 
the rule of diplomatic protection and reciprocity as rules of international law. After 
World War II a new type of human right treaty was launched. The most significant 
characteristic of this treaty type is to grant the treaty rights to all individuals regard-
less of factors such as nationality129. By the emergence of a generation of treaties 
granting human rights to all individuals130, human rights institutions formed a new 
conceptual understanding of the rule of diplomatic protection and diplomatic protec-
tion in terms of the classical conceptual understanding became largely superfluous. 
 
125  See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case, PCIL, Series A, No. 25 (1925). 
126  See Elettronica Sicula S. p. A. (ELSI), Judgment, ICJ Reports (1989).  
127  Gray, The Choice between Restitution and Compensation, European Journal of International 
Law, vol. 10 (1999), p. 413 (416).  
128  In accordance with the traditional approach in international law an individual is a mere part of 
his home state and therefore cannot assert rights out of an international treaty. The State has 
the exclusive procedural right to decide on the material right on the international plane.  
129  The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the American Convention on Human 
Rights (1969) and the United Nations Human Rights Covenants (1966) represent the new ge-
neration of human rights treaties.  
130  See e. g. Article 24 and Article 44 of the European Convention of Human Rights.  
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The new approach to the protection of the individual absent of classical diplomatic 
protection led to the emancipation of the individual from his home state under hu-
man rights conventions131.  
Given the existence of an absolute right to property, the investor would receive 
protection in absolute terms. Yet, there is no uniform understanding of property as 
an absolute right132, because the concept is placed uneasily between distinct consti-
tutional systems recognised in different parts of the world, one emphasizing the 
social function of property while the other follows the conceptual approach of an 
absolute right133. International human rights law concerning the protection of alien 
property needs to balance these divergent approaches, thus the international human 
rights law does not prohibit all forms of interferences with foreign property, as e. g. 
limitations on grounds of public good are lawful. The following section contributes 
to the protection of foreign property by human rights institutions by introducing and 
evaluating the applicable mechanisms. 
I. Universal Human Rights Systems 
Since World War II, in particular, human rights have achieved universal recognition 
and constitute a major concern of international law, but the first acknowledgement 
of the right to property as an internationally protected human right dates back to 
1929 when the “Institut de Droit International” established in its “Declaration des 
droits internationaux de’l homme” the right to property as a human right134. Hence-
forth, by international agreements concluded on the universal level, international 
human rights law has created obligations upon States to recognize, respect and en-
sure these rights subject to their jurisdiction and to provide remedies in case of 
breach of obligations135. The international law of human rights includes a number of 
comprehensive international human rights treaties of which the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is the principal instrument and the Uni-
 
131  Geck, Diplomatic Protection, in R. Bernhardt (ed.) Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, 
vol. I, (1992), p. 1059 (1060). 
132  Seidl-Hohenveldern, Aliens Property, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of International 
Law, Vol. I, (1992), p. 118. 
133  In the Commonwealth and the European systems of law the idea of property is that all individ-
ual property exists only to the extent that the interests of the society as a whole will permit it.  
134  “Il est du devoir de tout Etat de reconnaitre a tout individu le droit égal a la vie, a la liberté et a 
la propriété, et d’accorder a tous, sur son territoire, pleine et entière protection de ce droit…”; 
see Dolzer, Eigentum, Entschädigung und Enteignung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 127 
(128). 
135  Like all international agreements a human rights covenant or convention gives rise to remedies 
in favour of other State parties, and generally in favour of all other State parties equally; see 
for a general survey Henkin, Human Rights, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public In-
ternational Law, vol. II (1992), p. 886-893. 
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versal Declaration of Human Rights is the accepted general expression of recog-
nized human rights136. 
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
In 1945 the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations recommended to the 
General Assembly to establish a Commission of Human Rights. The task of this 
body  was to formulate an “International Bill of Rights”137. This proposal was fol-
lowed and the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) established 
a Commission on Human Rights on 15 February 1946138 and instructed the United 
Nations Secretariat to prepare a documented outline of the bill. Finally, on 10 De-
cember 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the pertinent resolution 
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights139. For the first time a common com-
prehensive international standard which should be guaranteed to every person was 
defined and the Declaration was the first enumeration, on the universal level, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus it was proclaimed to be “an historic 
act, destined to consolidate world peace through the contribution of the United Na-
tions toward the liberation of individuals from the unjustified oppression and con-
straint to which they are to often subject”140. Hence, it was agreed from the begin-
ning, the Declaration should be followed by a binding convention to determine the 
implementation of the Declaration and establish an appropriate supervisory mecha-
nism, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights141.  
 
136  Henkin, Human Rights, in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. 
II (1995), p. 888; still, the human rights recognized in the Declaration or the Covenants are not 
declared to be absolute, as Art. 29 (2) of the Universal Declaration provides: „In the exercise 
of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined 
by law, solely fort he purpose of securing due recognition and respect fort he rights and free-
doms of others and of meeting the just requirement of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society“. 
137  A draft of a proposed declaration was submitted by the representative of the United States 
which was modelled after the US Bill of Rights, see i. a. Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 7 
1947, p. 1076; see also Carrillo Salcedo, Human Rights, Universal Declaration, in R. Bern-
hardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, vol. II (1995), p. 926. 
138  It was decided that „the present Conference … could not proceed to realize such a draft … The 
Organization, once formed, could better proceed to consider the suggestion and deal with it 
through a special commission or by some other method. The Committee recommends that the 
General Assembly consider the proposal and give it effect”, Documents of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation, San Francisco, 1945, vol. VI, p. 456. 
139  UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III); at that time, the United Nations had 56 members. 
48 voted in favour, none against and 8 abstained.  
140  See <http://www.udhr.org/history/A777.htm>. 
141  As a resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
is not in itself legally binding, but it is considered as an international standard and as such as 
part of the law of nations.  
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Some fundamental concepts constitute the basis of the Declaration: all human   
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights142, everyone is entitled to a so-
cial and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declara-
tion may be fully realized143, and those rights determined in it apply to everyone 
without any form of discrimination whatsoever144. In Article 17 of the Declaration 
the right of every person to own property everywhere and of every kind is recog-
nized145, while the ownership of property is subject to the legislation and the laws of 
the respective country146. The issue of expropriation is addressed in the second para-
graph, stating that “No one shall arbitrarily be deprived of his property”147. The 
wording of the provision is as general as Article 17 (1) and due to the vagueness 
much room is left for the application of national law.  
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)148 provides pro-
tection for an extensive catalogue of fundamental rights. The Covenant establishes a 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) consisting of eighteen members, who are inde-
pendent experts being elected and nominated by the State Parties. These experts 
supervise the compliance of the Contracting Parties with the Covenant. They admin-
ister an optional inter-state complaint mechanism and consider individual petitions 
brought to the Committee pursuant to the ICCPR’s First Optional Protocol149. The 
Committee is, however, not authorized to take any action but only to raise questions 
 
142  See Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
143  See Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
144  See Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
145  Article 17 reads that (1.) “Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in associa-
tion with others”; generally see also Eide, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights – A 
Commentary, (1992), Article 17 with further references.  
146  See A7C.3/SR 126, p. 4, Art. 17. The drafting version contained an express reference explicitly 
referring to the situation under domestic law; it read: “the laws of the State in which the prop-
erty is located”, E/CN.4/AC.2/SR 8, p. 3. The reference was deleted during the drafting proc-
ess. 
147  Article 17 (2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.  
148  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, entered into force 23 May 
1976, G. A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 99 U.N.T.S. 171. 
149  Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 
1966, in force 23 March 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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with the reporting governments and make non-binding “general comments”150 which 
the states that have accepted these optional procedures are expected to implement in 
good faith151. In addition, the ICCPR establishes the obligation for states to ensure 
that any person whose rights have been violated are entitled to “an effective remedy” 
and that it be determined by a competent authority. In case remedies do not exist, 
states must “develop the possibilities of judicial remedy” and ensure that it is af-
forded152. Mere formal incorporation of the treaty protections are considered insuffi-
cient if further measures such as developing new procedural guarantees or other 
legal institutions are required to bring them to full effect153. The right of property is 
not among the specific rights the Covenant grants, but it contains a non-accessory 
non-discrimination rule in its Article 26.154 This rule determines equal treatment 
with regard to property between nationals and aliens. Reasonable and objective 
distinctions do not constitute a breach of Art. 26 ICCPR. Therefore specific distinc-
tions are regarded as permissible differentiations. These permissible differentiations 
have been subject of decisions concerning foreign property protection. 
The Benes-Decrees155, issued in context with expropriations in the Czech Repub-
lic156, gave rise to several communications to the Human Rights Committee. The 
 
150  Under the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, following consideration of an individual complaint, the 
“Committee shall forward its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual”, see Ar-
ticle 5 (4) First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Under the inter-state procedure, in cases 
where a solution is agreed to by the alleged violating party, the HRC shall “confine its reports 
to a brief statement of the facts and the solution reached.” Where no solution is reached, “the 
Committee shall confine its report to a brief statement of the facts; the written submissions and 
record of the oral submission made by the State Parties concerned shall be attached to the re-
port”. In either scenario, the reports are issued to the State concerned.  
151  VII United Nations, Blue Book Series, The United Nations and Human Rights 1945-1995, 61 
(1995). 
152  Article 2 (3) ICCPR.  
153  Furthermore, Article 50 ICCPR obliges all parts of federal states to comply with the treaty 
provisions: “The provisions of the present Covenant shall exceed to all parts of federal states 
without any limitations or exceptions.” 
154  See e.g. Article 26 ICCPR. 
155  The Benes Decrees are a series of decrees which were rendered during World War II and a 
short period after by the then President of Czechoslovakia, Edvard Benes who, as head of the 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile,  exercised emergency powers from London and continued 
to do after his return  Czechoslovakia at the end of World War II, see Europeans Parliament 
Resolution on the Czech Republic’s application for membership of the European Union and 
the states of negotiations (Official Journal C 72 E of 21 March 2002. The following Decrees 
related to property and its confiscation. (a) Decree 5/1945 (19.5.1945) – Invalidity of certain 
property-related acts effected in the period of non-freedom; (b) Decree 12/1945 (21.6.45) – 
Confiscation and expedited distribution of agricultural properties of Germans, Hungarians, 
traitors and collaborators and certain organisations and institutes; (c) Decree 28/1945 
(20.7.1945); (d) Decree 108/1945 (25.10.1945) Confiscation of enemy property and the na-
tional renewal funds.  
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decrees, formally still in force, claimed collective World War II responsibility of 
Germans and Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia. Persons belonging to these mi-
nority groups were deprived of many of their rights, in particular as concerned their 
property rights157 and then expelled. Austria, Germany and Hungary have called for 
the repeal of the decrees. The legal validity of the decrees, though issued by an exe-
cutive authority, has been approved158 and the Czech Republic views the Benes 
Decrees as the basis of post-war Czechoslovak and later Czech legislation159. The 
Committee found in this respective that the restitution procedure as practised by the 
Czech Republic was in violation of Article 26 ICCPR, as it was based on the double 
requirement of Czechoslovak citizenship and permanent residency in the state’s 
territory160.  
 
 
 
156  By virtue of the Benes-Decrees, 2.5 million ethnic Germans (Sudetendeutsche) and approxi-
mately 40.000 Hungarians lost their Czechoslovak citizenship, their landed properties due to 
expropriation measures based on the decrees and were exiled. These measures were carried out 
between 1945 and 1946.  
157  Decree 12/1945 related to “the confiscation and accelerated allocation of agricultural property 
of the German and Hungarian persons and of those having committed treason and acted as 
enemies of the Czech and Slovak people.” 
158  The Benes Decrees were ratified by Constitutional Act No. 57/1946 of 28 March 1946, which 
states that “the Provisional National Assembly passed this Act to approve and declare as law 
the presidential decrees […] All presidential decrees were to be regarded as laws from the very 
beginning and constitutional decrees were to be regarded as constitutional acts.” 
159  The Czechoslovak Republic was transformed into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic 
on 1 January 1993. The legislation of the former Czechoslovak Republic maintained its legal 
validity after the transformation process.  
160  UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 516/1992 Simunek v. Czech Republic, Nr. 
516, para 11.6; confirmed in Adam v. Czech Republic, Nr. 586/1994, para 12.6; and Blazek v. 
Czech Republic, Nr. 857/1999, para. 5.8; see also Des Fours Walderode v. Czech Republic, Nr. 
747/1997, para. 8.4.  
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The case De Fours Walderode et al. v. the Czech Republic161 which was submit-
ted to the Committee in 2001 is characterized by very specific facts: The applicant 
was born in 1904 in Vienna and a citizen of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, but his 
family had settled in Bohemia since the 17th century, which was a kingdom of the 
empire. After the end of the First World War the applicant, as a resident of Bohemia, 
became a citizen of the newly created Czechoslovak State in 1918. Due to his Ger-
man mother tongue his citizenship was automatically changed into German citizen-
ship in 1939 by virtue of Hitler’s decree of 16 March 1939. After the death of his 
father in 1941 he inherited property, the Hruby Rohozec estate, which was confis-
cated on the basis of Benes decree 12/1945 by the newly formed government and he 
was deprived of his citizenship which he retained some years later on account of his 
proven loyalty during occupation. After in 1948 a Communist government came into 
power the applicant was forced to leave Czechoslovakia in 1949 and returned to 
Prague only in 1991 after the “velvet revolution” of 1989 had taken place. He re-
tained his Czech citizenship in 1992 and subsequently, on the legal basis of Restitu-
tion Law No. 243/1992 he reclaimed possession of the estate he had inherited from 
his father in 1941. The respective restitution law was amended in 1996 by replacing 
the condition of permanent residence by the condition of uninterrupted 
Czech/Czechoslovak citizenship from the end of the war until 1 January 1990. As 
consequence, the restitution agreement of 1992 was invalidated and could not serve 
as the legal basis for restitution, since the applicant has not maintained continuous 
citizenship. Notwithstanding his reacquisition of Czechoslovak citizenship the ap-
plicant has not received any restitution for the loss he suffered. In 2000 the applicant 
died but his wife pursued the claim.  
The Committee found that the amendment of Law No. 243/1992 by the Law No. 
30/1996 implemented a more stringent requirement of citizenship, since citizenship 
had already been required as a condition for restitution under Law No. 243/1992. 
 
161  See UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 747/1997 on 30 October 2001, UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/7477/1997, Dr. Karel Des Fours Walderode v. The Czech Republic, 
CCPR/C/73/D/747/1997: 8.4. The Committee recalls its views in cases No. 516/1993 (Simunek 
et al.), 586/1994 (Joseph Adam) and 857/1999 (Blazek et al.) that “a requirement in the law for 
citizenship as an obligatory condition for restitution of property confiscated by the authorities 
makes an arbitrary, and, consequently a discriminatory distinction between individuals who are 
equally victims of prior state confiscations, and constitutes a violation of Article 26 of the 
Covenant. This violation is further expressed by the retroactive operation of the impugned 
Law. 9.1. The Human Rights Committee, acting under Article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional 
Protocol, is of the view that Article 26, in conjunction with Article 2 of the Covenant, has been 
violated by the State Party. 9. 2 In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 3 (a) of the Covenant, 
the State Party is under an obligation to provide the late author’s surviving spouse, Dr. 
Johanna Kammerlander, with an effective remedy, entailing in this case prompt restitution of 
the property in question or compensation therefore, and, in addition, appropriate compensation 
in respect of the fact that the author and his surviving spouse have been deprived of the enjoy-
ment of their property since its restitution was revoked in 1995. The State party should review 
its legislation and administrative practices to ensure that all persons enjoy both, equality before 
the law as well as equal protection of the law”. 
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The requirement of uninterrupted citizenship added by the amendment in 1996 led to 
an exclusion of the applicant and any others in that situation from restitution162. 
Therefore the Committee considered it discriminatory to require continuous Czech 
citizenship for someone who otherwise had the right to claim restitution of property 
confiscated on the basis of the Benes Decrees163. The Committee found that the 
measures carried out by the Czech government caused a violation of the non-
discrimination rule of the Article 26 of the Covenant, since the Czech law discrimi-
nated aliens against nationals. Since the ICCPR does not grant the protection of 
property specifically, the non-accessory rule of non-discrimination has to serve as 
the legal basis for the equal treatment of aliens and nationals with regard to property 
protection. Nevertheless, the Committee renders only non-binding comments which 
are not enforceable and the implementation of these “views” is optional, thus pro-
ceedings before ICSID tribunals are far more effective and less time-consuming.  
II. Regional Human Rights Systems 
The three regional human rights conventions – European, American and African – 
are all cast in broad language to protect aliens as well as nationals164 generally and 
 
162  The Committee stated that “this raises an issue of arbitrariness and, consequently, of a breach 
of the right to equality before the law, equal protection of the law and non-discrimination un-
der Article 26 of the Covenant”, see No. 747/1997, § 8.3. 
163  The Committee also ruled in favour of the applicant in the Fabryova v. Czech Republic case, 
when eligibility for compensation was denied while in similar cases the plaintiffs obtained res-
titution, see Fabryova v. Czech Republic (765/97), see also Pezoldova v. Czech Republic 
(757/97); the case of Brok and Brokova v. the Czech Republic was more controversial. The 
Committee observed that “legislation must not discriminate among the victims of the prior 
confiscation to which it applies, since all victims are entitled to redress without arbitrary dis-
tinctions”, see No. 774/1997, § 7.3. The Committee found that the restitution laws of 1991 and 
1994 “gave rise to a restitution claim of the author which was denied on the ground that the na-
tionalization took place in 1946/1947 on the basis of Benes-Decree No. 100/1945 falls outside 
the scope of laws of 1991 and 1994. Thus, the author was excluded from the benefit of the res-
titution law although the Czech nationalization in 1946/1947 could only been carried out be-
cause the author’s property was confiscated by the Nazi authorities during the time of German 
occupation. In the Committee’s view this discloses a discriminatory treatment of the author, 
compared to those individuals whose property was confiscated by Nazi authorities without be-
ing subjected, immediately after the war, to Czech nationalization and who, therefore, could 
benefit from the laws of 1991 and 1994. Irrespective of whether the arbitrariness in question 
was inherent in the law itself or whether it resulted from the application of the law by the 
courts of the State party, the Committee finds that the author was denied his right to equal pro-
tection of the law in violation of article 26 of the Covenant”, see id., § 7.4. 
164  See Article 1 ECHR, stating that “the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”. 
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with regard to property165, although in detail, the wording of the respective clauses is 
not identical. The two more recent regional systems - the Inter-American and the 
African one - are modelled in part on the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The following chapter introduces and analyzes the three different systems and the 
respective jurisprudence to provide an overview on the human rights institutions 
playing a role on the regional level. 
1. The European Convention on Human Rights  
The drawing up of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms was set up by the Council of Europe and the Convention was 
opened for ratification in Rome on 4 November 1950166. It entered into force three 
years later in September 1953. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
instituted the first regional Human Rights system. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights served as a model for the Convention and it was to pursue the begin-
ning steps for a collective enforcement of certain rights set out in the Universal Dec-
laration. The entry into force of the Convention was followed by fourteen protocols 
which have been adopted since. As amended further rights and liberties to those 
granted in by the Convention were added: Protocol 9 enables individuals to plead 
before the Court and now the Convention permits both states parties and individuals 
to bring communications against states adhering to the Convention. These develop-
ments led hand in hand with the accession of new Contracting States to an enormous 
increase of applications before the Court167 which now functions on a permanent 
basis with full-time judges resident in Strasbourg. The European system was the first 
to establish an international court for the protection of human rights and a procedure 
for individual denunciations of human rights violations168.   
 
165  See e.g. the Preamble of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, which states that 
”the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a national of a certain state, but 
are based upon attributes of human personality” and the Preamble of the African Charter: “ … 
the reality and respect of peoples’ rights should necessarily guarantee human rights”.  
166 See <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/HistoricalBackground.htm>. 
167  The number of applications registered by the Commission climbed from 404 in 1981 to 4750 
in 1997 and the number of provisional files opened each year with the Commission over-
stepped 12000. After the implementation of Protocol 11 which came into force on 1 November 
1998, the Court’s case load increased at an unprecedented rate: the number of registered appli-
cations rose from 5979 in 1998 to 13858 in 2001, which equals an increase of approximately 
130%. These circumstances were initiated to be resolved by a Ministerial Conference on Hu-
man Rights, which was held in Rome on 3 and 4 November 2000 to mark the 50th anniversary 
of the Convention. In 2004 44.100 new applications were lodged (a plus of 13% compared to 
2003) and 32.500 applications were allocated to a decision body, at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/F2B964EE-57C5-4C86-8B8F-
8B4B6095D89C/0/MicrosoftWordstatistical_charts_2004__internet_.pdf.  
168  Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (2005), p. 108. 
 299
The drafting of a rule for the protection of property provided by the ECHR has 
been shaped by endless discussions and difficulties in finding a consensus on its 
formulation169. This difficulty is born almost entirely out of the historical back-
ground170: The preliminary version of the Convention did not contain any rule for 
the protection of property, but the Advisory Committee, an organ subsequent to the 
European Council endorsed the admission of a rule for the protection of property171. 
The proposal made in this respect by the Advisory Committee172 was not backed on 
a broad basis by the Council, who then asked for an implementation of this guaran-
tee in further amendments. This proposal was followed and the protection of prop-
erty was introduced into Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol which entered into 
force on 20 March 1952173. Article 14 of the Convention prohibits any form of dis-
 
169  The members of the Council of Europe considered themselves sharing an “adequate common 
heritage  of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to implement further cer-
tain of the rights contained in the Universal Declaration of 1948 (Cmd. 8969 (1953), p. 2); Ja-
cobs/White, The European Convention on Human Rights (1996), p. 246; Due to the assertion 
of slavery and servitude, the protection of property was covered with oblivion; as in the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the term “property” appeared merely as 
a criterion of illegal discrimination; see further Böckstiegel, Die allgemeinen Grundsätze des 
Völkerrechts über Eigentumsentziehung, Eine Untersuchung zu Art. 1 ZP, 1963, p. 11; 
Schwelb, The Protection of the Right of Property of Nationals under the First Protocol, Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law, No. 12, 1964, p. 518; Janis/Kay/Bradley, European Human 
Rights Law (2000), pp. 16.  
170  In addition, the protection of property rights as human rights raises particular problems, see 
generally Schermers, The international Protection of the Right of Property, in Protecting Hu-
man Rights: The European Dimension, in Essays in Honour of Gerard J. Wiarda (Mats-
cher/Petzold ed.) (1988), p. 565.  
171  See Travaux Préparatoires, vol. III (1976), p. 262. 
172  «Toute personne, physique ou morale, a droit au respect de ses biens. Ses biens ne peuvent être 
soumis à confiscation arbitraire. Les présentes dispositions ne sauraient, toutefois, être consi-
dérées comme portant atteinte, de quelque manière que ce soit, au droit que possèdent les Etats 
de promulguer les lois nécessaires pour assurer l’utilisation de ces biens, conformément a 
l’intérêt générale». 
173  See Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights 
which states the following: „ Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possession except in the public interest and 
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce 
such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” Due to the 
vagueness of the wording, difficulties regarding the interpretation of the Article arose, e. g. the 
general principles of international law that are referred to are the rules of general law on the 
expropriation of foreign property and not the general principles of international law recognised 
by civilised nations. Thus the requirement of compensation for expropriation, as postulated by 
international customary law, was incorporated in Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol.   
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crimination174. It must be stressed, however, that – in contrast to Article 26 ICCPR – 
Article 14 ECHR provides only for an accessory right to non-discrimination, i.e. 
only insofar as rights guaranteed in the Convention or any of its Additional Protocol 
are at stake. This situation has changed for those states for which Additional Proto-
col N° 12 which provides for a non-accessory right to non-discrimination similar to 
the one enshrined in Article 26 ICCPR has entered into force. The scope of the right 
established in the Additional Protocol is broadly framed and permissible restrictions 
are widely drawn. According to the Court, the respective Article in the Additional 
Protocol No.1 comprises three distinct, but connected rules175, which are the peace-
ful enjoyment of property, the deprivation of possessions as subject to certain condi-
tions and the right of the state to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest. The certain conditions which have to be met when deprivation of 
property is exercised have posed difficulties of interpretation176. The said conditions 
are inter alia the principles of general international law which refer to the principles 
which have been established in general international law with regard to the confisca-
tion of property of aliens.177 Therefore measures exercised by a state against its own 
nationals do not fall within the scope of these general principles of international 
law178 and the nationals are in a different legal position from that of the alien179.  
The impact of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on the protection of foreign in-
vestment might appear in a deceptive light, since foreign investment requires in-
vestment undertakings in another state than the national state of the investor and no 
such case has been decided before the ECtHR up to now180. Yet, the Court has given 
 
174  According to Article 14, “the enjoyment of rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.” 
175  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1421; Jacobs/White, The European Convention on Human Rights 
(1996), p. 247. 
176  The European Convention on Human Rights accords priority to social interests over individual 
property rights, in particular when health and safety of the society at large are threatened by the 
recognition of the individual rights to property, in that sense also Ruffert, The Protection of 
Foreign Investment by the European Convention on Human Rights?, German Yearbook of In-
ternational Law, vol. 43 (2000), pp. 117 (131), (139-141). 
177  Schwelb, The Protection of Property of Nationals under the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, American Journal of Comparative Law (1964), No. 12, p. 518.  
178  See App. 1870/63, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, 16 December 1965 (1965) 8 Yearbook, 
218, 226, where the Commission held that Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol does not 
require a state which deprives its nationals of their possessions in the public interest and sub-
ject to the conditions provided for by the law to pay compensation, see also Lithgow and oth-
ers v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A, No. 102. 
179  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1458). 
180  Schöbi, Der Schutz des Eigentums in Europa, Recht - Zeitschrift für juristische Ausbildung 
und Praxis, vol. 18 (2000), p. 78; Peukert, Artikel 1 des Ersten Zusatzprotokolls, in EMRK 
Kommentar (Frowein/Peukert eds.), 1996, para 22 with note 67.  
 301
general interpretations to the text of the Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In the Case 
Sporrong and Lönnroth181 the Court ruled that the entitlement to the peaceful en-
joyment of possessions means the right to hold property. According to the state of 
facts two properties had been affected by the existence of construction prohibitions 
and expropriation permits for many years without compensating the owners for their 
losses incurred during these periods. The interference with the propertys’ function 
caused by the said regulations was considered not to equal a deprivation and the 
applicability of the second sentence of the first paragraph was denied182. The Court 
had to determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the 
general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the indi-
vidual’s fundamental rights183. It concluded, however, that the said balance was, as a 
requirement of proportionality, inherent in the whole of the Convention and con-
cluded a breach of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol184.  
In the Case James v. United Kingdom185, the leading case on the issue of expro-
priation, the ECtHR held that the principles in question are applicable exclusively to 
aliens, because they were specifically developed for their benefit and, as such, they 
would not relate to the treatment of nationals by their own state186. The case con-
cerned the loss of immovable property in Belgravia, London, by virtues of the lease-
hold reform in the late 1960s187. The Court reasoned that the reference to interna-
tional law allowed non-nationals access to the implementation machinery of the 
Convention for property protection instead of seeking for diplomatic protection188 
and concluded that since non-nationals were considered more vulnerable to domestic 
legislation as they were not part of the electorate and could not influence the adop-
tion of laws, nationals were imposed a greater burden in the public interest189. With 
regard to the standard of compensation the Court held that on the legal basis of Arti-
 
181  Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A, No. 52, 81983 5 
EHRR 35. 
182  Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the European Human 
Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1451). 
183  Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A, No. 52, 81983, 
5 EHRR 35, para 69. 
184  In that sense also Wiesinger v. Austria, Judgment of 30 October 1991, Series A, No. 213 
(1993) 16 EHRR 258, and Holy Monasteries v. Greece, Judgment of 9 December 1994, Series 
A, No. 301-A; Gordon/Ward/Eicke, The Strasbourg Case law – Leading Cases from the Euro-
pean Human Rights Reports (2001), p. 1422 (1453). 
185  James v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 21 February 1986. Series A, No. 98, 
para 37. 
186  See footnote 185, paras. 58-66. 
187  See for a survey Mendelson, The United Kingdom Nationalisation Cases and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 57 (1986), p. 33 
(73).  
188  James v. United Kingdom, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 98, para 62.  
189  See footnote 188, para. 63. 
 302
cle 1 of the First Additional Protocol a full compensation could not be guaranteed in 
every situation190.   
The Wasa Liv Omsesidigt Case191 dealt with two companies which had brought 
an application against the Swedish government and alleged that its tax legislation 
concerning insurance companies constituted a breach of Article 1 of the First Addi-
tional Protocol. The European Commission rejected the case after finding that the 
application was ill-founded. In the Darby Case192 the issue of taxation was also in 
the fore of attention, when a Finnish doctor resident in Sweden was taxed as a Swe-
dish resident by the Swedish administrative authorities and therefore had to pay the 
entire church tax. He opposed these decisions and applied to the ECtHR, which 
rightly held that tax obligations fall within the scope of the second paragraph of 
Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol and opened the admissibility of conside-
ring a discriminatory effect of the Swedish tax regulations under Article 14 ECHR.  
Another case concerning the issue of expropriation of foreign property was ad-
dressed in is the Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany case193. The 
applicant initiated a claim inter alia for restitution of property, namely for a painting 
confiscated by the former Czechoslovakia in 1946 under Benes-Decree 12/1945194 
and alleged a violation of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol195. He argued in 
this respect that the confiscation, as a violation of international law, had to remain 
ineffective. Challenging in particular the validity of the said expropriation, the ap-
plicant argued that, as heir, he was the owner of the painting concerned. In the appli-
cant’s submission, the restitution of the painting in question to the Czech Republic 
amounted to an unlawful interference with his “existing possessions”. The confisca-
tion of the painting by the former Czechoslovakia under Benes Decree No. 12 had 
been unlawful, since his father had been neither “German” nor an “enemy of the 
Czech and Slovak people” 196. The applicant’s father filed a claim, but on 21 No-
vember 1951 the Bratislava Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. In 1991 the 
municipality of Cologne obtained the painting as a temporary loan from the Brno 
Historical Monuments Office in the Czech Republic and the applicant requested for 
an interim injunction ordering to the City of Cologne to hand over the painting. He 
formed a file before the cologne Regional Court requesting for consent to the deli-
 
190  See above note, para. 54.  
191  Wasa Liv Omsesidigt v. Sweden, 58 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (1988). 
192  Darby v. Sweden, Judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A, No. 187; (1991) 13 EHRR 774; see 
also Gasus Dosier und Fördertechnik GmbH v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 23 February 
1995, Series A, No. 306-B. 
193  Eur. Court H. R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Ger-
many; Application No. 42527/98.  
194  Decree 12/1945 (21. 6. 1945) – Confiscation and expedited distribution of agricultural proper-
ties of Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators and certain organisations and institutes, 
see Chapter C. I. 2.  
195  The applicant also alleged a violation of Art. 6 (1) of the ECHR. 
196  Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany; 
Application No. 42527/98, para. 79.  
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very of the painting. In several proceedings the German courts found they lacked 
jurisdiction and as consequence the applicant then filed an application before the 
ECtHR. The ECtHR dismissed a violation of property rights under Article 1 of the 
First Protocol on grounds of the scope of the term “possession”197. In this respect the 
Court stated “the hope of recognition of the survival of an old property right cannot 
be considered a “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No.1. In 
these circumstances, the applicant as his father’s heir cannot, for the purposes of 
Article 1 of Protocol 1, be deemed to have retained a title to property nor a claim to 
restitution against the Federal Republic of Germany amounting to a legitimate ex-
pectation in the sense of the Court’s case law. The Court thus concludes that there 
has been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and observes that the expropria-
tion carried out by authorities of former Czechoslovakia in 1946, as confirmed by 
the Bratislava Administrative Court in 1951, that is before 3 September 1953, the 
entry into force of the Convention, and before 18 May 1954, the entry into force of 
Protocol No. 1. Accordingly, the Court is not competent ratione temporis to exa-
mine the circumstances of the expropriation or the continuing effects produced by it 
up to the present date”198. The ECtHR ruled that the Benes Decrees could not violate 
the ECHR and rejected the application.  
As discussed above, both the Commission and the ECtHR have taken a broad 
view of the interpretation of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol199. In this 
respect several judgments were rendered defining and clarifying its scope200, but 
foreign direct investment has, up to now, not been addressed directly by the 
Court201. In addition, expropriation of a foreigner’s property was uncommon among 
the traditional members of the members of the Convention202 and the ECtHR is 
considerably reluctant to recognize the existence of an expropriation or any other 
 
197  See also Malhous v. the Czech Republic (Dec.) No. 33071/96, 13 December 2000, ECHR 
2000-XII and Mayer & Others v. Germany , application No. 18890/91, 19048/91 and 
19549/92, Commission Decision of 4 March 1996, Decisions and Reports 85, p. 5-20. 
198  Eur. Court H.R., Judgment of 12 July 2002, Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany, 
paras. 79-87. 
199  See ECHR of 23 September 1982, Series A752; Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden: 60. 
“…Although the expropriation permits left intact in the law the owner’s right to use and dis-
pose of their possessions, they nevertheless in practice significantly reduced the possibility of 
its exercise. They also affected the very substance of ownership…The applicants’ right of 
property thus became precarious and defeasible…the justification for the interference with the 
applicants’ right of property”, and ECHR on 18. February 1991, Series A/192, Fredin; ECHR 
on 19 December 1982, Series 0A/169, Mellacher and ECHR on 7. December 1976, Series 
A724.  
200  Continuous jurisprudence since Eur. Court H.R., Handyside Case, Judgment of 7 December 
1976, Series A, No. 24, para. 62; Marckx Case, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31, 
para. 63.  
201  See footnote 180.  
202  Böckstiegel, Enteignungs- und Nationalisierungsmaßnahmen gegen ausländische Kapitalge-
sellschaften, Völkerrechtliche Aspekte, Bericht der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, 
vol. 13 (1974), pp. 7.   
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measure which would result in restitution and/or compensation203. But in the last few 
years membership to the Convention has grown considerably, since all Central and 
East European States, including Russia and the Ukraine204, joined it and its mecha-
nism of judicial implementation. This development is taking place together with a 
vast boom of foreign direct investment in the Eastern parts of Europe and might 
increase the impact of regional human rights treaties, in particular the European 
Convention upon the protection of foreign direct investment.  
2. The American Convention on Human Rights  
The Inter-American system of human rights protection comprises thirty-four coun-
tries with a population of more than 600 million and is represented by the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS). The economical development and the distribution of 
wealth vary widely in this area205. The protection of human rights is based on a dual 
institutional structure, one having evolved from the Charter of the Organization of 
American States in 1948 and the other established by the entry into force of the 1969 
American Convention on Human Rights in 1978206. Two independent organs safe-
guard implementation of the American Convention: In 1959 a Commission was set 
to serve as a mechanism for the protection of human rights, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights. The Commission is vested with the authority to deal 
with allegations concerning a violation of human rights contained in either the 
American Declarations of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 or the 1969 Ameri-
can Human Rights Convention.  The competence of the Commission was initially 
limited to give recommendations “with the objective to bring about more effective 
observance of Human Rights”. In 1978 the American Convention on Human Rights 
came into force and incorporated the Commission. Moreover, it provided for the 
establishment of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights. The protection system 
under the American Convention still resembles the one previously applicable under 
the European Convention: Only a state concerned or the Commission can submit a 
case to the Court, provided, moreover, that the state concerned has accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction. The Court’s judgments are binding, but without an enforcement 
mechanism comparable to the European system. Also in contrast to the European 
system, the OAS inter-state complaint mechanism is optional whereas the accep-
 
203  Weber, Menschenrechte (2004), p. 819. 
204  Waelde/Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition Economics: Western Transplants – A 
short-cut to Social Market Economy Status?, International and Comparative Legal Quarterly, 
vol. 43 (1994), p. 347 et seq. 
205  Reisman, Practical Matters for Consideration in the Establishment of a Regional Human Rights 
Mechanism: Lessons from the Inter-American Experience, St. Louis Warsaw Trans’l 89 
(1995), p. 90-92.  
206  American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, in force 18 July 1978, 
OEA/ser.L/V/II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), O.A.S.T.S. No. 36 at 1.  
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tance of the individual petition procedure is mandatory for any State Party to the 
Convention207.  
The instrument preceding this Convention, the American Declaration on the 
Rights and Duties of Man208, provided for property protection209, adhered to the 
approach to the right of property as a human right and set a rule for compensation in 
case of expropriation210. The American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 con-
tains rules for the protection of property in its Article 21211 and according to Articles 
24 and 25 the right to equal protection and the right to judicial protection. Article 44 
states that juridical persons do not have the capacity to lodge petitions to the Com-
mission212. In deciding not to entertain these kinds of petitions, the Commission is 
excluding a major part of the economic disputes potentially arising under the Ameri-
can Convention. Notwithstanding, a significant case in the context of foreign prop-
erty protection is the case Mevopal S. A. v. Argentina213. Mevopal S. A., a construc-
tion company, entered into three construction contracts with the Provincial Housing 
Institute in the Province of Buenos Aires. The contracts were breached in various 
respects and caused a loss of working capital for Mevopal. The company then filed 
various local suits, but the Argentine Supreme Court rejected the appeals filed. On 
behalf of Mevopal its legal representative filed a petition with the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights alleging inter alia the violation of property by the 
State of Argentina. The Commission found that it was lacking competence ratione 
personae, inasmuch as juridicial persons are not entitled to protection by the Con-
vention and declared the petition inadmissible. Although the awards rendered by the 
 
207  All states ratifying the convention accept the right of any person or group of persons, or any 
non-governmental entity legally recognized in one or more member states of the OAS to pre-
sent petitions to the inter-American Commission, see Art. 44 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights.  
208 The Declaration was accepted by the Ninth International Conference of the American States in 
1948 in Bogota and is available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-32.htm>. 
209  See Article XXIII: „Every person has a right to own such private property as meets the essen-
tial needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.” 
210  „The States shall guarantee the right to private property, and its individual or collective use 
shall be subject to the interests of society, with respect at all times for the dignity of the indi-
vidual and the inherent needs of family life. Expropriation shall be legal in cases of public util-
ity or social interest, in which case compensation shall be made.” 
211  The Article states that “(1) everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. 
The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interests of society. (2) No one shall 
be deprived of his property except upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public 
utility or social interest, and in the cases and according to the forms established by law. (3) 
Usury and other forms of exploitation of man and by man shall be prohibited by law,” see In-
ter-American Commission on Human Rights, Ten Years of Activity 1971-1981 (1982) 28. 
212  Article 44 states that „any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally 
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the 
Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State 
Party.“ 
213  Case Mevopal, S.A. v. Argentina, Report No. 39/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. OEA/Ser. L./V./II.95 
doc. 7 rev. 297 (1998).  
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Commission of the Convention entitle the claimant for compensation214, it has little 
practical relevance in the field of foreign investment.  
3. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights215 was the last regional human 
right Convention entering into force216. It obliges its contracting parties to recognize 
the rights, duties and freedoms contained in the Charter and bring them to full effect 
by adopting the legislative or other measures required217. The Charter functions 
within the framework of the African Union (AU). It emphasizes African traditions 
and values, but also grants peoples’ rights as well as individual rights, particularly 
referring to the right of development. Moreover, the Banjul Charter proclaims eco-
nomic, social, cultural as well as civil and political rights. It protects private property 
as such218, but not the owner. It reflects the specific attitude of the developing coun-
tries towards the right and protection of property as a fundamental right219, but it 
determines no legal consequences in case of expropriation220 and can therefore not 
provide a sufficient protection of property. 
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Charter the African Commission on Human and 
People’s Rights was founded which duties are to promote human and peoples’ rights 
and ensure their protection in Africa221. The Commission consists of eleven inde-
pendent members and has four functions explicitly conferred to it under the Charter: 
the promotion of human and peoples’ rights in Africa, the protection of those rights 
and the interpretation of the Charter. The Commission is deemed to still explore the 
scope of its powers due to the short time of its being in function, but by the end of its 
 
214  See Art. 68 (3) American Convention on Human Rights. 
215  The Convention is originally called the Banjul-Charter, see African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/687/3 rev. 5, reprinted in (1982) 21 I.L.M. 58. 
216  Shelton, Remedies in International Law (2005), p. 113; Mugwanya, Realizing universal human 
rights norms trough regional human rights mechanisms: reinvigorating the African System, 
Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 10, No. 1 (1999), p. 35-50. 
217  See generally Essien, The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights: Eleven Years 
After, 6 State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law Review 93 (2000), p. 93-111. 
218  See Article 14 stating that „The right to property shall be guaranteed. It may only be en-
croached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the community and in 
accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
219  Dolzer, Eigentum, Entschädigung und Enteignung im geltenden Völkerrecht (1985), p. 106. 
220  See Article 14 (2) African Charter on Human Rights.  
221  Before the adoption of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 
the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on 1 January 2004, the 
protection of rights listed in the Banjul-Charter was exercised solely by the African Commis-
sion on Human Rights, a quasi-judicial body, modelled on the United Nations Human Rights 
Commission with no power to adopt binding measures. The Commission’s functions are lim-
ited to examine state reports or to interpret the Charter on request of a state party. 
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first decade it had concluded over 100 cases222. To make the African system for the 
protection of human rights more effective, a new mechanism was taken on in 
1998223. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered into force 
on 25. January 2004 upon its ratification by fifteen Member states224 and resulted in 
the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)225. 
It provides that the Court accepts actions on the basis of any instrument, including 
human right treaties, which have been ratified by state parties in question226. Indi-
viduals as well as NGO’s may submit actions to the Court227. Moreover, the Court 
can apply as legal source of law any relevant human rights instrument ratified by the 
respective state228. While its judges have been recently elected, the permanent seat 
of the Court still has to be determined and its statute to be adopted in order to make 
it functionable229.  
 
222  See http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_reports/activity- 
16_en.pdf>; Quashigah, The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, African Human 
Rights Law Journal, vol. 2, No. 2 (2002), p. 261-300.  
223  Ibid.; Nmehielle, Towards an African Court of Human Rights: Structuring and the Court, 6 
Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law 27 (2000), pp. 27 (29); Udombana, To-
ward the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Better late than never, 3 Yale Human 
Rights and Development Journal (2000) 45; El-Obaid/Kwadwo, Human Rights in Africa – A 
New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present, 41 McGill Law Journal (1996) 819; 
Akinseye-George, New Trends in African Human Rights Law: Prospects of an African Court 
of Human Rights, University of Miami International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 
(2001/2002), p. 159 (175); Krisch, The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peo-
ple’s Rights, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 58 (1998), 
p. 713(733).  
224  See <http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../ratifications/ratifica- 
 tion_court_en.pdf>; Wundeh Eno, The Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights, African Human Rights Law Journal (2002), p. 223-233; Mubangisi, An African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights, South-African Yearbook of International Law (1999), 
pp. 256. 
225  The Court should eventually be merged with the envisaged African Court of Justice the Char-
ter of which has, however, not yet come into force; see further Udombana, An African Human 
Rights Court and African Union Court: A needful Duality or a needless Duplication?, Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law, vol. 28, No. 3 (2003), pp. 811. 
226  See Art. 3. 1. of the Protocol. 
227  See Occasional Paper, The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Presentation , 
analysis and commentary: the Protocol of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
establishing the Court (2000), IA; further Mohamed, Individual and NGO Participation in Hu-
man Rights Litigation before the African Court of Human and People’s Rights: Lessons from 
the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, Journal of African Law 377(1999), 
p. 201-213; generally Welch, Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-
Governmental Organizations, University of Philadelphia Press (1995), pp. 279. 
228  Art. 7 of the Protocol.  
229  See <http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?../activity_reports/activit 
y1 6_en.pdf>.  
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III. Summary  
The above considerations permit a brief evaluation of the role of human rights insti-
tutions in the context of foreign investment protection. While the traditional or clas-
sical concept of diplomatic protection in the sense of inter-state remedy has domina-
ted the area of human rights protection until World War II, the new generation of 
treaties granting human rights to the individual has challenged this approach and 
improved the standing of individuals in international human rights litigation signifi-
cantly. For instance, the ECHR and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights allow individuals to lodge claims against states who have expressly recogni-
zed the competence of the tribunals. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights also acknowledges human rights treaties concluded under the auspices of the 
United Nations as admissible sources of law; given the respective state is party to 
the treaty. The admissible application of the individual under the ECHR and the 
African Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights marks a great departure taken by 
these conventions from traditional forms of the international protection of individu-
als for they dispense with nationality as a condition of protection. Thus the deve-
lopments in international human rights law show that the conceptual understanding 
of the rule of diplomatic protection had to face the winds  of change resulting in a 
human rights protection system  which is based on treaty law and limited to the 
means provided by the particular treaty. In sum, the principal achievement of con-
temporary human rights protection is to grant the same protection to all individuals 
regardless of their nationality or other factors, which can be pursued procedurally.  
But there are two sides of the coin. Like all international law, human rights law is 
the law of the political system of nation states and subject to international political 
forces. The rights granted to the individuals by the respective treaties are not entirely 
covered by corresponding procedural rights in international law and it is not at all 
certain that the state parties intend to accept any international decision making and 
enforcement procedures for the protection of individual rights other than the ones 
provided for in the respective treaties. This is no coincidence but rather mirrors the 
underlying structural flaws of international law in general, which are to determine 
the amount of reparation to be paid to meet the requirements of an “adequate com-
pensation” in each given case. Receiving an appropriate reparation payment in case 
of deprivation of property is a major factor to safeguard investment, in particular in 
a foreign country. Invoking a tribunal under the ICSID Convention provides these 
safeguards by a consistent and coherent jurisprudence rendered by experts as well as 
by binding awards. Its structural framework is tailor-made to meet these specific 
requirements and can therefore afford legal certainty by rendering consistent juris-
prudence. The idea of the ICSID Convention at first line is to safeguard foreign 
property by providing a procedural framework in case of disputes, while human 
rights aim at the detachment of the individual from the state and a civilized conduct 
among states, including a non-discriminatory protection of property. Although, 
therefore, both concepts had the same basic purpose, namely the protection of the 
person and his property, they appear both in theory and in past practice as mutually 
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divergent. Ultimately, the exhaustion of local remedies remains a prerequisite for the 
application of diplomatic protection, which might be very time consuming and hin-
der alien investors from invoking human rights tribunals given that the ICISD Con-
vention is ratified by the respective state. Otherwise international and in particular 
regional human rights courts might represent the last legal resort for the investor. An 
institutionalisation of the right of unilateral recourse to a remedy such as ICSID in 
treaties creating investment protection regimes represents a new approach to juris-
diction absent the local remedies rule and caters to the interests of foreign investors. 
If the system established under ICSID can overcome its current state of crisis, inter-
national human rights courts will not draw up level with tribunals under the ICSID 
Convention in the field of foreign investment protection.  
D. The Role of the World Trade Organization 
The following section examines the approach of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to foreign investment in order to draw conclusions on its current role as well 
as on its potential future prospects. Taking in account the close linkage between 
trade and investment, the WTO seems to be the appropriate venue for international 
investment protection, yet investment is the “missing panel” in the WTO’s body of 
trade and trade-related agreements. Consequently, drafting a multilateral agreement 
on foreign investment protection under the auspices of the WTO has been on the 
agenda since the end of the twentieth century, when in the mid-1990s the Uruguay 
Round introduced an investment dimension in multilateral trade rules, bringing 
about new implications for foreign investment230. Notwithstanding this situation it is 
important to note that investment is, however, to some extent already covered by the 
WTO system, yet in a fragmented manner and dotted across a range of agreements. 
Foreign investment-related issues in that sense can now be found in five WTO 
agreements: the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(ASCM)231. A single multilateral investment agreement on a comprehensive basis 
might be a clearly better approach, since the plethora of diverse bilateral and pluri-
lateral agreements addressing foreign investment issues appears as a tangled web of 
competing and even conflicting commitments and potentially impairs foreign in-
vestment. Yet, significant objections were raised against the drafting of such a multi-
 
230  OECD, Working Papers on International Investment (2004), Relationship between Interna-
tional Investment Agreements, p. 3. 
231  The ASCM is dealing with the prohibition of subsidies contingent upon domestic over foreign 
procurement and export performances. This has implications for access to investment incen-
tives conditioned on performance requirements.  
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lateral agreement and none of the proposals made in this respect could successfully 
be implemented. Opposition against the idea of a multilateral comprehensive agree-
ment within the WTO system was voiced mainly by developing countries which 
demanded, as a minimum, the introduction of exceptions, special treatment and 
escape clauses. It is true that investment law and trade law overlap substantially, but 
as they are heading at different achievements, introducing an investment agreement 
into the WTO system may be of debatable merit. To illustrate the circumstances 
surrounding the negotiations and drafting process of such a multilateral framework 
on foreign investment in the WTO, the development of the issue will be briefly 
described with an emphasis on the conflict provoking aspects of the drafting of a 
multilateral comprehensive investment agreement.  
I. History 
A glance at the history and the development of the WTO elucidates the background 
of the current situation: The Havana Charter in its version of 1947/1948, made for 
the International Trade Organization (ITO)232, which was planned to come into ef-
fect along with other international institutions in this period of time, contained some 
provisions on foreign investment. Two articles of the Charter dealt with the issue of 
foreign direct investment and its protection233. One of these provisions was consid-
ered to give a preference to the developed states and was therefore severely objected 
to by the developing states. Ultimately, the Charter never came into force234 and the 
ITO was whittled down to the provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)235. They contained rules on trade in goods and dealt with investment 
only peripherally. This setting was the initial situation for the separate development 
of international trade and investment in the system of the WTO.  
During the Uruguay Round the issue of foreign investment was taken into consi-
deration again and efforts were made to agree on measures regarding investment in 
international trade236. However, the Uruguay Round negotiations on trade-related 
investment measures were marked by strong disagreement among participants over 
 
232  United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, UNYB 1947-1948, 522 et seq. 
233  Article 11 provided that no member “shall take unreasonable or unjustifiable action” against 
investment and determined “fair and equitable” treatment. Article 12 entitled the members to 
take appropriate safety valves against foreign investment and to “determine whether and to 
what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investment“. 
234  Schwarzenberger, Foreign Investment and International Law (1969), p. 136 (137). 
235  Dated 30 October 1947, in the version valid since 1 March 1969, UNTS 55, 94. 
236  Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este; see Senti, WTO – Regulation of World Trade after 
the Uruguay Round (1998), para 1143; Shenkin, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties and the GATT, Moving toward a multilateral investment treaty, Uni-
versity of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 55, No. 2 (1994), pp. 541; Mashayeki/Gibbs, Lessons 
from the Uruguay Round Negotiations on Investment, Journal of World Trade, vol. 33 (1999), 
pp. 1 (26). 
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the coverage and nature of possible new disciplines237 and proved to be highly frus-
trating;238 finally, the implementation of the TRIMS-Agreement was due to the de-
creasing interest of the U.S.A. on extensive investment liberalisation239. At the Min-
isterial Summit in Singapore in 1996 the WTO received the mandate to establish a 
“Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI)”240. The committee was to 
evaluate the feasibility of drafting a comprehensive regime on investment that could 
be administered by the WTO. Within the WGTI several aspects raised by the mem-
bers of the Working Group were discussed during the first sessions. This check list 
of trade and investment contained the issues of the implications of the linkage be-
tween trade and investment for development and economic growth, in particular the 
economic parameters relating to macroeconomic stability, the degree of correlation 
between trade and investment flows and the determinants between this relationship 
as well as a stocktaking exercise regarding existing WTO provisions and implica-
tions for trade and investment flows of existing international instruments. The man-
date was then renewed and specified at the Ministerial Summit in Doha in 2001241. 
The Doha Declaration announced commitment to the continuation of the WGTI and 
instructed the group to consider and clarify diverse issues, but is does not commit 
the WTO to formally launch comprehensive negotiations on a “General Agreement 
 
237  Some developed countries made proposals for regulations that would prohibit a wide range of 
measures in addition to the local content requirements, which were found to be inconsistent 
with Article III in the FIRA panel case. Many developing countries raised objections and  
heavily opposed this approach. 
238  Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System – a history of the Uruguay Round (1999), p. 
116; <http://www.wto.int/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/eol/e/wto05/wto0f_3.htm#note4>.  
239  The GATT rules only extend to a relatively narrow range of investment measures with direct 
and immediately identifiable impacts on trade. In the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, 
the United States in particular favoured a much more comprehensive GATT code on invest-
ment based upon the principle of free access to foreign markets. Unlike the United States, most 
other Contracting States were sceptical of the free access approach, and saw the task of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on investment as that of developing more detailed and explicit 
rules with respect to measures that appear inconsistent with well-established GATT-principles, 
such as national treatment with respect to products, which would also require an extension of 
the kind of analysis to a broader set of measures such as trade balancing requirements or export 
performance requirements that directly affect trade flows. 
240  Stoll, The World Trade Organization (WTO), in R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, vol. IV (1999), p. 1541; Gallagher, Guide to the WTO and Developing 
Countries (2000), p. 67; for a later stage see generally Correa/Kumar, Protecting Foreign In-
vestment, Implications of a WTO regime and policy options, (2003), p. 35 (50); a general sur-
vey is provided by Sauve, Qs and As on trade, investment and the WTO, Journal of World 
Trade, vol. 31, No. 4 (1997), p. 55 (79). 
241  The Doha-Ministerial Declaration, 14. November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. 
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on Investment”242. In addition, the development issue was levelled into play and, in 
accordance with the Doha mandate the needs of the poorer states were to be taken 
into account within the considerations of the WGTI243.  
At Cancún in 2003, the EC’s insistence on the launching of investment negotia-
tions and the adamant stance of a large group of developing countries that invest-
ment should be put on hold were a major factor244. With neither the USA nor the EC 
prepared to support negotiations in the face of the developing countries resistance, 
investment is effectively off the table at the WTO for a foreseeable future, which is 
clearly reflected in the results of the Ministerial Summit in Hong Kong in December 
2005245.  
II. The WTO Agreements 
Currently, the five agreements mentioned above address issues of foreign invest-
ment in their provisions. This section introduces three of them: the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Agreement on Trade Related Invest-
ment Measures (TRIMs). The regimes appear to be not entirely compatible, as the 
GATS seeks to provide market access by its non-discrimination rules, addressing 
primarily macroeconomic issues, while the TRIPs focuses on the microeconomic 
aspects of foreign direct investment246 and the TRIMs aims at prohibiting measures 
of WTO member states making the approval of investment conditional on compli-
ance with any regulations that favour domestic products. This section explores the 
agreements and provides a short analysis and evaluation.  
 
242  These issues were inter alia scope and definition; transparency; non-discrimination; modalities 
for pre-establishment based on GATS-type positive list approach; development provisions; ex-
ceptions and balance of payments safeguards; and consultation and the settlement of disputes; 
for an evaluation see Kurtz, A general investment agreement in the WTO – Lessons from 
Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and the OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper (2002), pp. 48; see also Kentin, Prospects for rules on investment in the new 
WTO round, Legal issues for economic integration (2002), p. 61 (77).  
243  Some states contributing to the work of the WGTI claimed that a comprehensive multilateral 
instrument should be based on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), see also 
WTO Secretariat, Modalities for Pre-Establishment – Commitments based on a GATS-Type, 
Positive List Approach (WT/WGTI/W/120), 19 June 2002. 
244  Generally Mosoti, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the possibility of a multilateral framework 
on investment at the WTO – are poor economics caught in between?, North-western Journal of 
International Law (2005), p. 95-138; Davenport, Investment incentives in commonwealth de-
veloped countries and the WTO investment negotiations, (2003).  
245  WTO-Doc. of the Ministerial Conference, 13-18 December 2005 in Hong Kong, WT/MIN 
(05)/DEC. 
246  See Vandevelde, The Economics of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Harvard International Law 
Journal, Vol. 41, No. 2 (2000), pp. 469. 
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1. The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs)  
The Uruguay Round Final Act reflects a subtle compromise247 between varying 
perspectives of the negotiating parties: the TRIMs Agreement248, which contains 
new disciplines for investment measures, aims at safeguarding investment benefits 
for national economy and development249. The main purpose of the agreement is to 
prohibit discrimination between imported and domestic goods. It applies to invest-
ment measures related to trade in goods, but not to general issues in the field and 
prohibits certain of these measures.250 As the TRIMs is no comprehensive agreement 
and partly linked to the GATT, the respective measures need to be consistent with 
the national treatment obligations of the GATT251 according to Article III252 and 
XI253 of GATT 94 as foreseen in Article 2 TRIMs254. An illustrative list255 has been 
attached to the TRIMs listing examples of potential measures considered inconsis-
 
247  The compromise eventually reached during the negotiations is essentially limited to an inter-
pretation and clarification of the application to trade-related investment measures of GATT 
provisions on national treatment for imported goods (Article III) and on quantitative restric-
tions on imports or exports (Article XI). 
248  Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(MTN/FA), Geneva, 15 December 1993, II. 7 “Agreement on Trade-Related Investment   
Measures”, which came into effect on 1 January 1995; thus, the TRIMs Agreement does not 
cover many of the measures that were discussed in the Uruguay Round negotiations, such as 
export performance and transfer of technology requirements. 
249  These measures are inter alia local content, local manufacturing requirements, trade balance 
targets, production mandates, foreign exchange restrictions, mandatory technology transfer re-
quirements and equity restrictions.  
250  Rai, Trade Related Investment Measures under the WTO, The Indian Journal of International 
Law, vol. 41, No. 3 (2001), p. 435-477; OECD Working Paper, Working Paper on Interna-
tional Investment, Relationship between International Investment Agreements, p. 7.  
251  This concerns the treatment of imported goods versus domestic goods.  
252  National Treatment. 
253  See Article 1 TRIMs: Prohibition on quotas and other measures prohibiting or restricting the 
importation, exportation or sale for export of any product, except for duties, taxes or other 
charges.  
254  See Panel WT/DS4/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para 14.61. 
255  The list is non-exhaustive but provides a very concise definition of the respective measures 
including local content, sourcing and some trade-balancing requirements, which violate na-
tional treatment, and import and export restrictions, which violate the ban on quantitative re-
strictions, see Article XI of the GATT. In the case discussed below the panel stated moreover 
that “[A]n examination of whether the measures (in question) are covered by Item (1) of the Il-
lustrative List … will not only indicate whether they are trade-related but also whether they are 
inconsistent with Article III:4 GATT and thus in violation of Article 2.1 of the TRIMS Agree-
ment, see Panel Report, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, para 
14.83. 
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tent with Article III:4 or Article XI:1 of the GATT 94256. In addition, the TRIMs 
provides for a transition period257, during which properly notified measures are not 
regarded inconsistent with GATT 94258. By now, however, all non-conforming 
measures should have been eliminated, but a number of waivers have been granted 
to some states259.  
In spite of the cautious approach of the TRIMs to comprehensive investment pro-
visions, the WTO panels were invoked to decide on conflicts based on an interpreta-
tion of TRIMs provisions. Yet, it was considerably notable that the panels largely 
attempted to avoid considering claims under the TRIMs by choosing to consider the 
related claims of violation of national treatment prior to examine alleged violations 
of TRIMs. Nevertheless, one of the first cases where the issue of foreign investment 
was brought on the table by a panel was the Case Indonesia- Certain Measures Af-
fecting the Automobile Industry260. Pursuant to an Indonesian Car Programme tax 
benefits were linked to domestic content requirements applicably solely to cars pro-
duced and manufactured in Indonesia. In addition, custom duty benefits for imported 
components for cars were also linked to similar domestic content requirements. The 
panel regarded these local content requirements as investment measures because 
they had a significant impact on investment in the automotive sector261 and consid-
ered them trade-related because they affected trade262. As a result, the Indonesian 
car programme providing for local content requirements was considered a breach of 
 
256  The Annex shall “provide additional guidance as to the identification of certain measures 
considered to be inconsistent with GATT Article III: 4 and XI: 1 of the GATT 1994”. Panel 
Report, India-Auto Sector, para 7.157. The India-Auto Sector Case involved a TRIM requiring 
“trade balancing”. Domestic auto manufactures were allowed to import components and parts 
conditioned on a certain FOB (free on board) value of exports of cars and components over the 
same period. The panel addressed this measure considering it a restriction, contrary to the 
terms of Article XI: 1 (paras 7.277-7.278). After finding the trade balancing requirements vio-
late GATT Article X: 1, the India-Auto Sector panel invoked the principle of judicial economy 
and concluded that it was not necessary to analyse the measures under the TRIMS Agreement.  
257  In accordance with Article 5.2-5; moreover, Article 5:4 contains a “stand-still” obligation, see 
Senti, WTO – Regulation of World trade after the Uruguay Round (1998), para 1147; Stoll, 
WTO-Handbuch – Welthandelsordnung und Welthandelsrecht (2006), Chapter C.I.6, para 24. 
258  In this respect, the TRIMS Agreement is a “one-stop shop”. 
259  In particular Columbia and Thailand benefit from a waiver. The measures in question were to 
be lifted by the end of 2003 at the latest.  
260  Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, 
WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, paras 14.97-14, 99; Falke, Vertragskonkurrenz und Vertragskon-
flikt im Recht der WTO: Erste Erfahrungen der Rechtsprechung 1995-1999, ZEuS 2000, 307. 
261  Id. para 14.80. 
262  Id. para 14.82; The panel also held that compliance with the requirements for the purchase and 
use of products of domestic origin was necessary to obtain the tax and customs duty benefits 
and those benefits were advantages within the meaning of the Illustrative List, see ibid paras 
14.89-14.91. 
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the TRIMS Agreement263. Another panel decision dealing with a potential violation 
of TRIMs obligations was the India-Auto Case264, where the panel found a breach of 
the national treatment obligation265. The panel followed the common strategy to 
avoid addressing a potential breach of TRIMs obligations directly and thus consi-
dered the allegations regarding the TRIMs solely on the basis of judicial economy266. 
Referring to the case, the panel stated that “the TRIMs Agreement might not be 
considered more specific than the GATT Article III:4”, which seems peculiar, as the 
TRIMS, only applicable to a specified subset of investment measures, appears to be 
an elaboration of Article III:4 GATT 94267.  
Perhaps the most significant development with respect to investment was a ruling 
by a panel in a dispute settlement proceeding between the United States and Canada: 
the FIRA Panel Decision268. The decision is the only case concerning foreign in-
vestment measures directly as a GATT dispute settlement panel considered a com-
plaint by the United States regarding specific types of undertakings which were 
required from foreign investors by the Canadian authorities as conditions for the 
approval of investment projects. At issue was the “Canadian Foreign Investment 
Review Act”, which established a governmental agency, the Foreign Investment 
Agency. The Agency’s task was to evaluate investment applications submitted by 
 
263  Id. para 14.91; Therefore any measure affecting investment matters should be regarded as an 
investment measure falling within the scope of the TRIMS Agreement, see Panel, 
WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para 14.80: “On the basis of our read-
ing of these measures which have investment objectives and investment features and which re-
fer to investment programmes, we find that these measures are aimed at encouraging the de-
velopment of a local manufacturing capability for finished motor vehicles and parts and com-
ponents in Indonesia.” 
264  India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R (21 De-
cember 2001). 
265  India-Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, Report of the Panel, WT/DS146/R (21 De-
cember 2001). 
266  Paras 7.151-7.161; the respective approach seems to be based to some extent on the considera-
bly superficial discussion of TRIMs in the early Bananas Case, see EC-Bananas III, Report of 
the Panel, para 7.186, where the Panel, however, considered the claims simultaneously; in the 
Canada-Auto dispute [Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 
WT/DS139/R (11 February 2000)], the Panel ruled moreover that the particular measure in 
question did not result in a breach of the national treatment Article III:4 of GATT, and there-
fore there could be no violation of the TRIMs Agreement, see para 10.150. 
267  In the Canada-Autos dispute (WT/DS139/R), the panel rejected an argument by Canada con-
cluding that a different aspect of its policies did not bring about a breach of Article III: 4 since 
the questionable measure was not listed in the TRIMs illustrative list of investment measures. 
Referring thereto the panel stated that since the list was non-exhaustive, the fact that a particu-
lar measure was not on the list expressed nothing in itself about whether the measure could be 
a national treatment violation, at para 10.89; the assumption that it is appropriate to consider a 
claim of national treatment violation prior to a claim of TRIMs violation appears at odds with 
the view of the Appellate Body in the Sardines case that claims under an agreement considered 
as lex specialis ought to be considered prior to those under the more general norms like na-
tional treatment; this view is also found in the early Appellate Body ruling in Bananas. 
268  Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984). 
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foreign investors. Applications were followed when investment could carry out a 
significant benefit for the country itself focusing on the advancement of national 
industrial and economic policies. The purchase of certain products from domestic 
sources were determined as well as the export of a certain amount or percentage of 
output in the sense of an export performance requirement. The Panel concluded that 
the local content requirements were inconsistent with the national treatment obliga-
tion of Article III:4 of the GATT but that the export performance requirements were 
not inconsistent with GATT obligations269. The panel decision in the FIRA case was 
significant in that it confirmed that existing obligations under the GATT were ap-
plicable to performance requirements imposed by governments in an investment 
context in so far as such requirements involve trade-distorting measures. But sum-
marizing the impact of the TRIMs, it appears that it merely emphasizes the validity 
of rules already in force under the GATT and does therefore not carry much of de-
velopment on foreign investment protection.   
2. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
As services are not covered by the GATT but play a significant role in contemporary 
international trade, the WTO system required the adoption of a new, separate and 
comprehensive agreement concerning trade in services. The General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) has partly been modelled on the GATT and mirrors its 
structure widely. Of all WTO agreements, the GATS addresses investment issues 
most directly270. In parallel to the GATT, some GATS provisions provide for most 
favoured nation (MFN) standards271 and national treatment272.  
In accordance with the MFN obligation, service suppliers from one member state 
must not be treated in a less favourable way than like services and service providers 
from any other member state which is regarded as an “immediate” and “uncondi-
tional” obligation273. National treatment, however, applies only to scheduled sectors. 
The GATS aims at liberalization in trade in services and contains therefore provi-
sions concerning general obligations and disciplines and provisions concerning 
additional standards applicable in liberalized sectors. The GATS provisions do not 
 
269  Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), BISD 30S/140 (1984), 
ibid. 
270  OECD Working Paper, Working Papers on International Investment, Relationships between 
International Investment Agreements (2004), p. 6.  
271  See Article II GATS.  
272  See Article XVII GATS. 
273  Part II: “General Obligations and Disciplines”, Article II Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, 
paragraph 1 reads: ”with respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member 
shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and services suppliers of any other 
Member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers 
of any other country”. 
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deal with investment directly, but the issue is being dealt with through the term of a 
“commercial presence mode of supply”, which is in essence an investment activity. 
Commercial presence in the sense of the provisions requires the establishment of 
commercial presence in the country where the service is supplied, which is there-
fore, in fact, a mechanism to provide market access274. Due to its inherent flexibility 
the GATS was considered to serve as a role model for the comprehensive multilat-
eral agreement and thus simply to extend the GATS style approach275. But the sug-
gested GATS style approach to liberalization holds various weaknesses: the level of 
liberalization might place constant pressure on certain countries to open sectors for 
liberalization and under the GATS countries are subject to uncertain terms for 
GATS rules are only poorly defined. Finally, negotiations under the GATS are bila-
teral, while a substantive agreement would bind multilaterally and create obligations 
in that sense.  
3. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
was initiated to address the growing importance of intellectual property rights and is 
therefore heading at adequately protecting intellectual property rights. The agree-
ment is building upon existing intellectual property conventions276 and provides for 
both, national treatment and MFN for the protection of specific sectors277. It contains 
three different sets of provisions, but none addresses issues of investment278. Yet, it 
helps to open up economies to foreign investment by protecting technology which 
 
274  The WTO members can impose restrictions with respect to the commercial presence through 
e.g. a limitation of the number of economic operators (Article XVI GATS) or take exceptions 
from MFN to foreign services suppliers or from the obligation to accord national treatment 
(Article II:2 and Article XVII GATS). 
275  As a consequence, this would mean the subjection of sectors to liberalization, while other 
exceptions and qualifications would be maintained. 
276  Such conventions include the 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis-
tic Works, the 1967 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the 1961 Rome 
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Or-
ganisations, 1961, and the 1989 Washington Convention on Intellectual Property in respect of 
Integrated Circuits.   
277  Such as copyright, patents, trademarks, etc. 
278  The different sets of provisions are (1) institutional arrangements and procedures to deal with 
intellectual property matters within the WTO system, (2) substantive standards relating to in-
tellectual property rights and (3) standards for enforcement of such rights.  
 318
plays an important role for investment abroad279. In addition, the TRIPs provides 
standards of protection which are also comprised by the scope of investment in re-
gional and bilateral investment treaties. The respective rights are created in domestic 
law and apply within these legal systems, as the TRIPs determines standards that are 
supposed to be transformed into national law. Holders of these rights are entitled to 
benefit from certain standards with respect to the domestic enforcement structures 
and their rights in terms of access to judicial remedies280. A breach of such standards 
does not imply a failure to an obligation resulting out of an international treaty, but 
has to be addressed in national and domestic law281.  
III. Summary 
Adding investment to the WTO agenda clearly goes beyond the traditional notion of 
trade and thus indicates an inclination to broaden the scope of the WTO system in 
order to comprise general commercial issues as well. Negotiations on a “General 
Agreement on Investment”, however, have an advantage as compared with other 
fora because of their capacity for trade-offs with other fields, such as intellectual 
property and trade in services. But it also sparked a contentious and complex debate 
within the system and the approach of the WTO system to draft a multilateral com-
prehensive regime on foreign investment has been challenged consistently. The 
recent history of the WTO may explain some of the circumstances, but in this con-
text the question must be raised as to the  benefits which would result from the draft-
ing of a multilateral comprehensive agreement by the WTO. The attempts to negoti-
ate such an instrument failed, however, and have been struck off the agenda since. 
At the present period the drafting of such a regime is being put on hold. Still, various 
benefits of such multilateral agreement could be asserted: A comprehensive invest-
ment agreement would provide for both, greater transparency and well-defined in-
vestor rights, and could thereby bring order to international investment law. Trade 
and investment are connected by a close linkage, which would be reflected in a 
comprehensive multilateral investment agreement drafted by the WTO. Ultimately, 
a substantive multilateral investment agreement may increase investment flows, in 
particular to developing countries.  
 
279 See Burt, Developing Countries and the Framework for Negotiations on Foreign Direct In-
vestment in the World Trade Organization, 12 Am.U. Int’l L. Rev. 1015, 1039 (1997), stating 
that “[t]he transfers of technology accompany the great majority of foreign investment from 
multinational corporations in home countries to their subsidiaries in host countries” and the 
protection of technology “[r]emoves another source of insecurity for foreign investors and pro-
motes the transfer of technology between countries, in particular between developed and de-
veloping countries”, ibid. at 1039. 
280  OECD Working Paper, Working Papers on International Investment, Relationships between 
International Investment Agreements (2004), p. 7. 
281  Conversely, investment treaties create such international obligations. 
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But the approach of the WTO to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on foreign 
investment also meets strong criticism, based on the idea of the different concepts 
and goals of international trade law and investment law. Including an agreement on 
foreign investment into the WTO system would require a basic equal concept of 
investment law and trade law. This is lacking. Despite the close linkage between 
trade and investment their diversity with regard to goals and achievements predomi-
nates. The WTO has its competence in trade issues and the principles governing 
trade are not suitable for investment282. In view of this situation, it can be stated that 
an investment agreement does not belong into the WTO system, because it simply 
might not be the right forum for a multilateral investment agreement. The factors 
stability, policy predictability and finally profit cannot be guaranteed by an invest-
ment agreement, but are of high importance for the success of investment abroad. In 
addition, there is no empirical proof that an investment agreement would promote 
foreign investment or increase investment flows. Another point of criticism is based 
on the fact that the mission of the WTO is of a fundamentally liberalizing character. 
This is a substantial objection to draft an instrument without such liberalization as its 
main object. Another weakness of the WTO system is its adherence to solely inter-
state remedies, which might be not as enforcement effective as the investor-state 
dispute resolution system under the ICSID.  
The issues raised here mirror first and foremost the interests of an investor, and 
the question as to whether the WTO is the appropriate venue for an international 
investment agreement implies at first place the question where one is needed. From 
an investor’s perspective, undertakings in certain developing countries bring about 
an immense risk with regard to potential rates of return and the WTO does not pro-
vide for the respective dispute settlement and enforcement processes. After all, it 
seems unlikely that negotiations on a comprehensive investment agreement will be 
able to proceed since there is no consensus on modalities, both procedural and sub-
stantive.  
E. Conclusion 
The roles of human rights institutions and the WTO in the context of foreign in-
vestment protection have been at issue in this paper and as a debate over the roles of 
these mechanisms in the context of foreign investment protection suggests, they, as 
mechanisms, seem only second choice when foreign investment litigation or arbitra-
tion is considered. Nevertheless, the coming period in ICSID jurisprudence is one in 
which the matter of consistency will be of utmost relevance. The challenge of the 
Argentine cases which are currently being dealt with extensively by the respective 
 
282  In particular the application of non-discrimination and national treatment were inappropriate 
and would damage development. Moreover, a treaty of investors rights would be against the 
principle of reciprocity. 
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tribunals is indeed remarkable. The tribunals need to achieve a substantial degree of 
consistency - otherwise the ICSID might slide into a substantial crisis. Likewise, the 
alternative approach to foreign investment protection is given a special emphasis. 
The vast network of human rights conventions concluded on both regional and uni-
versal level provides for foreign property protection and non-discriminatory treat-
ment of aliens. In particular in the regional human rights instruments, relatively 
effective human rights have been accorded to individuals irrespective of their na-
tionality. As each member state can demand the respect of treaty obligations by the 
other member states, all are on an equal footing. Consequently, no state rights as 
such are encroached upon  in case of a violation of such human rights held by any 
individual, but , a state party to a human rights convention can provide assistance to 
its national in order to secure his/her treaty rights. Thus the assistance is not dif-
ferent from any other state may provide. Given this assumption the rule of diplo-
matic protection in its classical conceptual inter-state understanding is not applica-
ble. The state rather has to apply human rights assistance in the sense presented 
above, which is based on treaty law and limited to the means provided by the par-
ticular treaty. Ultimately, the prerequisites for diplomatic protection - especially the 
local remedies rule - and various legal limitations on the means of protection help to 
prevent an overly frequent use and abuses by powerful states.  
Like any other mode the idea of investment protection by means of human rights 
institutions and human rights assistance is open to criticism. Obviously, the instru-
ment of diplomatic protection and the concept of human rights assistance are 
founded on somewhat different bases and the expectation that the instrument of 
diplomatic protection would become superfluous through the new generation of 
human rights conventions has not been fulfilled. On the international plane, the 
individual has no equivalent corresponding procedural rights to achieve the respect 
of the substantive rights provided for in the human rights treaties. The ECHR might 
serve as an exception, since every member state acknowledged jurisdiction of the 
ECtHR. From the current perspective these treaties establish quite far reaching sub-
stantive rights for individuals but not as a corresponding basis for diplomatic protec-
tion by their home countries. This has proved to be ineffective due to failures in the 
institutional system of the respective treaty and the unwillingness of states to ob-
serve international treaty obligations. Yet, there is no general obligation for all states 
to submit their relevant disputes to a peaceful settlement through the binding deci-
sion of an independent and neutral authority. In particular in the field of foreign 
investment protection with its inherent underlying risks, there is a strong need for 
reliance on effective remedies and even more effective enforcement mechanisms.  
One characteristic element of foreign investment law is that several concepts di-
verging with regard to their goal and nature are at clash at every moment. Foreign 
investment law and the protection of foreign investment are shaped by the goal of 
avoiding or at least reducing the element of risk for the investor in a long-term pro-
ject. Safeguarding foreign investment undertakings is the core idea of the law on 
international investment protection, while human rights law as provided for by the 
new type of human rights treaties aims at the independence of the individual from 
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the state with regard to the protection of human rights. Instead, trade law focuses on 
liberalisation for the exchange of goods. International investment law needs to com-
prise elements of all of these concepts, and as with most clashes of legal concepts, 
there will be no complete triumph of any conceptual approach. This assessment is 
backed and mirrored by the current developments of international investment litiga-
tion. In the light of the preceding analysis the paper argues that foreign investment 
protection as provided for by the ICSID system is, in spite of its current crisis, not at 
all a bad outcome. The advantages of arbitrating under the auspices of the ICSID are 
manifold and it seems unlikely that the mechanisms offered by human rights institu-
tions as well as the WTO can be considered as equal to ICSID. Each mechanism to 
protect foreign investment has to follow its own course in serving their task of fo-
reign property protection, although sometimes their courses may run parallel. 
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Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO      
                             
Comment by Sabine Konrad∗ 
A.  Introduction  
I would like to address two questions:  
• Is the European Convention of Human Rights (the “ECHR” or the “Conven-
tion”) an instrument of investment protection, and  
• Is there something to be learned from the ECHR on the topic of the state's right 
to regulate as opposed the rights of the investor to protection?  
B. The ECHR as an Instrument of Investment Protection  
The ECHR is certainly not an instrument of investment protection in the formal 
sense.   
However, the Convention has specific elements of investment protection in addi-
tion to the general protection of Human Rights of nationals and non-nationals alike.  
The case law of the Strasbourg court confirms this.   
At a conference on "Stocktaking after 40 years" of ICSID, it is perhaps fitting to 
refer to a seminal case on the Convention’s regime on expropriation which is 20 
years old: Lithgow vs UK1. 
Article 1 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention contains the right to property and 
deals with expropriation. 
Its relevant passage reads: 
"No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and sub-
ject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of interna-
tional law." 
The court held in James vs UK2 and Lithgow vs UK that there are two different 
regimes, one for national and one for non-national investors.  Whereas non-nationals 
are entitled to protection by the general principles of international law, including 
 
∗  Sabine Konrad, Attorney Lovells, Frankfurt. 
1  Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, ECHR, Series A No. 
102.  
2  James and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1986, ECHR, Series A No. 
98. 
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inter alia a right to compensation under the Hull-doctrine, nationals are not; for 
nationals, a right to compensation exists only as an emanation of the proportionality 
requirement.  Thus only the regime for non-nationals is comparable to protection 
under a BIT. 
Since most of its cases concern expropriation of the property of nationals, the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights on expropriation has to be looked 
at with caution.  Nonetheless it is possible to point to investment protection-type 
cases under the ECHR regime.  
One example is Sovtransavto Holding vs Ukraine.3   
This case concerns the rights of a Russian minority shareholder, Sovtransavto, in 
an Ukrainian public limited company, Sovtransavto-Lugansk. The management of 
Sovtransavto-Lugansk increased the shares of Sovtransavto-Lugansk thereby redu-
cing the overall shareholding of Sovtransavto from 49% to just under 21%, in effect 
curtailing Sovtransavto’s voting rights and taking control of the company. It further 
appears assets of Sovtransavto-Lugansk were sold to various entities set up by its 
managing director. 
The investor challenged the actions of the management of Sotransavto-Lugansk 
in the national courts. The President of Ukraine in person interceded on behalf of the 
government in the court proceedings citing "national interests". This was done at the 
instigation of the management of the Ukrainian company, which by this time had 
become a private company. The investor lost his case and subsequent appeals. Ulti-
mately Sotransavto-Lugansk was wound up and the investor received payments 
which "had not been in proportion to its initial 49% shareholding". 
Had Sovtransavto’s shareholding in question been an investment in the Energy 
Sector or had the 1998 Russian-Ukraine BIT of 17 November 1998 been in force (as 
of  December 2006 it has yet to be implemented), Sovtransavto would surely have 
travelled the BIT route. It can be speculated that it went to the European Court of 
Human Rights – where it won - precisely because neither of these two avenues was 
available to it. 
Sovtransavto did exactly what the European Court of Human Rights suggested in 
Lithgow: it employed the convention mechanism for investment protection. In the 
words of Lithgow: 
“[The reference to general principles of international law] enables non-nationals 
to resort directly to the machinery of the Convention to enforce their rights on the 
basis of the relevant principles of international law, whereas otherwise they would 
have to seek recourse to diplomatic channels or to other available means of dispute 
settlement to do so."4 
Article1 (1) 2nd sentence of Protocol No 1 is not an umbrella clause that “mirrors” 
customary law rules on expropriation of property belonging to non-nationals. It 
 
3  Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, No. 48553/99, ECHR 2002-VII. 
4  Infra., paragraph 115. 
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imports standards of customary international law into the Convention.  The effects, 
however, are equivalent.  
C. The Convention Perspective on the State’s Right to Regulate 
It is also worth observing that the Lithgow judgment contains a very interesting 
explanation of the difference between the protection of property rights afforded to 
nationals and non-nationals under the ECHR: 
“Especially as regards a taking of property effected in the context of a social re-
form or an economic restructuring, there may well be good grounds for drawing a 
distinction between nationals and non-nationals as far as compensation is concerned. 
To begin with, non-nationals are more vulnerable to domestic legislation: unlike 
nationals, they will generally have played no part in the election or designation of its 
authors nor have been consulted on its adoption. Secondly, although a taking of 
property must always be effected in the public interest, different considerations may 
apply to nationals and non-nationals and there may well be legitimate reason for 
requiring nationals to bear a greater burden in the public interest than non-
nationals”.5 
This explanation is based on two reasons for differential treatment: 
• The first is what one might call the 'Boston Tea Party' rule: "No regulation 
without representation." 
• The second reason is the fact that the national of the State in question is a mem-
ber of the public in whose interest the measure has been taken; a consideration 
which is not relevant in the case of a non-national. The non-national has in-
vested in the country but is not necessarily integrated to such an extent that he 
would enjoy the benefits of the regulation. 
Both reasons are relevant in the context of the present discussion on a host state's 
right to regulate in a BIT context. They militate for investor protection and against 
 
5  Supra., paragraph 116. The Lithgow arguments are echoed by Paulsson in support of a general 
distinction between human rights and investment protection. He does not address Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, which provides for a distinction between national and non-nationals; Paulsson, 
"Indirect expropriation is the right to regulate at risk," at the joint  UNCTAD, OECD and     
ICSID Conference "Making the Most  of International Investment Agreements", 12 December 
2005,  http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,2340,en_2649_33783766_35501697_1_1_1_1 
 ,00.html. 
 326
an unlimited right of the host state to regulate unless such a regulation is combined 
with an obligation to compensate if investor and investment specific considerations 
so required. This 20 year-old reasoning in Lithgow is fresh as well as topical and it 
deserves to be explored further. 
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Investment Protection by Other Mechanism: The Role of Human Rights 
Institutions and the WTO       
                   
Comment by Rudolf Dolzer∗ 
Our speaker has presented an impressive panorama of the diversity of international 
rules governing private property. These rules emanate from customary international 
law governing aliens, from the body of rules protecting human rights, from treaties 
regulating international trade and from conventions on the promotion and protection 
of foreign investment. Even a cursory consideration of the various rules on property 
as contained in these diverse areas of international law points to differences and to 
divergences in their content and the level of protection granted to the owners of the 
property.  
In view of these obvious differences, the question will be raised whether the dif-
ferentiations must be seen as undesirable fragmentations of diverse lawyers of inter-
national law in need of a comprehensive synthesis or as expressions of appropriate 
distinctions inherent in the diversity of objectives of international law. The debate 
on the possible integration of a future global investment regime into the scheme of 
the World Trade Organisation has carried overtones of the view that more integra-
tion is necessary and that the diversity of the existing rules will need to be reconsi-
dered. Also, the occasional drawing of analogies, in the legal analysis of individual 
issues, from one of the four areas to another one, has implicitly assumed that uni-
formity among these areas is appropriate and desirable.  
In my own view, the diversity of the rules echoes the diversity of objectives, and 
there is no reason to alter the existing scheme of rules. All of the four areas have 
their own legal characteristics. Customary law regarding the status of property held 
by an alien is an expression of the minimum standard of decency and civilisation 
which states have come to expect from each other and which each state has to accept 
as a member of the community of nations. The rules on property contained in human 
rights investment are meant to reflect and secure the well-being and the dignity of 
each person which a state has to respect in its treatment of all persons, including its 
own nationals. Trade law essentially focuses on creating a level playing field for all 
actors involved in the international exchange of goods, allowing for sound competi-
tion and the optimal allocation of resources. And, again different, treaties on foreign 
investment aim a reducing the political risks of the foreign investor who acquires an 
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investment, often for high initial costs and expects a fair rate of return, often over a 
long period. 
Thus, the differences in the content of the rules are dictated by the different objec-
tives, and they cannot be seen as accidental characteristics of uncoordinated frag-
mentation. Specific conclusions result from this diversity inherent in the difference 
of goals. 
On the doctrinal level, every effort to draw analogies between the different fields 
in principle runs the danger to ignore the differences in the legal context and purpose 
of each set of rules. Under certain circumstances, cross-references may still be pos-
sible; for instance, it is reasonable to assume that the standard afforded in an invest-
ment treaty will not be lower than the protection afforded in a human rights agree-
ment. An example of the limits of drawing on the notions and results in other fields 
concern the understanding of the requirement of national treatment which at first 
sight would seem to be identical in all areas concerned. However, recent jurispru-
dence convincingly demonstrates that the legal context of trade rules and investment 
rules does not permit analogies in every case and indeed may require different ap-
proaches (see R. Dolzer, National Treatment, OECD 2005). 
Given the diversity of purpose and objective, an effort to synthesize and harmo-
nize or unify the rules concerned seems neither possible nor desirable. With regard 
to the difference between the status of human rights and the law of aliens, in particu-
lar, it is reasonable to assume that the difference will remain existent for the foresee-
able future. 
Consistent with my emphasis on the fact that the differences are inherent in na-
ture, I am also sceptical on any effort to bring trade and investment rules under one 
organizational roof. Of course, it may be argued that both areas should retain their 
characteristics and nevertheless be managed by the same organization, in concreto 
the World Trade Organization. In my view, the advantages of such a re-organization 
are not apparent. In the first place, it seems to be obvious that the WTO continues to 
struggle with its own complexity and that an addition of a new major task such as 
the administration of investment rules would add to this complexity and thus lead to 
more stagnation, Moreover, the addition of investment rules would move the WTO 
into the direction of a world economic organization, in danger of imposing uniform 
policies where diversity may be more appropriate and where mistakes would be 
multiplied in their effects. Form this perspective, the decision not to pursue global 
investment rules specifically within the WTO may not have to be deplored.  
Our speaker has also addressed the different question whether the present patch-
work of bilateral and multilateral treaties on investment might not better be replaced 
by a single global convention. In my view, it is in any event useful to separate this 
question from the issue of an institutional link with the WTO and to consider it on 
its own merits. At first sight at least, it is far from obvious why a global framework 
would be appropriate for trade matters but not for the rules on investment. This is so 
especially today when developing states no longer see investment treaties as an 
undue impediment to their economic sovereignty but as an entrance card to the 
growing international markets of foreign investment and thus to gain access to fo-
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reign capital and know how. In recent years, developing states have concluded more 
investment treaties among themselves than with industrialised states. In my view, a 
global convention, if accepted widely, would also contribute to introduce and 
strengthen those disciplines necessary for good governance in the host states and 
thus to contribute to growth and the reduction of poverty in countries and regions 
which have fallen behind in the competition for foreign investment in the past de-
cade, in particular in Africa. Finally, a global agreement could replace the current 
multitude of rules with much more simplicity and transparency.  
It is not overlooked her that the negotiation of a global investment convention, 
outside the WTO would face major hurdles. Firstly, the time and effort needed for 
such negotiations would be enormous. Secondly, the industrialized countries would 
not be inclined to accept a convention providing less protection than their bilateral 
treaty programmes, while developing countries might be inclined to further insist on 
regulatory space for changing policy concepts. The issue of the further status of the 
existing treaties would also have to be resolved on another level, even among in-
dustrialized countries, significant differences in their policies remain, particularly in 
regard to the function of treaties as a vehicle for the opening of domestic markets. 
Given these open issues, it remains a matter of political will whether or not a new 
round of negotiation should be opened for a global investment treaty, this time out-
side the WTO. It is true that after the failures within the OECD in the 90’s and 
within the WTO more recently, a certain fatigue to renew these efforts has taken 
over, not surprisingly. At the same time, the advantages of a global investment treaty 
remain on the table, and the topic remains on the international economic agenda. 
 
 
